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All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Physical Tabletop Exercise for Small Modular Reactor Facilities

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. This evolving threat landscape includes adversaries having offensive cyber capabilities to attack information technology (IT) systems and operation technology (OT) systems. These adversaries may have the ability to attack the physical protection system (PPS) networks with potential consequential impacts that could degrade the effectiveness of the PPS. These cyber attacks may also be used to attack the safety and operational systems used to operate and ensure the safety of the reactor. Additionally, adversaries may gain access to unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that may be used to provide reconnaissance and surveillance of the facility, provide information to the adversaries, and be equipped with kinetic capabilities such as explosives or weapons that can be used to directly attack the facility. The Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy’s Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program funded Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop a cyber-physical tabletop exercise (TTX). This exercise was conducted on a hypothetical small modular reactor (SMR) facility, and only considered a potential adversary cyber attack on the PPS to a physical attack on the hypothetical facility to achieve a radiological release. This cyber-physical TTX is meant to provide lessons learned to integrate the cyber security system design and the physical protection system (PPS) design to decrease design, operation, and maintenance costs as well as increase effectiveness for defending against design basis threat attacks at the facility. This TTX will also provide a framework and method for SMR and microreactor vendors to conduct their own cyber-physical TTX and gain impactful insights to improving the cyber and physical protection system design for their SMR or microreactor facility design.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2016

psst: An open-source power system simulation toolbox in Python

This paper is an overview of Power System Simulation Toolbox (psst). psst is an open-source Python application for the simulation and analysis of power system models. psst simulates the wholesale market operation by solving a DC Optimal Power Flow (DCOPF), Security Constrained Unit Commitment (SCUC) and a Security Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED). psst also includes models for the various entities in a power system such as Generator Companies (GenCos), Load Serving Entities (LSEs) and an Independent System Operator (ISO). psst features an open modular object oriented architecture that will make it useful for researchers to customize, expand, experiment beyond solving traditional problems. psst also includes a web based Graphical User Interface (GUI) that allows for user friendly interaction and for implementation on remote High Performance Computing (HPCs) clusters for parallelized operations. This paper also provides an illustrative application of psst and benchmarks with standard IEEE test cases to show the advanced features and the performance of toolbox.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk (O.T. Gagnon III) 9-18-2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NASA NTRS2011

Harnessing the Risk-Related Data Supply Chain: An Information Architecture Approach to Enriching Human System Research and Operations Knowledge

An Information Architecture facilitates the understanding and, hence, harnessing of the human system risk-related data supply chain which enhances the ability to securely collect, integrate, and share data assets that improve human system research and operations. By mapping the risk-related data flow from raw data to useable information and knowledge (think of it as a data supply chain), the Human Research Program (HRP) and Space Life Science Directorate (SLSD) are building an information architecture plan to leverage their existing, and often shared, IT infrastructure.

Buquo, Lynn E.↗

DOE OSTI2021

Encoding Frequency Constraints in Preventive Unit Commitment Using Deep Learning With Region-of-Interest Active Sampling

With the increasing penetration of renewable energy, frequency response and its security are of significant concerns for reliable power system operations. Frequency-constrained unit commitment (FCUC) is proposed to address this challenge. Despite existing efforts in modeling frequency characteristics in unit commitment (UC), current strategies can only handle oversimplified low-order frequency response models and do not consider wide-range operating conditions. This paper presents a generic data-driven framework for FCUC under high renewable penetration. Here, deep neural networks (DNNs) are trained to predict the frequency response using real data or high-fidelity simulation data. Next, the DNN is reformulated as a set of mixed-integer linear constraints to be incorporated into the ordinary UC formulation. In the data generation phase, all possible power injections are considered, and a region-of-interest active sampling is proposed to include power injection samples with frequency nadirs closer to the UFLC threshold, which enhances the accuracy of frequency constraints in FCUC. The proposed FCUC is investigated on the IEEE 39-bus system. Then, a full-order dynamic model simulation using PSS/E verifies the effectiveness of FCUC in frequency-secure generator commitments.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS2019

Advancing the Standards for Unmanned Air System Communications, Navigation and Surveillance

