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At least 271 records · Page 15

Plutonium Age Dating Interlaboratory Comparison Overview - Project Design, Sample Preparation, and Results [Slides]

Project Design – How do you validate measured Pu model age? There are no certified reference materials (CRMs) that are certified for Pu model age or purification dates. There are no Am isotopic CRMs - IRMM 0243 243 Am spike has 241 Am impurity that can be used; Community working toward "consensus ages." This project executed and evaluated results from a Pu age dating interlaboratory comparison with six IAEA NWAL participant laboratories. It also ran the first quality control evaluation of single-picogram to sub-picogram scale interlaboratory 241 Am assay measurements from cotton swipe matrices. Results are promising, with a majority of 241 Am/ 241 Pu model age results agree to within 1 to 4 years. The calculated 241 Am assay results show interlaboratory variability, expanded percent uncertainties on calculated consensus 241 Am concentrations were: PuAge-S1 = 3.1 %, PuAge-S2 = 23 %, and PuAge-S3 = 26 %. Data can be used to investigate laboratory methods and improve precision and accuracy of 241 Pu and 241 Am assay for future campaigns.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Development of Corrosion Resistant Coatings for Structural Materials for Liquid Fueled Molten Salts Reactors Applications (Final Report)

Current structural alloys, code certified for the MSRs temperature ranges, contain high levels of chromium, making them highly susceptible to molten halide salt corrosion. One potential solution to circumvent the need for code certification of novel alloys, which is expensive and time consuming, is to design claddings that will protect the underlying code certified materials from corrosion damage during operation. In this work, we examined the corrosion of Ni and Cu electroplated, Ni and CuNi weld overlay, Mo-laser clad, and carburized claddings on SS316H for use in molten salt reactor environments. After characterization of the cladded materials (Task 1), static corrosion tests were used to assess corrosion resistance of the claddings in typical molten fluoride salts (Task 2). The corrosion tests were performed in molten FLiNaK at 700°C up to 1000 hours. Pre- and post-corrosion Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM), energy-dispersive-spectroscopy (EDS), Transmission Electron Microscopy (TEM), X-ray Diffraction (XRD) and glow-discharge-optical-emission-spectroscopy (GDOES) were performed on cladding cross-sections and surfaces to evaluate degradation. The Cu and Ni electroplated samples, as well as the carburized samples, showed excellent corrosion resistance relative to the bare SS316H. To assess high temperature cladding stability, ageing experiments were performed at temperatures up to 900 C in inert atmosphere for the electroplated and carburized samples and a diffusion model was developed to predict long term cladding behavior (Task 3). It was found that the Cu cladding was basically insensitive to the high temperature ageing, except for small secondary phases forming at the interface. On the other hand, the Ni electroplated cladding experienced significant interdiffusion. Nevertheless, the gain in corrosion resistance for a 100μm Ni electroplated cladding is phenomenal, with more than 50% reduction in chromium dissolution from the substrate material for the first 15 years of salt exposure at 700°C. To assess radiation resistance and phase stability, high-temperature 4MeV Ni heavy ion irradiation was performed across the cladding/substrate interface up to 50 displacement-per-atom (DPA) at 500°C and 700°C to assess the phase stability and irradiation behaviors of the electroplated systems (Task 4). The Ni and Cu electroplated systems did not experience void swelling at the contrary to the SS316H substrate due to their nanocrystalline nature. Some level of recrystallization was observed in the cladding, as well as radiation induced segregation and enhanced diffusion. The interface acted as a potent sink for point defects with the presence of a void denuded zone. The mechanical properties of the claddings were assessed using thermal shock, micro-indentation, nano-indentation, and four-point bend testing experiments (Task 5). These experiments were performed on the claddings in as-received, corroded, irradiated, and thermally aged states to determine the effects of typical molten salt reactor environments on cladding integrity. No significant mass loss was observed after repeated thermal shocks. While the electroplated samples softened after high-temperature ageing, irradiation hardening compensate this effect, such that there is little different with the as-received materials. The results of these experiments suggest that the electroplated (copper/nickel) show the greatest promise for application in molten salt reactor development. These claddings prevented any chromium dissolution from occurring during the static corrosion experiments. Additionally, they demonstrated favorable properties for high temperature diffusion, phase stability, interfacial mechanical properties, and irradiation resistance. Weld-overlay cladding are also of great interest and could reach properties similar to the electroplated samples upon optimization (especially with multiple weld passes). The carburized SS316H showed excellent behavior as well, but more work needs to be done to assess their long-term stability. Finally, the Mo-laser clad system was not pursued further due to the manufacturing challenges. It is also worth noting that the Ni cladding systems should behave relatively well in terms of weldability since the Ni-weld overlay microstructure and associated corrosion rate are sound. While the NiCu weld-overlay has even lower corrosion rates than the Ni-weld overlay, more studies on welding of Cu-electroplated systems are necessary since Cu clusters are known to embrittle steels.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Durable Low-Cost Pressure Vessels for Bulk Hydrogen Storage

