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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 253 records · Page 14
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2019

Fission Reactor Inadvertent Reentry: A Report to the Nuclear Power & Propulsion Technical Discipline Team

The Nuclear Power and Propulsion Technical Discipline Team has directed an effort to consider possible improvements to the launch approval process as it relates to fission reactors. To that end, Reference 1 described possible general design criteria and risk criteria for fission reactors. At the time that Reference 1 was completed, it was felt that additional examination of reentry issues was warranted. This paper presents the next step in that examination, which is to accurately describe and frame the problem and suggest safety criteria that might apply to inadvertent reentry. The report includes a discussion of the issues associated with different types of inadvertent reentry, the possible consequences of those events, a review of previous work in the area, security and nonproliferation issues, and options for safety requirements that might be considered. Note that safety requirements can have significant mission implications, e.g., no operation below a certain orbit.

Camp, Allen↗
DOE OSTI2020

Global Security & Strategic Partnership Programs

Long, proud history of expertise in uranium, lithium, high explosives, assembly/disassembly, and nuclear security and a vital part of today’s nuclear security enterprise Integral role in sustaining U.S. nuclear deterrent and reducing global nuclear threats with unique security and nonproliferation research capabilities NN and GSP Missions Bring Fresh Ideas and Solves Important National Security Problems NN and GSP Missions Keep Our Technology and People Sharp and Ready for New Challenges

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

International Symposium on Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material; Tokyo, Japan, November 2019

As an outcome of the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit of 2016, held in Washington D.C., the Governments of Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed, through INFCIRC/909, their will to further improve the overall security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. With this goal in mind, each expressed their commitment to further exchange national practices with other countries through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). They also committed to actively support the IAEA as the central organization for coordinating activities and developing guidance documents and to support the GICNT and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in developing and implementing its nuclear transport security activities. Both of these organizations address the commitments regarding nuclear transport security as outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit 2016. In an effort to continue the momentum from the Nuclear Security Summit, the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (ISCN/JAEA), hosted the International Transport Security Symposium in November 2019. With over fifty countries invited to attend, the event exchanged and promoted good practices in several topical area sessions related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Topical sessions included Laws and Regulatory Framework, Physical Protection Systems, Response Actions, and Insider/Information Security. The Symposium built support for transport security and encouraged IAEA Member States to actively work regionally and internationally with the IAEA’s transport security programme through the practical implementation and incorporation of IAEA Nuclear Security Series recommendations and guidance into their national frameworks for transport security. From these sessions, to the host detailed a recommended path forward for future engagements in the security of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. The paper will discuss the Symposium’s outcomes and highlight the forward momentum made by both signatories and non-signatories for the strengthening of all the critical elements of a State’s transport security regime, including physical protection systems, insider threats to the nuclear and radioactive material supply chains, planning and capabilities for law enforcement response to malicious transport security events, and employment of technology to address critical vulnerabilities to the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Holt, Katherine↗
DOE OSTI2021

Geologic Framework Modeling (GFM) Integration

To be presented at the 2021 NEM. The March 15-19, 2021 virtual Nuclear Explosion Monitoring (NEM) Program Review combines reviews of several related programs within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

New Experiments for Detecting Emissions from Fission

Ensuring that nuclear science and technology is used solely for peaceful purposes is one of the most pressing challenges facing our society. The Consortium for Monitoring, Technology, and Verification (MTV) mission is to help meet this challenge by providing advanced technology and trained talent for careers in nuclear security and nonproliferation. The study of nuclear fission is one area of interest in the MTV. We are performing new experiments for the characterization of neutron and gamma ray emissions from fission fragments. These emissions are signatures for the detection and characterization of nuclear materials. To perform these experiments, we have developed Fission Sphere (FS-3), an array of forty organic stilbene detectors operated in time-coincidence. The FS-3 is used to measure the prompt emissions of neutrons and gamma rays from Cf-252 spontaneous fission. These new data will be used to validate physics-based prediction codes, including CGMF and FREYA, and will be useful in future ENDF and ENSDF evaluations. This paper will present results from the first experiments using FS-3 and a Cf-252 spontaneous fission source. It will compare the experimental results with predictions from theory and Monte Carlo simulation. Specifically, we will describe the correlations among energy, multiplicity, and angles of emitted particles. We will also discuss the application of these correlations in multiplicity counting techniques, which are widely used in nuclear safeguards.

