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At least 253 records · Page 14

SCALE Code System

The SCALE Code System is a widely used modeling and simulation suite for nuclear safety analysis and design that is developed, maintained, tested, and managed by the Reactor and Nuclear Systems Division (RNSD) of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). SCALE provides a comprehensive, verified and validated, user-friendly tool set for criticality safety, reactor and lattice physics, radiation shielding, spent fuel and radioactive source term characterization, and sensitivity and uncertainty analysis. Since 1980, regulators, licensees, and research institutions around the world have used SCALE for safety analysis and design. SCALE provides an integrated framework with dozens of computational modules, including three deterministic and three Monte Carlo radiation transport solvers that are selected based on the desired solution strategy. SCALE includes current nuclear data libraries and problem-dependent processing tools for continuous-energy (CE) and multigroup (MG) neutronics and coupled neutron-gamma calculations, as well as activation, depletion, and decay calculations. SCALE includes unique capabilities for automated variance reduction for shielding calculations, as well as sensitivity and uncertainty analysis. SCALE’s graphical user interfaces assist with accurate system modeling, visualization of nuclear data, and convenient access to desired results.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Software Validation Work With The ZPPR-15 Data

The analysis activities for fast reactors involve using many different pieces of software that are relied upon for their predictive capabilities. For this software to be considered reliable, documented proof that the predictions of the software are accurate is required. In this manuscript, the validation work that covers some of the Argonne software used in fast reactor design activities is discussed and displayed. This validation work includes neutron and gamma flux distributions, reaction rate distributions, and reactivity worth. In an ideal world, a reactor development program would have access to a comprehensive set of experimental facilities to help inform the design aspects of the reactor itself. While thermal-hydraulics experiments, and to a limited degree mechanical experiments, can be carried out today for validation needs, neutronics related experimental facilities are rather impractical because of the lack of experimental facilities. Given the desired time table for construction of new reactors, the reconstitution or creation of new neutronic experimental facilities is untenable and thus those reactor development programs must rely upon any available experimental measurements that are qualitatively similar to the design. While a methodology has been proposed to assess the similarity between the past experimental measurements and the reactor itself, that aspect is beyond the scope of this manuscript. In this manuscript, the focus is entirely placed on the analysis results for a series of experiments carried out at the ZPPR facility in Idaho in the mid-1980s. In this regard, this manuscript only shows the validation of the stated neutronics software for specific loadings of the ZPPR reactor. Because of the fuel form, its proposed enrichment, and the material content of the reactor core, the ZPPR-15 experiments were identified as potential validation data for the reactor. The ZPPR-15 experiments were intended as mockups of a 330 MWe Integral Fast Reactor program which was a follow on program to the Clinch River Breeder Reactor. In the ZPPR-15 series of experiments, measurements of the neutron spectrum, control rod worth, sodium void worth, foil reaction rate distributions, Doppler worth of heated samples, gamma dose, and axial expansion worth were all carried out and published. In many cases, these reactivity coefficients are good candidates to validate the reactivity coefficient calculation scheme used by the analysis software and included in the safety analysis activities of fast reactor development projects today. This manuscript discusses the modeling methodology and accuracy of the calculated experimental results using the LANL software MCNP and the ANL software package ARC (Argonne Reactor Codes). As will be shown, for many of the experimental measurements, the two software packages are found to be good predictive analysis tools for those experiments. In other cases, problems with the analysis methodology or underlying cross section data are exposed which indicates where predictive analysis is not as reliable. Finally, in some of the measurements the conclusion is reached that the experimental measurement cannot be reproduced with the analysis software as it is simply too difficult.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Software Validation Work With The ZPPR-15 Data

