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At least 271 records · Page 15

RCT Continuing Training: Radiological Emergency Response

Objectives: 1) List the revised initial response and supplemental actions while responding to a major injury inside of a radiological area; 2) List the initial response and supplemental actions while responding to a minor injury inside of a radiological area; 3) List the initial response and supplemental actions for responding to a Continuous Air Monitoring (CAM) alarm; 4) List the initial response and supplemental actions for responding to a radioactive spill; 5) List the initial response and supplemental actions of responding to an Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) alarm; 6) List the initial response and supplemental actions of an Electronic Personal Dosimeter (EPD) dose and dose rate alarm; 7) List the initial response and supplemental actions of responding to a Stationary Contamination Monitor (SCM) alarm; 8) Identify the methods to perform personnel decontamination.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

The Evolution of the Federal Monitoring and Assessment Center

The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) is a federal emergency response asset whose assistance may be requested by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and state and local agencies to respond to a nuclear or radiological incident. It is an interagency organization with representation from the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other federal agencies. FRMAC, in its present form, was created in 1987 when the radiological support mission was assigned to the DOE’s Nevada Operations Office by DOE Headquarters. The FRMAC asset, including its predecessor entities, was created, grew, and evolved to function as a response to radiological incidents. Radiological emergency response exercises showed the need for a coordinated approach to managing federal emergency monitoring and assessment activities. The mission of FRMAC is to coordinate and manage all federal radiological environmental monitoring and assessment activities during a nuclear or radiological incident within the United States in support of state ,local, tribal governments, DHS, and the federal coordinating agency. Radiological emergency response professionals with the DOE’s national laboratories support the Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC), the Aerial Measuring System (AMS), and the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS). These teams support the FRMAC to provide: Atmospheric transport modeling; Radiation monitoring; Radiological analysis and data assessments; and Medical advice for radiation injuries In support of field operations, the FRMAC provides geographic information systems, communications, mechanical, electrical, logistics, and administrative support. The size of the FRMAC is tailored to the incident and is comprised of emergency response professionals drawn from across the federal government. State and local emergency response teams may also integrate their operations with FRMAC, but are not required to.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Study on the biological effect of cosmic radiation and the development of radiation protection technology (L-11)

NASDA is now participating in a series of flight experiments on Spacelab missions. The first experiment was carried out on the first International Microgravity Laboratory Mission (IML-1) January 1992, and the second experiment will be conducted on the Spacelab-J Mission, First Materials Processing Test (FMPT). The equipment or Radiation Monitoring Container Devices (RMCD) includes passive dosimeter systems and biological specimens. The experiments using this hardware are designed by NASDA to measure and investigate the radiation levels inside spacecraft like space shuttle and to look at the basic effects of the space environment from the aspect of radiation biology. The data gathered will be analyzed to understand the details of biological effects as well as the physical nature of space radiation registered in the sensitive Solid-State Track Detectors (SSTD).

Nagaoka, Shunji↗

Offshore Radiation Observations for Climate Research at the CERES Ocean Validation Experiment

When radiometers on a satellite are pointed towards the planet with the goal of understanding a phenomenon quantitatively, rather than just creating a pleasing image, the task at hand is often problematic. The signal at the detector can be affected by scattering, absorption, and emission; and these can be due to atmospheric constituents (gases, clouds, and aerosols), the earth's surface, and subsurface features. When targeting surface phenomena, the remote sensing algorithm needs to account for the radiation associated with the atmospheric constituents. Likewise, one needs to correct for the radiation leaving the surface, when atmospheric phenomena are of interest. Rigorous validation of such remote sensing products is a real challenge. In visible and near infrared wavelengths, the jumble of effects on atmospheric radiation are best accomplished over dark surfaces with fairly uniform reflective properties (spatial homogeneity) in the satellite instrument's field of view (FOV). The ocean's surface meets this criteria; land surfaces - which are brighter, more spatially inhomogeneous, and more changeable with time - generally do not. NASA's Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy System (CERES) project has used this backdrop to establish a radiation monitoring site in Virginia's coastal Atlantic Ocean. The project, called the CERES Ocean Validation Experiment (COVE), is located on a rigid ocean platform allowing the accurate measurement of radiation parameters that require precise leveling and pointing unavailable from ships or buoys. The COVE site is an optimal location for verifying radiative transfer models and remote sensing algorithms used in climate research; because of the platform's small size, there are no island wake effects; and suites of sensors can be simultaneously trained both on the sky and directly on ocean itself. This paper describes the site, the types of measurements made, multiple years of atmospheric and ocean surface radiation observations, and satellite validation results.

