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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 271 records · Page 15
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Neutron Source Facility of the National Science Center “Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology” at Kharkiv, Ukraine

Argonne National Laboratory developed, designed, and supported the construction of a state-of-the-art Neutron Source Facility (NSF) at the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) in Kharkov Ukraine, under the U.S. DOE NNSA Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) program. Ukraine approved the return of all highly enriched uranium in the country to Russia prior to the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in return for the RRRFR program to fund the development, the design, and the construction of the NSF. The facility is designed to produce medical isotopes, train nuclear professionals, support the Ukrainian nuclear industry, and provide experimental capabilities for performing reactor physics, materials, and basic science research. The NSF was successfully started and operated in August 2021. The NSF is the first facility of this type in the world, and it will be used to understand the physics of driven systems for energy production and the disposal of spent nuclear fuels. The NSF consists of a subcritical assembly using low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel driven with an electron accelerator. The NSF target design utilizes tungsten or natural uranium for producing neutrons through photonuclear reactions using 100-MeV electrons. The accelerator power is 100 KW, which produces 3x10 14 neutrons per second from the uranium target. The subcritical assembly is designed to obtain the highest possible neutron flux intensity with an effective neutron multiplication factor of less than 0.98. Passive safety, reliability, and environmental considerations were included in the NSF design. The NSF utilization study shows that this neutron source has the capability of producing different medical isotopes. Several horizontal neutron channels are incorporated for performing applied and basic research. The NSF is configured to accommodate future design upgrades and new missions. The facility design was approved by the Ukraine Academy of Sciences before starting the NSF construction. The construction, the equipment installation, and the operation of the different systems of the NSF were completed and approved by the Ukrainian regulators. In July 2020, the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) issued a license for the physical startup of the NSF. The construction of facility was completed in early 2021.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Keeping LANL at the forefront of list mode capability for safeguards and MC&A [Slides]

Neutron based detection forms key capability to enable and support international and domestic nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation missions. Key stakeholders include International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), regional safeguards inspectorates, domestic stakeholders. LANL has been historically a leader in development of Non-destructive Assay (NDA) instruments and associated data acquisition hardware and software.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

FY 22 Project Name: Boots versus Bytes

IAEA has increasingly leveraged remote data transfer, amplifying the effectiveness of inspectors and analysts by allowing them to view data from Headquarters rather than requiring on-site activities. We propose that there may be even more opportunities to shift the international nuclear safeguards paradigm to remote activities through the implementation of enhanced data sharing and analysis.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Energy Auditor Job Task Analysis

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is contracted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) to develop and maintain the resources under the Guidelines for Home Energy Professionals (GHEP) project. The purpose of the GHEP project is to increase the quality of work conducted for residential energy retrofits in the United States through the WAP network and other residential retrofit programs. The HEP certifications support WAP and the broader residential home performance industry through the credentialing process and development of defined JTAs for Energy Auditors (EA) and Quality Control Inspectors (QCI). This report outlines the most recent updates (2022) to the EA JTA.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2023

An Evaluation of Three Dimensional Scene Reconstruction Tools for Safeguards Applications

Over the past 5 years, advances in digital imaging and image processing have enabled everyday computing hardware, such as that found on laptops and even phones, to easily create 3D models of scenes from a series of still images. This field is broadly known as photogrammetry. For safeguards applications, a safeguards inspector could evaluate a 3D model of a facility (such as an enrichment plant or the top of a reactor) constructed from multiple photos instead of reviewing each photo individually. This report compares the detailed capabilities of a particular commercial offering (Quidient) that Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has investigated in depth with the general capabilities provided in the industry and recommends areas where the general technology could be pursued for potential safeguards applications.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Beating the Auditors: Comparing Doping in Sport to Nuclear Proliferators