The analysis activities for fast reactors involve using many different pieces of software that are relied upon for their predictive capabilities. For this software to be considered reliable, documented proof that the predictions of the software are accurate is required. In this manuscript, the validation work that covers some of the Argonne software used in fast reactor design activities is discussed and displayed. This validation work includes neutron and gamma flux distributions, reaction rate distributions, and reactivity worth. In an ideal world, a reactor development program would have access to a comprehensive set of experimental facilities to help inform the design aspects of the reactor itself. While thermal-hydraulics experiments, and to a limited degree mechanical experiments, can be carried out today for validation needs, neutronics related experimental facilities are rather impractical because of the lack of experimental facilities. Given the desired time table for construction of new reactors, the reconstitution or creation of new neutronic experimental facilities is untenable and thus those reactor development programs must rely upon any available experimental measurements that are qualitatively similar to the design. While a methodology has been proposed to assess the similarity between the past experimental measurements and the reactor itself, that aspect is beyond the scope of this manuscript. In this manuscript, the focus is entirely placed on the analysis results for a series of experiments carried out at the ZPPR facility in Idaho in the mid-1980s. In this regard, this manuscript only shows the validation of the stated neutronics software for specific loadings of the ZPPR reactor. Because of the fuel form, its proposed enrichment, and the material content of the reactor core, the ZPPR-15 experiments were identified as potential validation data for the reactor. The ZPPR-15 experiments were intended as mockups of a 330 MWe Integral Fast Reactor program which was a follow on program to the Clinch River Breeder Reactor. In the ZPPR-15 series of experiments, measurements of the neutron spectrum, control rod worth, sodium void worth, foil reaction rate distributions, Doppler worth of heated samples, gamma dose, and axial expansion worth were all carried out and published. In many cases, these reactivity coefficients are good candidates to validate the reactivity coefficient calculation scheme used by the analysis software and included in the safety analysis activities of fast reactor development projects today. This manuscript discusses the modeling methodology and accuracy of the calculated experimental results using the LANL software MCNP and the ANL software package ARC (Argonne Reactor Codes). As will be shown, for many of the experimental measurements, the two software packages are found to be good predictive analysis tools for those experiments. In other cases, problems with the analysis methodology or underlying cross section data are exposed which indicates where predictive analysis is not as reliable. Finally, in some of the measurements the conclusion is reached that the experimental measurement cannot be reproduced with the analysis software as it is simply too difficult.

Aliberti, Gerardo↗

NASA. Johnson Space Center primary battery applications

The role of the Power Branch/EP5 of JSC in primary battery applications is to support those JSC organizations having direct application responsibility with trade studies, battery selection recommendations, and with development, qualification, and provisioning of primary batteries. Battery subsystem management is provided. Payload hazard report preparation is supported, as is the review and comment of such reports for the JSC Payload Safety Panel, who approves the flight safety for all Orbiter payloads. JSC battery users are provided with safety analysis and test support to achieve safety approval. Finally, it is the responsibility of the Power Branch to define and maintain battery safety requirement documentation for JSC.

Bragg, Bob J.↗

Effects of Aircraft Health on Airspace Safety

This manuscript investigates the effects of aircraft health on the surrounding airspace, and proposes a methodology to understand how different aircraft-level faults (system faults, communication faults, etc.) can adversely affect the safety of the airspace, and qualitatively assess the impact of such faults on airspace safety metrics (such as congestion, controller/pilot workload, etc.). The topic of systems health management deals with continuously monitoring the performance of an engineering system, identifying and detecting the presence of faults, predicting the growth/progression of faults, computing the remaining useful life, and aiding online decision-making for the robust, continued operation of such engineering systems. The topic of real-time airspace modeling and safety analysis deals with defining and computing safety metrics for airspace operations in order to support risk-informed decision-making activities for various airspace entities including pilots, air traffic controllers, airlines, etc. This report presents recent research efforts that focus on combining multiple aspects of the aforementioned topics, and investigates the impact of aircraft-level faults on the airspace safety

Aircraft Health↗

Tank 11H Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution and Inhalation Dose Potential Analyses at Savannah River Site – 26018

