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At least 253 records · Page 14
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Human Systems Integration in Practice: Constellation Lessons Learned

NASA's Constellation program provided a unique testbed for Human Systems Integration (HSI) as a fundamental element of the Systems Engineering process. Constellation was the first major program to have HSI mandated by NASA's Human Rating document. Proper HSI is critical to the success of any project that relies on humans to function as operators, maintainers, or controllers of a system. HSI improves mission, system and human performance, significantly reduces lifecycle costs, lowers risk and minimizes re-design. Successful HSI begins with sufficient project schedule dedicated to the generation of human systems requirements, but is by no means solely a requirements management process. A top-down systems engineering process that recognizes throughout the organization, human factors as a technical discipline equal to traditional engineering disciplines with authority for the overall system. This partners with a bottoms-up mechanism for human-centered design and technical issue resolution. The Constellation Human Systems Integration Group (HSIG) was a part of the Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) organization within the program office, and existed alongside similar groups such as Flight Performance, Environments & Constraints, and Integrated Loads, Structures and Mechanisms. While the HSIG successfully managed, via influence leadership, a down-and-in Community of Practice to facilitate technical integration and issue resolution, it lacked parallel top-down authority to drive integrated design. This presentation will discuss how HSI was applied to Constellation, the lessons learned and best practices it revealed, and recommendations to future NASA program and project managers. This presentation will discuss how Human Systems Integration (HSI) was applied to NASA's Constellation program, the lessons learned and best practices it revealed, and recommendations to future NASA program and project managers on how to accomplish this critical function.

Zumbado, Jennifer Rochlis↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Ares I Launch Vehicle Roll and Reaction Control Systems Lessons Learned

On April 15, 2010 President Barak Obama made the official announcement that the Constellation Program, which included the Ares I launch vehicle, would be canceled. NASA s Ares I launch vehicle was being designed to launch the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, returning humans to the moon, Mars, and beyond. It consisted of a First Stage (FS) five segment solid rocket booster and a liquid J-2X Upper Stage (US) engine. Roll control for the FS was planned to be handled by a dedicated Roll Control System (RoCS), located on the connecting interstage. Induced yaw or pitch moments experienced during FS ascent would have been handled by vectoring of the booster nozzle. After FS booster separation, the US Reaction Control System (ReCS) would have provided the US Element with three degrees of freedom control as needed. The lessons learned documented in this paper will be focused on the technical designs and producibility of both systems along with the partnership between NASA and Boeing, who was on contract to build the Ares I US Element, which included the FS RoCS and US ReCS. In regards to partnership, focus will be placed on integration along with technical work accomplished by Boeing with special emphasis on each task order. In summary, this paper attempts to capture key lessons learned that should be helpful in the development of future launch vehicle RCS designs.

Butt, Adam↗
NASA NTRS2011

2010 CEOS Field Reflectance Intercomparisons Lessons Learned

This paper summarizes lessons learned from the 2009 and 2010 joint field campaigns to Tuz Golu, Turkey. Emphasis is placed on the 2010 campaign related to understanding the equipment and measurement protocols, processing schemes, and traceability to SI quantities. Participants in both 2009 and 2010 used an array of measurement approaches to determine surface reflectance. One lesson learned is that even with all of the differences in collection between groups, the differences in reflectance are currently dominated by instrumental artifacts including knowledge of the white reference. Processing methodology plays a limited role once the bi-directional reflectance of the white reference is used rather than a hemispheric-directional value. The lack of a basic set of measurement protocols, or best practices, limits a group s ability to ensure SI traceability and the development of proper error budgets. Finally, rigorous attention to sampling methodology and its impact on instrument behavior is needed. The results of the 2009 and 2010 joint campaigns clearly demonstrate both the need and utility of such campaigns and such comparisons must continue in the future to ensure a coherent set of data that can span multiple sensor types and multiple decades.

