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High-Reliability Systems and the Control of National Security Data and Information

High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of interinstitutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action— particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

High-Reliability Systems and the Control of National Security Data and Information

High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of inter-institutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action—particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Mil-Std-464C and Mil-Std-464D Electromagnetic Radiation Environment Evaluation

Many systems derive their electromagnetic radiation (EMR) environments from Mil-Std-464C or Mil-Std-464D, Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems. This standard defines several EMR environments based on the type of system and expected application. Many nuclear weapon (NW) systems reference the ordnance environments as the starting point for their functional EMR requirements, since any item intended to go into Department of Defense (DOD) custody is expected to be certified hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance (HERO) safe when exposed to the environments listed in Mil-Std-464 Table 9. This environment is defined as the envelope of all sources any system in DOD custody may ever encounter, however, and may include sources that are not relevant for a particular system. This document is intended to provide additional clarity on the Mil-Std-464C and Mil-Std-464D EMR environments, specifically the driving sources for the maximum ordnance levels. This supplementary information may be used to guide tailoring of relevant environments or application to different systems with the additional consideration of any shielding that may reduce the external environments defined in the military standard.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Detonation Waves in High Explosives

A material at high temperature can react or decompose. For an energetic material, the reaction is exothermic and releases chemical energy that would further increase the temperature. Under some circumstances, when a reaction is triggered, such a reaction can propagate and the material rapidly releases a large amount of energy giving rise to an explosion. Examples of such materials are aerosols, suspensions of solid particles or liquid droplets in a gas; such as coal dust, grain dust and fuel-air explosions. Frequently, explosions are due to accidents. A spectacularly destructive example is the recent explosion of a large quantity of ammonium nitrate (thousands of tons) in Beirut, Lebanon (August 2020); see for example Beirut explosion. Ammonium nitrate is used as a fertilizer. It and the aerosols are not considered to be explosives due to the limited conditions for which an explosion can occur. An aerosol gets the oxidizer from the surrounding air. Burning requires diffusion of the oxidizer to the particle surface where the reaction occurs. A large density of small particles is required for a fast enough reaction to support an explosion. In contrast, an explosive is an energetic material with both fuel and oxidizer mixed on a molecular scale (either premixed gases or within molecules of a solid). This allows fast enough reactions over a wide range of conditions to support a self-propagating reactive wave known as a detonation wave. A detonation wave can be controlled and an explosive used for useful purposes such as in mining, construction, demolition, explosive welding, argon flash lamp, pulsed power using a magnetic flux generator [see also Goforth et al., 2015], jet cutter with shaped charge, explosive art, and generating conditions to study the response of materials at high strain rates and high pressures [see for example, Marsh, 1980]. Explosives are also used in conventional munitions and nuclear weapons. The focus of this book is on the theory and phenomenology of solid high explosives (HEs); in particular, plastic-bonded explosives (PBXs). Some aspects of detonation wave theory are needed to interpret explosive data. Hence, the theory is presented before the detonation wave phenomenology. A familiarity with fluid flow, specifically the notion of shock waves and the shock loci are assumed. In the remainder of this chapter we give a brief overview on the basic properties of detonation waves and PBXs.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order Nevada National Security Site Use Restriction Management Plan, Revision 2

This Use Restriction Management Plan (URMP) provides the information needed to create, modify, and manage use restrictions (URs) for sites on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), and sites accessed through the NNSS main gate, that were closed using the corrective action alternative (CAA) of closure in place under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). It addresses URs established under the FFACO for releases related to the development, testing, and production of nuclear weapons that are located on the NNSS and that are accessed through the NNSS main gate. FFACO URs are established at sites where contamination remains at levels exceeding final action levels (FALs) or is forecasted to exceed Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) maximum contaminant levels (CFR, 2025a) over the next 1,000 years following completion of corrective actions. Administrative URs are established at Industrial Sites and Soils sites where contamination remains at levels exceeding industrial action levels as defined in the Soils RBCA document. All URs stipulate restrictions sufficient to ensure the protection of human health, safety, and the environment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Batch Test Analysis of Potential Treatment Technologies for Cyanide Groundwater Remediation

In addressing groundwater contamination, several remediation technologies are widely employed, including ion exchange (IX) resins and other adsorbents in pump-and-treat (P&T) facilities. However, many sites do not have the complex nature of the Hanford Site – a legacy production site that is part of the U.S. Department of Energy nuclear weapons complex. The Hanford Site covers an area of nearly 1,500 km 2 and has various inorganic and organic contaminants. One contaminant of concern in the Hanford Site’s Central Plateau is cyanide, particularly in the recalcitrant form of ferrocyanide. While ferrocyanide is often considered a stable complex, it can release free cyanide under certain conditions and presents challenges when testing for cyanide as a total cyanide analysis cannot differentiate between complexed and free cyanide.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Ultra-high Bandwidth, Ultra-high Dynamic Range X-Ray Shock Characterization via Photonic Integrated Circuit