The Berlinger Bottle (Figure 1, below) is the central part of the BEREG-Kit that has been used by anti-doping agencies worldwide for over 25 years. As documented in the World Anti-Doping Agency’s investigative report [Ref 1], in 2014, Russian state-level actors found ways to defeat these bottles and was able to secretly replace an athlete’s drug-laced urine with clean urine samples that had been collected earlier. This cheating scheme allowed rampant performance enhancing drug use by its athletes, and (before disqualifications) earned Russia 33 medals in the 2014 Sochi Olympics – more than double its haul of 15 medals at the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver. All this activity was conducted despite the watchful eye of the World Anti-Doping Agency. Similarly, Lance Armstrong and the US Postal Team infamously used performance enhancing drugs and blood transfusions to win 7 Tour de France titles (again, before disqualification) in a row, all under the supervision of L’Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) and the US Anti Doping Agency. The inspection role of anti-doping agencies is similar in scope to the role of a Safeguards Inspector with the International Atomic Energy Agency: detect the misuse of facilities, and conduct scheduled and randomized testing to detect and deter would-be cheaters. This paper will explore the motivation, the means, and the mistakes which led to discovery – and will draw out commonalities between those who seek to cheat in sports, and those who seek to undermine international nuclear safeguards as Iraq tried in the 1980s.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Creation Synthetic Data to Train a Digital Twin to Predict Reactor Operations

Understanding techniques to strengthen the nuclear safeguards regime is crucial in preventing nuclear proliferation due to recent advancements in the nuclear energy industry such as Generation IV reactors and microreactors. Prior to the construction of a nuclear power plant, it is necessary to understand the proliferation potential of the plant's reactor. Digital twins serve as a unique solution to recognizing reactor behavior indicative of nuclear proliferation. A digital twin is defined as a virtual model that works in unison to represent a physical asset, with a transference of data between the virtual and physical assets [1]. This work serves as validation for training a digital twin on synthetic data fabricated via means of Serpent reactor physics and point kinetics equations simulations. In this case this work is based on parameters of Idaho State University's AGN-201 reactor. The synthetic data can then be utilized to train machine learning models in the future to further investigate the utility of these methods. The accuracy of the predicted data is measured against real operational data to verify the reliability of the synthetic data creation methods and decide whether these methods should be used in the future to inform inspectors of a reactor's proliferation potential.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Utilizing Physics-Informed Synthetic Data to Train a Digital Twin for Predicting Reactor Operations

Understanding techniques to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime is crucial in reducing the creation of nuclear weaponry on the basis of advancements in the nuclear energy industry. Prior to construction of a nuclear power plant, it is necessary to understand the proliferation potential of the plant’s reactor. Digital twins serve as a unique solution to recognizing reactor behavior indicative of nuclear proliferation. The following research conducted serves as a validation to training a digital twin on synthetic data fabricated via means of reactor physics simulations based on parameters of Idaho State University’s AGN-201 reactor. The synthetic data is utilized to train a long short-term memory (LSTM) recurrent neural network model. The accuracy of the predicted data is measured against real operational data to verify the reliability of the synthetic data creation methods and if these methods should be used in the future to inform inspectors of a reactor’s proliferation capabilities.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

An Assessment of Machine Learning Applied to Ultrasonic Nondestructive Evaluation

In the United States, the nuclear industry performs inservice inspection (ISI) through nondestructive examination (NDE) methods in accordance with guidelines specified in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC), Section XI, Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components. Ultrasonic nondestructive testing and evaluation (NDT&E) is one of the more commonly used techniques for inspecting Class 1 structural components in nuclear power systems. As the number of qualified NDE inspectors declines, the nuclear industry is looking to take advantage of advances in automation to enhance inspection capabilities. Advances in computational power, cloud-based computing, and machine learning algorithms make automated data analysis possible. Machine learning (ML) has shown huge potential in automated data analyses for ultrasonic NDE in the context of weld inspections.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Developing an intrinsically secure information barrier for arms control verification through machine learning

