Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Physical security”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 271 records · Page 15
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Secrecy Analysis of Uplink IM-OFDMA Systems in the Presence of IQ Imbalance

This article introduces the secrecy analysis of the index modulation-based orthogonal frequency division multiple access (IM-OFDMA) schemes by considering the in-phase and quadrature imbalance (IQI) presence at the users' RF front ends. In particular, by assuming the existence of an eavesdropper, the secrecy performance of the considered uplink multiple-access system is investigated through the strictly positive secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability, and closed-form expressions are derived for both quantities. Moreover, the secrecy performance is conducted regarding IQI compensation based on a preamble-based estimation method. Further, analysis of the impact of the different parameters of IM-OFDMA, IQI, and estimation method is included via analytical and simulation-based results. In conclusion, the results reveal that IM-OFDMA is more reliable in secrecy performance than OFDMA, regardless of whether IQI is present. Also, IQI compensation can lead to a better secrecy performance compared to the case of no IQI.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Computer Science Research Needs for Parallel Discrete Event Simulation (PDES)

Historically, scientific computing efforts have demonstrated the clear need for, and effective use of, supercomputing with traditional time-stepped simulations. Nevertheless, there are several areas in the mission spaces of the U.S. Department of Energy and other agencies waiting to tap advanced computing research using a different, discrete event style of modeling, simulation, and analysis. These span a wide spectrum of applications including energy grid resilience, urban planning and policy, transportation science, building technologies, emergency response and planning, environmental impact analysis, computational epidemiology, Internet communications, cyber security, and cyber-physical systems, to name only a few. Even within traditional scientific applications, the role of discrete event modes of execution is increasing in the form of new event-based mathematical solvers such as quantized state integration methods and discrete-continuous hybrid system solvers. Co-design of advanced supercomputing hardware systems is another area that exploits discrete event simulation at its core for effective analyses. Complex systems, entity behaviors and interconnections play a significant role in all these applications, which are mapped to large-scale models with discrete event formulations. To make advancements in all the aforementioned scientific areas, many technical aspects need to be more thoroughly studied and deeply understood in parallel discrete event simulation (PDES). The unique dynamics inherent in a discrete event modeling approach, by their very nature, intersect and influence the entire stack of the computing system, including (a) the unique nature of the instruction sets exercised in PDES workloads without a predominance of high-precision floating point operations, (b) virtual time-constrained multi-threaded execution of many logical processes per processor, (c) extremely variable and difficult to predict network traffic characteristics, (d) interfaces and inter-dependencies with machine learning and artificial intelligence codes at higher software layers, and (e) highly challenging load balancing needs, especially in effectively accounting for accelerated/extremely heterogeneous computing in current and future high-performance computing systems. Efficient and accurate parallel execution of PDES workloads is also dominated by challenges in dealing with their asynchronous concurrency fundamentally present at the model level. Conservative synchronization, optimistic/speculative synchronization, and their hybrid schemes open new questions in fundamental computer science with respect to reversibility of computation and prediction (lookahead) of behaviors inherent within model codes. On the implementation front, there are relatively few scalable, general-purpose parallel discrete event simulators in the world, and even fewer have been studied on emerging hardware platforms. To enable scientific advances using PDES, the research needs in computer science must also be pursued and met in the intersection of the algorithmic and hardware-aware aspects of scalable PDES engines. This report is aimed at capturing a computer science-oriented view of this important area of research in PDES, presenting a sample of important applications with their inherent discrete event technology elements. Needs are outlined in core areas of parallel discrete event research as well as cross-cutting directions in computer science research that positively impact scientific advancements across several important application areas. A selection of priority research opportunities in advanced computing for PDES is identified to serve as reference for key research topics and their order of importance for scientific advancements.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

