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At least 271 records · Page 15

Aspects of Assessment of Packages with Wood Filled Impact Limiters during Fire Tests - 17191

Packages for the transport of radioactive material are often equipped with impact limiters consisting of wood, encapsulated by steel sheets. These impact limiters shall ensure that the transport casks meet the mechanical and thermal IAEA regulatory test requirements. According to the accident conditions of transport it is mandatory to expose the specimens to a cumulative effect by mechanical and thermal impacts. The mechanical tests consist of a free drop from 9 m onto a flat unyielding target and a 1 m drop onto a puncture bar. After damage caused by mechanical test sequences the package has to withstand a severe fire scenario. Corresponding to the IAEA advisory material it is required that the impact attitudes for the 9 m drop test and for the puncture test have to be such as to produce maximum damage, taking into account the thermal test. Moreover, any damage, which would give rise to increased radiation or loss of containment or affect the confinement system after the thermal test, should be considered. During and following the thermal test, the specimen shall not be artificially cooled and any combustion of materials of the package shall be permitted to proceed naturally. Different works from the French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) and BAM show that additional energy supply from a pre-damaged impact limiter to the cask could occur. This effect should be considered within the safety assessment of the containment. Thermal effects at the closure system of the cask, which might result in an elevated activity release, have to be excluded. BAM conducted small scale tests with wood filled metal buckets showing continuing combustion processes during the cooling down phase. These test results are presented. As not much is known about smouldering processes in wood filled impact limiters, it is highly complex to define pre-damage of impact limiters, which are conservative, regarding the maximum damaging energy flow from the impact limiter to the containment system. More research has to be done to develop models to examine the effects of smouldering impact limiters on the containment of packages for the transport of radioactive material. Aspects of assessment and its difficulties are shown. BAM as a competent authority for the approval of transport casks for radioactive material in Germany operates the test facilities to examine the issue of mechanical damage, combustion and heat transfer for such kind of package systems. For this purpose, the knowledge from real drop tests with casks of a mass partly over 100 tons was transferred to a test application. A thermal test will take place with a wood filled test specimen with a diameter of about 2.3 meters. The aim is to understand the phenomena of smouldering under the consideration of relevant regulatory boundary conditions. The process of smouldering is described with regard to the requirements in the thermal assessment of safety of packages for the transport of radioactive material. Requirements concerning the pre-damage of packages for the maximum damage of impact limiters are discussed. Parameters influencing the smouldering process are identified. (authors)

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Use of Ductile Iron for Radioactive Waste Packaging and Shielding in the United States - 17278

Ductile Cast Iron (DCI) has been used for packaging radioactive waste in Europe and the United Kingdom for many years. The ductile iron provides many favorable properties when compared with steel and offers many advantages including: - Monolithic structure increasing overall strength; - No welding required; no tempering or maintenance/inspection of the weld area is required; - Fast, serial production of similar containers reducing manufacturing costs; - Lower cost compared to steel or steel/lead composites; - Good corrosion resistance even when uncoated; - Can be coated or plated to provide suitable surface for decontamination; - Flexibility in design due to the manufacturing process permits a variety of shapes and very large size container possibilities; - Hazardous materials not needed or used for shielding. The flexibility in design will help generators find viable and more cost effective packaging options for radioactive waste. The package is conformed to the waste instead of conforming waste to the package. Commercial utilities often replace radioactive components which are too large for conventional packaging and have dose rates too high for flexible wraps while plant schedule and physical configuration won't allow for component segmentation. This is one situation where the use of ductile iron can be used to provide a packaging solution. By assessing the radiological characterization and component size and weight, ductile iron can be cast into certified containers to easily package, ship and dispose of the waste in a cost effective manner. (authors)

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Development of a Helical Closure for Radioactive Material Shipping Packages

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) Packaging Technology group proposed a closure design for the outer packaging of a prototype Type B shipping package being developed for the Department of Energy (DOE). The closure design provides an efficient means of securing the containment vessel (CV) within the radioactive material packaging. This design has a simplified operation, requires less components, and less maintenance when compared to current radioactive material package closure methods. This paper will review and discuss the materials, designs, processes, and testing activities that were considered and pursued in the development of the novel closure for the outer packaging of new radioactive material shipping packages.

