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Advances in geophysical forensic event monitoring

Forensic analysis of man-made, non-nuclear events (such as industrial accidents, explosion experiments and mine collapses) has become more frequent and detailed owing to advancements in geophysical monitoring. Here, in this Technical Review, we demonstrate how geophysical forensic monitoring using seismic, infrasound and hydroacoustic recordings provides insights on events in the solid earth, atmosphere and underwater. Advanced techniques, including machine-learning-based models, have been developed to detect, identify and investigate these events, providing information on location, subevents, sources and explosive yield. The increase in data availability, application of advanced methods and computation and the growth of multitechnology approaches have increased the accuracy of forensic event analysis and enabled more realistic characterization of uncertainties. For example, the 2020 Beirut explosion in Lebanon demonstrated that various seismic, acoustic and other methods could be used to estimate explosive yield (and yield uncertainties) of about 1 ktonne, providing confidence in the application of these methods to smaller events where data are available. However, forensic investigations remain largely limited to known events with identified sources. Increased access to data, sophisticated analysis methods and high-resolution earth models will improve forensic event analysis further, enabling civil and scientific applications, such as localization in the search for the lost ARA San Juan submarine.

geophysics↗

Considerations for Introducing Artificial Intelligence into Nuclear Power Plants

Advanced computational tools and techniques such as artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) can transform the nuclear power industry. This is necessary given that the economic viability of the existing fleet is in jeopardy and its labor-centric approach to operations and maintenance. Currently, AI/ML research is being undertaken for reactor system design and analysis including fault and accident prognosis, nuclear risk analysis such as plant safety and security evaluation, and plant operations and maintenance including predictive maintenance. Applications include both existing and advanced reactor technologies with the aim of improving operational and business efficiencies. Most every aspect of the organization can benefit, from instrumentation and control, to work planning, to human-machine interactions and business management. AI/ML in nuclear can simplify complex problems and produce more effective decision-making. Nonetheless, careful consideration must be given to the implementation of an AI/ML initiative. The aims of this research are to 1) review barriers to AI/ML adoption within the nuclear power industry, and 2) suggest potential solutions. These barriers are organized along five distinct categories (Figure 1) that are interconnected. The first are historical barriers that track the industry’s development over the decades including worldwide nuclear events that shaped public perceptions. The resulting federal scrutiny and intense safety culture that emerged are discussed. Technical barriers to AI/ML adoption are considerable, and include data privacy concerns, data governance, and the current lack of AI/ML expert knowledge at the plants. The main business case barrier remains cost, but an absence of an industry-wide vision and wide-scale adoption also produces reluctance. Stakeholder readiness is reviewed with special attention given to regulatory readiness. The 5-year strategic plan for AI readiness recently published by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is highlighted. Last, adoption barriers at the user level are addressed including the importance of user experience and explainable AI. The AI adoption barriers described here are inter-related and ideally should be addressed in a holistic fashion.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Network Slicing for Federated Learning in Operational Technology Environment

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) environments are essential to modern infrastructure, facing challenges in ensuring low-latency, high-throughput communication while mitigating cyber threats. This paper presents a framework integrating Federated Learning (FL) and network slicing with Quality of Service (QoS) to enable real-time monitoring without disrupting OT operations. Leveraging digital twin technology and Network Function Virtualization (NFV), the architecture supports predictive analytics and Industry 4.0 requirements. FL facilitates decentralized model training, preserving data privacy and scalability, though it introduces potential throughput constraints. Network slicing addresses this by creating dedicated virtualized segments optimized for performance and security. Advanced fault tolerance at the container and instance levels enhances system reliability. The proposed architecture ensures high throughput, low latency, and secure orchestration for real-time anomaly detection in OT networks. Performance evaluations validate its efficiency in throughput, deployment, and learning accuracy, providing a robust foundation for future ICS automation and data-driven decision-making.