Nuclear weapon component assessment tests at the Z Machine rely on accurate X-ray yield measurements for model validation, design and analysis of component survivability, and source optimization. Yield measurement devices currently used do not provide the requisite certainty to enable accurate and efficient data analysis of test results, which leads to an increase in Z-shots required for evaluation, longer device development times, and higher operation costs. Additionally, current X-ray flux detectors lack high temporal resolution at the tails. Similarly, shock measurement techniques used for component assessment often lack the ability to spatially resolve wave behavior thereby limiting the ability to measure shock propagation dynamics needed to design the next generation of ND components. Here we present the development of a photonic micro-calorimeter and shock sensor consisting of meter-long waveguide spirals that are optomechanically coupled to X-ray absorbing layers to characterize yield and shock propagation at nanosecond timescales.

42 ENGINEERING↗

An Overview of Manufacturing Controls for Production of High-Consequence, Single-Use Systems

Extended Testing (Crowder, et al. (2025) ) is a reliability demonstration technique that can be used to dramatically reduce sample size requirements. Manufacturing controls are needed to supplement extended testing by identifying production issues that a reduced sample sizes might overlook, especially built-in, or latent, manufacturing defects. This report focuses on some of the most commonly used, yet most impactful, manufacturing control tools that are used to limit production-related defects and efficiently screen any remaining defects at final inspection. These tools include statistical process control (SPC), acceptance sampling, environmental stress screening (HASS and ESS), and mistake proofing. The goal is to minimize the probability that built-in defects ever reach the customer. In terms of nuclear weapons (NW), the goal is to prevent defective units from ever entering the nation’s NW stockpile. Examples of each of the techniques are illustrated with case studies.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Characterizing the Mechanical Response of the Saturn Accelerator

The Saturn Particle Accelerator is a hot X-ray source used by the NNSA for creating conditions similar to that of a nuclear weapon. When Saturn fires some of it's energy is released in the form of mechanical shock and vibration. This mechanical output has not been characterized or understood, making design of components and diagnostics more difficult. Thus it will be helpful to understand this mechanical shock. This poster presents the beginnings of a project to do just that.

Cuneo, Nicolas Francis [Sandia National Laboratori↗

The propagation of seismic waves, misinformation, and disinformation from the 2024-10-05 M 4.5 Iran earthquake

The 2024-10-05 Iran M 4.5 earthquake took place at a time of heightened tensions in the Middle East. We perform a discrimination and moment tensor analysis and identify a shallow-dipping, reverse fault source commensurate with the compressional setting of the Iranian interior. Nonetheless, the event's aftermath saw widespread dissemination of misinformation, and potentially active disinformation, concluding that it was in fact a test of an Iranian nuclear weapon. The 'evidence' for many of these claims was based on inaccurate interpretation of seismic data. In this paper, we analyze how geophysical 'fake news' propagated through social media (mainly Twitter/X) following this event, eventually gaining traction in mainstream, earned media. This event is an illustrative warning of how seismic data can be misinterpreted and/or manipulated in public discourse.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

First experimental determination of the ⁴⁰Ar(𝑛, 2𝑛)³⁹Ar reaction cross section and ³⁹Ar production in Earth’s atmosphere

The cosmogenic ³⁹Ar(t1∕2 = 268 years) isotope of argon is used for geophysical dating and tracing of underground and ocean water, as well as ice owing to its appropriate half-life and chemical inertness as a noble gas; ³⁹Ar serves also in nuclear weapon test monitoring. We measured for the first time the total cross section of the main ³⁹Ar cosmogenic production reaction in the atmosphere, namely ⁴⁰Ar(𝑛, 2𝑛)39 Ar, using 14.8 ± 0.3 MeV neutrons. The neutrons, produced by a deuterium-tritium generator, impinged on a stainless steel sphere filled with Ar gas highly enriched in the ⁴⁰Ar isotope and were monitored by a stack of fast-neutron activation foils. The reaction yield was measured by atom counting of long-lived ³⁹Ar with noble gas accelerator mass spectrometry and, independently, by decay counting relative to atmospheric argon (³⁹Ar/Ar= 8.12 × 10−16 ). A total ⁴⁰Ar(𝑛, 2𝑛)39 Ar cross section of 610 ± 100 mb was determined at 14.8 ± 0.3 MeV incident neutron energy. This result serves as a benchmark for recent theoretical calculations and evaluations, found to reproduce well the experimental total cross section. We use these energy-dependent theoretical cross sections together with experimental spectra of cosmogenic neutrons at different altitudes to calculate the global average rate of neutron-induced ³⁹Ar atmospheric production, resulting in 770 ± 240 39 Ar atoms/cm²/day. The secular equilibrium between the ³⁹Ar calculated production rate and radioactive decay rate leads to a partial isotopic abundance ³⁹Ar/Ar = (5.9 ± 1.8) × 10−16 , showing that ≈73% of atmospheric ³⁹Ar is produced by cosmogenic neutrons, the remaining part believed to be induced by muons and high-energy 𝛾 rays. The ⁴⁰Ar(𝑛, 2𝑛)³⁹Ar cross section at 14 MeV is also a key parameter for quantifying the anthropogenic contribution to atmospheric 39 Ar produced during the thermonuclear tests of the 1960s. We estimate that anthropogenic ³⁹Ar accounts for roughly 20% of the present atmospheric inventory.