Pozzi, S. A.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Data Driven Analysis for Modernization Program Management

NNSA is responsible for managing national nuclear security missions: ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent; supplying nuclear fuel to the Navy; and supporting the nation’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts. However, over half of NNSA’s facilities are more than 40 years old, and roughly one-third date back to the Manhattan Project. To execute its critical nuclear security missions, NNSA is making large investments to modernize its nuclear production capabilities. This ramp up represents NNSA’s largest modernization effort since the Cold War. Given the scale of these efforts, NNSA’s Office of Secondary Stage Production Modernization has implemented data driven techniques to prioritize investments and inform strategic decision making. NNSA, with support from its site managing contractors, has developed and implemented an integrated schedule and risk management system to address the issues and limitations with the traditional approach. The multi-year integrated schedules are key to identifying program linkages and managing large portfolios comprised of many different projects and efforts. In conjunction with the integrated schedule, a new program risk management system has also been developed and implemented, which manages program risks and opportunities, along with specific mitigation strategies to reduce or eliminate the risks per timelines that are tracked in the integrated schedule. This paper is supplemented with a follow-on presentation on effective management of program material and throughput modeling.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

AWC for Nuclear Material Transportation

Presentation to the Forefront22 Workshop in DC to NNSA DNN. Generalized presentation on Advanced Wireless Communications and areas where Nuclear Material Transportation may find interesting to investigate further for security and cybersecurity interests. Summary of the Forefront22 workshop Traditional wireless communication technologies, such as Wi-Fi and Cellular, have modernized industries worldwide. The Nuclear industry has also started to modernize its operations by utilizing wireless connectivity and is well poised to expand the use of wireless to an increasing number of use cases. The most recent cellular technology, called 5G for Fifth Generation, brings a transformation not only to wireless; but to industries worldwide by fueling the growth of Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial IoT (IIoT). Availability of additional spectrum e.g., use of millimeter wave (mmWave) spectrum bands, is a critical boost to wireless growth. These advanced wireless technologies bring multiplicative gains in data rates, latency reduction, capacity growth, and localization accuracy, that can be harnessed for Nuclear Nonproliferation activities along with other mission critical applications. However, using these functional advances securely is of utmost important specially for these critical applications. The functional capabilities of these advanced technologies including 5G & Wi-Fi 6, and the associated security issues and mitigations will be discussed in this session. The future technologies including 6G which will follow 5G and newer versions of Wi-Fi will be also introduced.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Multi-Sensor Data Acquisition System for Process Monitoring

Idaho National Laboratory is building a new nuclear fuel cycle test bed. This fuel cycle test bed named “Beartooth” will give researchers the opportunity to study the nuclear fuel cycle process. The process operations include the use of centrifugal contactors and process flow for the purification of special nuclear material recovery in used fuel. This new research facility has the need to use non-traditional measurement sensors to determine the state-of-health of the solvent extraction process. These non-traditional sensors can also enhance nuclear nonproliferation supervision and other activities. The non-traditional sensors include accelerometers, acoustic, current, flow, colorimetric, temperature, pH and conductivity. The challenge behind deploying all these sensors, is the need for fast and reliable data collection. The data acquisition system (DAQ) needs to be capable of recording up to 12 accelerometers and/or acoustic microphones simultaneously at rates up to 12.8 kSamples/second/channel. This requires the need for a strong architecture and data collection solution. This summary identifies the system architecture, DAQ, and sensors needed to support non-traditional measurements in a solvent extraction process.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Use of Machine Learning for Signature Development in a Multi-Sensor Environment for Safeguard Applications of Solvent Extraction Processes

Idaho National Laboratory is constructing the Special Nuclear Material test bed (Beartooth) for research and development pertaining to nuclear fuel processing operations using centrifugal contactors. Beartooth will enable give researchers the opportunity to study the dissolution, separation, and conversion of special nuclear materials (e.g., plutonium, enriched uranium, and thorium). As a lead-in to Beartooth, this project constructed a test bed to study the process and equipment behavior with real time series data collection using a variety of non-traditional sensors, in order to identify process failures and label them as either accidental or purposeful, thus enhancing nuclear nonproliferation stewardship. The measurement sources in this test bed include vibration, acoustic, current, flow, colorimetric, and thermal data. These measurements vary in terms of magnitude, frequency, and location. This information will be combined and used within data-driven machine-learning methods to detect operation condition changes that are either intentional (i.e., changes in operating set points) or malicious (i.e., flow diversion) in nature. This presentation covers the data processing and signature development activities necessary for utilizing this heterogeneous dataset to classify process anomalies.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2023

