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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1997

Dynamics Questions Associated with the AERCam Sprint Free-Flyer

The International Space Station will require the development of small robotic vehicles for such tasks as external inspection, monitoring of extravehicular activities (EVA's) and station build-up, and providing additional lighting at EVA worksites. The Autonomous EVA Robotic Camera (AERCam) family of free-flyers is currently being developed at NASA Johnson Space Center to perform these functions; the first member of the family is the AERCam Sprint vehicle. Many interesting dynamical questions are associated with the Sprint free-flyer. For instance, the reaction of a vehicle which is nearly spherically symmetric (such as Sprint) to a stuck-on thruster is significantly more complicated than that obtained for an idealized, perfectly spherical, spacecraft model. In particular, the real spacecraft will experience a form of forced nutation, with convergence towards either its major or minor principal axis, depending on both the applied torque and the mass properties of the vehicle. Furthermore, the body-fixed jet force vector may have a significant component along this principal axis, so giving rise to a considerable net linear acceleration of the spacecraft. The large velocity that can result is very important, as it may lead to collision with the nearby Orbiter, and is completely overlooked in the idealized analysis. This report will firstly briefly describe the stuck-on thruster dynamics of the real vehicle, and outline how the small products of inertia of the spacecraft determine the time constants of the motion. Secondly, the dynamical effects of a failed-off jet on the Sprint free-flyer will be described in more detail, and compared with the stuck-on thruster case. This will help to show whether the two malfunctions should be dealt with differently in flight. Finally, the stuck-on thruster detection software (known as the uncommanded motion algorithm) that is proposed to be flown on the Sprint vehicle will be analyzed, and all possible perturbation sources that may tend to give rise to false stuck-on thruster alarms quantified. It will be shown that false alarms can be triggered by discrete events such as a failed-off thruster, a glancing collision with Orbiter structure, or thruster saturation. They can also be triggered by a combination of errors introduced by constantly present sources such as thrust level errors, thruster misalignment, inertial cross-coupling, angular rate sensor noise, and structural vibrations induced by thruster firings. Based on this fact, the original plan to have the spacecraft enter safe mode whenever the uncommanded motion algorithm is triggered does not appear to be advisable. A better approach seems to be to provide the Sprint pilot with a warning whenever uncommanded motion is detected, and then allow the crew to determine whether safing the vehicle is appropriate.

Williams, Trevor↗
NASA NTRS2014

Addressing Challenges to the Design & Test of Operational Lighting Environments for the International Space Station

In our day to day lives, the availability of light, with which to see our environment, is often taken for granted. The designers of land based lighting systems use sunlight and artificial light as their toolset. The availability of power, quantity of light sources, and variety of design options are often unlimited. The accessibility of most land based lighting systems makes it easy for the architect and engineer to verify and validate their design ideas. Failures with an implementation, while sometimes costly, can easily be addressed by renovation. Consider now, an architectural facility orbiting in space, 260 miles above the surface of the earth. This human rated architectural facility, the International Space Station (ISS) must maintain operations every day, including life support and appropriate human comforts without fail. The facility must also handle logistics of regular shipments of cargo, including new passengers. The ISS requires accommodations necessary for human control of machine systems. Additionally, the ISS is a research facility and supports investigations performed inside and outside its livable volume. Finally, the facility must support remote operations and observations by ground controllers. All of these architectural needs require a functional, safe, and even an aesthetic lighting environment. At Johnson Space Center, our Habitability and Human Factors team assists our diverse customers with their lighting environment challenges, via physical test and computer based analysis. Because of the complexity of ISS operational environment, our team has learned and developed processes that help ISS operate safely. Because of the dynamic exterior lighting environment, uses computational modeling to predict the lighting environment. The ISS' orbit exposes it to a sunrise every 90 minutes, causing work surfaces to quickly change from direct sunlight to earthshine to total darkness. Proper planning of vehicle approaches, robotics operations, and crewed Extra Vehicular Activities are mandatory to ensure safety to the crew and all others involved. Innovation in testing techniques is important as well. The advent of Solid State Lighting technology and the lack of stable national and international standards for its implementation pose new challenges on how to design, test and verify individual light fixtures and the environment that uses them. The ISS will soon be replacing its internal fluorescent lighting system to a solid state LED system. The Solid State Lighting Assembly will be used not only for general lighting, but also as a medical countermeasure to control the circadian rhythm of the crew. The new light source has performance criteria very specific to its spectral fingerprint, creating new challenges that were originally not as significant during the original design of the ISS. This presentation will showcase findings and toolsets our team is using to assist in the planning of tasks, and design of operational lighting environments on the International Space Station.

