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NASA NTRS2015

Python-Based Scientific Analysis and Visualization of Precipitation Systems at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center

At NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Python is used several different ways to analyze and visualize precipitating weather systems. A number of different Python‐based software packages have been developed, which are available to the larger scientific community. The approach in all these packages is to utilize pre‐existing Python modules as well as to be object‐oriented and scalable. The first package that will be described and demonstrated is the Python Advanced Microwave Precipitation Radiometer (AMPR) Data Toolkit, or PyAMPR for short. PyAMPR reads geolocated brightness temperature data from any flight of the AMPR airborne instrument over its 25‐year history into a common data structure suitable for user‐defined analyses. It features rapid, simplified (i.e., one line of code) production of quick‐look imagery, including Google Earth overlays, swath plots of individual channels, and strip charts showing multiple channels at once. These plotting routines are also capable of significant customization for detailed, publication‐ready figures. Deconvolution of the polarization‐varying channels to static horizontally and vertically polarized scenes is also available. Examples will be given of PyAMPR's contribution toward real‐time AMPR data display during the Integrated Precipitation and Hydrology Experiment (IPHEx), which took place in the Carolinas during May‐June 2014. The second software package is the Marshall Multi‐Radar/Multi‐Sensor (MRMS) Mosaic Python Toolkit, or MMM‐Py for short. MMM‐Py was designed to read, analyze, and display three‐dimensional national mosaicked reflectivity data produced by the NOAA National Severe Storms Laboratory (NSSL). MMM‐Py can read MRMS mosaics from either their unique binary format or their converted NetCDF format. It can also read and properly interpret the current mosaic design (4 regional tiles) as well as mosaics produced prior to late July 2013 (8 tiles). MMM‐Py can easily stitch multiple tiles together to provide a larger regional or national picture of precipitating weather systems. Composites, horizontal and vertical crosssections, and combinations thereof are easily displayed using as little as one line of code. MMM‐Py can also write to the native MRMS binary format, and sub‐sectioning of tiles (or multiple stitched tiles) is anticipated to be in place by the time of this meeting. Thus, MMM‐Py also can be used to power the creation of custom mosaics for targeted regional studies. Overlays of other data (e.g., lightning observations) are easily accomplished. Demonstrations of MMM‐Py, including the creation of animations, will be shown. Finally, Marshall has done significant work to interface Python‐based analysis routines with the U.S. Department of Energy's Py‐ART software package for radar data ingest, processing, and analysis. One example of this is the Python Turbulence Detection Algorithm (PyTDA), an MSFC‐based implementation of the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) Turbulence Detection Algorithm (NTDA) for the purposes of convective‐scale analysis, situational awareness, and forensic meteorology. PyTDA exploits Py‐ART's radar data ingest routines and data model to rapidly produce aviation‐relevant turbulence estimates from Doppler radar data. Work toward processing speed optimization and better integration within the Py‐ART framework will be highlighted. Python‐based analysis within the Py‐ART framework is also being done for new research related to intercomparison of ground‐based radar data with satellite estimates of ocean winds, as well as research on the electrification of pyrocumulus clouds.

Lang, Timothy J.↗

NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

NASA NTRS2012

Validation of Atmosphere/Ionosphere Signals Associated with Major Earthquakes by Multi-Instrument Space-Borne and Ground Observations