Long-duration energy storage (LDES) in the form of gaseous hydrogen is vital for fossil fuel power plants to reduce frequent shutdowns and rapid start-ups. It's also crucial in renewable energy power plants for grid stabilization. WireTough Cylinders (WTC) has developed a Type II-S pressure vessel that uses steel liners that are hoop-wrapped with multiple layers of high-strength, cost-effective, and readily available steel wires. This design enables the vessel to withstand significantly higher pressures. It addresses hydrogen embrittlement issues and cyclic loading from repeated pressurization and depressurization during service. The WireTough design is cost-efficient, robust, and fatigue-resistant (with a 30-year design life) and is ASME certified for ground storage of hydrogen at a maximum operating pressure (MOP) of 350 bar and a design pressure of 500 bar. The cylinder has a 645 mm outside diameter and a water capacity of 1,715 liters, capable of storing 40.7 KG of hydrogen at MOP. Two prototypes were successfully produced to showcase the manufacturing technologies, with one being certified under ASME Section VIII Division 3 rules. Preliminary design work for a similar Type II-S vessel with a 500 bar MOP was also completed. The 350 bar and 500 bar Type II-S vessels were shown respectively to be 47.5% to 60% more cost-effective and 55% and 62.5% lighter based on per KG of hydrogen stored, when compared with their Type 1 counterparts.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Sierra/SD – Verification Test Manual – 5.22

Verification and validation (V&V) of scientific computing programs are important at Sandia National Labs due to the expanding role of computational simulation in managing the United States nuclear stockpile. The complexities of structural response calculations used to analyze physical problems, the varieties of codes applied to the calculations, and the importance of accurate predictions when assessing field conditions demand confidence in the consistency and accuracy of computer codes. Confidence in the accuracy of the predictions arising from computer simulations must ultimately be gained through verification and validation. The Sierra salinas structural dynamics analysis code, Sierra/SD, is used at the DOE Laboratories, and in several DOD projects. The roles of Sierra/SD in the qualification of weapon systems and components for normal and hostile environments throughout the Stockpile-to-Target Sequence include to, • Redesign weapon components. • Certify weapon components and systems for target environments such as hypersonic vehicles. • Certify that components will survive the thermal mechanical shock loads associated with hostile environments. • Evaluate current stockpile issues, including issues associated with uncertainty quantification. • Address many other problems that are encountered in stockpile management. The Sierra/SD verification plan is described, and an evolving set of key verification tests are described in detail. The verification tests ensure the correctness of the mathematics and numerical algorithms associated with functionality describing engineering phenomena. Development is in accordance with a set of tailored Software Quality Engineering (SQE) practices. SQE practices guide the overall verification and validation effort.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Sensitivity calibration of a Carestream HPX-1 image plate scanner