Clark, Toni A.↗
NASA NTRS2008

ISS Contingency Attitude Control Recovery Method for Loss of Automatic Thruster Control

In this paper, the attitude control issues associated with International Space Station (ISS) loss of automatic thruster control capability are discussed and methods for attitude control recovery are presented. This scenario was experienced recently during Shuttle mission STS-117 and ISS Stage 13A in June 2007 when the Russian GN&C computers, which command the ISS thrusters, failed. Without automatic propulsive attitude control, the ISS would not be able to regain attitude control after the Orbiter undocked. The core issues associated with recovering long-term attitude control using CMGs are described as well as the systems engineering analysis to identify recovery options. It is shown that the recovery method can be separated into a procedure for rate damping to a safe harbor gravity gradient stable orientation and a capability to maneuver the vehicle to the necessary initial conditions for long term attitude hold. A manual control option using Soyuz and Progress vehicle thrusters is investigated for rate damping and maneuvers. The issues with implementing such an option are presented and the key issue of closed-loop stability is addressed. A new non-propulsive alternative to thruster control, Zero Propellant Maneuver (ZPM) attitude control method is introduced and its rate damping and maneuver performance evaluated. It is shown that ZPM can meet the tight attitude and rate error tolerances needed for long term attitude control. A combination of manual thruster rate damping to a safe harbor attitude followed by a ZPM to Stage long term attitude control orientation was selected by the Anomaly Resolution Team as the alternate attitude control method for such a contingency.

Bedrossian, Nazareth↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Integrated ECLSS Model Analysis of Intermodule Ventilation Failures

The Gateway Integrated ECLSS Model (GIEM) is a set of two independent models, made in Aspen Custom Modeler (ACM) and Thermal Desktop (TD), of the Gateway stack and each modules' associated environment control and life support system (ECLSS). The GIEM utilizes the 41-Node Metabolic Man (METMAN) to simulate crew inside the Gateway consuming O2 and producing CO2, H2O, and heat for the ECLSS to remove. The modules and visiting vehicles all have different levels of ECLSS capabilities and may rely on other modules and Intermodular Ventilation (IMV), which is used to exchange gas between the modules, to ensure the entire Gateway environment is controlled. If IMV were to fail or be turned off, some vehicles may have limited access to necessary ECLSS functions. This analysis focuses on evaluating O2, CO2, and H2O levels when crew are in vehicles without their own life support and IMV has failed to evaluate how long before the atmosphere is unsafe for the crew. This analysis uses the integrated nature of the GIEM to look at time to effect for O2 depletion and CO2 and H2O buildup when crew are working in vehicles that have been cut off from the ECLSS-active portion of the stack. This information is used to inform for how long crew can safely continue working in the ECLSS-inactive vehicles before experiencing a requirement violation or physical limitation and can be referenced when developing maintenance and emergency response concept of operations (ConOps).