The latest catastrophic earthquake in Japan (March 2011) has renewed interest in the important question of the existence of pre-earthquake anomalous signals related to strong earthquakes. Recent studies have shown that there were precursory atmospheric/ionospheric signals observed in space associated with major earthquakes. The critical question, still widely debated in the scientific community, is whether such ionospheric/atmospheric signals systematically precede large earthquakes. To address this problem we have started to investigate anomalous ionospheric / atmospheric signals occurring prior to large earthquakes. We are studying the Earth's atmospheric electromagnetic environment by developing a multisensor model for monitoring the signals related to active tectonic faulting and earthquake processes. The integrated satellite and terrestrial framework (ISTF) is our method for validation and is based on a joint analysis of several physical and environmental parameters (thermal infrared radiation, electron concentration in the ionosphere, lineament analysis, radon/ion activities, air temperature and seismicity) that were found to be associated with earthquakes. A physical link between these parameters and earthquake processes has been provided by the recent version of Lithosphere-Atmosphere-Ionosphere Coupling (LAIC) model. Our experimental measurements have supported the new theoretical estimates of LAIC hypothesis for an increase in the surface latent heat flux, integrated variability of outgoing long wave radiation (OLR) and anomalous variations of the total electron content (TEC) registered over the epicenters. Some of the major earthquakes are accompanied by an intensification of gas migration to the surface, thermodynamic and hydrodynamic processes of transformation of latent heat into thermal energy and with vertical transport of charged aerosols in the lower atmosphere. These processes lead to the generation of external electric currents in specific regions of the atmosphere and the modifications, by dc electric fields, in the ionosphere-atmosphere electric circuit. We retrospectively analyzed temporal and spatial variations of four different physical parameters (gas/radon counting rate, lineaments change, long-wave radiation transitions and ionospheric electron density/plasma variations) characterizing the state of the lithosphere/atmosphere coupling several days before the onset of the earthquakes. Validation processes consist in two phases: A. Case studies for seven recent major earthquakes: Japan (M9.0, 2011), China (M7.9, 2008), Italy (M6.3, 2009), Samoa (M7, 2009), Haiti (M7.0, 2010) and, Chile (M8.8, 2010) and B. A continuous retrospective analysis was preformed over two different regions with high seismicity- Taiwan and Japan for 2003-2009. Satellite, ground surface, and troposphere data were obtained from Terra/ASTER, Aqua/AIRS, POES and ionospheric variations from DEMETER and COSMIC-I data. Radon and GPS/TEC were obtaining from monitoring sites in Taiwan, Japan and Italy and from global ionosphere maps (GIM) respectively. Our analysis of ground and satellite data during the occurrence of 7 global earthquakes has shown the presence of anomalies in the atmosphere. Our results for Tohoku M9.0 earthquake show that on March 7th, 2011 (4 days before the main shock and 1 day before the M7.2 foreshock of March 8, 2011) a rapid increase of emitted infrared radiation was observed by the satellite data and an anomaly was developed near the epicenter. The GPS/TEC data indicate an increase and variation in electron density reaching a maximum value on March 8. From March 3 to 11 a large increase in electron concentration was recorded at all four Japanese ground-based ionosondes, which returned to normal after the main earthquake. Similar approach for analyzing atmospheric and ionospheric parameters has been applied for China (M7.9, 2008), Italy (M6.3, 2009), Samoa (M7, 2009), Haiti (M7.0, 2010) and Chile (M8.8, 2010) eahquakes. Results have revealed the presence of related variations of these parameters implying their connection with the earthquake process. The second phase (B) of this validation included 102 major earthquakes (M>5.9) in Taiwan and Japan. We have found anomalous behavior before all of these events with no false negatives. False alarm ratio for false positives is less then 10% and has been calculated for the same month of the earthquake occurrence for the entire period of analysis (2003-2009). The commonalities for detecting atmospheric/ionospheric anomalies are: i.) Regularly appearance over regions of maximum stress (i.e., along plate boundaries); ii.) Anomaly existence over land and sea; and iii) association with M>5.9 earthquakes not deeper than 100km. Due to their long duration over the same region these anomalies are not consistent with a meteorological origin. Our initial results from the ISTF validation of multi-instrument space-borne and ground observations show a systematic appearance of atmospheric anomalies near the epicentral area, one to seven (average) days prior to the largest earthquakes, and suggest that it could be explained by a coupling process between the observed physical parameters and the pre-earthquake preparation processes.

Ouzounov, Dimitar↗