Currently, there is approximately 34 million gallons of high-level radioactive tank waste in the Tank Farm at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The ultimate goal of operations at the Tank Farm is to remove the high level waste (HLW) from the tanks followed by stabilization of the waste through vitrification of the HLW into glass or grouting the decontaminated waste into saltstone. After bulk removal of the HLW consisting of sludge, saltcake, and supernatant, further efforts are made to reduce the residual waste present in the tank in order to declare preliminary cease waste removal (PCWR) signifying completion of HLW removal. These reduction efforts can include tank washing to remove soluble salts and radioisotopes and dissolution of solids including aluminum. Aluminum in the form of gibbsite and boehmite is relatively insoluble in water. Through addition of aqueous sodium hydroxide, the aluminum can be dissolved at mild temperatures. In order for the waste tank to meet closure mode requirements of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities (CSTF), which includes the Tank Farm, Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), a component of the safety basis, the inhalation dose potential (IDP) and the radiolytic hydrogen generation rate of the stored waste must be demonstrated to be lower than their respective designated limits. These parameters are calculated from measured radiochemical analyses of isotopes that emit a high amount of radioactivity including Cs-137, Sr-90, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241, Am-241, and Cm-244. Following the low temperature aluminum dissolution (LTAD) process, Tank 11H slurry samples were pulled from the tank and sent to Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to measure the extent of aluminum dissolution, hydroxide concentration, densities of slurry and supernatant, weight percent solids analyses, and radionuclide activities. The analyses of the composite sample found that approximately 90% of the total aluminum in the slurry was dissolved, indicating successful reduction of the insoluble aluminum in the waste tank. Additionally, the weight percent insoluble solids (slurry basis) measurement of the composite sample was found to be approximately 1%, demonstrating that minimal solids still remain in the tank. Finally, the radiochemical analyses of the composite sample determined that the waste contents of the tank met the IDP and radiolytic hydrogen generation rate requirements of the CSTF DSA. These measurements have shown that the LTAD process in Tank 11H was successful in waste reduction efforts and a positive step towards declaring PCWR and tank closure at SRS.

Dekarske, John [Savannah River National Laboratory↗

Risk Analysis of Radiological Release from Pu-238 Targets During Manual Handling

Pu-238 Isotope Production Targets are routinely installed in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) core, transferred, and stored in the spent fuel canal. These evolutions involve manual handling and manipulation of the targets underwater using long handled tools. The ATR Safety Analysis Report (SAR) postulates a design basis accident which results in damage from manual manipulation of targets, and radiological consequences must be determined for receptors inside the reactor facility, as well as public receptors. This presentation presents the analysis used to determine the radiological consequences due to potential target damage in the ATR canal. The analysis considered radionuclide release fractions, damage ratios for handling evolutions, and entrainment of radionuclides in the canal water.

Advanced Test Reactor↗

STAT7 v2.0 User Guide

The STAT7 software was developed to perform steady-state, single-phase thermal hydraulics analysis of plate-fueled reactors based on statistical propagation of uncertainties. Application of the software includes non-power research and test reactor analysis, and it has been used for the conversion to low- enriched uranium fuel of U.S. High Performance Research Reactors such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Research Reactor. Since it can be necessary to repeat reactor safety analysis, such as during fuel reloading, STAT7 accommodates flexibility in analyzing many practical aspects of reactor fuel management. STAT7 uses a Monte Carlo approach to model uncertainty in common fuel fabrication parameters and other key reactor operating parameters required for reactor thermal hydraulics analysis. These safety calculations are ultimately intended to protect against high fuel plate temperatures due to critical heat flux, or onset of flow instability. STAT7 supports water properties based on the IAPWS-IF97 functions (The International Association for the Properties of Water and Steam Industrial Formulation 1997 for the Thermodynamic Properties of Water and Steam) in addition to fitted functions. STAT7 predicts axial profiles of fuel, cladding, and coolant temperature along a lateral stripe that runs the full length of the fuel plate from the bottom to the top. STAT7 can simultaneously analyze every axial node in each lateral stripe of all fuel plates and coolant channels in every fuel element of an entire reactor core. Power splits are calculated for each axial node of each plate to determine how much of the power goes out each face of the plate. In a single execution, STAT7 can be used to perform full core analysis by analyzing the margin to onset of nucleate boiling and onset of flow instability for each axial node of each stripe of each plate of each fuel element in the core.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE Hanford Tank Side Cesium Removal System (TSCR) Update: Fabrication and Factory Acceptance Testing - 20300

The Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) System is a modular, quickly-deployable, and passively safe system for efficiently removing solids and cesium from alkaline liquid waste raffinate created by fuel processing on the Hanford site. This paper provides an overview of the project with particular emphasis on completion of fabrication and factory acceptance testing (FAT). All TSCR System components are inside three enclosures known as the Process Enclosure, Ancillary Enclosure, and Control Enclosure. The Process Enclosure is seismic design category II (SDC-II) and built to withstand the rigors of transportation and lifting, high winds, volcanic ash fall, and heavy precipitation (snow) over a temperature range of -25 to 115 deg. F. The Process Enclosure and Control Enclosure were fabricated in AVANTech's Columbia, SC facility, while the Ancillary Enclosure was fabricated in AVANTech's Richland, WA facility. The design and preliminary documented safety analysis were completed in December 2019, with all work being performed in accordance with ASME NQA-1 quality assurance requirements. The Process Enclosure, Ion Exchange Columns (IXCs), and several other TSCR components have a nuclear safety function and are designated as safety significant structures, systems, and components (SS-SSCs). The NQA-1 Commercial Grade Dedication (CGD) process was used to identify critical characteristics in order to accept materials and items used for fabrication of several safety significant TSCR components. This paper also addresses unique aspects and challenges of implementing CGD in DOE facilities and systems. After fabrication and preliminary testing, the Process and Control Enclosures were shipped to AVANTech's Richland facility where the complete TSCR System was setup and connected in a represented layout and configuration that will be used on the Hanford site. Test tanks and pumps were put in place and connected to the TSCR Process Enclosure in a manner that mimicked interfacing Double Shell Tanks in the 241-AP Tank Farm. The TSCR System was then tested/operated under conditions equivalent to those planned for onsite operation. Testing was separated into five separate phases as defined below: - Phase 1: Confirmation of TSCR System readiness for the FAT; - Phase 2: Verification of TSCR System operation under standard conditions; - Phase 3: Demonstration of TSCR System operation under non-standard conditions; - Phase 4: Demonstration of ion exchange media removal from an IXC; and - Phase 5: Completion of TSCR System lift plans and site mobilization. The Hanford Tank Operations Contractor, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), participated in all phases of testing. Testing at AVANTech's Richland Facility allowed WRPS personnel to familiarize themselves with TSCR operations in a radiologically clean facility prior to onsite mobilization. Engineering and operations personnel gained valuable experience that allowed them to better refine onsite operational protocols and procedures - including handling and movement of IXCs with a forklift. This paper describes the technologies used by the TSCR System as well as how these technologies are deployed and operated to advance the Hanford mission of safely, efficiently, and effectively treating tank waste. It also provides detailed information on fabrication and FAT, including operational data from simulated tank waste runs. A project schedule for WRPS' planned construction acceptance testing, operational acceptance testing, and actual tank waste treatment is provided. This presentation should be of great interest to parties responsible for the design, testing, and mobilization of modular NQA-1 technologies for the treatment of raffinate and similar liquid wastes containing high concentrations of radioactive cesium. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Engineering-Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.

Zelkin, Natalie↗

TCR Postulated Accident and MHA Dose Assessment

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is engaged in regulatory activities to gain US Department of Energy (DOE) approval to build and operate a small high-temperature gas reactor, the Transformational Challenge Reactor (TCR). ORNL uses advanced manufacturing techniques to produce select reactor components. The TCR is unique in its mission: the reactor’s at-power operating lifetime will be less than one effective full-power day to limit the radiological source term to very low values, thus facilitating approval to operate. The primary regulatory documents governing construction and operation of the facility are NUREG-1537, “Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors” and DOE-STD-3009, “Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis.” Although this document is not a safety basis document, it provides a conservative indication of the magnitude of onsite and offsite radiological doses for specific scenarios, thus informing future design and regulatory activities. As required by NUREG-1537, scenarios included in this analysis are (1) a worstcase depressurized loss-of-forced-circulation accident, and (2) a maximum hypothetical accident. Details on the analysis of dose consequences with various system configurations are also provided.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Ab Initio Evaluation of Plutonium Dioxide $S(α,β)$ and Thermal Neutron Cross Sections