Under NASA program NNA16BD84C, new architectures were identified and developed for supporting reliable and secure Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) needs for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) operating in both controlled and uncontrolled airspace. An analysis of architectures for the two categories of airspace and an implementation technology readiness analysis were performed. These studies produced NASA reports that have been made available in the public domain and have been briefed in previous conferences. We now consider how the products of the study are influencing emerging directions in the aviation standards communities. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Communications Panel (CP), Working Group I (WG-I) is currently developing a communications network architecture known as the Aeronautical Telecommunications Network with Internet Protocol Services (ATN/IPS). The target use case for this service is secure and reliable Air Traffic Management (ATM) for manned aircraft operating in controlled airspace. However, the work is more and more also considering the emerging class of airspace users known as Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), which refers to certain UAS classes. In addition, two Special Committees (SCs) in the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) are developing Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) and Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS. RTCA SC-223 is investigating an Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) and AeroMACS aviation data link for interoperable (INTEROP) UAS communications. Meanwhile, RTCA SC-228 is working to develop Detect And Avoid (DAA) equipment and a Command and Control (C2) Data Link MOPS establishing LBand and C-Band solutions. These RTCA Special Committees along with ICAO CP WG/I are therefore overlapping in terms of the Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) alternatives they are seeking to provide for an integrated manned- and unmanned air traffic management service as well as remote pilot command and control. This paper presents UAS CNS architecture concepts developed under the NASA program that apply to all three of the aforementioned committees. It discusses the similarities and differences in the problem spaces under consideration in each committee, and considers the application of a common set of CNS alternatives that can be widely applied. As the works of these committees progress, it is clear that the overlap will need to be addressed to ensure a consistent and safe framework for worldwide aviation. In this study, we discuss similarities and differences in the various operational models and show how the CNS architectures developed under the NASA program apply.

Ponchak, Denise S.↗

DOE OSTI2022

Resilient Hierarchical Networked Control Systems: Secure Controls for Critical Locations and at Edge

Integration of information and communication technology (ICT) offers new opportunities in improving the management and operation of critical infrastructures such as power systems as it allows connection of different sensors and control components via a communication network, leading to the so-called networked control systems (NCS). However, the use of open and pervasive ICT such as the Internet or wireless communication technologies comes at a price of making NCS vulnerable to cyber intrusions/attacks which may cause physical damage. Here, this chapter presents control algorithms to ensure resilient and safe operation of NCS under unknown cyberattacks. Specifically, a variant of dynamic watermarking strategies is presented by embedding encoding/decoding components of chaotic signals into the NCS for secure control for critical locations where the measurement/control signals are transmitted to/from the control center via a communication network. In addition, resilient cooperative control algorithms are discussed to ensure safe operation at edge of the NCS which consists of a large number of distributed controllable devices. Several numerical examples are provided to illustrate the proposed control strategies.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

DOE OSTI2021

Geologic Assessment and Recommended New Well Locations to Improve the Area 25 Potable Water System, Nevada National Security Site

The Mission Support and Test Services, LLC (MSTS) Geoscience Operations Group performed a hydrogeologic study of an area of interest in Area 25 at the request of the MSTS Enterprise Infrastructure Program to identify potential locations for a new water well to replace J-14 Water Well (J-14 WW). Based on limited subsurface hydrogeologic data for the area, geologists developed two options for construction of a new well. Option 1 is to construct the well within approximately 250 feet (ft) of J-14 WW, and Option 2 is to construct the well approximately 1,550 ft north of J-11 Water Well (J-11 WW). Option 1 may be preferred, as the hydrogeology is better understood adjacent to an existing well. A well drilled at the Option 2 location would not have to be as deep as that at the Option 1 location, but the hydrogeologic setting is more uncertain at this greater distance from a verified subsurface geologic data point.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS2003

Software Supports Distributed Operations via the Internet

Multi-mission Encrypted Communication System (MECS) is a computer program that enables authorized, geographically dispersed users to gain secure access to a common set of data files via the Internet. MECS is compatible with legacy application programs and a variety of operating systems. The MECS architecture is centered around maintaining consistent replicas of data files cached on remote computers. MECS monitors these files and, whenever one is changed, the changed file is committed to a master database as soon as network connectivity makes it possible to do so. MECS provides subscriptions for remote users to automatically receive new data as they are generated. Remote users can be producers as well as consumers of data. Whereas a prior program that provides some of the same services treats disconnection of a user from the network of users as an error from which recovery must be effected, MECS treats disconnection as a nominal state of the network: This leads to a different design that is more efficient for serving many users, each of whom typically connects and disconnects frequently and wants only a small fraction of the data at any given time.