Delgado, Brian G. Rodiles [University of Texas at ↗

Draft Feasibility Assessment for Use of AI in Preparing Transportation Safety Analysis Reports

Preparing transportation safety analysis reports for microreactors is time and labor intensive, requiring extensive cross referencing to Federal regulations, previously approved documents, and expert review comments across structural, thermal, criticality, shielding, containment, and security. These burdens are magnified by the novelty of microreactor technologies and the evolving regulatory landscape, as well as current workforce constraints. Generative AI and supporting machine learning tools present an opportunity to accelerate drafting timelines, lift generalized writing burdens, and systematically enforce regulatory adherence through retrieval augmented generation and other knowledge retrieval and mapping methods. This draft report presents a preliminary feasibility assessment of the use of AI to expedite the preparation of microreactor transportation safety analysis reports and proposes an initial methodology for doing so.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Vehicle-Cycle Inventory for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicles

The United States has witnessed multiple attempts to improve fuel economy and reduce pollutant emissions in the transportation sector, guided chiefly via technological interventions by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and by specific policies of the U.S. Federal Government, like Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) norms (Burnham et al., 2006; U.S. DoT, 2013). These efforts have resulted in the growing adoption of alternatives to conventional materials, fuels, and vehicle propulsion technologies across various transportation modes, while also helping to lower global pollution (greenhouse gas, or GHG, emissions). Yet, a holistic evaluation of the ecofriendliness of these alternatives, particularly their energy use and emissions, merits detailed focus on their entire life-cycle, and thereby, on the life-cycle of associated transport modes. This is vital since alternative fuels and materials can differ vastly in energy sources and production methods employed for their processing vis-à-vis their existing counterparts — and this difference causes significant variation in their respective upstream emissions.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

First Look at Quartic-in-Spin Binary Dynamics at Third Post-Minkowskian Order

We compute the conservative and radiation-reaction contributions to classical observables in the gravitational scattering between a spinning and a spinless black hole to the fourth order in spin and third order in the gravitational constant. The conservative results are obtained from two-loop amplitudes for the scattering process of a massive scalar with a massive spin-𝑠 field (𝑠=0, 1, 2) minimally coupled to gravity, employing the recently introduced spin interpolation method to resolve all spin-Casimir terms. The two-loop amplitude exhibits a spin-shift symmetry in both probe limits, which we conjecture to be a sign of yet unknown integrability of Kerr orbits through the quartic order in spin and to all orders in the gravitational constant. We obtain the radial action from the finite part of the amplitude and use it to compute classical observables, including the impulse and spin kick. This is done using the recently introduced covariant Dirac brackets, which allow for the computation of classical scattering observables for general (nonaligned) spin configurations. Finally, employing the radiation-reaction amplitude proposed by Alessio and Di Vecchia, together with the Dirac brackets, we obtain radiation-reaction contributions to observables at all orders in spin and beyond the aligned-spin limit. We find agreement with known results up to the quadratic order in spin for both conservative and radiation-reaction contributions. Our results advance the state of the art in the understanding of spinning binary dynamics in general relativity and demonstrate the power and simplicity of the Dirac bracket formalism for relating scattering amplitudes to classical observables.

general relativity↗

Summary of Expansions and Updates in GREET ® 2022

The GREET ® (Greenhouse gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy use in Technologies) model has been developed by Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) with the support of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and other federal agencies. GREET is a life cycle analysis (LCA) tool, structured to systematically examine the energy and environmental effects of a wide variety of transportation fuels and vehicle technologies in major transportation sectors (i.e., road, air, marine, and rail) and other end-use sectors, and energy systems. Argonne has expanded and updated the model in various sectors in GREET 2022, and this report provides a summary of the release.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

HELIUM LEAK TEST MODELING OF A SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL CANISTER

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is considering the development of one or more federal consolidated interim storage facilities (CISFs) to be used to store commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at locations in the U.S. One of the first technical challenges of a CISF is performing an inspection of SNF canisters upon their receipt to confirm they can be placed into the CISF’s licensed storage configuration. The canister receipt inspection is critical to CISF site operations. The test is conceived as being a helium (He) leak check, intended to confirm that the confinement boundary of a SNF canister is intact. SNF canisters are filled with He when they are sealed, so detection of a He leak indicates that a through-wall flaw has occurred in the canister confinement boundary. Other measurements are planned to occur upon canister receipt in addition to the He leak check such as krypton-85 measurements, which would indicate confinement breaches of one or more fuel rods in addition to a breach of the SNF canister. However, the He leak check has been identified as one of such high importance and has such significant technical challenges that a full-scale demonstration is needed to confirm the He leak test’s viability and to assist in planning relative to its operational requirements. A modeling methodology for simulating the He detection test was developed to help inform the test plan and the design of the test vessels. To develop the modeling methodology a detailed computational fluid dynamics (CFD) benchmark model was constructed to compare against leak rate test data from a transportation package for radioactive material. This report is focused on modeling efforts to simulate the benchmark leak test.