SB14 Source Reduction Evaluation Review and Plan for the DOE California Sites

The Department of Energy (DOE) is the owner of multiple facilities in Northern California. The facilities include Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Sandia National Laboratories/California (SNL/CA) and SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory (SLAC) among other sites. Through their operations, the facilities generate hazardous waste and, thereby, are subject to the requirements of Chapter 31 of the Title 22 California Code of Regulations, Waste Minimization. The Northern California sites are primarily research and development facilities in the areas relating to national security, high-energy physics, bioscience and the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Hazardous Waste Management Progress Report [SB14]

The Department of Energy (DOE) is the owner and part operator of multiple facilities in Northern California. The facilities include those located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Sandia National Laboratories/California (SNL/CA) and SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory (SLAC) among other sites. Through their operations, the facilities generate hazardous waste and, thereby, are subject to the requirements of Chapter 31 of the Title 22 California Code of Regulations, Waste Minimization. The Northern California sites are primarily research and development facilities in the areas relating to national security, high-energy physics, engineering, bioscience and environmental health and safety disciplines. As mentioned above these DOE facilities are primarily research and development facilities. The hazardous wastes generated may be associated with operations that range in size from small, bench scale R&D to major maintenance and operations waste streams. Therefore, even though this document breaks down the waste streams based on California Waste Codes (CWC), the quantities of waste within one waste code category could be from many different locations and dissimilar processes. Because of the nature of the work at the sites, it is not economically feasible to try to implement source reduction measures for every process that generates a portion of the waste stream. This document identifies the processes that generate the major portion of the waste within an identified major waste stream and reports on progress made toward source reduction. In accomplishing the mission, it is DOE’s goal to eliminate waste generation and emissions giving priority to those that may present the greatest risk to human health and the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Computer Science Research Needs for Parallel Discrete Event Simulation (PDES)

Historically, scientific computing efforts have demonstrated the clear need for, and effective use of, supercomputing with traditional time-stepped simulations. Nevertheless, there are several areas in the mission spaces of the U.S. Department of Energy and other agencies waiting to tap advanced computing research using a different, discrete event style of modeling, simulation, and analysis. These span a wide spectrum of applications including energy grid resilience, urban planning and policy, transportation science, building technologies, emergency response and planning, environmental impact analysis, computational epidemiology, Internet communications, cyber security, and cyber-physical systems, to name only a few. Even within traditional scientific applications, the role of discrete event modes of execution is increasing in the form of new event-based mathematical solvers such as quantized state integration methods and discrete-continuous hybrid system solvers. Co-design of advanced supercomputing hardware systems is another area that exploits discrete event simulation at its core for effective analyses. Complex systems, entity behaviors and interconnections play a significant role in all these applications, which are mapped to large-scale models with discrete event formulations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Two bright, optically clear, intrinsic fast-neutron and charged-particle detector materials for neutron imaging and other applications

Two optically clear, bright, scintillating ZnS materials have been identified that, like previous opaque ZnS scintillators, are excellent charged particle detectors. We show that ZnS is a good fast-neutron-to charged-particle converter making optically clear ZnS an intrinsic fast-neutron detector that does not require layering or mixing of converter materials and scintillator materials, and removes the limitations imposed by opaque ZnS scintillator materials used for more than a century. Thermal neutron detection using optically clear 6 LiF or 10 BN and clear ZnS may benefit from improved spatial resolution and light transmission. Properties and tests of clear scintillating ZnS are described. Fast-neutron imaging applications benefit from increased efficiency of these scintillators, minimal scattering in the scintillator, and increased useful detector volume. Charged particle and fast-neutron detectors have numerous applications in nuclear non-proliferation and security, nuclear and particle physics, and non-destructive testing and environmental measurements.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2023

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Security by Design: A Plant Design and Component-Based Approach to Technical Solutions to Insider and Outsider Threat

