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At least 253 records · Page 14

Radiation Dispersal Devices. A brief overview [Slides]

In this presentation I lump together the "classified RDD" - a dispersion of aerosolized radioactive material - with the nefarious use of radioactive materials. This can include other means of dispersal as well as an RED - a Radiological Exposure Device. This combination is because the threat is the nefarious use of radioactive material, and most of our concerns are in regards to the loss of control of the material, potential(s) for misuse, and detection.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Transportation scenarios for risk analysis.

Transportation risk, like any risk, is defined by the risk triplet: what can happen (the scenario), how likely it is (the probability), and the resulting consequences. This paper evaluates the development of transportation scenarios, the associated probabilities, and the consequences. The most likely radioactive materials transportation scenario is routine, incident-free transportation, which has a probability indistinguishable from unity. Accident scenarios in radioactive materials transportation are of three different types: accidents in which there is no impact on the radioactive cargo, accidents in which some gamma shielding may be lost but there is no release of radioactive material, and accident in which radioactive material may potentially be released. Accident frequencies, obtainable from recorded data validated by the U.S. Department of Transportation, are considered equivalent to accident probabilities in this study. Probabilities of different types of accidents are conditional probabilities, conditional on an accident occurring, and are developed from event trees. Development of all of these probabilities and the associated highway and rail accident event trees are discussed in this paper.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Designing Flexibility into the Authorized Radioactive Contents of the 9982 Shipping Package

The 9982 radioactive material package is being designed to safely transport small gram quantities of radioactive material within the United States. Typically, such shipping packages are designed to ship only a single radioactive material content within the U.S., which greatly limits the type of radioactive material allowed for shipment. The 9982’s content, however, is designed around bounding limits for numerous radionuclides, which will allow many more content variations to be shipped in a single package compared to other package designs. Here, contents from 3013, 9977, and 9978 packages are analyzed to determine if they are qualified for shipment in the 9982 using a sum-of-the-fractions methodology to see if the sum of the ratios of the masses of the radionuclides over the mass limits exceeds a value of one (1). Since all three of the example contents meet satisfy this method, the maximum content that could be shipped in a 9982 was determined. For the 3013 package, up to between 199.96 grams and 200 grams of a plutonium mixture could be shipped depending on the weight percentages of the isotopes. The 9977 material resulted in a 174-gram content that satisfies the summations for either metal or oxide form and regardless of whether a shielding pig is present or not. Lastly, the 9978 materials, two different americium standards, have a maximum content mass of 200 grams regardless of whether the americium-241 and americium-243 are shipped together or separately. These three applications of the 9982 exemplify the use for a package with multiple approved contents since the functions of three separate packages are fulfilled by one new package, reducing the need for separate operational procedures.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Intrinsic Dosimetry: Elemental Composition Effects on the Thermoluminescence of Commercial Borosilicate Glass

Intrinsic dosimetry is the method of measuring total absorbed dose received by the walls of a container holding radioactive material. By considering this dose in tandem with the physical characteristics of the radioactive material housed within the container, this method can provide enhanced pathway information for interdicted radioactive samples. Thermoluminescence (TL) dosimetry was used to measure ionizing radiation dose effects on stock borosilicate glass. Differences in TL glow curve shape and intensity were observed for glasses from different geographical origins. The different TL signatures strongly correlated with the concentration of alkaline earth metals and the ratio of sodium to the total amount of alkali metal present in the borosilicate glass.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