Lawrence Barrett↗
NASA NTRS1995

Designing Flight-Deck Procedures

A complex human-machine system consists of more than merely one or more human operators and a collection of hardware components. In order to operate a complex system successfully, the human-machine system must be supported by an organizational infrastructure of operating concepts, rules, guidelines, and documents. The coherency of such operating concepts, in terms of consistency and logic, is vitally important for the efficiency and safety of any complex system. In high-risk endeavors such as aircraft operations, space flight, nuclear power production, manufacturing process control, and military operations, it is essential that such support be flawless, as the price of operational error can be high. When operating rules are not adhered to, or the rules are inadequate for the task at hand, not only will the system's goals be thwarted, but there may also be tragic human and material consequences. To ensure safe and predictable operations, support to the operators, in this case flight crews, often comes in the form of standard operating procedures. These provide the crew with step-by-step guidance for carrying out their operations. Standard procedures do indeed promote uniformity, but they do so at the risk of reducing the role of human operators to a lower level. Management, however, must recognize the danger of over-procedurization, which fails to exploit one of the most valuable assets in the system, the intelligent operator who is "on the scene." The alert system designer and operations manager recognize that there cannot be a procedure for everything, and the time will come in which the operators of a complex system will face a situation for which there is no written procedure. Procedures, whether executed by humans or machines, have their place, but so does human cognition.

Degani, Asaf↗
NASA NTRS2008

Automatic Hazard Detection for Landers

Unmanned planetary landers to date have landed 'blind'; that is, without the benefit of onboard landing hazard detection and avoidance systems. This constrains landing site selection to very benign terrain,which in turn constrains the scientific agenda of missions. The state of the art Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) technology can land a spacecraft on Mars somewhere within a 20-100km landing ellipse.Landing ellipses are very likely to contain hazards such as craters, discontinuities, steep slopes, and large rocks, than can cause mission-fatal damage. We briefly review sensor options for landing hazard detection and identify a perception approach based on stereo vision and shadow analysis that addresses the broadest set of missions. Our approach fuses stereo vision and monocular shadow-based rock detection to maximize spacecraft safety. We summarize performance models for slope estimation and rock detection within this approach and validate those models experimentally. Instantiating our model of rock detection reliability for Mars predicts that this approach can reduce the probability of failed landing by at least a factor of 4 in any given terrain. We also describe a rock detector/mapper applied to large-high-resolution images from the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO) for landing site characterization and selection for Mars missions.

hazard detection↗
NASA NTRS2015

Odyssey Mars Orbiter - Thirteen Years of On-Orbit Navigation

The Odyssey spacecraft has been in Mars orbit since October 24, 2001 and has nearly completed 61,490 orbits. Navigation operational objectives include the following: Control the local mean solar time for science observations; for most of the mission, this varied from 3:45 pm to 5:20 pm. Currently, an orbit trim maneuver planned for November 10, 2015 will place Odyssey at 6:45 pm/6:45 am at equator crossings in order to observe early morning ground frost, fog and clouds. Initially, Odyssey was late by 42 minutes for an over-flight of the critical seven minutes of Phoenix's entry, descent and landing (EDL). Odyssey was successfully positioned for this over-flight using the Delta V from angular momentum desaturations (AMD). Similar results for the Mars Science Laboratory's EDL and Comet Siding Spring's minimum risk location will be presented. Odyssey has and continues to relay significant quantities of rover data. Navigation successfully models frequent AMD Delta Vs in order to generate accurate sixty-day trajectory predictions; a typical timing error is 25 seconds after 60 days. However, unexpected events, such as safe-mode entries with their larger and more frequent thrusting, severely impact that trajectory accuracy. Impacted trajectories can have timing errors ranging from a few minutes to ten-to-fifteen minutes after sixty-days. Other analyses (briefly stated) include: a) the offset of the orbital ground track pattern after an initial cycle of 30 days or 362 orbits and b) an operations environment of continuous thrusting if/when one of the three remaining reaction wheels fails.

trajectory accuracy↗
NASA NTRS2019

Reducing Aviation Fuel Costs with Non-Destructive Testing

Thermal barrier coatings (TBCs) are absolutely critical to the efficient and safe operation of gas turbine engines (GTEs). Manufacturing TBCs is a complex chemical, thermal and mechanical process that requires precise control. And yet, the variation in life of a TBC operated within a GTE is large. This variation ultimately reduces operational performance via a designed reduction to the turbine entry temperature, T4.This paper makes the case for developing advanced THz and sub-millimeter based nondestructive testing (NDT) techniques, capable of estimating when TBC components will fail. Such a technique could identify TBCs with low expected remaining useful lifetimes, directly after production. These TBCs could be re-manufactured, thereby not only improving their own expected useful life, but also the mean lifetime of the entire manufacturing population. A series of calculations demonstrates that TBCs with enhanced life characteristics can withstand higher T4 temperatures. Assuming that a GTE is to operate at a constant thrust, this increased temperature can be traded for a reduction in fuel flow. An analysis comparing fuel savings to manufacturing costs shows that substantial savings are achievable.

