Results for “hardware failure” — Page 14

NASA NTRS1995

Electrophoretic separation of cells and particles from rat pituitary

In spite of the fact that a vast majority of the electrophoresis effort (approximately 90%) could not be done on this mission (IML-2) due to failure of FFEU hardware, we find some interesting differences in flight samples obtained from other parts of the experiment. These differences are entirely novel and sometimes unexpected. This report is organized into 4 parts. Each part describes the data collected thus far from each of the 4 cell culture kits (CCK) which flew in space. Each CCK was loaded with 40x10(exp 6) fresh pituitary cells; all CCK's were identical at the start of the experiment because we prepared one pool of cells.

Hymer, W. C.↗

NASA NTRS1996

Bioprocessing in Microgravity: Applications of Continuous Flow Electrophoresis to Rat Anterior Pituitary Particles

In this report we describe the results of a continuous flow electrophoresis (CFE) experiment done on STS-65 in which we tested the idea that intracellular growth hormone (GH) particles contained in a cell lysate prepared from cultured rat anterior pituitary cells in microgravity might have different electrophoretic mobilities from those in a synchronous ground control cell lysate. Collectively, the results suggested that CFE processing in microgravity was better than on earth; more samples could be processed at a time (6 x) and more variant forms of GH molecules could be resolved as well. We had also hoped to carry out a pituitary cell CFE experiment, but failure of the hardware required that the actual cell electrophoresis trials be done on earth shortly after Shuttle landing. Data from these experiments showed that space-flown cells possessed a higher electrophoretic mobility than ground control cells, thereby offering evidence for the idea that exposure of cultured cells to microgravity can change their net surface charge-density especially when the cells are fed. Collectively, the results from this pituitary cell experiment document the advantage of using coupled cell culture and CFE techniques in the microgravity environment.

Hymer, W. C.↗

NASA NTRS1998

In-Flight Calibration of the Energetic Gamma-Ray Experiment Telescope (EGRET) on the Compton Gamma-Ray Observatory

The Energetic Gamma-Ray Experiment Telescope (EGRET) on the Compton Gamma-Ray Observatory has been operating for over seven years since its launch in 1991 April. This span of time far exceeds the design lifetime of two years. As the instrument has aged, several changes have occurred due to spark chamber gas exchanges as well as some hardware degradation and failures, all of which have an influence on the instrument sensitivity. This paper describes post-launch measurements and analysis that are done to calibrate the instrument response functions. The updated instrument characteristics are incorporated into the analysis software.

Esposito, J. A.↗

NASA NTRS2000

The Spacecraft Materials Selector: An Artificial Intelligence System for Preliminary Design Trade Studies, Materials Assessments, and Estimates of Environments Present

Institutions need ways to retain valuable information even as experienced individuals leave an organization. Modern electronic systems have enough capacity to retain large quantities of information that can mitigate the loss of experience. Performance information for long-term space applications is relatively scarce and specific information (typically held by a few individuals within a single project) is often rather narrowly distributed. Spacecraft operate under severe conditions and the consequences of hardware and/or system failures, in terms of cost, loss of information, and time required to replace the loss, are extreme. These risk factors place a premium on appropriate choice of materials and components for space applications. An expert system is a very cost-effective method for sharing valuable and scarce information about spacecraft performance. Boeing has an artificial intelligence software package, called the Boeing Expert System Tool (BEST), to construct and operate knowledge bases to selectively recall and distribute information about specific subjects. A specific knowledge base to evaluate the on-orbit performance of selected materials on spacecraft has been developed under contract to the NASA SEE program. The performance capabilities of the Spacecraft Materials Selector (SMS) knowledge base are described. The knowledge base is a backward-chaining, rule-based system. The user answers a sequence of questions, and the expert system provides estimates of optical and mechanical performance of selected materials under specific environmental conditions. The initial operating capability of the system will include data for Kapton, silverized Teflon, selected paints, silicone-based materials, and certain metals. For situations where a mission profile (launch date, orbital parameters, mission duration, spacecraft orientation) is not precisely defined, the knowledge base still attempts to provide qualitative observations about materials performance and likely exposures. Prior to the NASA contract, a knowledge base, the Spacecraft Environments Assistant (SEA,) was initially developed by Boeing to estimate the environmental factors important for a specific spacecraft mission profile. The NASA SEE program has funded specific enhancements to the capability of this knowledge base. The SEA qualitatively identifies over 25 environmental factors that may influence the performance of a spacecraft during its operational lifetime. For cases where sufficiently detailed answers are provided to questions asked by the knowledge base, atomic oxygen fluence levels, proton and/or electron fluence and dose levels, and solar exposure hours are calculated. The SMS knowledge base incorporates the previously developed SEA knowledge base. A case history for previous flight experiment will be shown as an example, and capabilities and limitations of the system will be discussed.