Norris, Jeffrey↗

DOE OSTI2023

Deploying Automation Technology Supporting Packaging and Transportation Operations

Various United States Department of Energy (DOE) sites are investigating the deployment of robotics to provide safer, effective, and more efficient operations. By implementing robotics in packaging and transportation operations, improvements toward production efficiency, worker ergonomics, radiological dose reduction, and security assurance can be realized. Robotic Systems must be designed and implemented in concert with a facility’s safety basis, classification, and security constraints, while improving overall operational effectiveness. The desired robotic implementation should provide a path to potential long-term cost savings, reduce/eliminate hazardous conditions and radiological exposure, while improving quality and reliability of an operation process. The Savannah River Site (SRS), a DOE Site located in Aiken South Carolina, has initiated several large scale projects supporting future nuclear material disposition activities. Incorporation of automation and robotic equipment in system designs will support effective and efficient material handling operations, including container movements and packaging activities. Robotic systems will execute tasks that are precise, procedural and integrated with control systems to verify and record data for material inventory and historical archiving. An overview of the current robotic system development to perform receipt inspection, packaging, storage and shipment preparation activities of designated Type A and B shipping packages will be presented.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASA NTRS1991

The Management and Security Expert (MASE)

The Management and Security Expert (MASE) is a distributed expert system that monitors the operating systems and applications of a network. It is capable of gleaning the information provided by the different operating systems in order to optimize hardware and software performance; recognize potential hardware and/or software failure, and either repair the problem before it becomes an emergency, or notify the systems manager of the problem; and monitor applications and known security holes for indications of an intruder or virus. MASE can eradicate much of the guess work of system management.

Miller, Mark D.↗

DOE OSTI2026

Genesis Mission-Enabled Secure AI to Fortify Energy Process Safety (Genesis-SAFE)

Argonne National Laboratory is supporting the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (USDOT’s) Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) with collaborative research on development and application of privacy preserving AI frameworks that leverage unmatched AI expertise and secure computing resources made available through the U.S. Genesis Mission1 . This research advances U.S. energy security goals by supporting a safe offshore energy industry with secure, domain-specific AI tools to analyze confidential industry datasets collected by BTS to rapidly improve identification of hazards, precursors, and systemic safety risks in high-risk operational environments. The staged, security-first approach begins with development and testing of Argonne’s Genesis Mission-enabled Secure AI to Fortify Energy Process Safety (Genesis-SAFE) framework within Argonne’s accredited secure computing enclave (ABLE) leveraging Argonne’s AI scientific assistant substrate (AISAC). Methods to build synthetic datasets were developed together with BTS for use in preparing synthetic datasets that can be used to validate data containment, governance, and security controls in the ABLE environment. Future research directions would focus on applying the Genesis-SAFE framework to CIPSEA-protected datasets entirely within ABLE to support confidentiality-preserving analysis of safety risks, trends, and contributing factors.

Kim, Hyekyung [Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), ↗

DOE OSTI2020

Method for Assessment of Security-Relevant Settings in Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection for Industrial Control Systems

Ensuring the integrity of Ethernet-based networks is a challenging and constantly evolving domain. This problem is exacerbated for those operational technology (OT) networks supporting industrial control systems (ICS) since much of that equipment was originally designed to be on a network that was isolated and generally considered free of malefactors. Increasing pressure to bridge these systems with traditional information technology (IT) networks has introduced a bevy of new threats. In response, both academia and industry have responded with security solutions tailored to ICS environments. Deploying these protection systems often involves several configuration choices. While some of these choices are clear (e.g., block/enable protocol X) others are far more subjective (e.g. alert threshold == 3.43). Further complicating the situation, while often similar to IT networks, OT networks have unique challenges and characteristics that make the task of protecting them simultaneously more difficult and straight forward.Extant solutions for quantifying the relative security of intrusion detection systems fail to effectively support the operators of said systems with understanding the impact of various configuration changes. Further, they assume that the attacks are static and not subject to manipulation or alteration in the face of defenses. In this paper, we present a threat-based method for quantifying the relative impact of various security settings for intrusion detection systems (IDSs) within ICS environments. This method provides operational staff with a clear understanding of the relative impact of their settings and assumes that the attacks levied against them are dynamic. The model is described in detail, we apply the model to a synthetic data set, and discuss the inferences that can be made and what types of decisions they could be used to support.