Rutledge, Charles K.↗

Nevada National Security Site 2011 Waste Management Monitoring Report, Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data are associated with radiation exposure, air, groundwater, meteorology, and vadose zone. This report summarizes the 2011 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports. Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data show tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are only slightly above detection limits and background levels. The measured levels of radionuclides in air particulates and moisture are below derived concentration guides for these radionuclides. During the last 2 weeks of March 2011, gamma spectroscopy results for air particles showed measurable activities of iodine-131 ( 131 I), cesium-134 ( 134 Cs), and cesium-137 ( 137 Cs). These results are attributed to the release of fission products from the damaged Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan. The remaining gamma spectroscopy results for air particulates collected at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS were below minimum detectable concentrations. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS were all below established investigation levels. The 86.3 millimeters (mm) (3.40 inches [in.]) of precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS during 2011 is 44% below the average of 154.1 mm (6.07 in.), and the 64.8 mm (2.55 in.) of precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS during 2011 is 47% below the average of 122.4 mm (4.82 in.). Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Automated vadose zone monitoring on Area 5 RWMS operational waste covers was not done during 2011 due to construction of the final evapotranspiration cover at these monitoring locations. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 122 centimeters (4 feet) in the vegetated final mono-layer cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS before being removed by evapotranspiration. During 2011, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 feet) of soil from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. Ten percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter that received 3 times natural precipitation. All 2011 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facility PAs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site 2012 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area: 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data are associated with radiation exposure, air, groundwater, meteorology, and vadose zone. This report summarizes the 2012 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports (National Security Technologies, LLC, 2012; 2013a; 2013b). Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data show tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are only slightly above detection limits and background levels. The measured levels of radionuclides in air particulates and moisture are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS were all below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection system at the mixed low-level waste cell were below established contaminant regulatory limits. The 133.9 millimeters (mm) (5.27 inches [in.]) of precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS during 2012 is 12% below the average of 153.0 mm (6.02 in.), and the 137.6 mm (5.42 in.) of precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS during 2012 is 11% below the average of 122.4 mm (4.82 in.). Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Automated vadose zone monitoring on Area 5 and Area 3 RWMS cell covers show no evidence of precipitation percolating through the cover to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 60 centimeters (cm) (2 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS, and moisture from precipitation and irrigation did not percolate below 45 cm (1.5 ft) on the 92-Acre Area final cover. Irrigation was applied to this cover for seed germination and plant growth. During 2012, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. Twenty percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter that received 3 times natural precipitation. All 2012 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facility PAs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site 2013 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data are associated with radiation exposure, air, groundwater, meteorology, and vadose zone. This report summarizes the 2013 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports (National Security Technologies, LLC, 2013; 2014a; 2014b). Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data show tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are close to detection limits and background levels. The measured levels of radionuclides in air particulates and moisture are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS were all below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection system at the mixed low-level waste cell were below established contaminant regulatory limits. The 105.8 millimeters (mm) (4.17 inches [in.]) of precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS during 2013 is 30% below the average of 150.3 mm (5.92 in.), and the 117.5 mm (4.63 in.) of precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS during 2013 is 5% below the average of 123.6 mm (4.86 in.). Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Automated vadose zone monitoring on Area 5 and Area 3 RWMS cell covers show no evidence of precipitation percolating through the cover to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 60 centimeters (cm) (2 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS, and moisture from precipitation and irrigation did not percolate below 45 cm (1.5 ft) on the 92-Acre Area final cover. Irrigation was applied to this cover for seed germination and plant growth. During 2013, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. Twenty percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter that received 3-times natural precipitation. All 2013 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facility PAs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Application of MODIS-Derived Active Fire Radiative Energy to Fire Disaster and Smoke Pollution Monitoring

The radiative energy emitted by large fires and the corresponding smoke aerosol loading are simultaneously measured from the MODIS sensor from both the Terra and Aqua satellites. Quantitative relationships between the rates of emission of fire radiative energy and smoke are being developed for different fire-prone regions of the globe. Preliminary results are presented. When fully developed, the system will enable the use of MODIS direct broadcast fire data for near real-time monitoring of fire strength and smoke emission as well as forecasting of fire progression and smoke dispersion, several hours to a few days in advance.

Ichoku, Charles↗

Verification of Dosimetry Measurements with Timepix Pixel Detectors for Space Applications

The current capabilities of modern pixel-detector technology has provided the possibility to design a new generation of radiation monitors. Timepix detectors are semiconductor pixel detectors based on a hybrid configuration. As such, the read-out chip can be used with different types and thicknesses of sensors. For space radiation dosimetry applications, Timepix devices with 300 and 500 microns thick silicon sensors have been used by a collaboration between NASA and University of Houston to explore their performance. For that purpose, an extensive evaluation of the response of Timepix for such applications has been performed. Timepix-based devices were tested in many different environments both at ground-based accelerator facilities such as HIMAC (Heavy Ion Medical Accelerator in Chiba, Japan), and at NSRL (NASA Space Radiation Laboratory at Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton, NY), as well as in space on board of the International Space Station (ISS). These tests have included a wide range of the particle types and energies, from protons through iron nuclei. The results have been compared both with other devices and theoretical values. This effort has demonstrated that Timepix-based detectors are exceptionally capable at providing accurate dosimetry measurements in this application as verified by the confirming correspondence with the other accepted techniques.