Housley, William M. [Savannah River National Labor↗

malbacR: A Package for Standardized Implementation of Batch Correction Methods for Omics Data

Mass spectrometry is a powerful tool for identifying and analyzing small molecules, such as metabolites and lipids, in com-plex biological samples. Liquid chromatography and gas chromatography mass spectrometry studies quite commonly in-volve large numbers of samples, which can require significant time for sample preparation and analyses. To accommodate such studies, the samples are commonly split into batches. Inevitably, variations in sample handling, temperature fluctua-tion, imprecise timing, column degradation and other factors result in systematic errors or biases of the measured abundances between the batches. Numerous methods are available via R packages to assist with batch correction for small molecule om-ics data; however, since these methods were developed by different research teams, the algorithms are available in separate R packages, each with different data input and output formats. We introduce the malbacR package which consolidates eleven common batch effect correction methods for small molecule omics data into one place so users can easily implement and compare: pareto scaling, power scaling, range scaling, ComBat, EigenMS, NOMIS, RUV-random, QC-RLSC, WaveI-CA2.0, TIGER, and SERRF. The malbacR package standardizes data input and output formats across these batch correction methods. The package works in conjunction with the pmartR package, allowing users to seamlessly include batch effect cor-rection in a pmartR workflow without needing any additional data manipulation.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

9975 SHIPPING PACKAGE LIFE EXTENSION SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM RESULTS SUMMARY

Results from the 9975 Surveillance Program at the Savannah River Site (SRS) are summarized for justification to extend the life of the 9975 packages currently stored in the K-Area Materials Storage (KAMS) facility from 10 years to 15 years. This justification is established with the stipulation that surveillance activities will continue throughout this extended time to ensure the continued integrity of the 9975 materials of construction and to further understand the currently identified degradation mechanisms. The current 10 year storage life was developed prior to storage. A subsequent report was later used to extend the qualification of the 9975 shipping packages for 2 years for shipping plus 10 years for storage. However the qualification for the storage period was provided by the monitoring requirements of the Storage and Surveillance Program. This report summarizes efforts to determine a new safe storage limit for the 9975 shipping package based on the surveillance data collected since 2005 when the surveillance program began. KAMS is a zero-release facility that depends upon containment by the 9975 to meet design basis storage requirements. Therefore, to confirm the continued integrity of the 9975 packages while stored in KAMS, a 9975 Storage and Surveillance Program was implemented alongside the DOE required Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) for 3013 plutonium-bearing containers. The 9975 Storage and Surveillance Program performs field surveillance as well as accelerated aging tests to ensure any degradation due to aging, to the extent that could affect packaging performance, is detected in advance of such degradation occurring in the field. The Program has demonstrated that the 9975 package has a robust design that can perform under a variety of conditions. As such the primary emphasis of the on-going 9975 Surveillance Program is an aging study of the 9975 Viton(reg.sign) GLT containment vessel O-rings and the Celotex(reg.sign) fiberboard thermal insulation at bounding conditions of radiation and elevated temperatures. Other materials of construction, however, are also discussed.

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Destructive Examination of Shipping Package 9975-02019

Destructive and non-destructive examinations have been performed on the components of shipping package 9975-02019 as part of a comprehensive SRS surveillance program for plutonium material stored in the K-Area Complex (KAC). During the field surveillance inspection of this package in KAC, two non-conforming conditions were noted: the axial gap of 1.577 inch exceeded the 1 inch maximum criterion, and two areas of dried glue residue were noted on the upper fiberboard subassembly. This package was subsequently transferred to SRNL for more detailed inspection and destructive examination. In addition to the conditions noted in KAC, the following conditions were noted: - Numerous small spots of corrosion were observed along the bottom edge of the drum. - In addition to the smeared glue residue on the upper fiberboard subassembly, there was also a small dark stain. - Mold was present on the side and bottom of the lower fiberboard subassembly. Dark stains from elevated moisture content were also present in these areas. - A dark spot with possible light corrosion was observed on the primary containment vessel flange, and corresponding rub marks were observed on the secondary containment vessel ID. - The fiberboard thermal conductivity in the radial orientation was above the specified range. When the test was repeated with slightly lower moisture content, the result was acceptable. The moisture content for both tests was within a range typical of other packages in storage. The observed conditions must be fully evaluated by KAC to ensure the safety function of the package is being maintained. Several factors can contribute to the concentration of moisture in the fiberboard, including higher than average initial moisture content, higher internal temperature (due to internal heat load and placement within the array of packages), and the creation of additional moisture as the fiberboard begins to degrade.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Destructive Examination of Shipping Package 9975-02731

