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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Planetary Protection

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Amy Baker↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Ultrashort Pulse Laser Surface Processing Techniques for Sterilization of Metal Surfaces for Planetary Protection

To prevent forward contamination from microbes aboard spacecraft intended to search for extraterrestrial life, there is a need for effective sterilization methods. However, current techniques are both time-consuming and expensive. For example, dry heat sterilization requires removal from the assembly site and several days of treatment. Furthermore, some components such as optics and electronics are not compatible with current sterilization techniques. Here, we report the latest results in our development of a novel femtosecond laser processing technique for the rapid sterilization of spacecraft hardware. Femtosecond lasers produce extremely high photon fluxes (10^29 photons/sec*cm^2, ~0.03 J/cm^2) in extremely short pulses, which can inactivate even stress-tolerant microbial spores with minimal damage to the spacecraft surface. Aluminum coupons were inoculated with specific densities of Bacillus subtilis bacterial endospores. These coupons were treated with various laser illumination parameters. Afterward, metal coupon samples were assayed for viable spores using a polyvinyl alcohol (PVA) peel, serial dilution, and plating for colony-forming units (CFU). Results indicate that with high enough energy density and pulse counts, most bacterial spores are inactivated with minimal damage to the metal. The sterilization is dependent on both the fluence and pulse count. In addition, femtosecond pulses are more effective than longer pulses for inactivation. These experiments have consistently achieved 4-log reduction in viable spores. Sterilization has been achieved on both flat metal coupons and non-flat surfaces with microchannels, with a slight reduction in sterilization efficiency on the uneven surface. The application of air flow during laser processing was also investigated as a way to remove spores that are dislodged from the surface by the laser illumination, which would contribute to the reduction of spacecraft bioburden. With laser processing technology rapidly evolving, our results support the possibility of an extremely rapid, in-situ surface sterilization method for use in spacecraft assembly clean rooms.

Kaleb McQuillan↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

What Is the OPP Approach to the Next Generation of Laboratory Requirements

Planetary Protection Quality Management System NASA’s Office of Planetary Protection uses a quality-based process evaluation approach to verify planetary protection bioburden compliance over a project’s life cycle. The verification strategy shifts from a comparative direct assay approach validating hardware bioburden at a “moment in time,” to one that implements a continual quality assurance demonstration of the analytical process via established data requirements, laboratory operational, and management parameters throughout the mission’s entire assembly process. Laboratory quality-based systems and management strategies are standardized and implemented across government and industry. A standardized laboratory quality system approach increases transparency throughout the project’s life cycle and aligns planetary protection analytical approaches with government and industry practices to support both NASA and commercial endeavors. Strategies include the implementation of a laboratory quality management structure that documents and routinely validates parameters critical to experimental design and data collection, provides data quality assessment parameters, and ultimately validates that the collected data is of sufficient quality and quantity to meet the specified technical goals. Planetary protection can draw on these practices to provide a systematic process-based quality approach to support planetary protection validation and compliance requirements. Quality approaches including data quality objectives, method performance, data acceptance criteria and the associated laboratory quality management system are presented to provide an overview and framework for a planetary protection laboratory quality management system.

Amy Baker↗
NASA NTRS2003

Robotic Mars Sample Return: Risk Assessment and Analysis Report

A comparison of the risk associated with two alternative scenarios for a robotic Mars sample return mission was conducted. Two alternative mission scenarios were identified, the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL) reference Mission and a mission proposed by Johnson Space Center (JSC). The JPL mission was characterized by two landers and an orbiter, and a Mars orbit rendezvous to retrieve the samples. The JSC mission (Direct/SEP) involves a solar electric propulsion (SEP) return to earth followed by a rendezvous with the space shuttle in earth orbit. A qualitative risk assessment to identify and characterize the risks, and a risk analysis to quantify the risks were conducted on these missions. Technical descriptions of the competing scenarios were developed in conjunction with NASA engineers and the sequence of events for each candidate mission was developed. Risk distributions associated with individual and combinations of events were consolidated using event tree analysis in conjunction with Monte Carlo techniques to develop probabilities of mission success for each of the various alternatives. The results were the probability of success of various end states for each candidate scenario. These end states ranged from complete success through various levels of partial success to complete failure. Overall probability of success for the Direct/SEP mission was determined to be 66% for the return of at least one sample and 58% for the JPL mission for the return of at least one sample cache. Values were also determined for intermediate events and end states as well as for the probability of violation of planetary protection. Overall mission planetary protection event probabilities of occurrence were determined to be 0.002% and 1.3% for the Direct/SEP and JPL Reference missions respectively.