39 Ar atmospheric production↗

A New Process for Small-Batch Purification of the Medical Isotope Molybdenum-99: Non-Technical Overview

The U.S. medical community depends on a reliable supply of the radioisotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) for nuclear medical diagnostic procedures. Mo-99's decay product, technetium-99m (Tc-99m), is used in over 40,000 medical procedures in the United States each day to diagnose heart disease and cancer, to study organ structure and function, and to perform other important medical applications. For example, patients undergoing a common procedure—the cardiac “stress test”—likely have benefited from Tc-99m. Historically, Mo-99 was primarily produced through the fission of uranium-235, in the form of highly enriched uranium (HEU) targets irradiated in research and test reactors. HEU is a proliferation-sensitive material that, if diverted or stolen, could be used as a component of a nuclear weapon. NNSA’s Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) manages the Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) Program as part of its mission to minimize the use of HEU in civilian applications. The Mo-99 Program assists global Mo-99 production facilities in converting to non-HEU processes and supports the establishment of domestic supplies of Mo-99 without the use of proliferation-sensitive HEU. As part of this program, M3 funds U.S. national laboratories to provide non-proprietary technical support to U.S. companies working to establish non-HEU-based Mo-99 production capabilities. The results of this research are published on OSTI.gov for the benefit of the Mo-99 community and the public. However, it can be difficult for readers without a scientific background to understand and interpret these publications. In order to increase public understanding of the work being done in M3’s Mo-99 Program, this paper aims to provide an overview of a key, recent national laboratory technical publication in terms that can be understood by readers without a technical background. To accomplish this, the paper first explains key scientific concepts—primarily related to chemistry—that provide a foundation for understanding research in this area. This includes chromatography, absorption vs. adsorption, dissolution and precipitation, and liquid-liquid extraction. Drawing on these concepts, the paper then provides an explanation for non-technical audiences of the Argonne National Laboratory publication entitled Recovery of High Specific Activity Molybdenum-99 from Accelerator-Induced Fission on Low-Enriched Uranium for Technetium-99m Generators (Brown, M.A. et al., 2021) and related article Separation and Purification of Mo-99 Produced from Natural U3O8 Targets via Photo-Fission (Brown, M.A. et al., 2021).

Stamler, Bradley↗

Feasibility Study for Cathodic Protection of Waste Tanks at Hanford

The Hanford Nuclear Reservation site contains approximately 211 million liters of radioactive and chemically hazardous waste arising from nuclear weapons production, beginning with World War II, and continuing through the Cold War. The waste is stored in 177 carbon-steel underground storage tanks, of which 149 are single-shell tanks (SSTs) and the remaining are double-shell tanks (DSTs). The mission of an ongoing River Protection Project is to retrieve the waste from the underground storage tanks and then treat and immobilize (i.e., vitrify) it for disposal. Waste from the older SSTs is being progressively retrieved into the newer DSTs for storage pending treatment, immobilization, and disposal. Waste chemistry controls are in place to mitigate general corrosion, pitting corrosion, and stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and minimize corrosion risks to the carbon steel tank liners of DST at the Hanford Site. The chemistry control program focuses on preserving liner integrity while balancing the need for caustic/nitrite additions that have large downstream impacts on vitrification. Some of the DSTs store salt cake or sludge waste layers contain out-of-specification interstitial liquids that contact the primary tank bottom or sidewall. Remediation of such layers through chemical additions is not practical. At the present time, the most significant leak integrity concern at Hanford is for corrosion of the tank bottoms of DSTs where the solids layer is out of specification because of hydroxide ion depletion and consequently, pH values that are less than 12. Cathodic protection (CP) has been proposed as a possible way to protect the liners of such tanks against corrosion. The objective of this project was to investigate the feasibility of applying CP to Hanford DSTs to mitigate internal corrosion of the carbon steel tank primary liners. The scope of the project included (1) a literature review on the application of CP to storage tank systems, in general, and to waste tanks at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Hanford, (2) a review of the finite element analysis (FEA) model recently developed to evaluate potentials for a DST, and (3) the development of a boundary element analysis (BEA) model for CP for a DST. Tank AN-107, one of the Hanford DSTs, was selected for this work because (1) the bottommost waste layer in the tank is out-of-specification, and (2) electrochemical and resistivity data, based on recent waste sampling and testing, are available for this tank. The overarching conclusion of this study is that, based on the available information, it is feasible to apply CP to mitigate internal corrosion of the primary liners of the Hanford DSTs. However, significant additional information and work are required before a CP system can be designed. Recommendations for next steps in the design of the CP system will be presented.