There is a need to measure the sensitivity of the image plate scanners used to scan Z shot data. The Carestream HPX-1 image plate scanner was tested, and its performance was characterized to determine the system sensitivity in terms of signal per incident photon as a function of x-ray energy. A Manson source was used to simultaneously expose an Amptek x-ray multi-channel analyzer and image plates, allowing for a comparison of the counts as a function of energy to the signal recorded on the image plates. NIST-certified radioactive sources were used to assign an absolute sensitivity. Results indicate that the HPX-1 scanner response matches the shape of the modeled response, allowing for absolute scaling using NIST-certified radioisotope sources. The HPX-1 scanner shows a stable response with measurements taken over one week. In contrast, the sensitivity of the DITABIS scanner was characterized using the same approach, but it exhibits changes in its response that varied by more than 50% over the span of 4 days.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Production of NBL PO plutonium isotopic standards CRM 136A, CRM 137A, and CRM 138A

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) produced approximately 1 mg units of purified Pu from the parent New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) certified reference materials (CRM) 137, 136 and 138 isotopic standards for the NBL Program Office (NBL PO) as detailed in the revised project plan. As stated in the plan, three representative units of each material were dispensed at the same time to be characterized at LLNL and provide informational values for the quantity of Pu and progeny nuclides in each unit. NBL PO intends to collect and evaluate isotopic measurement data from multiple laboratories and certify these materials as new isotopic standards C137A, C136A, and C138A, respectively. Soon after production eleven units of each analytical standard were shipped to other analytical laboratories for the certification effort, and 121, 119, and 119 units of C137A, C136A and C138A, respectively were shipped to Mickey Finch at Y12 NBL distribution center in November 2024 (30-gallon drum, TID 003777 PRL 7000005043). Residual purified Pu from the effort is being stored indefinitely in B332 at LLNL. Detailed methods can be found in the production plan, and this report describes and documents aspects of the production effort that are not in or were modified from the original production plan.

and nuclear chemistry↗

Documentation pckage for the RFID temperature monitoring system (Of Model 9977 packages at NTS).

The technical basis for extending the Model 9977 shipping package periodic maintenance beyond the one-year interval to a maximum of five years is based on the performance of the O-ring seals and the environmental conditions. The DOE Packaging Certification Program (PCP) has tasked Argonne National Laboratory to develop a Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) temperature monitoring system for use by the facility personnel at DAF/NTS. The RFID temperature monitoring system, depicted in the figure below, consists of the Mk-1 RFId tags, a reader, and a control computer mounted on a mobile platform that can operate as a stand-alone system, or it can be connected to the local IT network. As part of the Conditions of Approval of the CoC, the user must complete the prescribed training to become qualified and be certified for operation of the RFID temperature monitoring system. The training course will be administered by Argonne National Laboratory on behalf of the Headquarters Certifying Official. This is a complete documentation package for the RFID temperature monitoring system of the Model 9977 packagings at NTS. The documentation package will be used for training and certification. The table of contents are: Acceptance Testing Procedure of MK-1 RFID Tags for DOE/EM Nuclear Materials Management Applications; Acceptance Testing Result of MK-1 RFID Tags for DOE/EM Nuclear Materials Management Applications; Performance Test of the Single Bolt Seal Sensor for the Model 9977 Packaging; Calibration of Built-in Thermistors in RFID Tags for Nevada Test Site; Results of Calibration of Built-in Thermistors in RFID Tags; Results of Thermal Calibration of Second Batch of MK-I RFID Tags; Procedure for Installing and Removing MK-1 RFID Tag on Model 9977 Drum; User Guide for RFID Reader and Software for Temperature Monitoring of Model 9977 Drums at NTS; Software Quality Assurance Plan (SQAP) for the ARG-US System; Quality Category for the RFID Temperature Monitoring System; The Documentation Package for the RFID Temperature Monitoring System; Software Test Plan and Results for ARG-US OnSite; Configuration Management Plan (CMP) for the ARG-US System; Requirements Management Plan for the ARG-US System; and Design Management Plan for ARG-US.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Technical Review Report for the Model 9978-96 Package Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (S-SARP-G-00002, Revision 1, March 2009)

