Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Critical infrastructure”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 271 records · Page 15

Leveraging Technology Services for Public Good

As the technological world expands, vulnerabilities of our critical infrastructure are becoming clear. Fortunately, emerging services provide an opportunity to improve the efficiency and security of current practices. In particular, serverless computing (such as Amazon Web Services and REDFISHs Acequia) provide opportunities to improve current practices. However, the critical infrastructure needs to evolve and that will require due diligence to ensure that transferring aspects of its practices onto the internet is done in a secure manner.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Commodity Flow Study - Clark County, Nevada, USA

The United States Department of Energy has designated Clark County, Nevada as an 'Affected Unit of Local Government' due to the potential for impacts by activities associated with the Yucca Mountain High Level Nuclear Waste Repository project. Urban Transit, LLC has led a project team of transportation including experts from the University of Nevada Las Vegas Transportation Research Center to conduct a hazardous materials community flow study along Clark County's rail and truck corridors. In addition, a critical infrastructure analysis has also been carried out in order to assess the potential impacts of transportation within Clark County of high level nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel to a proposed repository 90 miles away in an adjacent county on the critical infrastructure in Clark County. These studies were designed to obtain information relating to the transportation, identification and routing of hazardous materials through Clark County. Coordinating with the United States Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U. S. Federal Highway Administration, the Nevada Department of Transportation, and various other stakeholders, these studies and future research will examine the risk factors along the entire transportation corridor within Clark County and provide a context for understanding the additional vulnerability associated with shipping spent fuel through Clark County. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

History of Industrial Control System Cyber Incidents

For many years malicious cyber actors have been targeting the industrial control systems (ICS) that manage our critical infrastructures. Most of these events are not reported to the public, and the threats and incidents to ICS are not as well-known as enterprise cyber threats and incidents. This paper is a brief study of publically reported cyber threats to critical infrastructure that sheds light on the growing cyber threats to ICS devices. It is important to note that this list is not all inclusive. The events selected in this study highlight the significant threats and incidents to industrial control systems and demonstrate that significant cyber incidents to ICS devices are growing and becoming more complex.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Analysis of Microgrid Locations Benefitting Community Resilience for Puerto Rico

An analysis of microgrids to increase resilience was conducted for the island of Puerto Rico. Critical infrastructure throughout the island was mapped to the key services provided by those sectors to help inform primary and secondary service sources during a major disruption to the electrical grid. Additionally, a resilience metric of burden was developed to quantify community resilience, and a related baseline resilience figure was calculated for the area. To improve resilience, Sandia performed an analysis of where clusters of critical infrastructure are located and used these suggested resilience node locations to create a portfolio of 159 microgrid options throughout Puerto Rico. The team then calculated the impact of these microgrids on the region's ability to provide critical services during an outage, and compared this impact to high-level estimates of cost for each microgrid to generate a set of efficient microgrid portfolios costing in the range of $\$218$-$\$917$M. This analysis is a refinement of the analysis delivered on June 01, 2018.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Analysis of Microgrid Locations Benefitting Community Resilience for Puerto Rico

An analysis of microgrids to increase resilience was conducted for the island of Puerto Rico. Critical infrastructure throughout the island was mapped to the key services provided by those sectors to help inform primary and secondary service sources during a major disruption to the electrical grid. Additionally, a resilience metric of burden was developed to quantify community resilience, and a related baseline resilience figure was calculated for the area. To improve resilience, Sandia performed an analysis of where clusters of critical infrastructure are located and used these suggested resilience node locations to create a portfolio of 159 microgrid options throughout Puerto Rico. The team then calculated the impact of these microgrids on the region's ability to provide critical services during an outage, and compared this impact to high-level estimates of cost for each microgrid to generate a set of efficient microgrid portfolios costing in the range of 218-917M dollars. This analysis is a refinement of the analysis delivered on June 01, 2018.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Quantifying Availability in SCADA Environments Using the Cyber Security Metric MFC

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are distributed networks dispersed over large geographic areas that aim to monitor and control industrial processes from remote areas and/or a centralized location. They are used in the management of critical infrastructures such as electric power generation, transmission and distribution, water and sewage, manufacturing/industrial manufacturing as well as oil and gas production. The availability of SCADA systems is tantamount to assuring safety, security and profitability. SCADA systems are the backbone of the national cyber-physical critical infrastructure. Herein, we explore the definition and quantification of an econometric measure of availability, as it applies to SCADA systems; our metric is a specialization of the generic measure of mean failure cost.