Lalk, Thomas R.↗
NASA NTRS2026

Does the International Space Station Leak DNA? Preliminary Results from the ISS External Microorganisms Payload

Existing crewed spacecraft like the ISS (International Space Station) leak by design. The ISS routinely releases gas to maintain life support systems and when astronauts exit the station to perform space walks. The chemical component of this leakage is well characterized, but the biological components are not. The ISS is not subject to planetary protection requirements, but planned missions to Mars will use similar systems and will be subject to planetary protection requirements. If detectable microorganisms are escaping through vents and or airlocks we may need to redesign our crewed habitats to minimize this type of contamination. To test the hypothesis that microorganisms from inside ISS are detectable on exterior surfaces an astronaut used the ISS External Microorganisms sampling kit (Rucker et al. 2018) to sample exterior surfaces of the ISS during an EVA (Extra Vehicular Activity) in January of 2025. These samples were returned to Earth for DNA extraction and sequencing. We successfully, extracted and sequenced bacterial, fungal and viral DNA from these samples that was not present in the negative controls. These results should help NASA refine the planetary protection requirements for crewed missions. Methods: The samples were collected using sterile, DNA free, buccal swabs (23 mm. diameter) housed in custom canisters. Each canister uses a 0.2 μm Teflon filter to maintain sterility as the caddy, holding 8 swabs moves in and out of vacuum. The astronaut sampled the: 1) airlock vestibule, 2) airlock thermal cover, 3) a gap in the micrometeorite shielding near the airlock, 4) a handrail near the airlock, 5) the Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly vent, and 6) the Vacuum Exhaust System vent. The seventh swab was exposed to vacuum during the EVA without touching it to a surface. The eighth swab, a negative control, was not opened until the caddy returned to Earth. DNA was extracted from the swabs using a QIamp UCP Pathogen kit and prepared for sequencing on an Aviti (Element Biosciences) sequencer (Arslan et al. 2024). The resulting sequences were analyzed using the EDGE Bioinformatics platform (Li et al. 2017). The sequences were analyzed individually using tools like BLAST, GOTTCHA2, Kraken2, and PanGIA. The data were also assembled into metagenome assembled genomes) using tools like CONCOCT, MaxBin2 and MetaBAT2. Results: We successfully extracted and sequenced bacterial, archaeal, fungal and viral DNA from all seven samples. The handrail swab had the lowest number of reads (768,651) and the airlock thermal cover had the highest number of reads (8,819,230). These samples contain DNA from human associated bacteria (e.g. Crynebacterium riegelii ), fungi (.e.g. Penicillium rubens ), and viruses (e.g Alphapapillomavirus ). Conclusion: Preliminary interpretation suggest that the airlock and the space suits themselves are the largest sources of contaminant DNA. Most if not all of the DNA is from organisms known to be present inside the ISS. Vents attached to life support systems may be a lesser source of biological contamination. Further analysis should help NASA address planetary protection knowledge gaps for crewed missions.

Aaron B Regberg↗
NASA NTRS2024

Susceptibility of extremophiles to far-UVC light for bioburden reduction in spacecraft assembly facilities

The prevention and reduction of microbial species entering and leaving Earth's biosphere is a critical aspect of planetary protection research. While various decontamination methods exist and are currently utilized for planetary protection purposes, the use of far-UVC light (200–230 nm) as a means for microbial reduction remains underexplored. Unlike conventional germicidal ultraviolet at 254 nm, which can pose a health risk to humans even with small exposure doses, far-UVC light poses minimal health hazard making it a suitable candidate for implementation in occupied areas of spacecraft assembly facilities. This study investigates the efficacy of far-UVC 222-nm light to inactivate bacteria using microbial species which are relevant to planetary protection either in vegetative cell or spore form. All the tested vegetative cells demonstrated susceptibility to 222-nm exposure, although susceptibility varied among the tested species. Notably, Deinococcus radiodurans, a species highly tolerant to extreme environmental conditions, exhibited the most resistance to far-UVC exposure with a dose of 112 mJ/cm 2 required for a 1-log reduction in survival. While spore susceptibility was similar across the species tested, Bacillus pumilus spores were the most resistant of the tested spores when analyzed with a bi-exponential cell killing model (D 90 of 6.8 mJ/cm 2 ). Overall, these results demonstrate the efficacy of far-UVC light for reducing microbial bioburden to help ensure the success and safety of future space exploration missions.