This Technical Review Report (TRR) documents the review, performed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Staff, at the request of the Department of Energy (DOE), on the 'Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), Model 9978 B(M)F-96', Revision 1, March 2009 (S-SARP-G-00002). The Model 9978 Package complies with 10 CFR 71, and with 'Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material-1996 Edition (As Amended, 2000)-Safety Requirements', International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Standards Series No. TS-R-1. The Model 9978 Packaging is designed, analyzed, fabricated, and tested in accordance with Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME B&PVC). The review presented in this TRR was performed using the methods outlined in Revision 3 of the DOE's 'Packaging Review Guide (PRG) for Reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packages'. The format of the SARP follows that specified in Revision 2 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Regulatory Guide 7.9, i.e., 'Standard Format and Content of Part 71 Applications for Approval of Packages for Radioactive Material'. Although the two documents are similar in their content, they are not identical. Formatting differences have been noted in this TRR, where appropriate. The Model 9978 Packaging is a single containment package, using a 5-inch containment vessel (5CV). It uses a nominal 35-gallon drum package design. In comparison, the Model 9977 Packaging uses a 6-inch containment vessel (6CV). The Model 9977 and Model 9978 Packagings were developed concurrently, and they were referred to as the General Purpose Fissile Material Package, Version 1 (GPFP). Both packagings use General Plastics FR-3716 polyurethane foam as insulation and as impact limiters. The 5CV is used as the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) in the Model 9975-96 Packaging. The Model 9975-96 Packaging also has the 6CV as its Secondary Containment Vessel (SCV). In comparison, the Model 9975 Packagings use Celotex{trademark} for insulation and as impact limiters. To provide a historical perspective, it is noted that the Model 9975-96 Packaging is a 35-gallon drum package design that has evolved from a family of packages designed by DOE contractors at the Savannah River Site. Earlier package designs, i.e., the Model 9965, the Model 9966, the Model 9967, and the Model 9968 Packagings, were originally designed and certified in the early 1980s. In the 1990s, updated package designs that incorporated design features consistent with the then-newer safety requirements were proposed. The updated package designs at the time were the Model 9972, the Model 9973, the Model 9974, and the Model 9975 Packagings, respectively. The Model 9975 Package was certified by the Packaging Certification Program, under the Office of Safety Management and Operations. The Model 9978 Package has six Content Envelopes: C.1 ({sup 238}Pu Heat Sources), C.2 ( Pu/U Metals), C.3 (Pu/U Oxides, Reserved), C.4 (U Metal or Alloy), C.5 (U Compounds), and C.6 (Samples and Sources). Per 10 CFR 71.59 (Code of Federal Regulations), the value of N is 50 for the Model 9978 Package leading to a Criticality Safety Index (CSI) of 1.0. The Transport Index (TI), based on dose rate, is calculated to be a maximum of 4.1.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Overview of Deployed EDS Technologies