Availability↗

Framework for Real-Time All-Hazards Global Situational Awareness

Information systems play a pivotal role in emergency response by making consequence analysis models based on up-to-date data available to decision makers. While consequence analysis models have been used for years on local scales, their application on national and global scales has been constrained by lack of non-proprietary data. This chapter describes how this has changed using a framework for real-time all-hazards situational awareness called the Energy Awareness and Resiliency Standardized Services (EARSS) as an example. EARSS is a system of systems developed to collect non-proprietary data from diverse open content sources to develop a geodatabase of critical infrastructures all over the world. The EARSS system shows that it is feasible to provide global disaster alerts by producing valuable information such as texting messages about detected hazards, emailing reports about affected areas, estimating an expected number of impacted people and their demographic characteristics, identifying critical infrastructures that may be affected, and analyzing potential downstream effects. This information is provided in real-time to federal agencies and subscribers all over the world for decision making in humanitarian assistance and emergency response. The system also uses live streams of power outages, weather, and satellite surveillance data as events unfold. This, in turn, is combined with other public domain or open content information, such as media reports and postings on social networking websites, for complete coverage of the situation as events unfold. Working with up-to-date information from the EARSS system, emergency responders on the ground could pre-position their staff and resources, such as emergency generators and ice, where they are most needed.

disaster consequence management↗

Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense (Final)

In the world of ever-advancing technology, Autonomous Systems (AS) find extensive application, bolstering functionalities of critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants. These systems, however, are increasingly becoming a target for nefarious activities, namely through inference attacks, trojan attacks, and adversarial reprogramming. This paper delves into a comprehensive exploration of machine learning (ML)-driven autonomous control systems within advanced nuclear reactor designs, revealing the vulnerabilities and proposing strategies for defense against potential cyber-attacks. Advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)- based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber-physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems. As global reliance on generation III reactors begins to be critically assessed, the evolution towards advanced reactor systems utilizing digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) becomes not merely preferable, but essential. The integration of semi and fully autonomous control systems (ACS), powered by digital I&C and machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies, emerges as a potent strategy to mitigate operations and maintenance costs, thereby enhancing the economic feasibility of novel reactor designs. However, with a staggering 500% and 380% increase in cyber-attacks reported against the energy sector by the United States Department of Energy (DoE) and the European Union respectively, a surge in cyber vulnerabilities specifically targeting the nuclear industry has been 2 markedly observed. Notable incidents, such as the W32.Ramnit spyware infiltration at the Gundremmingen nuclear power plant in Germany and the Dtrack spyware intrusion at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in India, while not directly compromising core industrial control systems (ICS), underscore a compelling necessity to fortify cybersecurity protocols in safeguarding reactor systems against increasingly adept digital adversaries. In light of this, our investigation extends beyond conventional cybersecurity parameters, diving into the intricate web of potential vulnerabilities woven into ML-based DTs and ACS in advanced reactor systems. A crafted cyber-physical testbed and preliminary ACS were devised to act as a mirror, reflecting potential configurations of advanced reactor control designs. Moreover, this study is intertwined with a scrutinization of ML models, developed either through conventional, manually tuned methodologies or via automated means through AutoML, probing into their cyber-risk profiles within operational technology (OT) environments. Expanding on this, two distinct ACS blueprints were forged – one navigating through the corridors of traditional ML and the other traversing the path of AutoML – in an effort to holistically encapsulate the considerations pivotal to ML-based DT control system design. Employing the SANS Institute Industrial Control System (ICS) Kill Chain and the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) framework, a structured analysis was conducted, launching three targeted attacks against the training dataset, real-time dataset, and ML models, therein dissecting the potential cyber-attack implications against both ML frameworks within an ACS milieu. It is essential to note that three distinct categories of attacks were conducted against both ACS configurations, each encompassing three distinct ML-based DTs, cumulating in a total of 18 varied attacks. This exploration extends into the realms of Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense, unraveling vulnerabilities, and opportunities for fortified defenses against such intrusions, particularly where ML-driven technologies, and by extension, ACS, are deployed. Final recommendations, articulated through a lens of security, safeguard, and implementation considerations, are presented for both traditional and AutoML models, anchoring upon the existing knowledge landscape and ML-based DT modeling for ACS, and are offered as a beacon to guide the nuclear industry through the intricate cybersecurity challenges that lie ahead.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cybersecurity Considerations for Emerging Energy Technologies