Ultraviolet light↗
NASA NTRS2014

Human Mars Surface Science Operations

Human missions to the surface of Mars will have challenging science operations. This paper will explore some of those challenges, based on science operations considerations as part of more general operational concepts being developed by NASA's Human Spaceflight Architecture (HAT) Mars Destination Operations Team (DOT). The HAT Mars DOT has been developing comprehensive surface operations concepts with an initial emphasis on a multi-phased mission that includes a 500-day surface stay. This paper will address crew science activities, operational details and potential architectural and system implications in the areas of (a) traverse planning and execution, (b) sample acquisition and sample handling, (c) in-situ science analysis, and (d) planetary protection. Three cross-cutting themes will also be explored in this paper: (a) contamination control, (b) low-latency telerobotic science, and (c) crew autonomy. The present traverses under consideration are based on the report, Planning for the Scientific Exploration of Mars by Humans1, by the Mars Exploration Planning and Analysis Group (MEPAG) Human Exploration of Mars-Science Analysis Group (HEM-SAG). The traverses are ambitious and the role of science in those traverses is a key component that will be discussed in this paper. The process of obtaining, handling, and analyzing samples will be an important part of ensuring acceptable science return. Meeting planetary protection protocols will be a key challenge and this paper will explore operational strategies and system designs to meet the challenges of planetary protection, particularly with respect to the exploration of "special regions." A significant challenge for Mars surface science operations with crew is preserving science sample integrity in what will likely be an uncertain environment. Crewed mission surface assets -- such as habitats, spacesuits, and pressurized rovers -- could be a significant source of contamination due to venting, out-gassing and cleanliness levels associated with crew presence. Low-latency telerobotic science operations has the potential to address a number of contamination control and planetary protection issues and will be explored in this paper. Crew autonomy is another key cross-cutting challenge regarding Mars surface science operations, because the communications delay between earth and Mars could as high as 20 minutes one way, likely requiring the crew to perform many science tasks without direct timely intervention from ground support on earth. Striking the operational balance between crew autonomy and earth support will be a key challenge that this paper will address.

Bobskill, Marianne R.↗
NASA NTRS2012

MSL Lessons Learned and Knowledge Capture

The Mars Program has recently been informed of the Planetary Protection Subcommittee (PPS) recommendation, which was endorsed by the NAC, concerning Mars Science Lab (MSL) lessons learned and knowledge capture. The Mars Program has not had an opportunity to consider any decisions specific to the PPS recommendation. Some of the activities recommended by the PPS would involve members of the MSL flight team who are focused on cruise, entry descent & landing, and early surface operations; those activities would have to wait. Members of the MSL planetary protection team at JPL are still available to support MSL lessons learned and knowledge capture; some of the specifically recommended activities have already begun. The Mars Program shares the PPS/NAC concerns about loss of potential information & expertise in planetary protection practice.

planetary protection↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Need for Earth-Based Experiments to Inform Microbial Evolution on Planetary Surfaces

Introduction: Historically, the focus of planetary protection at NASA has been on unmanned, robotic missions. Such missions have paved the way for understanding how to implement planetary protection in a feasible and cost-sensitive way. However, with the introduction of crewed missions to Mars in the not-sodistant future, there is a need to better define and understand how to implement planetary protection under new circumstances, as well as understand the risk of contaminating Mars. One unavoidable fact is that microbes will go where humans go. Therefore, it is critical to understand how these microbes may (and will) impact our ability to conduct meaningful, reliable astrobiological science. Microorganisms have spent millions of years evolving to survive in extreme environments here on Earth. Already there are indications that microbes aboard the International Space Station evolve and adapt to life in low earth orbit. The microbes that are eventually taken to Mars with humans will also adapt, potentially causing harmful effects to crew and/or the planetary or astrobiological science conducted. Therefore, it is of critical interest that we evaluate and characterize the potential risks of microbial evolution on Mars. It is expected that microbes carried by humans will begin to evolve to new environments even before landing on Mars, during the several month cruise phase. Once landed, microbes will encounter different stressors within the crew habitats on Mars. During extravehicular activities, venting, or other release events, microbes will find their way out onto the Martian surface. The induced environments around crewed systems will create potentially-favorable conditions for microbes to continue evolving on Mars. Eventually, microbes may find their way beyond the close confines of the crewed area and continue evolving so as to fill new or distant niches on the Martian surface. It is challenging to replicate Martian environments here on Earth, making it nearly impossible to predict the evolutionary changes that microbes would undergo on Mars. But this work is critical. Serial passaging experiments performed by Richard Lenski on E. coli show the dramatic changes microbes can undergo even within a laboratory setting. Furthermore, experiments performed by Michael Baym also demonstrate the power of single mutations in microbial development of antibiotic resistance [3]. Long duration experiments should be performed on a suite of microbes exposed to environments likely to be experienced on the Martian surface. While simulating space environments can be challenging, facilities exist that can achieve individual and combinatorial environmental conditions to simulate space and planetary conditions. Such chambers should be employed for microbial studies. Currently, at the Marshall Space Flight Center, we have used various stressors like drying, vacuum, proton radiation, and ultraviolet light both separately and in combination, to evaluate the survival of cleanroom microbes. Shockingly, several non-spore forming isolates have demonstrated the ability to survive many extreme conditions (manuscript in preparation). These short duration exposures must be augmented with larger and more gradual studies to replicate what microbes might experience in the transition from cruise, to surface habitats, to induced surface environments, and finally true Martian environments. While no Earth-based experiment can perfectly replicate the Martian environment, nor could we test every possible microbe in simulation experimental regimes, efforts should be made to examine the evolutionary potential of the “usual suspects” seen on the ISS or in other crewed environments to begin to fill this important knowledge gap.

Chelsi D. Cassilly↗