Pippin, H. G.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Computer Reliability

Using a NASA developed program, Dr. J. Walter Bond is creating a course in computer reliability modeling. The course will examine three different computer programs, one of them NASA's Care III, the others UCLA's Aries 78 and Aries 82. All three are designed to help estimate the reliability of complex, redundant, fault tolerant system. In computer design, software of this kind can predict or model the effects of various hardware or software failures, a process called reliability modeling.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2006

Noninvasive Diagnosis of Coronary Artery Disease Using 12-Lead High-Frequency Electrocardiograms

A noninvasive, sensitive method of diagnosing certain pathological conditions of the human heart involves computational processing of digitized electrocardiographic (ECG) signals acquired from a patient at all 12 conventional ECG electrode positions. In the processing, attention is focused on low-amplitude, high-frequency components of those portions of the ECG signals known in the art as QRS complexes. The unique contribution of this method lies in the utilization of signal features and combinations of signal features from various combinations of electrode positions, not reported previously, that have been found to be helpful in diagnosing coronary artery disease and such related pathological conditions as myocardial ischemia, myocardial infarction, and congestive heart failure. The electronic hardware and software used to acquire the QRS complexes and perform some preliminary analyses of their high-frequency components were summarized in Real-Time, High-Frequency QRS Electrocardiograph (MSC- 23154), NASA Tech Briefs, Vol. 27, No. 7 (July 2003), pp. 26-28. To recapitulate, signals from standard electrocardiograph electrodes are preamplified, then digitized at a sampling rate of 1,000 Hz, then analyzed by the software that detects R waves and QRS complexes and analyzes them from several perspectives. The software includes provisions for averaging signals over multiple beats and for special-purpose nonrecursive digital filters with specific low- and high-frequency cutoffs. These filters, applied to the averaged signal, effect a band-pass operation in the frequency range from 150 to 250 Hz. The output of the bandpass filter is the desired high-frequency QRS signal. Further processing is then performed in real time to obtain the beat-to-beat root mean square (RMS) voltage amplitude of the filtered signal, certain variations of the RMS voltage, and such standard measures as the heart rate and R-R interval at any given time. A key signal feature analyzed in the present method is the presence versus the absence of reduced-amplitude zones (RAZs). In terms that must be simplified for the sake of brevity, an RAZ comprises several cycles of a high-frequency QRS signal during which the amplitude of the high-frequency oscillation in a portion of the signal is abnormally low (see figure). A given signal sample exhibiting an interval of reduced amplitude may or may not be classified as an RAZ, depending on quantitative criteria regarding peaks and troughs within the reduced-amplitude portion of the high-frequency QRS signal. This analysis is performed in all 12 leads in real time.