Kroupa, M.↗

Local Radiation Shielding Design Methodology

The NSLS-II accelerators are housed within a radiation enclosure of normal concrete (and in some places high density concrete) that has been designed to reduce the radiation generated from an assumed operational beam loss or bulk shielding current (BCS) from each accelerator. The beam loss model used to estimate the thickness of this bulk shielding, assumed a beam energy at the expected operating energy and a current loss based on reasonable assumptions for the fraction of the expected operating current. The thickness of the shield was determined to be the amount required to reduce the radiation outside the shield to a maximum dose rate of <0.5mrem/hr. for occupied areas for these normal operational losses. These assumed beam losses and the bulk shielding thicknesses required are given in reference [1]. Abnormal operating conditions generating higher than normal beam losses must also be considered, and additional engineering controls will be required depending on the magnitude of the radiation levels generated during the abnormal condition. Additional local shielding subject to configuration control may be utilized to reduce radiation levels associated with these abnormal loss conditions. Interlocked area radiation monitors are another means to prevent continued operation with higher than an acceptable level. The NSLS-II Shielding Policy requires that an engineered system be utilized to mitigate an abnormal condition producing radiation levels greater than 100 mR/h, and that two systems are required if the projected radiation levels during a fault condition are > 2000 mR/h. It is intended that shielding limits the dose rate to < 0.5 mR/h in occupied areas for normal operational losses, and the combination of administrative and engineered controls for abnormal losses will maintain radiation exposure to trained personnel working at the NSLS-II facility to as low as reasonably achievable. It is anticipated that all individual exposures will be well within the planned administrative control level of 100mrem/year. This technical note presents the method used to identify these potential high beam loss locations, evaluate the potential radiation risk these losses create outside the enclosure shield and the design process that specifies the required local radiation shielding needed to reduce this risk below the maximum dose rate of the bulk shield design, listed above. If shielding can’t be adequately provided or if other fault initiated losses could occur, then the necessary engineering controls will be indicated that will limit the energy, current or duration of the beam transport that constitute this high beam loss risk.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2018 (Revision 0)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; and CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. The locations of the sites are shown in Figure ES-1. This report covers calender year 2018. The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted annually at CAUs 90, 91, and 112; semiannually at CAUs 92 and 110; and quarterly at CAU 111. Additional inspections are conducted at CAUs 92 and 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inch in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. At CAUs 110 and 111, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted in addition to the visual inspections. At CAU 110 the site fence, gate, lock and use restriction signs are evaluated. At CAU 111, an ecological survey, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are also conducted. This report will address all monitoring item notes above except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 6 of Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remains in effect until December 10, 2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Local Radiation Shielding Design Methodology

The NSLS-II accelerators are housed within a radiation enclosure of normal concrete (and in some places high density concrete) that has been designed to reduce the radiation generated from an assumed operational beam loss or bulk shielding current (BCS) from each accelerator. The beam loss model used to estimate the thickness of this bulk shielding, assumed a beam energy at the expected operating energy and a current loss based on reasonable assumptions for the fraction of the expected operating current. The thickness of the shield was determined to be the amount required to reduce the radiation outside the shield to a maximum dose rate of <0.5mrem/hr. for occupied areas for these normal operational losses. These assumed beam losses and the bulk shielding thicknesses required are given in reference. Abnormal operating conditions generating higher than normal beam losses must also be considered, and additional engineering controls will be required depending on the magnitude of the radiation levels generated during the abnormal condition. Additional local shielding subject to configuration control may be utilized to reduce radiation levels associated with these abnormal loss conditions. Interlocked area radiation monitors are another means to prevent continued operation with higher than an acceptable level. The NSLS-II Shielding Policy requires that an engineered system be utilized to mitigate an abnormal condition producing radiation levels greater than 100 mR/h, and that two systems are required if the projected radiation levels during a fault condition are > 2000 mR/h. It is intended that shielding limits the dose rate to < 0.5 mR/h in occupied areas for normal operational losses, and the combination of administrative and engineered controls for abnormal losses will maintain radiation exposure to trained personnel working at the NSLS-II facility to as low as reasonably achievable. It is anticipated that all individual exposures will be well within the planned administrative control level of 100mrem/year.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2020 (Rev. 2)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities in compliance with the requirements listed in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Number NEV HW0101 associated with the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): 1) CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; 2) CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; 3) CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; 4) CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; 5) CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; 6) CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches The locations of the sites are shown in Figure ES-1. This report covers calendar year 2020. The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted annually at CAUs 90, 91, and 112; semiannually at CAUs 92 and 110; and quarterly at CAU 111. Additional inspections are conducted at CAUs 92 and 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inch in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. At CAUs 110 and 111, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted in addition to the visual inspections. At CAU 110, the site fence, gate, lock, and use restriction signs are evaluated. At CAU 111, an ecological survey, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are also conducted. This report will address all monitoring item notes above except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 6 of RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remained in effect until December 10, 2020. At the time of this report submittal, the new RCRA permit application was in review.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Long-length Scintillating Fibers for Nuclear Waste Repositories (Conference Record)