microwaves↗
NASA NTRS2009

Constellations: A New Paradigm for Earth Observations

The last decade has seen a significant increase in the number and the capabilities of remote sensing satellites launched by the international community. A relatively new approach has been the launching of satellites into heterogeneous constellations. Constellations provide the scientists a capability to acquire science data, not only from specific instruments on a single satellite, but also from instruments on other satellites that fly in the same orbit. Initial results from the A-Train (especially following the CALIPSO/CloudSat launch) attest to the tremendous scientific value of constellation flying. This paper provides a history of the constellations (particularly the A-Train) and how the A-Train mission design was driven by science requirements. The A-Train has presented operational challenges which had not previously been encountered. Operations planning had to address not only how the satellites of each constellation operate safely together, but also how the two constellations fly in the same orbits without interfering with each other when commands are uplinked or data are downlinked to their respective ground stations. This paper discusses the benefits of joining an on-orbit constellation. When compared to a single, large satellite, a constellation infrastructure offers more than just the opportunities for coincidental science observations. For example, constellations reduce risks by distributing observing instruments among numerous satellites; in contrast, a failed launch or a system failure in a single satellite would lead to loss of all observations. Constellations allow for more focused, less complex satellites. Constellations distribute the development, testing, and operations costs among various agencies and organizations for example, the Morning and Afternoon Constellations involve several agencies within the U.S. and in other countries. Lastly, this paper addresses the need to plan for the long-term evolution of a constellation. Agencies need to have a replenishment strategy as some satellites age and eventually leave the constellation. This will ensure overlap of observations, thus providing continuous, calibrated science data over a much longer time period. Thoughts on the evolution of the A-Train will also be presented.

Kelly, Angelita C.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Controlled Environmental Effects on Creep Test Data of Woven Fabric Webbings for Inflatable Space Modules

eveloping technologies for proposed lunar and Mars space exploration missions. Enhanced habitation sy g studied as potential habitats due to their inherent low mass and small launch volume. One goal of inflatable module research is quantification of the safe-life and end-of-life creep-strain spectrum. Full-scale pressurized inflatable modules are large, costly, and difficult to experimentally study. Therefore, material subcomponents are often studied as an alternative. An experimental thermally controlled long-term creep study of VectranTM webbings for application to inflatable modules is presented. Vectran fibers have high strength and low creep properties. High strength webbing materials are desirable for the load bearing restraint layer of inflatable modules because they are strong, flexible, and lightweight. Characterization of the creep behavior, safe-life, and end-of- life of webbing specimens will help quantify comparable life properties for inflatable modules. Several experimental multiple-year creep studies of webbing specimens in uncontrolled thermal environments have been conducted at NASA Langley Research Center. Experimental data obtained exhibits the classic creep-strain curve due to load, coupled with unique sinusoidal variation due to variation in temperature and humidity over daily and annual time periods. Results also have indicated that specimens fail within a year if the applied load is greater than 50 percent of the rated load. The primary goal of this study is to eliminate thermal effects from the creep data for a group of webbing specimens, and to allow uncontrolled thermal effects to influence the creep data of a second group of webbing specimens. Comparison of both sets of data will define how temperature influences creep data. A unique creep test facility was fabricated to facilitate the generation and comparison of the two sets of data. The facility consists of five creep test stands with an integrated heating and cooling system, and four creep test stands exposed to external environmental or ambient conditions. The facility contains displacement, temperature, humidity, and load sensors. Test specimens consist of one- inch wide, 48-inch long Vectran webbings rated at 12,500 pounds-per-inch. Experimental thermally controlled creep-strain data has been generated for two groups of webbing specimens. Applied load for all test stands was above 9000 lbs and greater than 50 percent of the rated load. Temperatures varied between 58˚F and 83˚F for the four test stands exposed to ambient conditions. Associated creep data exhibited the classic creep- strain profiles. The temperature was set to 72˚F for the five test stands in the controlled temperature environment. Creep data for tests with temperature control also exhibited the classic strain profiles. Data indicated that if the load is greater n thermal effects do not manifest. Therefore, creep tests with loads less than 50 percent of the rated load are planned for in the near future.