AI, cloud computing, post-quantum cryptography, zero-trust architectures, microgrids, and virtual power plants. What do these things have in common? They are all emerging technologies in the clean energy space that will be a critical part of grid modernization efforts. As we work towards clean energy and decarbonization targets, these technologies, developed to solve real-world problems, will help us reach goals and achieve new efficiencies as the paradigm of grid operation shifts. However, there are growing concerns about the cybersecurity risks associated with these trending topics as they are used in critical infrastructure applications. This talk will cover gaps, challenges, and opportunities for the secure implementation of grid modernization solutions and novel energy applications of state-of-the-art networking and communications. Proactive risk mitigation strategies, including the application of cyber-informed engineering, will be discussed. Practical applications of these techniques will help provide countermeasures to the impact of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure technologies in a new, digitized grid landscape.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Storm-DEPART (Damage Estimate Prediction and Recovery Tool)

Storm-DEPART (Damage Estimate Prediction and Restoration Tool): Each year hurricanes and tropical storms in the United States damage critical infrastructure assets, disrupt the services they provide, and cause millions to billions of dollars in economic impacts due to extended recovery times. The Storm-DEPART tool and analytical output enable more impactful data-driven decision-making capabilities and strengthen national-level disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. Storm-DEPART, built through multi-month collaboration between Entergy and INL, combines Entergy’s critical infrastructure inventory data with weather forecasts to predict damages to Electric utility’s assets due to natural disasters and the estimated recovery support needed, including time, materials, and resource allocation. In the event of an approaching hurricane, this innovative solution can assess potential damage to power generation capacity, transmission grids, distribution networks, and communications assets from wind bands, storm surge, and flooding. With more effective predictions, Entergy can more efficiently allocate resources to mitigate impacts and optimize recovery for customers. Storm-DEPART also allows Electric utilities the ability to apply a planning scenario and model expected damage to better inform infrastructure restoration needs leading to enhance system resiliency. The technology is fully transferrable to other electric utilities with the same damage estimating challenges. The INL team is working on the evolution of Storm-DEPART to include ice event damage prediction framework.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Storm-DEPART (Damage Estimate Prediction and Recovery Tool)

Storm-DEPART (Damage Estimate Prediction and Restoration Tool): Each year hurricanes and tropical storms in the United States damage critical infrastructure assets, disrupt the services they provide, and cause millions to billions of dollars in economic impacts due to extended recovery times. The Storm-DEPART tool and analytical output enable more impactful data-driven decision-making capabilities and strengthen national-level disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. Storm-DEPART, built through multi-month collaboration between Entergy and INL, combines Entergy’s critical infrastructure inventory data with weather forecasts to predict damages to Electric utility’s assets due to natural disasters and the estimated recovery support needed, including time, materials, and resource allocation. In the event of an approaching hurricane, this innovative solution can assess potential damage to power generation capacity, transmission grids, distribution networks, and communications assets from wind bands, storm surge, and flooding. With more effective predictions, Entergy can more efficiently allocate resources to mitigate impacts and optimize recovery for customers. Storm-DEPART also allows Electric utilities the ability to apply a planning scenario and model expected damage to better inform infrastructure restoration needs leading to enhance system resiliency. The technology is fully transferrable to other electric utilities with the same damage estimating challenges. The INL team is working on the evolution of Storm-DEPART to include ice event damage prediction framework.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Framework for Shared Drinking Water Risk Assessment

Risk assessment plays a vital role in protecting our nation's critical infrastructure. Traditionally, such assessments have been conducted as a singular activity confined to the boarders of a particular asset or utility with little external sharing of information. In contrast other domains, e.g., disaster preparedness, cyber security, food-borne hazards, have demonstrated the benefits of sharing data, experiences and lessons learned in assessing and managing risk. Here we explore the concept of a Shared Risk Framework (SRF) in the context of critical infrastructure assessments. In this exploration, key elements of an SRF are introduced and initial instantiations demonstrated by way of three water utility assessments. Results from these three demonstrations were then combined with results from four other risk assessments developed using a different risk assessment application by a different set of analysts. Through this comparison we were able to explore potential challenges and benefits from implementation of a SRF. Challenges included both the capacity and interest of local utilities to conduct a shared risk assessment; particularly, wide scale adoption of any SRF will require a clear demonstration that such an effort supports the basic mission of the utility, adds benefit to the utility, and protects utility data from unintended access or misuse. In terms of benefits, anonymous sharing of results among utilities could provide the added benefits of recognizing and correcting bias; identifying ‘unknown, unknowns’; assisting self-assessment and benchmarking for the local utility; and providing a basis for treating shared assets and/or threats across multiple utilities.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Disruption-Robust Community Detection Using Consensus Clustering in Complex Networks

Topological (graph-theoretic) analysis of critical infrastructure networks provides insight on several aspects of resilience. Graph clustering or community detection, which identifies densely connected components in a graph, has been employed for analysis. In this paper, we propose employing consensus clustering, which is a technique to determine consensus from a collection of different clusters on an input, such that the resulting clustering is robust to disruptions, where a disruption is represented as loss of one or more vertices or edges in the graph. Using two critical infrastructure networks as case studies, we empirically demonstrate the need to compute consensus clustering in order to address the drastic changes in the topology due to disruptions in the network.