Security costs for nuclear reactors have been shown to rise over the lifecycle of a nuclear facility as new threats, security weaknesses, and the generic threat profile of the plant location change over time. This paper conducts a review of the technological gaps that currently exist in Security by Design (SeBD) based on the literature available and attempts to close those gaps through proposing technological constructs and processes that can integrate safety and security in the design process of a plant, with a primary focus on SMR technology. Under the new modular and mass manufacturing regime, where plant designs attempt to reduce costs with potential economies of scale and modular construction, the current SeBD definitions focusing on state level regulators are not considered adequate since the licensing stage is often too late in the design process to integrate the true cost savings of SeBD. Thus, this paper attempts to remedy the current logic in order to allow for continuous implementation of security alongside the development of the safety concept for the plant. If adopted within the design process the establishment of this type of technology will allow for a technological ecosystem to evolve that will imbed security concepts into the physical design of the components of the plant.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Temperature and Pressure Instrumentation for LYNM PE1 Chemical Explosive Testing

Underground chemical explosive testing has been conducted at the Nevada National Security Site under the Physics Experiment 1 (PE1) to validate explosive computer modeling and, ultimately, improve the accuracy of subsurface explosive detection. This SAND Report describes the dynamic temperature and pressure measurements within the chamber induced by the chemical explosive for the first of three experiments, PE1-A. The report details the instrumentation used for the experiment, the emplacement of the hardware, and the measured results. Dynamic temperature measurements were accomplished with the use of optical spectrometers and dynamic pressure was measured with a series of high-rated pressure transducers. This report includes details of the design and results of four cavity sensor systems used to measure early-time temperature, early-time pressure, late-time temperature, and late time pressure. The outcomes of PE1-A were used to inform the design of the remaining PE1 series experiments, PE1-B and PE1-DL.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Device Classification for Industrial Control Systems Using Predicted Traffic Features

To achieve a secure interconnected Industrial Control System (ICS) architecture, security practitioners depend on accurate identification of network host behavior. However, accurate machine learning based host identification methods depends on the availability of significant quantities of network traffic data, which can be difficult to obtain due to system constraints such as network security, data confidentiality, and physical location. In this work, we propose a network traffic feature prediction method based on a generative model, which achieves high host identification accuracy. Furthermore, we develop a joint training algorithm to improve host identification performance compared to separate training of the generative model and the classifier responsible for host identification.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Advances in CdZnTeSe for Radiation Detector Applications

Detection of X- and gamma-rays is essential to a wide range of applications from medical imaging to high energy physics, astronomy, and homeland security. Cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) is the most widely used material for room-temperature detector applications and has been fulfilling the requirements for growing detection demands over the last three decades. However, CZT still suffers from the presence of a high density of performance-limiting defects, such as sub-grain boundary networks and Te inclusions. Cadmium zinc telluride selenide (CZTS) is an emerging material with compelling properties that mitigate some of the long-standing issues seen in CZT. This new quaternary is free from sub-grain boundary networks and possesses very few Te inclusions. In addition, the material offers a high degree of compositional homogeneity. The advancement of CZTS has accelerated through investigations of the material properties and virtual Frisch-grid (VFG) detector performance. The excellent material quality with highly reduced performance-limiting defects elevates the importance of CZTS as a potential replacement to CZT at a substantially lower cost.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

Leveraging graph clustering techniques for cyber‐physical system analysis to enhance disturbance characterisation

Abstract Cyber‐physical systems have behaviour that crosses domain boundaries during events such as planned operational changes and malicious disturbances. Traditionally, the cyber and physical systems are monitored separately and use very different toolsets and analysis paradigms. The security and privacy of these cyber‐physical systems requires improved understanding of the combined cyber‐physical system behaviour and methods for holistic analysis. Therefore, the authors propose leveraging clustering techniques on cyber‐physical data from smart grid systems to analyse differences and similarities in behaviour during cyber‐, physical‐, and cyber‐physical disturbances. Since clustering methods are commonly used in data science to examine statistical similarities in order to sort large datasets, these algorithms can assist in identifying useful relationships in cyber‐physical systems. Through this analysis, deeper insights can be shared with decision‐makers on what cyber and physical components are strongly or weakly linked, what cyber‐physical pathways are most traversed, and the criticality of certain cyber‐physical nodes or edges. This paper presents several types of clustering methods for cyber‐physical graphs of smart grid systems and their application in assessing different types of disturbances for informing cyber‐physical situational awareness. The collection of these clustering techniques provide a foundational basis for cyber‐physical graph interdependency analysis.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Grid Cyber-Security Strategy in an Attacker-Defender Model