Plutonium Dioxide (PuO 2 ) is an advanced fuel-cycle nuclear fuel material for thermal and fast reactors, with a melting point at 3261.8 K and thermal conductivity above 3 Wm -1 K -1 for temperatures below 1500 K. Plutonium from spent UO 2 is reprocessed to form chemically stable mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. In contrast to metallic fuels, the low PuO 2 conductivity results in high thermal gradients between fuel center and surface, resulting in structural annealing and efficient fission product migration over burnup. Crystal binding affects the doppler broadening of epithermal resonances for nuclear fuels and scattering behavior of thermal neutrons. Currently, there is no ENDF/B Thermal Scattering Law, i.e., $S(α,β)$, evaluation for PuO 2 , only free atom cross sections for Plutonium and Oxygen, respectively, which neglect lattice contributions to total cross section. Herein, ab initio lattice dynamics (AILD) techniques are employed to calculate the phonon density of states (DOS) using spin-orbit-coupling density functional theory (DFT) to predict the PuO2 paramagnetic ground-state structure. These results highlight the evaluation of $S(α,β)$ for Plutonium and Oxygen, respectively in PuO 2 and consequential generation of thermal neutron scattering cross sections for high fidelity criticality safety analysis and reactor calculations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Integral and Separate Effects Test Facilities To Support Water Cooled Small Modular Reactors: A Review

This study reviews previous experimental facilities and test programs relevant to water-cooled reactor system design and analysis to meet regulatory compliances. This study aims to find the best solution for designing the required experiments, obtaining necessary test data, and verifying the developed computer code/models to support the new reactor design and development while minimizing cost and time while leveraging experiences from previous facilities to minimize. Nuclear reactor licensing requires supportive design, analysis, and experimental results to ensure the safety of the full-scale prototype reactor in regular operation, as well as during postulated accident scenarios. These reactor design analyses are generally performed using system codes and other associated simulation tools that require assessment, verification and validation using an appropriate experimental dataset. Experimental facilities used for reactor system safety analysis and system code assessments are categorized into integral effects test (IET) and separate effects test (SET) facilities. Further, these IET and SET experiments and studies use geometrically scaled systems to reproduce the prototype system behavior at a reasonable cost, albeit with some scaling-related distortions. The design challenge of these model facilities is to identify and minimize scaling distortions while reproducing the most important operational phenomena in steady-state operation and in postulated accident scenarios. Lessons learned from previous experimental facilities, models, and correlations can support the development of new multipurpose, scaled, hybrid, integrated, and modular experimental facilities for advanced light water-cooled small modular reactors (SMRs). Successful operation of these facilities can significantly reduce upfront reactor development and demonstration costs and time to deployment.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Flightdeck Automation Problems (FLAP) Model for Safety Technology Portfolio Assessment

NASA's Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) develops and advances methodologies and technologies to improve air transportation safety. The Safety Analysis and Integration Team (SAIT) conducts a safety technology portfolio assessment (PA) to analyze the program content, to examine the benefits and risks of products with respect to program goals, and to support programmatic decision making. The PA process includes systematic identification of current and future safety risks as well as tracking several quantitative and qualitative metrics to ensure the program goals are addressing prominent safety risks accurately and effectively. One of the metrics within the PA process involves using quantitative aviation safety models to gauge the impact of the safety products. This paper demonstrates the role of aviation safety modeling by providing model outputs and evaluating a sample of portfolio elements using the Flightdeck Automation Problems (FLAP) model. The model enables not only ranking of the quantitative relative risk reduction impact of all portfolio elements, but also highlighting the areas with high potential impact via sensitivity and gap analyses in support of the program office. Although the model outputs are preliminary and products are notional, the process shown in this paper is essential to a comprehensive PA of NASA's safety products in the current program and future programs/projects.