Kenner, Winfred S.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Avionics Configuration Assessment for Flightdeck Interval Management: A Comparison of Avionics and Notification Methods

Flightdeck Interval Management is one of the NextGen operational concepts that FAA is sponsoring to realize requisite National Airspace System (NAS) efficiencies. Interval Management will reduce variability in temporal deviations at a position, and thereby reduce buffers typically applied by controllers - resulting in higher arrival rates, and more efficient operations. Ground software generates a strategic schedule of aircraft pairs. Air Traffic Control (ATC) provides an IM clearance with the IM spacing objective (i.e., the TTF, and at which point to achieve the appropriate spacing from this aircraft) to the IM aircraft. Pilots must dial FIM speeds into the speed window on the Mode Control Panel in a timely manner, and attend to deviations between actual speed and the instantaneous FIM profile speed. Here, the crew is assumed to be operating the aircraft with autothrottles on, with autopilot engaged, and the autoflight system in Vertical Navigation (VNAV) and Lateral Navigation (LNAV); and is responsible for safely flying the aircraft while maintaining situation awareness of their ability to follow FIM speed commands and to achieve the FIM spacing goal. The objective of this study is to examine whether three Notification Methods and four Avionics Conditions affect pilots' performance, ratings on constructs associated with performance (workload, situation awareness), or opinions on acceptability. Three Notification Methods (alternate visual and aural alerts that notified pilots to the onset of a speed target, conformance deviation from the required speed profile, and reminded them if they failed to enter the speed within 10 seconds) were examined. These Notification Methods were: VVV (visuals for all three events), VAV (visuals for all three events, plus an aural for speed conformance deviations), and AAA (visual indications and the same aural to indicate all three of these events). Avionics Conditions were defined by the instrumentation (and location) used to present IM information to crews: (1) Integrated (IM information is embedded in extant PFD (Primary Flight Display), ND (Navigation Display), EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) displays); (2) EFB_Aft (IM information is only supplied in an EFB and mounted in location similar to that for MITRE's UPS work); (3) EFB_Fore (IM information is only supplied in an EFB which is mounted more forward, under the side window), and (4) EFB_Aft plus use of an AGD (the same IM information is supplied in an EFB and on an AGD, both mounted in locations similar to that in MITRE's UPS work ). Twelve commercial pilot crews flew descent scenarios (VNAV Speed with the mode control panel (MCP) speed window open until flaps extended, then VNAV Path) in a commercial transport flight simulator with realistic visual scene and communications. The results of this study serve three practical aims: (1) contribute to the down-select of avionics configuration for future assessment of the ASTAR spacing algorithm at NASA; (2) provide information useful to the FAA Human Factors Division (ANG-C1)'s mission to identify issues pertinent to flight certification of, and flight standards; (3) identify methodological considerations in support of future FIM human-in-the-loop (HITL) investigations.

Latorella, Kara A.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Flying Qualities Evaluation of a Commuter Aircraft With an Ice Contaminated Tailplane