Thome, Kurtis↗
NASA NTRS2012

An Overview of MODIS On-orbit Operation, Calibration, and Lessons

Two nearly identical copies of the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) have successfully operated onboard the Terra and Aqua spacecraft for more than II years and 9 years since their launch in December 1999 and May 2002, respectively. MODIS is a key instrument for the NASA's Earth Observing System (EOS) missions. MODIS observations have produced an unprecedented amount and a broad range of data products and significantly benefited the science and user community. Its follow-on instrument, the Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) on-board the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) spacecraft, is currently scheduled for launch in late October, 2011. The NPP serves as a bridge mission between EOS and the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS). MODIS collects data in 36 spectral bands, covering spectral regions from visible (VIS) to long-wave infrared (L WIR), and at three different spatial resolutions. Because of its stringent design requirements, MODIS was built with a complete set of onboard calibrators, including a solar diffuser (SO), a solar diffuser stability monitor (SDSM), a blackbody (BB), a spectroradiometric calibration assembly (SRCA), and a space view (SV) port. Except for tbe SRCA, VIlRS carries the same set of onboard calibrators as MODIS. The SD/SDSM system is used together to calibrate tbe reflective solar bands (RSB). The BB is designed for the thermal emissive bands (TEB) calibration. Similar to Terra and Aqua MODIS, VIlRS will also make regular lunar observations to monitor RSB radiometric calibration stability. In this paper, we provide an overview of MODIS on-orbit operation and calibration activities and present issues identified and lessons learned from mission-long instrument operations and implementation of various calibration and characterization strategies. Examples of both Terra and Aqua MODIS instrument on-orbit performance, including their similarities and unique characteristics, are discussed in tbe context of what might be expected from and benefited to tbe NPP VIlRS operation and calibration. It is anticipated that MODIS experience and lessons will also provide valuable information for other earth observing missions/sensors.

Xiong, Jack↗
NASA NTRS2012

Fast, Affordable, Science and Technology Satellite (FASTSAT) Huntsville-01 (HSV-01) Spacecraft Lessons Learned Report

The Fast Affordable Science and Technology Satellite (FASTSAT) project is a path finding effort to produce reliable satellite busses for different applications at an unprecedented speed and low cost. The project is designed to be a generational project and the first satellite produced is the Huntsville -01 (HSV-01) spacecraft. The subject of this report is the lessons learned gained during the development, testing, and up to the delivery of the FASTSAT HSV -01 spacecraft. The purpose of this report is to capture the major findings that will greatly benefit the future FASTSAT satellites and perhaps other projects interested in pushing the boundaries for cost and schedule. The FASTSAT HSV -01 primary objectives, success criteria, and team partners are summarized to give a frame of reference to the lessons learned.

Smith, Timothy A.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Science Highlights and Lessons Learned from the Atmospheric Infrared Sounder (AIRS)

The Atmospheric Infrared Sounder (AIRS) and companion instrument, the Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit (AMSU) on the NASA Earth Observing System Aqua spacecraft are facility instruments designed to support measurements of atmospheric temperature, water vapor and a wide range of atmospheric constituents in support of weather forecasting and scientific research in climate and atmospheric chemistry. This paper is an update to the science highlights from a paper by the authors released last year and also looks back at the lessons learned and future needs of the scientific community. These lessons not only include requirements on the measurements, but scientific shortfalls as well. Results from the NASA Science Community Workshop in IR and MW Sounders relating to AIRS and AMSU requirements and concerns are covered and reflect much of what has been learned and what is needed for future atmospheric sounding from Low Earth Orbit.

Atmospheric Composition↗
NASA NTRS2012

MSL Lessons Learned and Knowledge Capture

The Mars Program has recently been informed of the Planetary Protection Subcommittee (PPS) recommendation, which was endorsed by the NAC, concerning Mars Science Lab (MSL) lessons learned and knowledge capture. The Mars Program has not had an opportunity to consider any decisions specific to the PPS recommendation. Some of the activities recommended by the PPS would involve members of the MSL flight team who are focused on cruise, entry descent & landing, and early surface operations; those activities would have to wait. Members of the MSL planetary protection team at JPL are still available to support MSL lessons learned and knowledge capture; some of the specifically recommended activities have already begun. The Mars Program shares the PPS/NAC concerns about loss of potential information & expertise in planetary protection practice.

planetary protection↗
NASA NTRS2013

Lessons of History: Organizational Factors in Three Aviation Mishaps

This presentation examines organizational factors that contributed to three aircraft mishaps and provides analysis of lessons learned. Three historical aviation mishaps were studied from a human factors perspective, and organizational factors identified and analyzed. These case studies provide valuable lessons for understanding the interaction of people with aircraft systems and with each other during flight operations.