Gillen, Rob↗

NASA NTRS2017

Secure Network-Centric Aviation Communication (SNAC)

The existing National Airspace System (NAS) communications capabilities are largely unsecured, are not designed for efficient use of spectrum and collectively are not capable of servicing the future needs of the NAS with the inclusion of new operators in Unmanned Aviation Systems (UAS) or On Demand Mobility (ODM). SNAC will provide a ubiquitous secure, network-based communications architecture that will provide new service capabilities and allow for the migration of current communications to SNAC over time. The necessary change in communication technologies to digital domains will allow for the adoption of security mechanisms, sharing of link technologies, large increase in spectrum utilization, new forms of resilience and redundancy and the possibly of spectrum reuse. SNAC consists of a long term open architectural approach with increasingly capable designs used to steer research and development and enable operating capabilities that run in parallel with current NAS systems.

Communications↗

NASA NTRS2020

Reliable, Secure, and Scalable Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS) Options for Urban Air Mobility (UAM)

The Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate directed a study to identify, evaluate, and recommend viable communications, navigation, and surveillance systems and technologies to enable safe, secure, and efficient Urban Air Mobility operations in US cities. The focus is on UML-4, when commercial air taxi operations take place in all weather, are widespread, and include autonomous systems. This report recommends technologies for independent navigation, collaborative communication, and surveillance, based on capacity, availability, precision, and update rate, size, weight, power, cost and other values. Recommendations for maturing and implementing the technologies are included.

Virginia L. Stouffer↗

DOE OSTI2025

MetaHeart: Metasurface enabled biometrics camouflage

Privacy-invading biometrics monitoring is becoming a prominent security threat as modern sensing systems move to higher operating frequencies (mmWave, sub-THz), increasing sensing resolution and accuracy. As such, developing systems that can protect or obfuscate biometrics from adversarial intrusion becomes pivotal to preserving user privacy. In this work, we develop and implement MetaHeart, a real-time biometrics misinformation system based on reflective, programmable metasurfaces and dynamic phase-front manipulation of radar inferences. MetaHeart’s key goal is to prevent the leakage of a legitimate user’s heartbeat biometrics by spoofing fake heartbeat signals at a malicious, radar-equipped, heart rate sensing intruder. Furthermore, we experimentally demonstrate MetaHeart’s ability to fake Alice’s presence when she is not there and to fool Trudy’s inferences even when Alice is present, achieving an overall accuracy above 98%. Finally, we conduct a robustness analysis to determine MetaHeart’s required spatial placement within the intruder’s monitoring area that would allow for effective spoofing.

77 NANOSCIENCE AND NANOTECHNOLOGY↗

DOE OSTI2014

Uncertainty-based Estimation of the Secure Range for ISO New England Dynamic Interchange Adjustment

The paper proposes an approach to estimate the secure range for dynamic interchange adjustment, which assists system operators in scheduling the interchange with neighboring control areas. Uncertainties associated with various sources are incorporated. The proposed method is implemented in the dynamic interchange adjustment (DINA) tool developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for ISO New England. Simulation results are used to validate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

forecast errors↗

DOE OSTI2017

Enhancing power plant safety through simulated cyber events - 341

There are gaps in understanding how a cyber-attack would manifest itself within power plants and what these events would look like within the control room from an operator's perspective. This is especially true for nuclear power plants where safety has much broader consequences than nonnuclear plants. The operating and emergency procedures that operators currently use are likely inadequate for targeted cyber-attacks. This research focuses on understanding how a cyber event would affect the operation of the plant, how an operator would perceive the event, and if the operator's actions would keep the plant in a safe condition. This research is part of Sandia's Laboratory Directed Research and Development program where a nuclear power plant cyber model of the control system digital architecture is coupled with a generic pressurized water reactor plant training simulator. Cyber event scenarios will be performed on the coupled system with plant operators. The scenarios simulate plant conditions that may exist during a cyber-attack, component failure, or insider sabotage, and provide an understanding of the displayed information and the actual plant conditions. These scenarios will determine if plant operators can 1) recognize that they are under cyber-attack and 2) take appropriate actions to keep the plant safe. This will also provide the opportunity to assess the operator cognitive workload during such events and identify where improvements might be made. Experiments with nuclear power plant operators will be carried out over FY 2018 and results of the research are expected by the end of FY 2018. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