During the NASA/FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) Tailplane Icing Program, pilot evaluations of aircraft flying qualities were conducted with various ice shapes attached to the horizontal tailplane of the NASA Twin Otter Icing Research Aircraft. Initially, only NASA pilots conducted these evaluations, assessing the differences in longitudinal flight characteristics between the baseline or clean aircraft, and the aircraft configured with an Ice Contaminated Tailplane (ICT). Longitudinal tests included Constant Airspeed Flap Transitions, Constant Airspeed Thrust Transitions, zero-G Pushovers, Repeat Elevator Doublets, and Simulated Approach and Go-Around tasks. Later in the program, guest pilots from government and industry were invited to fly the NASA Twin Otter configured with a single full-span artificial ice shape attached to the leading edge of the horizontal tailplane. This shape represented ice formed due to a 'Failed Boot' condition, and was generated from tests in the Glenn Icing Research Tunnel on a full-scale tailplane model. Guest pilots performed longitudinal handling tests, similar to those conducted by the NASA pilots, to evaluate the ICT condition. In general, all pilots agreed that longitudinal flying qualities were degraded as flaps were lowered, and further degraded at high thrust settings. Repeat elevator doublets demonstrated reduced pitch damping effects due to ICT, which is a characteristic that results in degraded flying qualities. Pilots identified elevator control force reversals (CFR) in zero-G pushovers at a 20 deg flap setting, a characteristic that fails the FAR 25 no CFR certification requirement. However, when the same pilots used the Cooper-Harper rating scale to perform a simulated approach and go-around task at the 20 deg flap setting, they rated the airplane as having Level I and Level II flying qualities respectively. By comparison, the same task conducted at the 30 deg flap setting, resulted in Level II flying qualities for the approach portion, and Level III for the go-around portion.The results of this program indicate that safe and acceptable flying qualities with an ICT condition, can be effectively assessed by task-oriented pilot maneuvers. In addition, other maneuvers such as repeat elevator doublets provide good qualitative and quantitative assessments of pitch damping and elevator effectiveness, which are characteristics that correlate well with pilot task ratings. The results of this testing indicate that the FAR 25 zero-G pushover maneuver, which requires no CFR during its execution, may be an overly conservative pass/fail criteria for aircraft certification.

Ranaudo, Richard J.↗
NASA NTRS2012

CloudSat Anomaly Recovery and Operational Lessons Learned

In April 2011, NASA's pioneering cloud profiling radar satellite, CloudSat, experienced a battery anomaly that placed it into emergency mode and rendered it operations incapable. All initial attempts to recover the spacecraft failed as the resultant power limitations could not support even the lowest power mode. Originally part of a six-satellite constellation known as the "A-Train", CloudSat was unable to stay within its assigned control box, posing a threat to other A-Train satellites. CloudSat needed to exit the constellation, but with the tenuous power profile, conducting maneuvers was very risky. The team was able to execute a complex sequence of operations which recovered control, conducted an orbit lower maneuver, and returned the satellite to safe mode, within one 65 minute sunlit period. During the course of the anomaly recovery, the team developed several bold, innovative operational strategies. Details of the investigation into the root-cause and the multiple approaches to revive CloudSat are examined. Satellite communication and commanding during the anomaly are presented. A radical new system of "Daylight Only Operations" (DO-OP) was developed, which cycles the payload and subsystem components off in tune with earth eclipse entry and exit in order to maintain positive power and thermal profiles. The scientific methodology and operational results behind the graduated testing and ramp-up to DO-OP are analyzed. In November 2011, the CloudSat team successfully restored the vehicle to consistent operational collection of cloud radar data during sunlit portions of the orbit. Lessons learned throughout the six-month return-to-operations recovery effort are discussed and offered for application to other R&D satellites, in the context of on-orbit anomaly resolution efforts.

cloud profiling radar satellite↗
NASA NTRS2009

Software Health Management: A Short Review of Challenges and Existing Techniques

Modern spacecraft (as well as most other complex mechanisms like aircraft, automobiles, and chemical plants) rely more and more on software, to a point where software failures have caused severe accidents and loss of missions. Software failures during a manned mission can cause loss of life, so there are severe requirements to make the software as safe and reliable as possible. Typically, verification and validation (V&V) has the task of making sure that all software errors are found before the software is deployed and that it always conforms to the requirements. Experience, however, shows that this gold standard of error-free software cannot be reached in practice. Even if the software alone is free of glitches, its interoperation with the hardware (e.g., with sensors or actuators) can cause problems. Unexpected operational conditions or changes in the environment may ultimately cause a software system to fail. Is there a way to surmount this problem? In most modern aircraft and many automobiles, hardware such as central electrical, mechanical, and hydraulic components are monitored by IVHM (Integrated Vehicle Health Management) systems. These systems can recognize, isolate, and identify faults and failures, both those that already occurred as well as imminent ones. With the help of diagnostics and prognostics, appropriate mitigation strategies can be selected (replacement or repair, switch to redundant systems, etc.). In this short paper, we discuss some challenges and promising techniques for software health management (SWHM). In particular, we identify unique challenges for preventing software failure in systems which involve both software and hardware components. We then present our classifications of techniques related to SWHM. These classifications are performed based on dimensions of interest to both developers and users of the techniques, and hopefully provide a map for dealing with software faults and failures.