Schlegel, Todd T.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) Risk Analysis Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) directorate at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied its knowledge and experience with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to projects in industries ranging from spacecraft to nuclear power plants. PRA is a comprehensive and structured process for analyzing risk in complex engineered systems and/or processes. The PRA process enables the user to identify potential risk contributors such as, hardware and software failure, human error, and external events. Recent developments in the oil and gas industry have presented opportunities for NASA to lend their PRA expertise to both ongoing and developmental projects within the industry. This paper provides an overview of the PRA process and demonstrates how this process was applied in estimating the probability that a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) operating in the Gulf of Mexico and equipped with a generically configured Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) loses location and needs to initiate an emergency disconnect. The PRA described in this paper is intended to be generic such that the vessel meets the general requirements of an International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)/Circ. 645 Class 3 dynamically positioned vessel. The results of this analysis are not intended to be applied to any specific drilling vessel, although provisions were made to allow the analysis to be configured to a specific vessel if required.

Thigpen, Eric B.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) Risk Analysis Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) directorate at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) has applied its knowledge and experience with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to projects in industries ranging from spacecraft to nuclear power plants. PRA is a comprehensive and structured process for analyzing risk in complex engineered systems and/or processes. The PRA process enables the user to identify potential risk contributors such as, hardware and software failure, human error, and external events. Recent developments in the oil and gas industry have presented opportunities for NASA to lend their PRA expertise to both ongoing and developmental projects within the industry. This paper provides an overview of the PRA process and demonstrates how this process was applied in estimating the probability that a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) operating in the Gulf of Mexico and equipped with a generically configured Dynamic Positioning System (DPS) loses location and needs to initiate an emergency disconnect. The PRA described in this paper is intended to be generic such that the vessel meets the general requirements of an International Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)/Circ. 645 Class 3 dynamically positioned vessel. The results of this analysis are not intended to be applied to any specific drilling vessel, although provisions were made to allow the analysis to be configured to a specific vessel if required.

Thigpen, Eric B.↗

NASA NTRS2020

Driving Curiosity: Mars Rover Mobility Trends During the First Seven Years

NASA’s Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission landed the Curiosity rover on Mars on August 6, 2012. As of August 6, 2019 (sol 2488), Curiosity has driven 21,318.5 meters over a variety of terrain types and slopes, employing multiple drive modes with varying amounts of onboard autonomy. Curiosity’s drive distances each sol have ranged from its shortest drive of 2.6 centimeters to its longest drive of 142.5 meters, with an average drive distance of 28.9 meters. Real-time human intervention during Curiosity drives on Mars is not possible due to the latency in uplinking commands and downlinking telemetry, so the operations team relies on the rover’s flight software to prevent an unsafe state during driving. Over the first seven years of the mission, Curiosity has attempted 738 drives. While 622 drives have completed successfully, 116 drives were prevented or stopped early by the rover’s fault protection software. The primary risks to mobility success have been wheel wear, wheel entrapment, progressive wheel sinkage (which can lead to rover embedding), and terrain interactions or hardware or cabling failures that result in an inability to command one or more steer or drive actuators. In this paper, we describe mobility trends over the first 21.3km of the mission, operational aspects of the mobility fault protection, and risk mitigation strategies that will support continued mobility success for the remainder of the mission.

Rankin, Arturo↗

NASA NTRS2001

Control of Flexible Systems in the Presence of Failures

Control of flexible systems under degradation or failure of sensors/actuators is considered. A Linear Matrix Inequality framework is used to synthesize H(sub infinity)-based controllers, which provide good disturbance rejection while capable of tolerating real parameter uncertainties in the system model, as well as potential degradation or failure of the control system hardware. In this approach, a one-at-a-time failure scenario is considered, wherein no more than one sensor or actuator is allowed to fail at any given time. A numerical example involving control synthesis for a two-dimensional flexible system is presented to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed approach.