The term explosive detection system (EDS) is used by the TSA to describe equipment that is certified to detect explosives in checked bags. The EDS, as certified, by the TSL must consist of device for interrogating a bag and an automated detection algorithm (ATD) for evaluating the results of the interrogation. We only consider CT as the interrogation device in this report. A schematic drawing of a CT-based EDS is shown in Figure 2. The output of the ATD is the binary decision of alarm or non-alarm. Alarms may true- or false-positives. Non-alarms may be true- or false-negatives. False positives are also denoted false alarms. The true detection means that the ATD reports an alarm when a threat is present in the scanned bag. The probability of detecting a threat given that a threat is present is denoted the probability of detection (PD). The probability of false alarm (PFA) is the case when an alarm is reported when a threat is not present in a bag. Certification in this context means passing tests for PD and PFA at the TSL. The results of the EDS include CT cross-sectional images of the bag and specifics about the alarmed objects generated by ATD. These results are presented on a display so that a person may override the decision of ATD and declare the alarm to be a non-alarm. This process is denoted clearing. Bags that are not cleared by the person are sent to a secondary inspection process. Here the bags may be opened or assessed with explosive trace detection (ETD) in order to clear the bags. Bags that are not cleared at this point are evaluated by an ordinance disposal team. The CT scanner along with ATD is denoted Level 1 screening. The process of clearing on a display is denoted Level 2 screening. Secondary inspection is denoted Level 3 screening. Vendors of the deployed EDSs supply the TSA with equipment for all three levels. Therefore, the term EDS may include the equipment provided for Levels 1, 2 and 3. A schematic diagram of an EDS and the levels of screening are shown in Figure 7. The decision processes used as a bag is scanned and cleared is shown in Figure 8. Shield alarms and exceptions are discussed below. Since most alarms are false alarms, the probability of alarm is often times denoted the probability of a false alarm. The expenses associated with clearing false alarms occur in Levels 2 and 3.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Audit Report on "Waste Processing and Recovery Act Acceleration Efforts for Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste at the Hanford Site"

The Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management's (EM), Richland Operations Office (Richland), is responsible for disposing of the Hanford Site's (Hanford) transuranic (TRU) waste, including nearly 12,000 cubic meters of radioactive contact-handled TRU wastes. Prior to disposing of this waste at the Department's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), Richland must certify that it meets WIPP's waste acceptance criteria. To be certified, the waste must be characterized, screened for prohibited items, treated (if necessary) and placed into a satisfactory disposal container. In a February 2008 amendment to an existing Record of Decision (Decision), the Department announced its plan to ship up to 8,764 cubic meters of contact-handled TRU waste from Hanford and other waste generator sites to the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP) at Idaho's National Laboratory (INL) for processing and certification prior to disposal at WIPP. The Department decided to maximize the use of the AMWTP's automated waste processing capabilities to compact and, thereby, reduce the volume of contact-handled TRU waste. Compaction reduces the number of shipments and permits WIPP to more efficiently use its limited TRU waste disposal capacity. The Decision noted that the use of AMWTP would avoid the time and expense of establishing a processing capability at other sites. In May 2009, EM allocated $229 million of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) funds to support Hanford's Solid Waste Program, including Hanford's contact-handled TRU waste. Besides providing jobs, these funds were intended to accelerate cleanup in the short term. We initiated this audit to determine whether the Department was effectively using Recovery Act funds to accelerate processing of Hanford's contact-handled TRU waste. Relying on the availability of Recovery Act funds, the Department changed course and approved an alternative plan that could increase costs by about $25 million by processing Hanford TRU-waste on-site rather than at AMWTP. Further, under the newly adopted alternative approach, the Department would fail to achieve the previously anticipated reductions in volume associated with the use of existing AMWTP waste compaction capabilities.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Definition of Small Gram Quantity Contents for Type B Radioactive Material Transportation Packages: Activity-Based Content Limitations