Pipatsrisawat, Knot↗
NASA NTRS2019

Airborne Radar for sUAS Sense and Avoid

A primary challenge for the safe integration of small UAS operations into the National Airspace System (NAS) is traffic deconfliction, both from manned and unmanned aircraft. The UAS Traffic Management (UTM) project being conducted at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) considers a layered approach to separation provision, ranging from segregation of operations through airspace volumes (geofences) to autonomous sense and avoid (SAA) technologies for higher risk, densely occupied airspace. Cooperative SAA systems, such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and/or vehicle-to-vehicle communication systems provide significant additional risk mitigation but they fail to adequately mitigate collision risks for non-cooperative (non-transponder equipped) airborne aircraft. The RAAVIN (Radar on Autonomous Aircraft to Verify ICAROUS Navigation) flight test being conducted by NASA and the Mid-Atlantic Aviation Partnership (MAAP) was designed to investigate the applicability and performance of a prototype, commercially available sUAS radar to detect and track non-cooperative airborne traffic, both manned and unmanned. The radar selected for this research was a Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar with 120 degree azimuth and 80 degree elevation field of view operating at 24.55GHz center frequency with a 200 MHz bandwidth. The radar transmits 2 watts of power thru a Metamaterial Electronically Scanning Array antenna in horizontal polarization. When the radar is transmitting, personnel must be at least 1 meter away from the active array to limit nonionizing radiation exposure. The radar physical dimensions are 18.7cm by 12.1cm by 4.1cm and it weighs less than 820 grams making it well suited for installation on small UASs. The onboard, SAA capability, known as ICAROUS, (Independent Configurable Architecture for Reliable Operations of Unmanned Systems), developed by NASA to support sUAS operations, will provide autonomous guidance using the traffic radar tracks from the onboard radar. The RAAVIN set of studies will be conducted in three phases. The first phase included outdoor, ground-based radar evaluations performed at the Virginia Tech’s Kentland Farm testing range in Blacksburg, VA. The test was designed to measure how well the radar could detect and track a small UAS flying in the radar’s field of view. The radar was used to monitor 5 test flights consisting of outbound, inbound and crossing routes at different ranges and altitudes. The UAS flown during the ground test was the Inspire 2, a quad copter weighing less than 4250 grams (10 pounds) at maximum payload. The radar was set up to scan and track targets over its full azimuthal field of view from 0 to 40 degrees in elevation. The radar was configured to eliminate tracks generated from any targets located beyond 2000 meters from the radar and moving at velocities under 1.45 meters per second. For subsequent phases of the study the radar will be integrated with a sUAS platform to evaluate its performance in flight for SAA applications ranging from sUAS to manned GA aircraft detections and tracking. Preliminary data analysis from the first outdoor ground tests showed the radar performed well at tracking the vehicle as it flew outbound and repeatedly maintained a track out to 1000 meters (maximum 1387 meters) until the vehicle slowed to a stop to reverse direction to fly inbound. As the Inspire flew inbound tracks from beyond 800 meters, a reacquisition time delay was consistently observed between when the Inspire exceeds a speed of 1.45 meters per second and when the radar indicated an inbound target was present and maintained its track. The time delay varied between 6 seconds to over 37 seconds for the inbound flights examined, and typically resulted in about a 200 meter closure distance before the Inspire track was maintained. The radar performed well at both acquiring and tracking the vehicle as it flew crossing routes out past 400 meters across the azimuthal field of view. The radar and ICAROUS software will be integrated and flown on a BFD-1400-SE8-E UAS during the next phase of the RAAVIN project. The main goal at the conclusion of this effort is to determine if this radar technology can reliably support minimum requirements for SAA applications of sUAS. In particular, the study will measure the range of vehicle detections, lateral and vertical angular errors, false and missed/late detections, and estimated distance at closest point of approach after an avoidance maneuver is executed. This last metric is directly impacted by sensor performance and indicates its suitability for the task.