WIERSMA, BRUCE↗

A Discrete Event Simulation Approach to Nuclear Arms Enterprise Modeling and Analysis

We overview a discrete event simulation of an arms control enterprise developed to familiarize individuals with the challenges of verification and monitoring at the enterprise level. We will review the design of the simulation applied to a notional country’s nuclear arms enterprise. This simulation models how these nuclear weapons move over their lifetime from deployment, storage, maintenance, and dismantlement. With this output information, we then characterize the “ground truth” of the enterprise. Next, based on these data, we built a sophisticated analysis engine designed to provide treaty monitoring and verification information to support partner country inspectors and their evaluation. This tool was designed to be used as a game, enabling teams to compete on developing the best inspection plan to determine if the host country is complying with the conceptual treaty developed for this effort.

Pulliam, Rachel M.↗

The Vault National Security Then & Now (2021 Annual)

Looking back, I can say with certainty that we rose to the challenge. Like other entities all around the globe, the National Security Research Center was tested by the COVID-19 pandemic. As a young organization (we celebrated our second anniversary in June 2021) and one that is critical to Los Alamos National Laboratory’s national security charge, we faced the difficult task of continuing our mission-essential work while keeping our staff safe. The NSRC is one of the largest libraries in the United States, and it houses the country’s most-comprehensive collections of nuclear weapons-related national security material. The NSRC contains millions of documents, films, photos, and other materials on the development, testing, and production of nuclear weapons. These are accessed on a daily basis by scientists, engineers, and researchers at Los Alamos and other National Nuclear Security Administration’s labs and sites, as well as partners in the Department of Defense. It was not an option for us to close our doors - our nation’s security depended on us not to. Not only did we continue operating under new safety protocols, we successfully accomplished many pre-pandemic goals. Thanks to the NSRC’s dedicated staff, our accomplishments during our second year are too numerous to list, though two in particular come to mind.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Research and Test Reactor Fuels

PRO-RR is the research reactor focused program element of the broader Proliferation Resistance Optimization program (PRO-X) under the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). PRO-X provides a framework for integrating proliferation resistance in nuclear system designs to minimize weapons usable nuclear materials (WUNM) production and diversion pathways while optimizing systems performance for peaceful use missions. PRO-RR applies the PRO-X mission objectives to research reactor system design. This document serves as one of the foundational documents for the PRO-RR-Fuel System Design technical team by documenting current research reactor fuels usage. The PRO-RR-Fuel System Design technical team consists of subject matter experts from Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) and Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). In order to determine the preferred fuel of use in upcoming research and test reactors to optimize proliferation resistance, performance, and safety, it is useful to assess the fuels that have been used in the past, or are currently in use. This report reviews the historical and current fuels used in research and test reactors to inform future fuel selection. Chapter 2 discusses the low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels currently in use in terms of thermal power level and utilization of the reactor. Chapter 3 summarizes the fabrication processes for common fuel types. Chapter 4 discusses in detail the fuel types in use in research and test reactors. A review of the cladding types in use is presented in Chapter 5, and a historical review of research and test reactor fuel fabricators is presented in Chapter 6. The data collection strategy used the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) research reactor database [1] as a starting point. Information on the fuel used was gathered on research reactors (other than critical assemblies) that were listed as operational, planned, or in temporary shutdown in the IAEA database. Data on the fuel type, geometry, enrichment, uranium loading, cladding type, and fabricator were collected for each of the reactors available in the public domain. Sources of data included conference papers, journal articles, and facility and fabricator websites. Data on research reactors operating on LEU fuels are presented in Appendix A, while Appendix B presents data collected on all reactors at the time of publication of this report. Appendix C presents data collected on reactors that were part of the M3 research and test reactor conversion program.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