Since the 1960's, the Department of Transportation Specification (DOT Spec) 6M packages have been used extensively for transportation of Type B quantities of radioactive materials between Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, laboratories, and productions sites. However, due to the advancement of packaging technology, the aging of the 6M packages, and variability in the quality of the packages, the DOT implemented a phased elimination of the 6M specification packages (and other DOT Spec packages) in favor of packages certified to meet federal performance requirements. DOT issued the final rule in the Federal Register on October 1, 2004 requiring that use of the DOT Specification 6M be discontinued as of October 1, 2008. A main driver for the change was the fact that the 6M specification packagings were not supported by a Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) that was compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations part 71 (10 CFR 71). Therefore, materials that would have historically been shipped in 6M packages are being identified as contents in Type B (and sometimes Type A fissile) package applications and addenda that are to be certified under the requirements of 10 CFR 71. The requirements in 10 CFR 71 include that the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) must identify the maximum radioactivity of radioactive constituents and maximum quantities of fissile constituents (10 CFR 71.33(b)(1) and 10 CFR 71.33(b)(2)), and that the application (i.e., SARP submittal or SARP addendum) demonstrates that the external dose rate (due to the maximum radioactivity of radioactive constituents and maximum quantities of fissile constituents) on the surface of the packaging (i.e., package and contents) not exceed 200 mrem/hr (10 CFR 71.35(a), 10 CFR 71.47(a)). It has been proposed that a 'Small Gram Quantity' of radioactive material be defined, such that, when loaded in a transportation package, the dose rates at external points of an unshielded packaging not exceed the regulatory limits prescribed by 10 CFR 71 for non-exclusive shipments. The mass of each radioisotope presented in this paper is limited by the radiation dose rate on the external surface of the package, which per the regulatory limit should not exceed 200 mrem/hr. The results presented are a compendium of allowable masses of a variety of different isotopes (with varying impurity levels of beryllium in some of the actinide isotopes) that, when loaded in an unshielded packaging, do not result in an external dose rate on the surface of the package that exceeds 190 mrem/hr (190 mrem/hr was chosen to provide 5% conservatism relative to the regulatory limit). These mass limits define the term 'Small Gram Quantity' (SGQ) contents in the context of radioactive material transportation packages. The term SGQ is isotope-specific and pertains to contents in radioactive material transportation packages that do not require shielding and still satisfy the external dose rate requirements. Since these calculated mass limits are for contents without shielding, they are conservative for packaging materials that provide some limited shielding or if the contents are placed into a shielded package. The isotopes presented in this paper were chosen as the isotopes that Department of Energy (DOE) sites most likely need to ship. Other more rarely shipped isotopes, along with industrial and medical isotopes, are planned to be included in subsequent extensions of this work.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Brookfield Homes Passive House Performance Evaluation

TO4 3.1.3: Brookfield Homes Short-Term Results TO5 3.1.3: Brookfield Passive House Monitoring To further define its market position on high performance homebuilding, Brookfield worked with IBACOS and the Building America program to design and construct a Passive House (PH) certified model home in Denver, CO to evaluate advanced building technologies and to use as a marketing tool for potential homebuyers. Brookfield used a new architect and a new floor plan as a standard production model and constructed it to the PH standard as an upgrade option. This PH was completely built and certified in August 2013.

Array↗

Engineering flight and guest pilot evaluation report, phase 2

Prior to the flight evaluation, the two-segment profile capabilities of the DC-8-61 were evaluated and flight procedures were developed in a flight simulator at the UA Flight Training Center in Denver, Colorado. The flight evaluation reported was conducted to determine the validity of the simulation results, further develop the procedures and use of the area navigation system in the terminal area, certify the system for line operation, and obtain evaluations of the system and procedures by a number of pilots from the industry. The full area navigation capabilities of the special equipment installed were developed to provide terminal area guidance for two-segment approaches. The objectives of this evaluation were: (1) perform an engineering flight evaluation sufficient to certify the two-segment system for the six-month in-service evaluation; (2) evaluate the suitability of a modified RNAV system for flying two-segment approaches; and (3) provide evaluation of the two-segment approach by management and line pilots.

Morrison, J. A.↗

Phase 2 program on ground test of refanned JT8D turbofan engines and nacelles for the 727 airplane. Volume 1: Summary