Destructive and non-destructive examinations were performed on the components of the package 9975-02731 as part of a comprehensive Savannah River Site surveillance program for plutonium materials stored in the K-Area Complex (KAC). The package stored nuclear materials in KAC for 13.8 years. Inspection of the package during opening in KAC noted one non-conforming condition: a large discolored area on the upper fiberboard subassembly. The package was subsequently transferred to Savannah River National Laboratory for more detailed examination. In addition to the observation noted in KAC, the following conditions were observed: (1) Axial gap of 1.021 inch slightly exceeded the 1 inch maximum criterion, and (2) Lead shield height exceeded drawing tolerance of 24.7 inch by 0.019 inch. Visual examination of the upper fiberboard assembly and analysis of the discolored fiberboard indicate the discoloration was due to wood glue residue. The physical, thermal, and mechanical properties of the fiberboard met the acceptance criteria and/or were within the range of previously tested fiberboard and baseline samples. The visual, microscopic and tensile testing results were consistent with previous O-ring and baseline Viton results. The lead shield surface was covered with corrosion product as observed on other shields but there was no evidence of excessive blistering, flaking, or spalling. Besides minor and expected corrosion, no evidence of a degraded condition was found in this package. Examination of the 9975-02731 corroborates existing evidence that the 9975 package is robust and the components can perform their expected functions.

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Technical Review Report for the Justification for 233U Content Envelope Safety Analysis Report for Packaging Model 9975-85, Addendum 2

This report documents the review of Addendum 2, Justification for {sup 233}U Content Envelope, Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, prepared by Savannah River Packaging Technology (SRPT) of Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL),--the Submittal--at the request of the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Agency's (NNSA) Albuquerque Operations Office, for the shipment of 233U-bearing material from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in support of the Technical Area 18 (TA-18) Materials Relocation Program. This Addendum supplements the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), Revision 0, and Addendum 1 to Revision 0 of the 9975 SARP (called Revision 0 of the 9975 SARP in this Addendum). The {sup 233}U-bearing items are currently stored at TA-18, awaiting shipment in the Model 9975-85 Package as a new Content Envelope, C.9. Following acceptance of this Addendum by the DOE-Headquarters Certifying Official (EM-60), and subsequent revision to the current Certificate of Compliance (CoC), the new contents will be authorized for shipment in the Model 9975-85 Package. The new Content Configuration, C.9, along with the optional Shielded-Pig Convenience Container Configuration, will be incorporated into the next revision of the Model 9975-85 Package SARP. In addition to the {sup 233}U-bearing items stored at TA-18, kilogram quantities of {sup 233}U-bearing materials are stored at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). About one quarter of the items is Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) as U{sub 3}O{sub 8} with {sup 233}U and {sup 232}U. Highly Enriched Uranium implies a {sup 236}U enrichment of >93%. The remaining material located at ORNL is pure {sup 233}U (>90%) with varying amounts of {sup 232}U. The form of the material is U{sub 3}O{sub 8}, UO{sub 3}, UO{sub 2}, and U metal. Additional DOE Sites may also have {sup 233}U-bearing materials for shipment.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

500 C Electronic Packaging and Dielectric Materials for High Temperature Applications

High-temperature environment operable sensors and electronics are required for exploring the inner solar planets and distributed control of next generation aeronautical engines. Various silicon carbide (SiC) high temperature sensors, actuators, and electronics have been demonstrated at and above 500C. A compatible packaging system is essential for long-term testing and application of high temperature electronics and sensors. High temperature passive components are also necessary for high temperature electronic systems. This talk will discuss ceramic packaging systems developed for high temperature electronics, and related testing results of SiC circuits at 500C and silicon-on-insulator (SOI) integrated circuits at temperatures beyond commercial limit facilitated by these high temperature packaging technologies. Dielectric materials for high temperature multilayers capacitors will also be discussed. High-temperature environment operable sensors and electronics are required for probing the inner solar planets and distributed control of next generation aeronautical engines. Various silicon carbide (SiC) high temperature sensors, actuators, and electronics have been demonstrated at and above 500C. A compatible packaging system is essential for long-term testing and eventual applications of high temperature electronics and sensors. High temperature passive components are also necessary for high temperature electronic systems. This talk will discuss ceramic packaging systems developed for high electronics and related testing results of SiC circuits at 500C and silicon-on-insulator (SOI) integrated circuits at temperatures beyond commercial limit facilitated by high temperature packaging technologies. Dielectric materials for high temperature multilayers capacitors will also be discussed.