Hussain, Md Taufique↗

Irreversible Wash Aid Additive for Cesium Mitigation: Phase II. Selection and/or Modification of COTS Field Portable Waste Water Systems

After an accidental or malicious release of radioactivity, large urban areas may be contaminated, compromising response efforts by first responders and law enforcement officials. In addition, some public services (e.g., drinking water and wastewater treatment, electrical power distribution, etc.) may be disrupted. In such an event, it may be important to deploy mitigation efforts in certain areas to restore response activities and public services (Fig. S-1). This report explores the state-of-the-art approach for a system to rapidly return critical infrastructure components to service following a cesium-137 (Cs-137) radiological dispersal device (RDD) release while avoiding the spread of Cs-137 beyond its original deposition area and minimizing the amount of Cs-137-contaminated wastewater. Specifically, we describe a wash system consisting of chemical additives added to fire hydrant water and irreversible solid sequestering agents added as the water is collected and treated for recycle in situ. The wash system is intended to be a rapidly deployable, cost-effective means of mitigating an urban setting for the purpose of restoring critical infrastructure and operational activities after a radiological release.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Protecting water and wastewater utilities from cyber‐physical threats

Abstract Recent events have highlighted the need to address cybersecurity threats to systems supporting critical infrastructure and federal information systems which are evolving and growing. These threats have become ubiquitous in the United States, and throughout the world. Many information and communications technology (ICT) devices and other components are interdependent so that disruption of one component may have a negative, cascading effect on others. In the United States, the Federal role in cyber‐security has been debated for more than a decade but creating a policy is complicated because in the United States, State and local governments are the major institutions responsible for providing services to their populations. It is important that critical infrastructure such as Publically Owned Treatment Works (POTWs) and Public Water Systems (PWSs) adopt suitable countermeasures to prevent or minimise the consequences of cyber‐attacks. This paper discusses both technological and procedural techniques that can be used to protect against cyber‐threats.

Clark, Robert M.↗

UAS Activity Profile Survey

Commercial vendors, trying to tap into the physical protection of critical infrastructure, are offering nuclear facilities the opportunity to borrow detection counter-unmanned aircraft systems (CUAS) equipment to survey the airspace over and around the facility. However, using one vendor or method of detection (e.g., radio frequency [RF], radar, acoustic, visual) will not necessarily provide a complete airspace profile since no single method can detect all UAS threats. Using several detection technologies, the unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) Team, who supports the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Security (INS), would like to offer partners a comprehensive airspace profile of the types and frequency of UAS that fly within and around critical infrastructure. Improved UAS awareness will aid in the risk assessment process.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Analysis of High Plains Resource Risk and Economic Impacts

The importance of the High Plains Aquifer is broadly recognized as is its vulnerability to continued overuse. T his study e xplore s how continued depletions of the High Plains Aquifer might impact both critical infrastructure and the economy at the local, r egional , and national scale. This analysis is conducted at the county level over a broad geographic region within the states of Kansas and Nebraska. In total , 140 counties that overlie the High Plains Aquifer in these two states are analyzed. The analysis utilizes future climate projections to estimate crop production. Current water use and management practices are projected into the future to explore their related impact on the High Plains Aquifer , barring any changes in water management practices, regulat ion, or policy. Finally, the impact of declining water levels and even exhaustion of groundwater resources are projected for specific sectors of the economy as well as particular elements of the region's critical infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cybersecurity Vulnerability Mitigation Framework through Empirical Paradigm: Enhanced Prioritized Gap Analysis

Existing cybersecurity vulnerability assessment tools were designed based on the policies and standards defined by organizations such as the U.S. Department of Energy and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Frameworks such as the cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2) and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) are often used by the critical infrastructure owners and operators to determine the cybersecurity maturity of their facility. Although these frameworks are exceptional at performing qualitative cybersecurity analysis and identifying vulnerabilities, they do not provide a means to perform prioritized mitigation of those vulnerabilities in order to achieve a desired cybersecurity maturity. To address that challenge, we developed a framework and software application called the cybersecurity vulnerability mitigation framework through empirical paradigm (CyFEr). This paper presents the detailed architecture of CyFEr’s enhanced prioritized gap analysis (EPGA) methodology and its application to CSF. The efficacy of the presented framework is demonstrated by comparing against existing similar models and testing against the cyber injects from a real-world cyber-attack that targeted industrial control systems (ICS) in critical infrastructures.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil G.↗