Merlin, Peter William↗
NASA NTRS2013

Lessons Learned from the Stardust Sample Return Mission

These are science and mission design and operations lessons learned from the Stardust Mission, which returned grains from comet Wild-2 and fresh interstellar dust to Earth in 2006 [1]. Science Lessons: Major discoveries of the Stardust Wild-2 samples include the presence of numerous chondrules and CAI in a comet, which requires a much more dynamic early solar system than many had envisaged, and verified predictions made by models requiring outward flow of early solar system solids before the early nebular gas had dissipated [1-3]. No evidence has been found for the presence of live Al-26 in the comet, suggesting late accretion [4]. Carbonates and unusual sulfides were found which potentially require activity of liquid water within the comet, but to only a minor degree at best [5-6]. The presence of abundant thermally-metamorphosed silicates in Wild-2 appears to require assembly from an earlier generation of bodies [7]. The abundance of presolar grains in the Wild-2 samples appears to be below what has been found in most chondritic IDPs and primitive chondrites [1]. The bulk mineralogy of Wild-2 grains does not match the mineralogy from any single other known astromaterial [7], and is also strikingly unlike that inferred from Spitzer Telescope spectra of Comet Temple 1 dust [8]. Amino acids and other fragile organics have been detected among the Wild-2 samples [9], which highlights the critical importance of further developing techniques for organic analysis in small samples, and cleaning outbound spacecraft.

Zolensky, M. E.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Loss of Signal, Aeromedical Lessons Learned from the STS-107 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 2014 presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival on human space flight missions. These lessons were presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space flight. As we embark on the development of new spacefaring vehicles through both government and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make this information available to a wider audience engaged in the design and development of future space vehicles. Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process-the response, recovery, identification, investigative studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft mishaps. The goal of this book is to provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews. This poster presents an outline of Loss of Signal contents and highlights from each of five sections - the mission and mishap, the response, the investigation, the analysis and the future.

Stepaniak, Phillip C.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Loss of Signal, Aeromedical Lessons Learned for the STS-I07 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 2014, presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival on human space flight missions. These lessons were presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space flight. As we embark on the development of new spacefaring vehicles through both government and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make this information available to a wider audience engaged in the design and development of future space vehicles. Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process-the response, recovery, identification, investigative studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft mishaps. The goals of this book are to provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews.

Patlach, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2014

Loss of Signal: Aeromedical Lessons Learned from the STS-107 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

The editors of Loss of Signal wanted to document the aeromedical lessons learned from the Space Shuttle Columbia mishap. The book is intended to be an accurate and easily understood account of the entire process of recovering and analyzing the human remains, investigating and analyzing what happened to the crew, and using the resulting information to recommend ways to prevent mishaps and provide better protection to crewmembers. Our goal is to capture the passions of those who devoted their energies in responding to the Columbia mishap. We have reunited authors who were directly involved in each of these aspects. These authors tell the story of their efforts related to the Columbia mishap from their point of view. They give the reader an honest description of their responsibilities and share their challenges, their experiences, and their lessons learned on how to enhance crew safety and survival, and how to be prepared to support space mishap investigations. As a result of this approach, a few of the chapters have some redundancy of information and authors' opinions may differ. In no way did we or they intend to assign blame or criticize anyone's professional efforts. All those involved did their best to obtain the truth in the situations to which they were assigned.

Stepaniak, Philip C.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Lessons We Learned Designing and Building the Chandra Telescope

2014 marks the crystal (15th) anniversary of the launch of the Chandra X‐ray Observatory. This paper offers some of the major lessons learned by some of the key members of the Chandra Telescope team. We offer some of the lessons gleaned from our experiences developing, designing, building and testing the telescope and its subsystems, with 15 years of hindsight. Among the topics to be discussed are the early developmental tests, known as VETA‐I and VETA‐II, requirements derivation, the impact of late requirements and reflection on the conservatism in the design process.

Arenberg, Jonathan↗
NASA NTRS2014

Lessons Learned in the First Year Operating Software Defined Radios in Space

Operating three unique software defined radios (SDRs) in a space environment aboard the Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) Testbed for over one year has provided an opportunity to gather knowledge useful for future missions considering using software defined radios. This paper provides recommendations for the development and use of SDRs, and it considers the details of each SDRs approach to software upgrades and operation. After one year, the SCaN Testbed SDRs have operated for over 1000 hours. During this time, the waveforms launched with the SDR were tested on-orbit to assure that they operated in space at the same performance level as on the ground prior to launch to obtain an initial on-orbit performance baseline. A new waveform for each SDR has been developed, implemented, uploaded to the flight system, and tested in the flight environment. Recommendations for SDR-based missions have been gathered from early development through operations. These recommendations will aid future missions to reduce the cost, schedule, and risk of operating SDRs in a space environment. This paper considers the lessons learned as they apply to SDR pre-launch checkout, purchasing space-rated hardware, flexibility in command and telemetry methods, on-orbit diagnostics, use of engineering models to aid future development, and third-party software. Each SDR implements the SCaN Testbed flight computer command and telemetry interface uniquely, allowing comparisons to be drawn. The paper discusses the lessons learned from these three unique implementations, with suggestions on the preferred approach. Also, results are presented showing that it is important to have full system performance knowledge prior to launch to establish better performance baselines in space, requiring additional test applications to be developed pre-launch. Finally, the paper presents the issues encountered with the operation and implementation of new waveforms on each SDR and proposes recommendations to avoid these issues.