Empirical Bounding Analysis and User Recommendations for a Neutron Multiplicity Detector

Neutron multiplicity detectors are useful for a variety of applications including nuclear emergency response, nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and criticality safety. When measuring black-box problems (i.e., when the system being measured is completely unknown) with systems that have relatively low detection efficiency, expert analysis is frequently required to determine appropriate bounds for system parameters such as neutron multiplication and neutron leakage. This is because the detection efficiency can vary wildly, which also means that the resulting system parameters can have large variations. This work applies an empirical approach to provide bounds on system parameters (such as system multiplication, neutron leakage, and detector efficiency). The results of this bounding analysis are then used as inputs to provide recommendations to users regarding criticality safety. In addition to describing the method used, this work provides sample results from a measurement campaign performed at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2023

NA-213 Presentation.pdf

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is one of 17 United States Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories. SRNL, a multi-program national laboratory, is a leading research and development institution for the Offices of Environmental Management and Legacy Management at the U.S. Department of Energy and the Weapons and Nonproliferation programs for the National Nuclear Security Administration. Battelle Savannah River Alliance, LLC (BSRA), a not-for-profit limited liability company, manages and operates SRNL for the DOE. BSRA board leadership includes Battelle Memorial Institute, Clemson University, University of South Carolina, South Carolina State University, University of Georgia, and Georgia Institute of Technology. Battelle Memorial Institute and the five universities are joined in partnership with preferred subcontractors TechSource and Longenecker & Associates with the singular purpose of maintaining SRNL as a best-in-class national laboratory. Scientists and Engineers at SRNL use leading edge science and technology to advance the Department of Energy’s critical mission outcomes.

Hasty, Timothy C.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Remote Radiation Sensing Using Aerial and Ground Platforms

Remote sensing of ionizing radiation has a significant role in waste management, nuclear material management and nonproliferation, and radiation safety. Robotic platforms can surpass the number of tasks that are achieved by humans. With this technique, the operator's radiation exposure can be decreased. Remote sensing allows for the evaluation and monitoring of radiological contamination. Gamma-ray and neutron sensors were integrated onto the robotic platforms. This approach allows for the radiation sensor data to be dynamically tracked and mapped thus enabling further analysis of the radiation flux in temporal and spatial domains. The goal is to complete scheduled tasks while the robot is being irradiated. To achieve this, electronic components must be shielded and radiation hardened. CZT Detector: Cadmium Zinc Telluride (CZT) detector technology has been a promising solution for gamma-ray and x-ray measurements. Detector data is transferred to the Odroid minicomputer that controls and powers the module via the USB. Robot Operating System (ROS) was utilized for data acquisition and data fusion. The Mariscotti method was employed for the spectrum analysis. A function was programmed in ROS for the automatic identification of photopeaks. CLYC Detector: A Cs{sub 2}LiYCl{sub 6}:Ce{sup 3+} (CLYC) detector was used for simultaneous medium-resolution gamma-ray measurements and neutron counting. A 2.54 cm diameter photomultiplier tube (PMT) was equipped with a high voltage supply and a miniature digitizer. Gamma-ray excitation: fast core-to-valence luminescence (CVL) with 1 ns decay constant, and prompt Ce{sup 3+} emission with 50 ns decay constant. Neutron excitation: slow cerium self-trapped excitation (Ce{sup 3+} STE), 1000 ns decay constant. Radiation Source Localization: Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and gradient-based methods were used to locate the position of a radiation source based on measured radiation intensities. Multi-Particle Transport Code FLUKA: Estimation of radiation damage of the electronic components is important in order to optimize the robot's operational time while it is irradiated. Displacement per atom (DPA) represents the radiation damage in materials exposed to the ionizing radiation. Various shielding layers of different thickness t were analyzed (< 5% statistical error). The model of the controller of the UAS was designed in FLUKA. Conclusion: CZT and CLYC detectors were integrated onto the robotic platforms. Radiation source localization and contour mapping using robotic platforms were studied. Functions for data analysis and fusion were developed in ROS. FLUKA code was utilized to analyze DPA values. Layers of low-density and high-density materials were used to shield the UAS electronics.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