Near-term solutions are needed to allow for flexible engagement in future nuclear arms control discussions. This project developed a method for implementing an information barrier (IB) on commercial systems, shortening the research and development lifecycle for warhead verification technologies while offering improved and inherently flexible capabilities. The crux of the verification challenge remains the difficulty in developing an authenticatable IB which prevents sensitive host country information from inadvertent transmission to an inspector. Many concepts for IB’s rely on dedicated “trusted” processor modules developed with dedicated custom radiation detection systems and associated algorithms. Without a priori knowledge of the treaty item, the parameter space for measurements can be nearly infinite and robustness against spoofing without the ability to view sensitive data is key. This project has produced an unclassified framework capable of ingesting data from common gamma detectors and identifying the presence of weapons grade nuclear material at over 90% accuracy.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Non-nuclear Component Signatures for Warhead Dismantlement Confirmation

The verification of warhead dismantlement is expected to be an important component in future arms reduction treaties. Historic approaches developed with future arms control treaty verification in mind often involve intrusive measurements, process monitoring, and/or inspector presence to provide confidence that an authentic warhead has been dismantled. This work explores the possibility of reducing the negative impacts of these invasive approaches while also delivering a method that is more likely to provide non-sensitive data that can be shared with not only other nuclear weapons states but also non-nuclear weapons states partners. This work explores a novel approach for verifying dispositioned non-nuclear weapon components, providing confidence post-dismantlement that a treaty accountable item that was dismantled was in fact a treaty-relevant nuclear weapon system as declared. This method provides an alternative to intrusive inspection processes in nuclear weapons production environments, which would require significant changes to the host’s operational behaviors. It achieves this by identifying intrinsic neutron-induced signatures of non-nuclear components to determine their authenticity and estimate the duration they were exposed within a nuclear weapons system using technologies that are already in use for other national security applications. Intrinsic radiation effects studies are already a part of the stockpile aging and surveillance evaluations. However, none of these technologies and approaches have been previously considered for verification applications of non-nuclear component disposition. In this report, we introduce modeling studies that have been used to identify the most promising candidate parts and materials with signatures that are measurable and actionable. These models have been validated with laboratory measurements of signatures induced by the exposure of candidate materials to neutrons over a range of times. Predictive modeling then demonstrates the methodology for estimating exposure times and/or limits. Laboratory measurements of authentic non-nuclear parts from a dismantled warhead demonstrate the feasibility of employing these signature measurements. And finally, a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the potential use of this methodology is presented.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Diagnosis and Accelerated Testing of Balance of System Components for Utility Scale PV Installations: October 1, 2022-September 30, 2024

A study of the durability of PV Balance of System components was performed. Specifically, wire cable jackets and cable connectors were examined within the direct current (DC) PV Power Transmission Chain (PTC). Degraded and failed samples have been obtained from utility PV installations to provide feedback on the degradation modes and the related damage-enabling considerations in today's PV systems. An industry interface group (including system owners, system inspectors, component manufacturers, and test labs) was used to help identify and obtain field-failed samples, for feedback (including samples and experimental design), and to facilitate the subsequent dissemination of the results of this study. Samples were empirically studied using accelerated stress testing with steady-state conditions (cable jackets) in addition to combined-accelerated stress testing (cable jackets, connectors and uncapped connectors). Steady-state accelerated testing has been performed using at least one applied stressor (e.g. UV light) to aid understanding of jacket durability relative to its application. Component- and material-focused failure analysis was conducted to develop an understanding and advise the PV industry. In-depth characterization will be applied selectively to field- and artificially aged-samples, to gain scientific understanding of the structural, chemical, electrical, mechanical, and thermal properties enabling degradation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Puck and Puck/SAW Loop Seals (Final Report)

Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), also known as seals, play a crucial role in various sectors including international nuclear safeguards, arms control, domestic security, and commercial products, by ensuring that monitored or high-value items are not accessed undetected. These devices do not block access but alert to unauthorized tampering. With adversaries' capabilities evolving, there's a pressing need for seals to advance in terms of effectiveness (e.g., better tamper indication and unique identification), and new technology can improve the efficiency of installation and verification. Passive loop seals, widely used in international nuclear safeguards to ensure that continuity of knowledge is maintained on declared items, face stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements that surpass those met by commercial products. The metal cup seal (Figure 1, left), a staple IAEA seal, is robust but requires significant resources for post-use verification – specifically, the seal’s unique identity can only be verified at IAEA headquarters after removal from facilities. Further, the seal has been in use for decades and seal types should periodically be replaced to counter adversarial efforts for defeating seals. In 2020, the IAEA outlined about 40 requirements for a new passive loop seal, aiming for in-situ verification, minimal external tool use, unique identification (UID), and clear tamper indication. In response, research and development efforts focused on creating a new passive loop seal that meets these criteria and in 2022 the IAEA announced the completion of the Field Verifiable Passive Loop Seal (FVPS) (Figure 1, right). Concurrently to the IAEA’s efforts, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) designed, developed, and tested two seal versions – Puck and Puck/SAW, with Puck based on the IAEA’s requirements and including a novel visually-obvious tamper response, and Puck/SAW adding additional beneficial capabilities like the ability to receive a unique identifier from a standoff distance and monitoring the wire integrity. Puck/SAW was specifically designed and developed to address sealing applications in dry spent fuel storage facilities, where the number of sealed spent fuel containers results in heavy verification burden and inspector safety issues related to radiation exposure. These efforts are described in this Executive Summary.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Análisis de Tareas del Auditor Energético [Energy Auditor Job Task Analysis (Spanish Translation)]

El Laboratorio Nacional de Energía Renovable (NREL), bajo el contrato con el Programa de Asistencia para la Climatización (WAP) del Departamento de Energía de EE.UU. (DOE), desarrolla y mantiene los recursos en el marco del proyecto Directrices para Profesionales de la Energía Doméstica (GHEP). El objetivo del proyecto GHEP es aumentar la calidad del trabajo de remodelación energética residencial realizado por WAP y otros programas de remodelación residencial en Estados Unidos. Para cumplir el objetivo de “Establecer certificaciones nacionales de la mano de obra y normas de formación”, el DOE encargó al NREL el desarrollo de recursos GHEP, incluido un conjunto de certificaciones avanzadas, basadas en aptitud, para el personal de los profesionales de la energía doméstica (HEP). Desde 2010, el NREL ha reclutado voluntarios expertos en la materia de WAP y de la industria del mantenimiento del hogar para que formen parte de comités que desarrollen y actualicen programas de certificación y sus análisis de tareas (JTA) necesarios como base de programas de certificación y formación estandarizados. Las certificaciones HEP apoyan al WAP y al sector del mantenimiento de viviendas residenciales en general mediante el proceso de acreditación y el desarrollo de JTA definidos para auditores energéticos (EA) e inspectores de control de calidad (QCI). Este informe es un resumen de las actualizaciones más recientes (2022) del JTA del EA. [The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is contracted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) to develop and maintain the resources under the Guidelines for Home Energy Professionals (GHEP) project. The purpose of the GHEP project is to increase the quality of work conducted for residential energy retrofits in the United States through the WAP network and other residential retrofit programs. This is the Spanish translation of NREL/TP-7A40-85300.]

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

COnfirmation using Gamma-ray Non-Imaging Zero-knowledge ANti-mask Time-encoding (COGNIZANT) Final Summary Report