Suffield, Sarah R.↗

Microgrid Hardening Design Toolkit User Guide: Software v0.29

Microgrid Hardening Design Toolkit helps microgrid stakeholders assess community-specific natural hazard risks to microgrid components and provides mitigation strategies to reduce those risks. Using census tract location inputs and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Risk Index dataset, the tool provides a ranked list of the highest risk hazards for a selected community and hazard-specific mitigation options for microgrid components. It also provides risk twin communities with similar hazard risk profiles and includes a radar-chart to visually compare risk profiles across communities. The toolkit is expected to help users quickly understand community-specific hazard risks and make decisions for microgrid hardening.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Validation of the NLR Pumped Storage Hydropower Cost Model

The National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) first released its pumped storage hydropower (PSH) cost model in 2023 as the most detailed bottom-up PSH cost model available to the public. It is available both as a spreadsheet and an interactive web tool, enabling users with a variety of PSH interests to transparently characterize costs of alternative PSH sites and designs. The PSH cost model cannot replace detailed site-level studies and design, but it is important to validate it against other industry PSH cost estimates. The initial model methodology report validated the cost model for a single proposed site, the Eagle Mountain Project in California. This slide deck documents an expanded validation exercise using cost data from six other sites: Goldendale (Washington), Seminoe (Wyoming), Gordon Butte (Montana), Swan Lake (Oregon), White Pine (Oregon), and Lewis Ridge (Kentucky). It compares itemized costs from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) applications and other reported costs with NLR PSH cost model outputs after customizing inputs for each site. The validation exercise finds that the NLR model's conservative indirect cost assumptions often drive overall cost overestimation, with direct cost comparisons typically agreeing more closely. All cost model estimates are well within an Association for the Advancement of Cost Engineering (AACE) Class 5 estimation range (-50% to +100%), with five within the AACE Class 4 range (-30% to +50%) and four being within 15%. This result is considered reasonable performance for a parametric model applied at a preliminary design stage.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

California Energy Systems for the 21st Century (CES-21) Program, CRADA TC02200 (Final Report)

The following report representsthe culmination of a five-year Cybersecurity Research and Development (R&D) program performed by California’s Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and funded by the IOUs’ electricity ratepayers as authorized by California Legislation and the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). The cybersecurity R&D, which was intensely technical in nature, was broken into three major workstreams: 1. The development of a modeling & simulation platform, to explore the potential effects of various threat and response scenarios at grid scale; 2. The establishment of a physical testbed with separate substation instances from each of the IOUs, to evaluate threats and responses on actual substation equipment; 3. The development of a research package consisting of several capabilities to support the industry’s evolution towards automated threat response and other next-generation cybersecurity techniques Throughout the program, there was extensive collaboration between the program team and national laboratories, federal departments, academic institutions and industry organizations. Several of the tools developed through the program have been made available to the open source community, to enable faster adoption and continued development of important cybersecurity capabilities. While this program began to develop much of the foundation for automated threat response, much work remains to be done, and this report recommends a series of next steps. While the Executive Summary below has been simplified as much as possible, the very technical nature of the subject matter would make further reduction difficult without causing meaning to be lost. Due to the sensitive nature of the research, some topics are intentionally covered at a high level to protect the research and therefore the electric grid and customers of California and the Nation. For further detail, clarification or questions we suggest discussion with the program team.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Characterizing the Impact of GPU Power Management on an Exascale System

As GPU-accelerated high-performance computing (HPC) systems approach exascale performance, controlling energy consumption without compromising throughput is essential. Architectures such as the AMD MI250X-based Frontier supercomputer provide runtime mechanisms like frequency and power capping, enabling energy tuning without modifying application code. Although both target energy reduction, they operate via distinct hardware control paths and influence workloads differently. We present a comprehensive evaluation of these strategies on a leadership-class system using diverse HPC proxy applications representative of production workloads. Our study analyzes performance–energy trade-offs across multiple capping levels, node counts (1 and 32), and application profiles. Results show that frequency capping generally achieves higher energy efficiency and scalability, with gains of up to 13.2% without performance loss, while power capping is more effective for single-node runs or bursty GPU utilization. We also provide practical guidelines to help system administrators and users balance energy efficiency and performance in large-scale scientific workloads.