The progression of cyber-attacks on the cyber-physical system is analyzed by the Probabilistic, Learning Attacker, and Dynamic Defender (PLADD) model. Although our research does apply to all cyber-physical systems, we focus on power grid infrastructure. The PLADD model evaluates the effectiveness of moving target defense (MTD) techniques. We consider the power grid attack scenarios in the AND configurations and OR configurations. In addition, we consider, for the first time ever, power grid attack scenarios involving both AND configurations and OR configurations simultaneously. Cyber-security managers can use the strategy introduced in this manuscript to optimize their defense strategies. Specifically, our research provides insight into when to reset access controls (such as passwords, internet protocol addresses, and session keys), to minimize the probability of a successful attack. Our mathematical proof for the OR configuration of multiple PLADD games shows that it is best if all access controls are reset simultaneously. For the AND configuration, our mathematical proof shows that it is best (in terms of minimizing the attacker's average probability of success) that the resets are equally spaced apart. We introduce a novel concept called hierarchical parallel PLADD system to cover additional attack scenarios that require combinations of AND and OR configurations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Deploying Software-Defined Networking in Operational Technology Environments

Software Defined Networking for Operational Technologies, referred to as OT-SDN, is a leading technology to secure critical infrastructure and command and control (C2) systems. As the name implies, OT-SDN networks are programmable, which allows system owners to utilize the characteristics of their physical process to inform the security of their network. There are best practices for deploying OT-SDN into an environment, whether it is all at once or over time (hybrid) that the network is converted to SDN technologies. Through the development of data mining tools and standardized process control, OT-SDN can be deployed reliably. These tools will minimize or eliminate any communication failures during the transition and provide the network owner with complete documentation of their environment. This documentation could enable or facilitate the network owner to pass any audits or policy checks (Authority to Operate) before being allowed to utilize the OT-SDN infrastructure.

Software Defined Networking, Operational Technolog↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber Attack Sequences Generation for Electric Power Grid

Security assessment of cyber-physical energy systems (CPESs) such as the electric power grid is a critical operation to maintain availability, reliability, and quality of service in the presence of persistent threats from malicious cyber actors. Existing security assessment approaches such as penetration testing and red teaming rely on subject matter expert experience and forensic cyber analysis of historical events to perform realistic, threat-informed assessments of CPES defense. CPESs have a large attack surface because of the heterogeneity and complexity of underlying topology, devices, measurements, and vulnerabilities. The aforementioned approaches lead to partial coverage of the attack surface with a large set of unknown but possible exploits. There is a need to automate the CPES attack surface discovery and contextualize it for relevant, highly probable, real-world attack scenarios. We propose a methodology and framework to facilitate the discovery of the CPES attack surface. We present a multilayer attack graph with ranked attack sequences to describe CPES failure scenarios. We present a work-in-progress framework that lists key components to automate the attack modeling and sequence generation. We demonstrate the published National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource CPES failure scenario to highlight the trustworthiness of generated attack sequences.

Dutta, Ashutosh↗
DOE OSTI2025

Proposed Classifications of Remote Operations for Nuclear Reactors Based on Physical and Cybersecurity Considerations

The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber Physical Protection for Natural Gas Compression

The secure transport of natural gas through North American pipelines is vital for both home and industrial purposes. GE in collaboration with Baker Hughes and Idaho National Laboratory, completed a US Department of Energy grant program to develop a new cyber-physical protection system that monitors the large compressor stations used to boost pressure and maintain proper gas flow. Algorithms were developed to detect the presence of a cyber-attack that impacts the compressor station physical processes, locate the critical functions being manipulated, and potentially neutralize the attack allowing continued operations. The technology was successfully demonstrated at an operating compressor facility located in New York state.

03 NATURAL GAS↗