Szatkowski, George N.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Dynamic Response Testing in an Electrically Heated Reactor Test Facility

Non-nuclear testing can be a valuable tool in development of a space nuclear power or propulsion system. In a non-nuclear test bed, electric heaters are used to simulate the heat from nuclear fuel. Standard testing allows one to fully assess thermal, heat transfer, and stress related attributes of a given system, but fails to demonstrate the dynamic response that would be present in an integrated, fueled reactor system. The integration of thermal hydraulic hardware tests with simulated neutronic response provides a bridge between electrically heated testing and full nuclear testing. By implementing a neutronic response model to simulate the dynamic response that would be expected in a fueled reactor system, one can better understand system integration issues, characterize integrated system response times and response characteristics, and assess potential design improvements at a relatively small fiscal investment. Initial system dynamic response testing was demonstrated on the integrated SAFE-100a heat pipe cooled, electrically heated reactor and heat exchanger hardware, utilizing a one-group solution to the point kinetics equations to simulate the expected neutronic response of the system (Bragg-Sitton, 2005). The current paper applies the same testing methodology to a direct drive gas cooled reactor system, demonstrating the applicability of the testing methodology to any reactor type and demonstrating the variation in system response characteristics in different reactor concepts. In each testing application, core power transients were controlled by a point kinetics model with reactivity feedback based on core average temperature; the neutron generation time and the temperature feedback coefficient are provided as model inputs. Although both system designs utilize a fast spectrum reactor, the method of cooling the reactor differs significantly, leading to a variable system response that can be demonstrated and assessed in a non-nuclear test facility.

Bragg-Sitton, Shannon M.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Application of Simulated Reactivity Feedback in Nonnuclear Testing of a Direct-Drive Gas-Cooled Reactor

Nonnuclear testing can be a valuable tool in the development of an in-space nuclear power or propulsion system. In a nonnuclear test facility, electric heaters are used to simulate heat from nuclear fuel. Standard testing allows one to fully assess thermal, heat transfer, and stress related attributes of a given system but fails to demonstrate the dynamic response that would be present in an integrated, fueled reactor system. The integration of thermal hydraulic hardware tests with simulated neutronic response provides a bridge between electrically heated testing and full nuclear testing. By implementing a neutronic response model to simulate the dynamic response that would be expected in a fueled reactor system, one can better understand system integration issues, characterize integrated system response times and response and response characteristics, and assess potential design improvements with a relatively small fiscal investment. Initial system dynamic response testing was demonstrated on the integrated SAFE 100a heat pipe cooled, electrically heated reactor and heat exchanger hardware. This Technical Memorandum discusses the status of the planned dynamic test methodology for implementation in the direct-drive gas-cooled reactor testing and assesses the additional instrumentation needed to implement high-fidelity dynamic testing.

Bragg-Sitton, S. M.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Apollo 16 Mission Anomaly Report No. 1: Oxidizer Deservicing Tank Failure

The command module reaction control system is emptied of all remaining propellant using ground support equipment designed to provide an acid/base neutralization of the propellant in both the liquid and gaseous phases so that it may be disposed of safely. During the deactivation operation of the oxidizer from the Apollo 16 command module on 7 May 1972, the scrubber tank of the decontamination unit exploded, destroying the ground support equipment unit and damaging the building that housed the operation. Only minor injuries were received by the personnel in the area and the command module was not damaged. Test results show that the failure was caused by an insufficient quantity of neutralizer for the quantity of oxidizer. This insufficiency lead to exothermic nitration-type reactions which produced large quantities of gas at a very high rate and failed the decontamination tank.

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