This paper describes the fabrication, testing, and characterization of long-length, up to 50 m, scintillating fibers for the purpose of radiation monitoring in inaccessible radiological and nuclear waste repositories. The fabrication aspect was focused on ruggedizing the 1-mm diameter fiber and limiting external light interference for fibers. Testing and characterization were performed in a laboratory setting with radiation sources, a photosensor module and a multi-channel analyzer. Light attenuation was studied as a function of distance by analyzing both the spectrum and count rate. Additionally, the scintillating fibers were coupled to optical communication fibers (100 m) to extend the reach of the system. This paper also includes the optical spectrometry results from the sensitivity and response of the signal attenuation. Lastly, the paper covers the field testing of the scintillating fibers in a relevant environment.

47 - OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Measurements of background gamma radiation on Spacelab 2

A nuclear radiation monitor (NRM) which was flown as part of the verification instrumentation on the Spacelab 2 mission (July 29 - August 6, 1985) recorded spectra every 20 seconds and counting rates in coarse energy bands on finer time scales. The gamma radiation environment on Spacelab is characterized by cosmic-ray and trapped proton secondary radiation in the Spacelab/Shuttle, earth albedo radiation, and delayed induced radioactivity in the detector and surrounding materials. It is found that passages through South Atlantic Anomaly protons produce a well-defined background enhancement.

Fishman, G. J.↗

An LSTM Deep Learning Network for ¿Background Radiation Prediction

Determination of appropriate background radiation is important in any measurement application. Environmental radiation monitors and monitors used to assess dose to individuals outside of controlled areas are particularly susceptible to changes in readings due to fluctuations in the environmental conditions. These fluctuations (e.g. radon progeny concentrations) lead to changes in the detector response in the actual radiation environment, and they need to be taken into account when extracting the net operational doses. Work has been ongoing to apply advances in Deep Learning and Artificial Intelligence to account for changes in detector responses based on environmental parameters; in particular, a Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) Deep Learning architecture has been utilized to incorporate time-series data into a prediction model. In this work, we present the current status of the project to predict radiation measurements based on meteorological conditions and air packet trajectories extracted using the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Hybrid Single-Particle Lagrangian Integrated Trajectory (HYSPLIT4) model.

Degtiarenko, Pavel↗

Sci-Fri AM: Quality, Safety, and Professional Issues 05: QC Program Management and the Benefits of QATrack+

Purpose: Treatment unit uptime statistics are typically used to monitor radiation equipment performance. The Ottawa Hospital Cancer Centre has introduced the use of Quality Control (QC) test success as a quality indicator for equipment performance and overall health of the equipment QC program. Methods: Implemented in 2012, QATrack+ is used to record and monitor over 1100 routine machine QC tests each month for 20 treatment and imaging units ( http://qatrackplus.com/ ). Using an SQL (structured query language) script, automated queries of the QATrack+ database are used to generate program metrics such as the number of QC tests executed and the percentage of tests passing, at tolerance or at action. These metrics are compared against machine uptime statistics already reported within the program. Results: Program metrics for 2015 show good correlation between pass rate of QC tests and uptime for a given machine. For the nine conventional linacs, the QC test success rate was consistently greater than 97%. The corresponding uptimes for these units are better than 98%. Machines that consistently show higher failure or tolerance rates in the QC tests have lower uptimes. This points to either poor machine performance requiring corrective action or to problems with the QC program. Conclusions: QATrack+ significantly improves the organization of QC data but can also aid in overall equipment management. Complimenting machine uptime statistics with QC test metrics provides a more complete picture of overall machine performance and can be used to identify areas of improvement in the machine service and QC programs.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

RCT Continuing Training (Q2 2021) [Slides]

This quarter’s training assignment is split into two sections. Section one will review the fundamental elements of removing items from controlled areas. This section discusses each decision point and the required actions to determine if an item is suitable for release. Section two briefly reviews Area Radiation Monitors, commonly referred to as ‘ARMs’, and discusses the required actions to take in the event of an ARM alarm.” Report includes slides and transcript.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