AUTHORIZING THE DOT SPECIFICATION 6M PACKAGING FOR CONTINUED USE AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M packaging was in extensive use for more than 40 years for in-commerce shipments of Type B quantities of fissile and radioactive material (RAM) across the USA, among the Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories, and between facilities in the DOE production complex. In January 2004, the DOT Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) Agency issued a final rule in the Federal Register to ammend requirements in the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) pertaining to the transportation of radioactive materials. The final rule became effective on October 1, 2004. One of those changes discontinued the use of the DOT specification 6M, along with other DOT specification packagings, on October 1, 2008. A main driver for the change was due to the fact that 6M specification packagings were not supported by a Safety Analysis Report for Packagings (SARP) that was compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 71 (10 CFR 71). The regulatory rules for the discontinued use have been edited in Title 49 of the CFR Parts 100-185, 2004 edition and thereafter. Prior to October 1, 2008, the use of the 6M within the boundaries of the Savannah River Site (SRS), called an onsite transfer, was governed by an onsite transportation document that referenced 49 CFR Parts 100-185. SRS had to develop an Onsite Safety Assessment (OSA) which was independent of 49 CFR in order to justify the continued use of the DOT Specification 6M for the transfer of radioactive material (RAM) at the SRS after October 1, 2008. This paper will discuss the methodology for and difficulties associated with authorizing the DOT Specification 6M Packaging for continued use at the Savannah River Site.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

In situ liquid SIMS analysis of uranium oxide

Trace analysis of nuclear materials in solid particles collected in the environment or particles in liquid slurry generated in nuclear material manufacturing processes can pinpoint elemental, organic, and isotopic signatures of nuclear fuel cycle activities and processes. Such information can support nuclear safeguards programs by increasing our ability to detect undeclared nuclear materials, routine activities for safeguarding at declared facilities, and illicit activities. However, trace radioactive material analysis in liquids and slurries is challenging using bulk approaches. For example, one drawback of sensitive analysis such as inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) is that sample is consumed or destroyed as a result of the technical approach. We developed a vacuum compatible microfluidic interface to enable surface analysis of liquids and liquid-solid interactions using time-of-flight secondary ion mass spectrometry (ToF-SIMS). In this work, we illustrate initial results of liquid standards containing uranium using in situ liquid SIMS. Specifically a series of diluted uranium standards used for ICPMS analysis were studied and the limit of detection was estimated. Since the liquid SIMS analysis is almost nondestructive, the same sample can be analyzed by other more destructive approaches afterwards or saved for future references. Consequently, multimodal analysis is possible. Our results demonstrate that in situ liquid SIMS can be used as a new approach to analyze radioactive materials in liquid and slurry forms of relevance to the IAEA safeguards missions.

In situ liquid ToF-SIMS, uranium, limit of detecti↗

Risks of Hazardous Substances in Radioactive Waste for the Konrad Repository in Germany - 17522

When disposing of radioactive waste with negligible heat generation, the activity of the radionuclides is limited. However, the waste including radioactive material comprises a certain proportion of non-radioactive material. The risk of hazardous contamination of the groundwater by non-radioactive substances must be taken into account. It must be ascertained that the non-radioactive material cannot affect near-surface groundwater, which is a resource for drinking water supply. To achieve this, limit values on the amount of hazardous substances in the total waste volume shall be determined. In 2002 a regulatory approval was granted to the 'Konrad' final storage facility for radioactive waste with negligible heat generation according to the German Water Resources Act. This approval is embedded in the license (plan-approval decision) based on the German Atomic Energy Act. The approval is based on the model of a possible discharge of contaminants from the final storage facility. In a long-term simulation spanning 300,000 years, contact of the waste with the groundwater in the surrounding rock formations over the postoperational phase was conservatively assumed. The maximum amount of allowable disposal of substances - such that no concern of affecting the near-surface groundwater arises - can be derived from the solubility of the respective substances. Implementing the permit according to the Water Resources Act requires: - classification of the waste through delivery declaration obligations - monitoring the substance inspection in the waste to assess its suitability for the disposal, and - stock keeping procedures for the disposal waste by the operator. While the repository is operated by the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) (http://www.bfs.de./EN/home/home{sub n}ode;), reporting to the Federal Environment Ministry, the statutory water permit is issued and applied by the State of Lower Saxony as responsible state authority. A waste package/container list supplements a comprehensive list of substances. From this - depending on the respectively conditioned waste - material vectors can be derived. For this purpose, BfS provides a database with a substances and container list to the waste owners. In the meantime, first experiences have been collected in applying the approval. More than 540 waste containers with a total mass of almost 6,000 Mg have been controlled and are ready for disposal. In our presentation we will show the recent development in supervising the preparation for the disposal of mixed waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