Magahami, Peiman G.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the mechanical actuation subsystem, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine draft failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline that was available. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System (MAS) hardware. Specifically, the MAS hardware consists of the following components: Air Data Probe (ADP); Elevon Seal Panel (ESP); External Tank Umbilical (ETU); Ku-Band Deploy (KBD); Payload Bay Doors (PBD); Payload Bay Radiators (PBR); Personnel Hatches (PH); Vent Door Mechanism (VDM); and Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM). Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Bradway, M. W.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the mechanical actuation subsystem, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine draft failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline that was available. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System (MAS) hardware. Specifically, the MAS hardware consists of the following components: Air Data Probe (ADP); Elevon Seal Panel (ESP); External Tank Umbilical (ETU); Ku-Band Deploy (KBD); Payload Bay Doors (PBD); Payload Bay Radiators (PBR); Personnel Hatches (PH); Vent Door Mechanism (VDM); and Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM). Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and contains the potential critical items list, detailed analysis, and NASA FMEA/CIL to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Bradway, M. W.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Experiences with Extra-Vehicular Activities in Response to Critical ISS Contingencies

The maturation of the International Space Station (ISS) design from the proposed Space Station Freedom to today's current implementation resulted in external hardware redundancy vulnerabilities in the final design. Failure to compensate for or respond to these vulnerabilities could put the ISS in a posture where it could no longer function as a habitable space station. In the first years of ISS assembly, these responses were to largely be addressed by the continued resupply and Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) capabilities of the Space Shuttle. Even prior to the decision to retire the Space Shuttle, it was realized that ISS needed to have its own capability to be able to rapidly repair or replace external hardware without needing to wait for the next cargo resupply mission. As documented in a previous publication, in 2006 development was started to baseline Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA, or spacewalk) procedures to replace hardware components whose failure would expose some of the ISS vulnerabilities should a second failure occur. This development work laid the groundwork for the onboard crews and the ground operations and engineering teams to be ready to replace any of this failed hardware. In 2010, this development work was put to the test when one of these pieces of hardware failed. This paper will provide a brief summary of the planning and processes established in the original Contingency EVA development phase. It will then review how those plans and processes were implemented in 2010, highlighting what went well as well as where there were deficiencies between theory and reality. This paper will show that the original approach and analyses, though sound, were not as thorough as they should have been in the realm of planning for next worse failures, for documenting Programmatic approval of key assumptions, and not pursuing sufficient engineering analysis prior to the failure of the hardware. The paper will further highlight the changes made to the Contingency EVA preparation team structure, approach, goals, and the resources allocated to its work after the 2010 events. Finally, the authors will overview the implementation of these updates in addressing failures onboard the ISS in 2012, 2013, and 2014. The successful use of the updated approaches, and the application of the approaches to other spacewalks, will demonstrate the effectiveness of this additional work and make a case for putting significant time and resources into pre-failure planning and analysis for critical hardware items on human-tended spacecraft.

Van Cise, E. A.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Experiences with Extra-Vehicular Activities in Response to Critical ISS Contingencies

The maturation of the International Space Station (ISS) design from the proposed Space Station Freedom to today's current implementation resulted in external hardware redundancy vulnerabilities in the final design. Failure to compensate for or respond to these vulnerabilities could put the ISS in a posture to where it could no longer function as a habitable space station. In the first years of ISS assembly, these responses were to largely be addressed by the continued resupply and Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) capabilities of the Space Shuttle. Even prior to the decision to retire the Space Shuttle, it was realized that ISS needed to have its own capability to be able to rapidly repair or replace external hardware without needing to wait for the next cargo resupply mission. As documented in a previous publicatoin5, in 2006 development was started to baseline Extra- Vehicular Activity (EVA, or spacewalk) procedures to replace hardware components whose failure would expose some of the ISS vulnerabilities should a second failure occur. This development work laid the groundwork for the onboard crews and the ground operations and engineering teams to be ready to replace any of this failed hardware. In 2010, this development work was put to the test when one of these pieces of hardware failed. This paper will provide a brief summary of the planning and processes established in the original Contingency EVA development phase. It will then review how those plans and processes were implemented in 2010, highlighting what went well as well as where there were deficiencies between theory and reality. This paper will show that the original approach and analyses, though sound, were not as thorough as they should have been in the realm of planning for next worse failures, for documenting Programmatic approval of key assumptions, and not pursuing sufficient engineering analysis prior to the failure of the hardware. The paper will further highlight the changes made to the Contingency EVA preparation team structure, approach, goals, and the resources allocated to its work after the 2010 events. Finally, the authors will overview the implementation of these updates in addressing failures onboard the ISS in 2012, 2013, and 2014. The successful use of the updated approaches, and the application of the approaches to other spacewalks, will demonstrate the effectiveness of this additional work and make a case for putting significant time and resources into pre-failure planning and analysis for critical hardware items on human-tended spacecraft.