Ancel, Ersin↗

Analysis of Radiological Release From Fueled Irradiation Experiments During Manual Handling (Slides)

Irradiation experiments are manually handled at the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) by qualified operators using long handled tools. Standard handling evolutions include insertion and removal from the reactor vessel, transfer to/from a storage location or cask in the ATR canal, and handling/reconfigurations at a canal working tray. Such routine handling has the potential to result in mechanical damage to the experiment boundary which is credited to retain fission products. Since damage can occur due to operator error, this is an anticipated occurrence. This work determines the radiological consequences to receptors inside the ATR facility, as well as public receptors. Given the wide variety of fuel types tested at the ATR, a generic approach to the analysis is taken. The radiological inventory is determined to bound a variety of fuel types (e.g., ceramic and molten fuel matrices) and fission powers on the U-235 enrichment spectrum. The source term analysis considers different release fractions to bound different fuel types and burnups. The postulated handling events occur underwater; thus, retention of the released isotopic content is considered within the canal water column. Retention of radionuclides in the water column is determined using a modified approach of United States (US) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183. Radiological dose to the facility receptor is determined using a compartment release model. Dose to the public receptor is determined using atmospheric dispersion models using site specific atmospheric conditions with the use of the Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) program version 7.2.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

Fabrication Lessons Learned of Transportation Packaging from the Perspective of a Design Authority - 20322

This paper presents lessons learned regarding fabricating packaging systems from the perspective of a design authority (DA). Capturing and implementing lessons learned is critical for an organization to reduce systematic project risk and thereby promote the likelihood of project success. This paper defines the design authority as the organization responsible for technical design, resolving technical design issues, quality assurance program, and maintenance of the packaging system license. A package system is defined as the packaging, its contents, and auxiliary equipment. Packages are certified by the NRC under 10 CFR 71[1] for transportation by ground. The following lessons learned subjects are presented in the paper: quality assurance, interpretation of drawing dimensional requirements, execution of manufacturing processes, hardware dimensional inspection, and leakage rate testing. All discrepancies presented in this paper have been resolved as described in the appropriate final data package. All described package systems are in compliance with their Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and certificate of conformance requirements. The intent of this paper is to identify opportunities for improving the outcome of future projects and to mitigate fabrication challenges proactively. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Image Fusion Guidance for In Situ Laser Fenestration of Aortic Stent graft for Endovascular Repair of Complex Aortic Aneurysm: Feasibility, Efficacy and Overall Functional Success

Objective: To evaluate feasibility, efficacy and overall functional success of image fusion guidance during laser-assisted in situ fenestration of aortic stent graft (LISFAS) for endovascular repair of complex aortic aneurysm (complex-EVAR) in a prospective study. Methods: Between September 2016 and July 2018, 20 patients were included and treated with LISFAS for complex-EVAR. Aortic aneurysms were either para-renal (n = 15) or thoraco-abdominal (n = 5) with 57 mm [first quartile: 54; third quartile: 68] median aneurysm diameter in 69 years [68;78] patients. All interventions were performed using the same angiographic system and 3D image fusion software for overlying pre-intervention CTA on per-intervention 2D fluoroscopy with cone-beam CT images to display target vessels ostia. Results: LISFAS for complex-EVAR with image fusion was performed in all patients, and no endovascular intervention required conversion to an open aortic repair. LISFAS of all target vessels was feasible in 18 patients (90%); 48 fenestrations out of 50 were performed successfully. Two fenestrations failed for renal arteries in two patients. Median ischemic times were as follows: 34 min [25;43] for superior mesenteric artery; 69 min [56;83] for left renal artery; 73 min [36;102] for right renal artery; and 93 min [89;96] for the celiac trunk. Median intervention and fluoroscopy times, iodinated contrast volume and X-ray exposure were 180 min [150;180], 74 min [64;87], 80 mL [59;113] and 338 Gy.cm{sup 2} [259;495], respectively. Efficacy was found in 17 patients (85%) on one-week follow-up CTA: Two patients had type 1 and 3 endoleaks, respectively, that were successfully embolized. Overall functional success was 90%. Median hospitalization stay was 9 days [8, 17]. The 30-day safety analysis was 90% (n = 2 deaths) owing to an undetermined cause and to bowel ischemia after low flow in intensive care unit. Conclusions: LISFAS using image fusion was feasible, efficient and overall functionally successful for complex-EVAR in this preliminary study.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