The propulsion performance, acoustic, structural, and systems changes to a 727-200 airplane retrofitted with a refan modification of the JT8D turbofan engine are evaluated. Model tests, design of certifiable airplane retrofit kit hardware, manufacture of test hardware, ground test of a current production JT8D engine, followed by test of the same engine modified to the refan configuration, detailed analyses of the retrofit impact on airplane airworthiness, performance, and noise, and a preliminary analysis of retrofit costs are included. Results indicate that the refan retrofit of the 727-200 would be certifiable and would result in a 6-to 8 EPNdb reduction in effective perceived noise level (EPNL) at the FAR 36 measuring points and an annoyance-weighted footprint area reduction of 68% to 83%. The installed refan engine is estimated to provide 14% greater takeoff thrust at zero velocity and 10% greater thrust at 100 kn (51.4 m/s). There would be an approximate 0.6% increase in cruise specific fuel consumption (SFC). The refan engine performance in conjunction with the increase in stalled weight results in a range reduction of approximately 15% over the unmodified airplane at the same brake release gross weight (BRGW), with a block fuel increase of 1.5% to 3%. With the particular model 727 that was studied, however, it is possible to operate the airplane (with minor structural modifications) at a higher BRGW and increase the range up to approximately 15% relative to the nonrefanned airplane (with equal or slightly increased noise levels). The JT8D refan engine also improves the limited-field range of the airplane.

Source record↗

The Viking landing sites - Selection and certification

During the past several years the Viking project developed plans to use Viking orbiter instruments and earth-based radar to certify the suitability of the landing sites selected as the safest and most scientifically rewarding using Mariner 9 data. During June and July 1976, the earth-based radar and orbital spacecraft observations of some of the prime and backup sites were completed. The results of these combined observations indicated that the Viking 1 prime landing area in the Chryse region of Mars is geologically varied and possibly more hazardous than expected, and was not certifiable as a site for the Viking 1 landing. Consequently, the site certification effort had to be drastically modified and lengthened to search for a site that might be safe enough to attempt to land. The selected site considered at 47.5 deg W, 22.4 deg N represented a compromise between desirable characteristics observed with visual images and those inferred from earth-based radar. It lies in the Chryse region about 900 kilometers northwest of the original site.

Masursky, H.↗

Boeing 234 flight control development

The Boeing 234 is the commercially certified derivative of the CH-47 Chinook. The automatic flight control system and flight director with coupler were designed to reduce pilot work-load for missions of approximately six hour duration during VFR, IFR, day and night conditions. The AFCS system for the 234 is essentially the same system as developed for the CH-47D, which has airspeed hold, attitude hold, and maneuver enhancement in all three axes. The system also has the capability to couple to the Sperry Helcis flight director system which provides for enroute navigation and landing approaches. Certification testing was completed, by both the FAA and CAA, to FAR Part 29 for Transport Category Rotorcraft and BCAR Section G: Rotorcraft. The aircraft was certified for civil operation in June 1981.

Morris, J. J.↗

Field joint environmental protection system vibration/pressurization qualification

The procedures used and results obtained from vibration testing the redesigned solid rocket motor (RSRM) field joint environmental protection system (FJEPS), hereafter referred to as the joint protection system (JPS) are documented. The major purposes were to certify that the flight-designed JPS will withstand the dynamic environmental conditions of the redesigned solid rocket booster, and to certify that the cartridge check valve (vent valve) will relieve pressure build-up under the JPS during the initial 120 sec of flight. Also, an evaluation of the extruded cork insulation bonding was performed after the vibration testing.

Cook, M.↗

ACES: Space shuttle flight software analysis expert system

The Analysis Criteria Evaluation System (ACES) is a knowledge based expert system that automates the final certification of the Space Shuttle onboard flight software. Guidance, navigation and control of the Space Shuttle through all its flight phases are accomplished by a complex onboard flight software system. This software is reconfigured for each flight to allow thousands of mission-specific parameters to be introduced and must therefore be thoroughly certified prior to each flight. This certification is performed in ground simulations by executing the software in the flight computers. Flight trajectories from liftoff to landing, including abort scenarios, are simulated and the results are stored for analysis. The current methodology of performing this analysis is repetitive and requires many man-hours. The ultimate goals of ACES are to capture the knowledge of the current experts and improve the quality and reduce the manpower required to certify the Space Shuttle onboard flight software.

Satterwhite, R. Scott↗