An Aerial Survey of the 200 East and 200 West Areas of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation - October 2016

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Aerial Measuring System (AMS), based at the Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) in Las Vegas, Nevada, performed an aerial survey of the 200 West and 200 East Areas of the DOE Hanford Site during September 2015. The survey was performed using the RSL Bell 412 helicopter equipped with twelve 2"x4"x16" thallium-activated sodium iodide (NaI) logs with their spectra summed to form a single detector and a mechanically-cooled high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector. Both detectors collected gamma ray spectra from naturally-occurring radioactive materials and from anthropogenic radioactive materials present due to activities at the site. Data was collected over the site during the 30 hours of survey flight time, resulting in approximately 100,000 one-second spectra collected by both the NaI array and the HPGe detector. These data have been analyzed to map the distribution of anthropogenic radioactivity and identify the isotopes responsible for that activity.

200 East↗

A microfluidic electrochemical cell for studying the corrosion of uranium dioxide (UO 2 )

We have developed a specialized microfluidic electrochemical cell that enables in situ investigation of the electrochemical corrosion of microgram quantities of redox active solids. The advantage of downscaling is the reduction of hazards, waste, expense, and greatly expanding data collection for hazardous materials, including radioactive samples. Cyclic voltammetry was used to monitor the oxidation–reduction cycle of minute quantities of micron-size uraninite (UO 2 ) particles, from the formation of hexavalent uranium (U(VI)), U 3 O 7 and reduction to UO 2+x . Reaction progress was also studied in situ with scanning electron microscopy. The electrochemical measurements matched those obtained at the bulk-scale and were consistent with ex situ characterization of the run products by X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy, scanning transmission electron microscopy, and atomic force microscopy; thus, demonstrating the utility of the microfluidic approach for studying radioactive materials.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Quartz Ampoule Loading, Sealing, and Inspection

This procedure applies to the loading of materials into quartz ampoules and flame sealing these ampoules. Flame sealed quartz ampoules are commonly used as a sealed containment for neutron irradiation. Due to the importance of maintaining containment for this application, this procedure involves a double encapsulation design wherein a sealed inner ampoule is sealed is in turn sealed within a larger diameter outer ampoule. General guidance for inspection of ampoules by destructive, non-destructive, qualitative (e.g., visual) and other methods are given. Materials to be placed inside the ampoules may consist of stable element materials or radioactive materials in either solid or liquid form. Liquids shall be dried prior to sealing the ampoule.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Effect of atmospheric conditions on operation of terahertz systems for remote detection of ionizing materials

This study was motivated by a new concept of remote detection of concealed radioactive materials by using a high power terahertz (THz) wave beam, which can be focused in a small spot where the wave electric field exceeds the breakdown threshold. In the presence of seed electrons in such a volume, this focusing can initiate the avalanche breakdown. Typically, an ambient density of free electrons is assumed to be at the level of one particle per cubic centimeter. So, when a breakdown-prone volume is smaller than 1 cm{sup 3}, there should be significant difference between the breakdown rates in the case of presence of additional sources of ionization versus its absence. Since the flux density of gamma rays emitted by radioactive materials rapidly falls with the distance from the source, while the intensity of THz waves also decreases with the distance due to wave attenuation in the atmosphere, it is important to find an optimal location of the breakdown to be initiated for a given distance between a radioactive material and a THz antenna. This problem is analyzed in a given paper with the account for not only atmospheric attenuation of THz waves but also the air turbulence.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Nondestructive Analysis of MET-5 Paint Can at TA35 Building 2 A-Wing Vault