Costa, Mariana [Universidade Federal do Rio Grande↗

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security 2024 Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program was established to provide research support addressing near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accounting (MC&A), Physical Protection System (PPS), and Cybersecurity requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A, PPS, and Cybersecurity designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARSS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARSS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Large-scale parametric modeling of spent nuclear fuel dynamics in the 30 cm package drop scenario

Packages used to transport spent nuclear fuel (SNF) are required by the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 71.71 to demonstrate satisfactory performance during a drop scenario. While the CFR is meant to ensure safe package function, it does not evaluate survival of the SNF within. The U.S. Department of Energy Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology program is working on closing the knowledge gap related to the response of SNF to external mechanical loads, including the hypothetical 30 cm package drop scenario in the CFR. In support of this effort, LS-DYNA finite element simulations were developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to model generic drop scenarios at both the package and fuel assembly level. The models were validated against one-third scale package and full scale fuel assembly drop test data and were exercised to predict fuel cladding strains in a narrow range of model configurations. This work describes a large-scale parametric study conducted by PNNL using the previously developed and validated PWR finite element model, with the addition of a new generic BWR assembly model. The motivation for the parametric study was to characterize the broad range of SNF responses in the 30 cm package drop scenario. This was accomplished by varying the drop orientation, fuel assembly type (17x17 PWR and 10x10 BWR), burnup, cladding temperature, spacer grid buckling load, package mass, impact limiter stiffness, and mechanical gap conditions within the basket. A MATLAB framework was developed to automate LS-DYNA model generation and execution on PNNL institutional computing resources. In total, over 2000 simulations were performed. For each simulation, the SNF response was quantified in terms of permanent grid deformation, fuel rod contact pressure, and strains within the fuel rods, guide tubes, and water rods. The results provide valuable insight into the range of responses that could be reasonably expected from SNF in the hypothetical drop scenario, as well as the sensitivity to each input parameter. The results of this parametric study are a key component of the testing and modeling strategy the Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology program is using to close the external loads knowledge gap.

Kadooka, Kevin↗

Er Al :Al 2 ⁢O 3 for telecom-band photonics: Electronic structure and optical properties

Er-doped Al 2 ⁢O 3 is a promising host for telecom-band integrated photonics. Here, in this study, we combine ab initio calculations with a symmetry-resolved analysis to elucidate substitutional Er on the Al site (Er Al ) in 𝛼−Al 2 ⁢O 3 . First-principles relaxations confirm the structural stability of Er Al . We then use the local trigonal crystal-field symmetry to classify the Er-derived impurity levels by irreducible representations and to derive polarization-resolved electric-dipole selection rules, explicitly identifying the symmetry-allowed 𝑓−𝑑 hybridization channels. Kubo-Greenwood absorption spectra computed from Kohn-Sham states quantitatively corroborate these symmetry predictions. Furthermore, we connect the calculated intra-4⁢𝑓 line strengths to Judd-Ofelt theory, clarifying the role of 4⁢𝑓−5⁢𝑑 admixture in enabling optical activity. Notably, we predict a characteristic absorption near 1.47 µ⁢m (telecom band), relevant for on-chip amplification and emission. To our knowledge, a symmetry-resolved first-principles treatment of Er:Al 2 ⁢O 3 with an explicit Judd-Ofelt interpretation has not been reported, providing a transferable framework for tailoring rare-earth dopants in wide-band-gap oxides for integrated photonics. Our results for the optical spectra are in good agreement with experimental data. The resulting symmetry-based selection rules translate directly to polarization-dependent coupling in Al 2 ⁢O 3 integrated photonic waveguides and resonators, enabling device-level design of TE/TM-mode interaction with Er emitters in the 1.5-µ⁢m telecom band.

Er-doped Al2O3↗

Applying the Risk Management Framework: The Distributed Energy Resource Risk Manager

As part of a multiyear effort, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) has dedicated resources to understand and identify cybersecurity weaknesses in distributed energy resources (DERs) by performing assessments. Due to a lack of standardization and rapidly increasing adoption of DERs, there is a critical need to address cybersecurity needs for DER systems in an interactive way. Furthermore, federal agencies, which are required to obtain an authority to operate, are challenged by the complexities of including their DERs. To help meet this need, in early 2020, NREL released the Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Framework (DERCF) and accompanying Web application. This process is supported by the Risk Management Framework (RMF) developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. This project, referred to as the DERCF RMF application, expands on the existing DERCF work to include methods that support walking a user through the seven RMF steps. The tool will be available for download at no cost from [link ]. The purpose of this paper is to describe the steps the DERCF team at NREL took to understand Steps 1-5 of the RMF process. Additionally, this document will identify future work on the first five steps as well as a plan for Steps 6 and 7.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