dielectric performance↗

A Fruit of Yucca Mountain: The Remote Waste Package Closure System

Was the death of the Yucca Mountain repository the fate of a technical lemon or a political lemon? Without caution, this debate could lure us away from capitalizing on the fruits of the project. In March 2009, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) successfully demonstrated the Waste Package Closure System, a full-scale prototype system for closing waste packages that were to be entombed in the now abandoned Yucca Mountain repository. This article describes the system, which INL designed and built, to weld the closure lids on the waste packages, nondestructively examine the welds using four different techniques, repair the welds if necessary, mitigate crack initiating stresses in the surfaces of the welds, evacuate and backfill the packages with an inert gas, and perform all of these tasks remotely. As a nation, we now have a proven method for securely sealing nuclear waste packages for long term storage—regardless of whether or not the future destination for these packages will be an underground repository. Additionally, many of the system’s features and concepts may benefit other remote nuclear applications.

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Practical issues and applications for vacuum and hermetic microsystems packaging.

Microsystems packaging involves physically placing and electrically interconnecting a microelectronic device in a package that protects it from and interfaces it with the outside world. When the device requires a hermetic or controlled microenvironment, it is typically sealed within a cavity in the package. Sealing involves placing and attaching a lid, typically by welding, brazing, or soldering. Materials selection (e.g., the epoxy die attach), and process control (e.g., the epoxy curing temperature and time) are critical for reproducible and reliable microsystems packaging. This paper will review some hermetic and controlled microenvironment packaging at Sandia Labs, and will discuss materials, processes, and equipment used to package environmentally sensitive microelectronics (e.g., MEMS and sensors).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Microelectronics package design using experimentally-validated modeling and simulation.

Packaging high power radio frequency integrated circuits (RFICs) in low temperature cofired ceramic (LTCC) presents many challenges. Within the constraints of LTCC fabrication, the design must provide the usual electrical isolation and interconnections required to package the IC, with additional consideration given to RF isolation and thermal management. While iterative design and prototyping is an option for developing RFIC packaging, it would be expensive and most likely unsuccessful due to the complexity of the problem. To facilitate and optimize package design, thermal and mechanical simulations were used to understand and control the critical parameters in LTCC package design. The models were validated through comparisons to experimental results. This paper summarizes an experimentally-validated modeling approach to RFIC package design, and presents some results and key findings.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Practical issues and applications for vacuum and hermetic microsystems packaging.

Microsystems packaging involves physically placing and electrically interconnecting a microelectronic device in a package that protects it from and interfaces it with the outside world. When the device requires a hermetic or controlled microenvironment, it is typically sealed within a cavity in the package. Sealing involves placing and attaching a lid, typically by welding, brazing, or soldering. Materials selection (e.g., the epoxy die attach), and process control (e.g., the epoxy curing temperature and time) are critical for reproducible and reliable microsystems packaging. This paper will review some hermetic and controlled microenvironment packaging at Sandia Labs, and will discuss materials, processes, and equipment used to package environmentally sensitive microelectronics (e.g., MEMS and sensors).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

ADAPTING A CERTIFIED SHIPPING PACKAGE FOR STORAGE APPLICATIONS

For years shipping packages have been used to store radioactive materials at many DOE sites. Recently, the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Savannah River Site became interested in and approved the Model 9977 Shipping Package for use as a storage package. In order to allow the 9977 to be stored in the facility, there were a number of evaluations and modifications that were required. There were additional suggested modifications to improve the performance of the package as a storage container that were discussed but not incorporated in the design that is currently in use. This paper will discuss the design being utilized for shipping and storage, suggested modifications that have improved the storage configuration but were not used, as well as modifications that have merit for future adaptations for both the 9977 and for other shipping packages to be used as storage packages.