In Building 2 A-wing vault MET-5 has some drums and other packages they wanted NEN-1 help identifying nondestructively. Measurements using a mechanically cooled portable high-purity germanium HPGe Ortec detective were taken of a paint can container labeled DU-2A to determine if any radioactive material was inside. The HPGe detector measures the gamma rays emitted by radioactive material and displays it as a spectrum. The spectrum is used to identify this radioactive material by using appropriate analysis software and identifying the gamma ray peaks. A paint can container, DU-2A, was analyzed with PeakEasy 4.84 and FRAM 5.2. The FRAM report is shown. The enrichment is 0.091% U235 and 99.907% U238. This material is depleted uranium. The measurement was performed in the near field, and to extract a mass a far field measurement will need to be taken.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR. To protect the health and safety of the public, shipments of radioactive materials are made in packaging that is designed, fabricated, assembled, tested, procured, used, maintained, and repaired in accordance with the provisions cited above. Safety requirements addressed by the regulations that must be met when transporting radioactive materials are containment of radioactive materials, radiation shielding, and assurance of nuclear subcriticality.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Examining the Effect of Plume Rise on Radiological Consequences of Nuclear Accidents

A nuclear accident could cause release of radioactive material outside containment. This material will eventually disperse into the surrounding environment, and could pose a serious threat to public safety, and environment. Mitigation of radiological consequences of such an accident is highly desirable, and since Fukushima accident, there has been a growing focus on nuclear utilities to develop capabilities for this purpose. Undoubtedly, suppression of radioactive material release and dispersion is the primary mean for mitigating radiological consequences nevertheless alternative methods should also be explored to broaden the spectrum of choices for actual circumstances. As we know that, dispersion of radioactive material and subsequent radiological consequences are affected by plume rise. Plume rise is an important factor in determining ground level contamination since it can increase effective release height appreciably provided that effluent discharge speed and temperature is high enough. Under most circumstances, one can expect reduction in radiological consequences due to lower levels of radiation dose and ground contamination in the presence of adequate plume rise. Nevertheless, the effect of plume rise is usually ignored in radiological consequence studies for the sake of conservatism, and lack of information. However, this particular attribute of plume rise interested us to investigate the effect of plume rise in the scope of consequence mitigation and how this advantage could be utilized during an accident progression to minimize the impact of radioactivity release to the environment. In this work, we examine the effect of plume rise on radiological consequences of a nuclear accident for plume rise contributions much larger ({approx}500 m) than usually achievable in normal circumstances. The effect of plume rise on radiological consequences is quantified in this study as decontamination credit (DCC) achievable corresponding to maximum annual dose. This analysis is performed for a number of release heights and atmospheric conditions. We discuss available results in the scope of radiological consequence mitigation, devising a strategy for utilizing plume rise phenomenon with the help of an external propelling device like a jet engine for radiological consequence management. This study is continuation of our efforts for devising systems and strategies to mitigate consequences of radioactivity release accidents like Fukushima. We have proposed several ideas for suppressing/preventing the dispersion of released radioactive material to the environment using offsite equipment.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