An Overview in the Development of a Multi-Sensor Data Science System for Monitoring a Solvent Extraction Process

To enhance nuclear nonproliferation stewardship, Idaho National Laboratory is building the Beartooth nuclear fuel cycle processing test bed. The Beartooth test bed will allow researchers the opportunity to study nuclear fuel processing operations including the use of centrifugal contactors in solvent extraction processes. The test bed is designed to support data collection and machine learning to monitor process operations. As part of this project, researchers will study data collected from a host of sensors that have not been typically used to monitor solvent extraction processes such as vibration, acoustic, colormetric, and thermal measurement data. The goal of this research is to employ machine learning and data analytics to study the confluence of signals collected from both traditionally and non-traditionally used sensors to provide operator process awareness and discover process anomalies. An overview of planned sensors and experiments that will focus on signal discovery will be presented.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

An Overview in the Development of a Multi-Sensor Data Science System for Monitoring a Solvent Extraction Process

To enhance nuclear nonproliferation stewardship, Idaho National Laboratory is building the Beartooth nuclear fuel cycle processing test bed. The Beartooth test bed will allow researchers the opportunity to study nuclear fuel processing operations including the use of centrifugal contactors in solvent extraction processes. The test bed is designed to support data collection and machine learning to monitor process operations. As part of this project, researchers will study data collected from a host of sensors that have not been typically used to monitor solvent extraction processes such as vibration, acoustic, colormetric, and thermal measurement data. The goal of this research is to employ machine learning and data analytics to study the confluence of signals collected from both traditionally and non-traditionally used sensors to provide operator process awareness and discover process anomalies. An overview of planned sensors and experiments that will focus on signal discovery will be presented.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Proliferation Detection via Acoustic Monitoring of Pyroprocessing Equipment and Related Systems

In support of nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation, this effort is leveraging acoustic and seismic sensors to advance detection of pyroprocessing activities. Pyroprocessing, or electrochemical processing, is a method of separating irradiated nuclear fuel into its actinide and fission product components, enabling the reuse of fuel materials and reducing the radiotoxicity of the remaining waste. Verification and accountability in the process poses several challenges because of the high radiation environment and the presence of material holdup through the facility. Irregular or unaccounted-for equipment operation can signify diversion or misuse of critical materials. Acoustic and seismic sensors offer the capability to identify periods of equipment operation and help verify adherence to accountancy records.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Overview of Molten Salt Chemistry

This is a presentation to be given at an INL workshop. "Crossroads of Nonproliferation and Safeguarding Technologies for Implementation in Molten Salt Reactors", December 6-7, 2023. The presentation discusses historical molten salt reactor technologies and basic salt chemistries. Nothing in the presentation is sensitive or proprietary.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Results of an In-Field Validation Exercise in Support of Wide-Area Environmental Sampling

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NA-24) is evaluating Wide-Area Environmental Sampling (WAES) as an additional safeguards verification tool for the International Atomic Energy Agency to detect undeclared nuclear activities. The NNSA is evaluating strategies for conducting a generic WAES campaign, the cost of a WAES campaign, and the effect of technological advancements that have occurred since the last major WAES review in 1999. Until now, the NNSA effort has focused on tabletop exercises (TTXs) in which high-performance computing allows for advanced modeling and simulation efforts to be applied to the WAES question. Although the modeling and simulations used in the TTXs are extremely valuable, field campaigns are still needed to validate the assumptions that underpin the models and the modeling process itself. During a 7 week period beginning in May 2023 and ending in June 2023, which included 4 weeks of active field collections, a multilaboratory team conducted its first in-field validation exercise. Prior to the in-field exercise, abbreviated TTXs were conducted to estimate the performance of all collection systems to be used during the field test. These TTXs guided the selection of materials to be released and the placement of the collection system. Based on these determinations, materials were procured to use in the field test, and an injection/release system was designed, built, and installed at the test facility. Background samples were collected during weeks one and four, and environmental collections against active releases were conducted during weeks two and three. The goals of this validation exercise included a demonstration of (1) the ability to provide controlled releases of particulates of surrogate materials, (2) the fielding and operation of collection systems (including deposition and active air collectors), and (3) the flexibility to revise equipment and campaign plans in the field. This paper presents the results and preliminary conclusions for this initial validation test. Based on these results, subsequent field campaigns are anticipated and will include the addition of other released materials.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