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Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types, such as light- and heavy-water-moderated reactors, graphite-moderated reactors, and breeder reactors, with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and condition of SNF, a robust canister termed the DOE Standardized SNF Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard SNF Canister had four variations consisting of a 10- or 15-foot length and an 18- or 24-inch diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository these canisters were to be grouped with 24-inch diameter HLW canisters in a codisposal waste package. The 18-inch DOE Standardized SNF Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The 24-inch DOE Standardized SNF Canister would take the place of one the five HLW canister on the outer ring in the codisposal waste package. No DOE Standardized SNF Canisters have been loaded, and many fuel types can be loaded in multiple canisters. Depending on the selected diameter of the DOE Standardized SNF Canister for a particular fuel, the number of potential codisposal waste packages could vary. In addition, different types of DOE SNF may be able to be combined in a single canister. This could significantly change the number of DOE SNF canisters that are loaded and result in a decrease of the number of total potential codisposal waste packages. Ultimately, if too many HLW canisters need disposition, then a reduction in the number of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters will change the final total of codisposal waste packages very little. Likewise, if the ratio of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters to HLW canister produced is too high, then DOE Standardized SNF Canisters will not have enough HLW canisters to surround them in the codisposal waste package. This paper examines the results of differing loading strategies for a few DOE SNFs. It also compares the ranges of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters that may be produced to the ranges of HLW canisters that may be produced in order to determine potential scenarios.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Packaging, Transportation, and Disposal Logistics for Large Radioactively Contaminated Reactor Decommissioning Components

The packaging, transportation and disposal of large, retired reactor components from operating or decommissioning nuclear plants pose unique challenges from a technical as well as regulatory compliance standpoint. In addition to the routine considerations associated with any radioactive waste disposition activity, such as characterization, ALARA, and manifesting, the technical challenges for large radioactively contaminated components, such as access, segmentation, removal, packaging, rigging, lifting, mode of transportation, conveyance compatibility, and load securing require significant planning and execution. In addition, the current regulatory framework, domestically in Titles 49 and 10 and internationally in TS-R-1, does not lend itself to the transport of these large radioactively contaminated components, such as reactor vessels, steam generators, reactor pressure vessel heads, and pressurizers, without application for a special permit or arrangement. This paper addresses the methods of overcoming the technical and regulatory challenges. The challenges and disposition decisions do differ during decommissioning versus component replacement during an outage at an operating plant. During decommissioning, there is less concern about critical path for restart and more concern about volume reduction and waste minimization. Segmentation on-site is an available option during decommissioning, since labor and equipment will be readily available and decontamination activities are routine. The reactor building removal path is also of less concern and there are more rigging/lifting options available. Radionuclide assessment is necessary for transportation and disposal characterization. Characterization will dictate the packaging methodology, transportation mode, need for intermediate processing, and the disposal location or availability. Characterization will also assist in determining if the large component can be transported in full compliance with the transportation and disposal regulations and criteria or if special authorizations must be granted to transport and/or dispose. The U.S. DOT routinely issues special permits for large components where compliance with regulatory or acceptance criteria is impractical or impossible to meet. Transportation and disposal safety must be maintained even under special permits or authorizations. For example, if transported un-packaged, performance analysis must still be performed to assess the ability of the large component's outer steel shell to contain the internal radioactive contamination under normal transportation conditions and possibly incidence normal to transportation. The dimensions and weight of a large component must be considered when determining the possible modes of transportation (rail, water, or highway). At some locations, rail and/or barge access is unavailable. Many locations that once had an active rail spur to deliver new construction materials and components have let the spur deteriorate to the point that repair and upgrade of the spur is no longer economically feasible. Barge slips that have not been used since new plant construction require significant repair and/or dredging. Short on-site haul routes must be assessed for surface and subsurface conditions, as well as longer off-site routes. Off-site routes require clearance approvals from the regulatory authorities or, in the case of rail transport, the rail lines. Significant engineering planning and analysis must be performed during the pre-mobilization. In conclusion, the packaging, transportation, and disposal of large, oversized radioactively contaminated components removed during plant decommissioning is complex. However, over the last 15 years, a 100 or more components have been safely and compliantly packaged and transported for processing and/or disposal.