radio equipment↗
NASA NTRS2011

An Interview with Joe McMann: Lessons Learned from Fifty Years of Observing Hardware and Human Behavior

Pica Kahn conducted "An Interview with Joe McMann: Lessons Learned in Human and Hardware Behavior" on August 16, 2011. With more than 40 years of experience in the aerospace industry, McMann has gained a wealth of knowledge. This presentation focused on lessons learned in human and hardware behavior. During his many years in the industry, McMann observed that the hardware development process was intertwined with human influences, which impacted the outcome of the product.

McMann, Joe↗
NASA NTRS2014

Veggie Hardware Validation Test Preliminary Results and Lessons Learned

The Veggie hardware validation test, VEG-01, was conducted on the International Space Station during Expeditions 39 and 40 from May through June of 2014. The Veggie hardware and the VEG-01 experiment payload were launched to station aboard the SpaceX-3 resupply mission in April, 2014. Veggie was installed in an Expedite-the-Processing-of-Experiments-to-Space-Station (ExPRESS) rack in the Columbus module, and the VEG-01 validation test was initiated. Veggie installation was successful, and power was supplied to the unit. The hardware was programmed and the root mat reservoir and plant pillows were installed without issue. As expected, a small amount of growth media was observed in the sealed bags which enclosed the plant pillows when they were destowed. Astronaut Steve Swanson used the wet/dry vacuum to clean up the escaped particles. Water insertion or priming the first plant pillow was unsuccessful as an issue prevented water movement through the quick disconnect. All subsequent pillows were successfully primed, and the initial pillow was replaced with a backup pillow and successfully primed. Six pillows were primed, but only five pillows had plants which germinated. After about a week and a half it was observed that plants were not growing well and that pillow wicks were dry. This indicated that the reservoir was not supplying sufficient water to the pillows via wicking, and so the team reverted to an operational fix which added water directly to the plant pillows. Direct watering of the pillows led to a recovery in several of the stressed plants; a couple of which did not recover. An important lesson learned involved Veggie's bellows. The bellows tended to float and interfere with operations when opened, so Steve secured them to the baseplate during plant tending operations. Due to the perceived intensity of the LED lights, the crew found it challenging to both work under the lights and read crew procedures on their computer. Although the lights are not a safety hazard, for visual comfort crewmembers were advised to wear sunglasses when working with the plants and then they can lift glasses to read procedures. Steve Swanson had already trail-blazed this procedure when he initiated VEG-01. The temperature and humidity data logger was relocated mid-experiment to provide measurements on both sides of the unit. Images of the plants were downlinked weekly, and videos of installation and harvest were recorded. This imaging frequency was not sufficient to monitor and respond to changes in plant growth. Plants, samples, and data loggers will be returned on SpaceX-4, scheduled to return the fall of 2014. Lessons learned will be translated into hardware and operational modifications for future Veggie payloads.

International Space Station↗
NASA NTRS2014

Lessons Learned in the First Year Operating Software Defined Radios in Space

Operating three unique software defined radios (SDRs) in a space environment aboard the Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) Testbed for over one year has provided an opportunity to gather knowledge useful for future missions considering using software defined radios. This paper provides recommendations for the development and use of SDRs, and it considers the details of each SDR's approach to software upgrades and operation. After one year, the SCaN Testbed SDRs have operated for over 1000 hours. During this time, the waveforms launched with the SDR were tested on-orbit to assure that they operated in space at the same performance level as on the ground prior to launch to obtain an initial on-orbit performance baseline. A new waveform for each SDR has been developed, implemented, uploaded to the flight system, and tested in the flight environment. Recommendations for SDR-based missions have been gathered from early development through operations. These recommendations will aid future missions to reduce the cost, schedule, and risk of operating SDRs in a space environment. This paper considers the lessons learned as they apply to SDR pre-launch checkout, purchasing space-rated hardware, flexibility in command and telemetry methods, on-orbit diagnostics, use of engineering models to aid future development, and third-party software. Each SDR implements the SCaN Testbed flight computer command and telemetry interface uniquely, allowing comparisons to be drawn. The paper discusses the lessons learned from these three unique implementations, with suggestions on the preferred approach. Also, results are presented showing that it is important to have full system performance knowledge prior to launch to establish better performance baselines in space, requiring additional test applications to be developed pre-launch. Finally, the paper presents the issues encountered with the operation and implementation of new waveforms on each SDR and proposes recommendations to avoid these issues.

space communication↗