In potential future arms reduction treaties in which the numbers of nuclear warheads may approach small numbers, using delivery systems as a proxy for the warheads themselves may be insufficient. Therefore, a technical means of verifying the presence of a nuclear warhead may become necessary. Verifying that a declared item actually is a warhead is technically challenging within a verification regime: providing assurance to the monitoring party that a presented item is a warhead while protecting sensitive information about that warhead may be required. It is generally believed that strong assurance will require the confirmation of key attributes that may reveal closely-guarded critical design information. This provides high confidence to the monitoring party, but presents a risk of information loss to the host. A verification system must overcome this hurdle. Over the last several decades, systems have been developed that balance host and monitoring partner needs by using sensitive information to confirm treaty accountable items (TAI) as warheads while sequestering that information behind an information barrier (1). These are designed to meet the needs of the host but places the onus on the monitor to authenticate the hardware, firmware, and software. Authentication requires that the monitor confirm that all components of the system have not been modified and work as intended. In 2014, Glaser et al. proposed applying the concept of “zero knowledge protocols” (ZKP) from the field of cryptography to the problem of warhead verification (2). In mathematical cryptography, ZKP is accomplished by challenging one party to solve a problem that is only possible if that party possesses the information being authenticated. After repeated challenges, the party provides confidence that it possesses this information without revealing any details about the information itself. Systems have been in development based on this idea at both Princeton and MIT (2) (3) (4). The final measurement results produced by these systems can be viewed by both the host and the monitoring party without the worry of revealing sensitive information. However, in both of these physical implementations, there remains an information barrier within the system. The need for a digital information barrier to protect a measurement result is eliminated, but it has been replaced with the need to sequester physical components of the system, potentially obfuscating the measurement process itself. Both implementations physically insert information into the system that requires protection to prevent undesired disclosure of sensitive information: in the Princeton method, one must physically load the complement of the expected image of a true warhead into the system, and in the MIT technique, one loads a collection of spectator foils whose thicknesses physically encrypt a measured spectrum. This complicates authentication of the hardware and measurement process. The CONFIDANTE/COGNIZANT concept developed in this project do not load sensitive information into the system at any time, and could therefore open the possibility of allowing the inspector to not only view the final data but also the measurement as it is being performed and all associated equipment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Cryptographic Obfuscation Sensor System Guarding Restricted Data (CrOSSGRD): Prototype Detailed Design Document

A prototype has been developed at Sandia National Laboratories to collect nominally sensitive data from a mock treaty accountable item, record that information as non-sensitive encrypted outputs, and allow inspectors to subsequently evaluate that information at a time and location of their choice without any risk of the host party’s data being inadvertently (or maliciously) revealed.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

2023 Annual Explosives Inventory Completion

The 2023 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) annual explosives inventory was executed from May 18, 2023 to September 27, 2023 and was verified for accuracy effective September 28, 2023 following the LLNL Explosive Materials Inventory Plan. This year’s annual inventory includes changes incorporated based on the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Audit Report DOE-OIG-20-50, The Department of Energy’s Storage and Disposition of Explosives Material at Selected Sites, dated July of 2020. Based on the associated recommendations, explosives at DOE and National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) sites are considered "sensitive personal property" and applicable inventories must comply with 41 CFR 109, Personal Property Management. This regulation adds additional stipulations which require the annual inventory to include accountability of the total site inventory. In addition, the inventory must be performed by personnel other than the property owner, or alternatively must include independent verification. The development of the inventory plan was agreed to by the LLNL Explosives Safety Committee in conjunction with the LLNL Property and Business Division Leader. The LLNL Explosive Materials Inventory Plan was reviewed and approved by the DOE Explosives Safety Committee Chair on May 17, 2023 and by the NNSA Property Management Office on May 25, 2023.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2025

Pose Estimation for the Inspecta Project

In this addendum report we take the lessons learned from our initial generic object pose estimation research described in (Smartt, et al., 2025) and apply it to metal cup seals, which are attached to items after an international nuclear safeguards inspection (i.e., metal cup seals may be attached to containers of spent nuclear fuel after an inspector has measured and verified the material). We have also refined our software pipeline and training techniques since the final Inspecta report and will describe that process here. The objective of this task is to allow a robot to acquire images of the engraved seal characters to confirm that the correct seal is attached to the correct container. However, the seal may be attached in any orientation and therefore the robot manipulator arm with a camera needs to align with the normal face of the seal.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