42 ENGINEERING↗

K-Basins Sludge Treatment and Packaging at the Hanford Site - 13585

Highly radioactive sludge resulting from the storage of degraded spent nuclear fuel has been consolidated in Engineered Containers (ECs) in the 105-K West Storage Basin located on the Hanford site near the Columbia River in Washington State. CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) is proceeding with a project to retrieve the sludge, place it in Sludge Transport and Storage Containers (STSCs) and store those filled containers within the T Plant Canyon facility on the Hanford Site Central Plateau (Phase 1). Retrieval and transfer of the sludge material will enable removal of the 105-K West Basin and allow remediation of the subsurface contamination plumes under the basin. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) plans to treat and dispose of this K Basins sludge (Phase 2) as Remote Handled Transuranic Waste (RH TRU) at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) located in New Mexico. The K Basin sludge currently contains uranium metal which reacts with water present in the stored slurry, generating hydrogen and other byproducts. The established transportation and disposal requirements require the transformation of the K Basins sludge to a chemically stable, liquid-free, packaged waste form. The Treatment and Packaging Project includes removal of the containerised sludge from T Plant, the treatment of the sludge as required, and packaging of all the sludge into a form that is certifiable for transportation to and disposal at WIPP. Completion of this scope will require construction and operation of a Sludge Treatment and Packaging Facility (STPF), which could be either a completely new facility or a modification of an existing Hanford Site facility. A Technology Evaluation and Alternatives Analysis (TEAA) for the STP Phase 2 was completed in 2011. A Request for Technology Information (RFI) had been issued in October 2009 to solicit candidate technologies for use in Phase 2. The RFI also included a preliminary definition of Phase 2 functions and requirements. Potentially applicable technologies were identified through a commercial procurement process, technical workshops, and review of the numerous previous sludge treatment technology studies. The identified technology approaches were screened using the criteria established in the Decision Plan, and focused bench top feasibility testing was conducted. Engineering evaluations of the costs, schedules, and technical maturity were developed and evaluated. Recommendations were developed based on technical evaluations. The criteria used in the evaluation process were as follows: (1) Safety, (2) Regulatory/stakeholder acceptance, (3) Technical maturity, (4) Operability and maintainability, (5) Life cycle cost and schedule, (6) Potential for beneficial integration with ongoing STP-Phase 1 activities, and (7) Integration with Site-wide RH-TRU processing/packaging, planning, schedule, and approach. The TEAA recommended Warm Water Oxidation (WWO) as the baseline treatment technology and two risk reduction enhancement options for further consideration during development of the process - size reduction and chemical oxidation (Fenton's reagent). The enhancement options would potentially allow a useful reduction in the total operating time required to process the K Basins sludge. The U.S. Department of Energy's Richland Field Office (DOE-RL) has approved this recommended technical approach. The baseline process can be broken down into the following main process steps: (1) STSC transfer from T Plant to the Sludge Treatment and Packaging Facility (STPF). (2) Retrieval of sludge from the STSCs and transfer to the Receipt and Reaction Tank (RRT). (3) Preparation for immobilization by oxidation using heated water (i.e., WWO) for those batches that require it and concentration by evaporating water at about atmospheric pressure in the RRT. (4) Immobilization by using additives to eliminate free liquids and packaging of the treated sludge into drums. (5) Inspection and handling of the filled drums prior to transfer to a separate storage and shipping facility. (6) Handling of vapor, condensate, and other waste streams generated by the process. Each of these steps is discussed in the paper, together with the current state of progress in developing the technology and requirements for continued development. A schematic of the recommended baseline WWO treatment process is given below. (authors)

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U.S. Department of Energy/Argonne National Laboratory Training Courses for Packaging, Transportation, and Storage of Radioactive Material - 17269

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program (PCP), Office of Packaging and Transportation, Office of Environmental Management, has sponsored a suite of training courses that have been conducted since the early 1990s. Of these training courses, Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) conducts three courses: (1) Quality Assurance (QA) for Radioactive Material Packaging, (2) American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Pressure Vessel Code for Nuclear Transport and Storage, and (3) Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials Transport Security. Argonne has been working with the University of Nevada, Reno, to develop an accredited graduate-level program in nuclear packaging. The Graduate Certificate in Nuclear Packaging (GCNP) program provides an applied knowledge-based curriculum in packaging for nuclear and radioactive materials that complements other graduate programs at the University (for additional information, see https://www.unr.edu/degrees/nuclear-packaging/certificate). (authors)

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