University of Nevada, Reno Graduate Certificate in Nuclear Packaging

This paper describes a new Graduate Certificate in Nuclear Packaging (GCNP). Nuclear materials are currently used for large-scale production of electricity without greenhouse gas generation, advanced medical treatments, food sterilization, and sophisticated measurement technologies. In order to benefit from these uses, nuclear materials packaging must be developed, manufactured, inspected, and maintained for storage, transfer, transport, and disposal that protect the public and the environment. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program (PCP) originally offered the following ten, one-day to ten-day training courses. 1. Methods for Reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packages and Performing Confirmatory Analysis; 2. Welding Criteria for Shipping Containers; 3. Structural Analysis and Acceptance Criteria; 4. Quality Assurance (QA) for Radioactive Material Packaging Training; 5. Application of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code to Radioactive Material Transportation Packaging; 6. ARG-US Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) System for Management of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials; 7. Packaging Operations and Maintenance; 8. Packaging Leakage Test Training; 9. Management of SARP Preparation; 10. Transport Security of Radioactive Material. These courses were designed in accordance with DOE standards. They were taught at a rigorous graduate-university level by experienced technical staff who are coordinated by Argonne, Lawrence Livermore, and Savannah River National Laboratories. The courses were taught at these Laboratories or nearby locations. The PCP courses are attended by personnel from government agencies, national laboratories, and the nuclear industry, from both inside and outside the United States. Students in these classes have generally earned undergraduate or higher degrees. These courses are designed to assist student with specialized job duties, and may provide them a competitive advantage when seeking employment or promotion in the nuclear packaging and other related fields. (authors)

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR. To protect the health and safety of the public, shipments of radioactive materials are made in packaging that is designed, fabricated, assembled, tested, procured, used, maintained, and repaired in accordance with the provisions cited above. Safety requirements addressed by the regulations that must be met when transporting radioactive materials are containment of radioactive materials, radiation shielding, and assurance of nuclear subcriticality.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radionuclide Emission Estimation for the Center for Advanced Energy Studies (CAES)

An Radiological Safety Analysis Computer Program (RSAC)-7 model dose assessment was performed to evaluate maximum Center for Advanced Energy Studies (CAES) boundary effective dose equivalent (EDE, in mrem/yr) for potential individual releases of radionuclides from the facility. The CAES is a public/private partnership between the State of Idaho and its academic research institutions, the federal government through the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) managed by the Battelle Energy Alliance (BEA). CAES serves to advance energy security for our nation by expanding educational opportunities at Idaho universities in energy-related areas, creating new capabilities within its member institutions, and delivering technological innovations leading to technology-based economic development for the intermountain region. CAES has developed a strategic plan (INL/EXT-07-12950) based on the balanced scorecard approach. At the present time it is unknown exactly what processes will be used in the facility in support of this strategic plan. What is known is that the Idaho State University (ISU) Radioactive Materials License (Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC] license 11-27380-01) is the basis for handling radioactive material in the facility. The material in this license is shared between the ISU campus and the CAES facility. There currently are no agreements in place to limit the amount of radioactive material at the CAES facility or what is done to the material in the facility. The scope of this analysis is a summary look at the basis dose for each radionuclide included under the license at a distance of 100, 500, and 1,000 m. Inhalation, ingestion and ground surface dose was evaluated using the NRC design basis guidelines. The results can be used to determine a sum of the fractions approach to facility safety. This sum of the fractions allows a facility threshold value (TV) to be established and potential activities to be evaluated against this TV.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Propagation of gamma rays and production of free electrons in air

This paper is devoted to the analysis of production of free electrons in air by gamma-rays leaking from radioactive materials. A model based on the Klein-Nishina scattering theory is used to calculate scattering cross sections and approximate the electron production rate. The model includes the effects of primary gamma-quanta radiated by the source as well as that scattered in air. Comparison of the model with the mcnpx kinetic code (http://mcnpx.lanl.gov/) in a sample problem shows excellent agreement. The motivation for this research comes from the recently proposed concept of remote detection of concealed radioactive materials [V. L. Granatstein and G. S. Nusinovich, J. Appl. Phys. 108, 063304 (2010)]. The concept is based on the breakdown in air at the focal point of a high-power beam of electromagnetic waves produced by a THz gyrotron with a 10-20 {mu}s pulse. The presence of a radioactive material can greatly exceed the production rate of free electrons over the natural background rate. Additional electrons act as seeds to initiate the breakdown and create sufficiently dense plasma at the focal region. The dense plasma can then be remotely detected as an unambiguous effect of the concealed radioactive material.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