Van Cise, E. A.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Study of a unified hardware and software fault-tolerant architecture

A unified architectural concept, called the Fault Tolerant Processor Attached Processor (FTP-AP), that can tolerate hardware as well as software faults is proposed for applications requiring ultrareliable computation capability. An emulation of the FTP-AP architecture, consisting of a breadboard Motorola 68010-based quadruply redundant Fault Tolerant Processor, four VAX 750s as attached processors, and four versions of a transport aircraft yaw damper control law, is used as a testbed in the AIRLAB to examine a number of critical issues. Solutions of several basic problems associated with N-Version software are proposed and implemented on the testbed. This includes a confidence voter to resolve coincident errors in N-Version software. A reliability model of N-Version software that is based upon the recent understanding of software failure mechanisms is also developed. The basic FTP-AP architectural concept appears suitable for hosting N-Version application software while at the same time tolerating hardware failures. Architectural enhancements for greater efficiency, software reliability modeling, and N-Version issues that merit further research are identified.

Lala, Jaynarayan↗

NASA NTRS2009

Applying Model-based Diagnosis to a Rapid Propellant Loading System

The overall objective of the US Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Rapid Propellant Loading (RPL) Program is to develop a launch vehicle, payload and ground support equipment that can support a rapid propellant load and launch within one hour. NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) has been funded by AFRL to develop hardware and software to demonstrate this capability. The key features of the software would be the ability to recognize and adapt to failures in the physical hardware components, advise operators of equipment faults and workarounds, and put the system in a safe configuration if unable to fly. In December 2008 NASA KSC and NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) demonstrated model based simulation and diagnosis capabilities for a scaled-down configuration of the RPL hardware. In this paper we present a description of the model-based technologies that were included as part of this demonstration and the results that were achieved. In continuation of this work we are currently testing the technologies on a simulation of the complete RPL system. Later in the year, when the RPL hardware is ready, we will be integrating these technologies with the real-time operation of the system to provide live state estimates. In future years we will be developing the capability to recover from faulty conditions via redundancy and reconfiguration.

Goodrich, Charlie H.↗

NASA NTRS2005

A Proposal for the Creation of a Diagnostics and Power Port Standard

The contents of this paper discuss plans for communication failure due to lost hardware during Moon and Mars exploration missions. The author proposes a Diagnostics and Power Port (DPP) creation in the face of total communication failure. DDP would have a number of different power channels to replicate computer diagnostic abilities to find the root cause of failure.

Willeke, Thomas↗

NASA NTRS1986

Management of SSME hardware life utilization

Statistical and probabilistic reliability methodologies were developed for the determination of hardware life limits for the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). Both methodologies require that a mathematical reliability model of the engine (system) performance be developed as a function of the reliabilities of the components and parts. The system reliability model should be developed from the Failute Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List. The statistical reliability methodology establishes hardware life limits directly from the failure distributions of the components and parts obtained from statistically-designed testing. The probabilistic reliability methodology establishes hardware life limits from a decision analysis methodology which incorporates the component/part reliabilities obtained from a probabilistic structural analysis, a calibrated maintenance program, inspection techniques, and fabrication procedures. Probilistic structural analysis is recommended as a tool to prioritize upgrading of the components and parts. The Weibull probability distribution is presently being investigated by NASA/MSFC to characterize the failure distribution of the SSME hardware from a limited data base of failures.

Pauschke, J. M.↗