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243 records · Page 14
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Unrolled Video Super-Resolution Network with Autoregressive Prior for the Case of Known Motion

Real-time detection and classification of distant objects is necessary for many national security applications. However, when objects are far from the sensor, they occupy only a small number of pixels in the captured video, limiting the amount of visual detail available for recognition. State-of-the-art classification methods typically rely on high-resolution (HR) video streams to capture characteristic object features, but obtaining such detail is challenging for distant objects that occupy only a few pixels. This motivates the development of video super-resolution (VSR) methods that enhance object classification by recovering fine details from low-pixel representations. Current VSR methods rely either on model-based optimization, which is interpretable but computationally expensive, or on learning-based approaches, which are efficient and high-performing but often lack flexibility and interpretability. In this report, we propose an end-to-end trainable unrolled VSR network, UVSRNet, which super-resolves each frame in a video by exploiting sub-pixel motion between neighboring low-resolution (LR) frames as well as incorporating high-frequency detail from previously super-resolved frames. In particular, by unrolling a plug-and-play (PnP) half-quadratic splitting (HQS) algorithm, we leverage a model-based data-fitting module alongside a learning-based autoregressive prior module. This combination yields a method that maintains the flexibility and interpretability of model-based methods while achieving the performance advantages of learning-based methods.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Low Yield Nuclear Monitoring Physics Experiment 1 – Integrated Data Acquisition System Design and Initial Observations

The report documents the design of the Integrated Data AcQuisition (IDAQ) system and observations recorded during the first in a series of underground chemical explosions conducted on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in southern Nevada. Experiments are funded as part of Low Yield Nuclear Monitoring (LYNM) research and development within the United States National Nuclear Security Administration NA-22 nuclear non-proliferation program. The series is part of the broader Physical Experiment 1 (PE1) being conducted in and around the P-tunnel facility on the NNSS. Each explosive experiment utilizes several tons of comp-B to generate signals recorded by a broad suite of instrumentation. The IDAQ serves as the backbone for all subsurface instrumentation providing precise time synchronization, remote control, data exfiltration and backup, along with recording several sensing modalities throughout the underground complex that includes ground motion, environmental conditions, and electromagnetic signals.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Seismic DAS Observations of a large underground chemical explosion in dry tuff

On 18 October 2023 a 16.3-ton TNT equivalent chemical explosion was detonated underground at the Nevada National Security Site, generating a seismic event (Meyers et al., 2024). The associated seismic wavefield was measured on a Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) array with slant range distances from 27 m – 1123 m. The first arriving phase traveled at an apparent velocity of about 2640 m s -1 from 27 m to 420 m slant range and about 2470 m s -1 from 505 m to 1123 m slant range according to the first arrival moveouts on the DAS data. The first arrival from the explosion temporarily saturated the cable from a slant range of 27 m – 186 m and 0.009 s to 0.084 s post detonation. From 186 m slant range to 420 m slant range, peak strain rates of 5.6 x 10 6 nm m -1 s -1 were observed for the first arrival phase. For the first arrival from 505 m slant range to 1123 m slant range, peak strain rates reduced to 8.0 x 10 4 nm m -1 s -1 . A comparison of the scaled accelerations computed from DAS, the geophone pairs, and the measurements of co-located accelerometer pairs show common agreement at the scaled ranges of the single point sensors. This study adds to the body of work reporting near-source DAS observations of the seismic wavefields generated by underground chemical explosions. These results indicate that near-source DAS observations can refine interpretations of phase identification from single-point sensor observations. Phase identification could be one mechanism that contributes scatter to single point seismic measurements which would confound the performance of empirical relationships for small explosions. Removing that mechanism may therefore reduce interstation variability and increase empirical relationship performance for small explosions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2019

Data-driven cyber attack detection and mitigation for decentralized wide-area protection and control in smart grids

Modern power systems have already evolved into complicated cyber physical systems (CPS), often referred to as smart grids, due to the continuous expansion of the electrical infrastructure, the augmentation of the number of heterogeneous system components and players, and the consequential application of a diversity of information and telecommunication technologies to facilitate the Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) of the day-to-day power system operation. Because of the reliance on cyber technologies, WAMPAC, among other critical functions, is prone to various malicious cyber attacks. Successful cyber attacks, especially those sabotage the operation of Bulk Electric System (BES), can cause great financial losses and social panics. Application of conventional IT security solutions is indispensable, but it often turns out to be insufficient to mitigate sophisticated attacks that deploy zero-day vulnerabilities or social engineering tactics. To further improve the resilience of the operation of smart grids when facing cyber attacks, it is desirable to make the WAMPAC functions per se capable of detecting various anomalies automatically, carrying out adaptive activity adjustments in time and thus staying unimpaired even under attack. Most of the existing research efforts attempt to achieve this by adding novel functional modules, such as model-based anomaly detectors, to the legacy centralized WAMPAC functions. In contrast, this dissertation investigates the application of data-driven algorithms in cyber attack detection and mitigation within a decentralized architecture aiming at improving the situational awareness and self-adaptiveness of WAMPAC. First part of the research focuses on the decentralization of System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS) with Multi-Agent System (MAS), within which the data-driven anomaly detection and optimal adaptive load shedding are further explored. An algorithm named as Support Vector Machine embedded Layered Decision Tree (SVMLDT) is proposed for the anomaly detection, which provides satisfactory detection accuracy as well as decision-making interpretability. The adaptive load shedding is carried out by every agent individually with dynamic programming. The load shedding relies on the load profile propagation among peer agents and the attack adaptiveness is accomplished by maintaining the historical mean of load shedding proportion. Load shedding only takes place after the consensus pertaining to the anomaly detection is achieved among all interconnected agents and it serves the purpose of mitigating certain cyber attacks. The attack resilience of the decentralized SIPS is evaluated using IEEE 39 bus model. It is shown that, unlike the traditional centralized SIPS, the proposed solution is able to carry out the remedial actions under most Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The second part investigates the clustering based anomalous behavior detection and peer-assisted mitigation for power system generation control. To reduce the dimensionality of the data, three metrics are designed to interpret the behavior conformity of generator within the same balancing area. Semi-supervised K-means clustering and a density sensitive clustering algorithm based on Hierarchical DBSCAN (HDBSCAN) are both applied in clustering in the 3D feature space. Aiming to mitigate the cyber attacks targeting the generation control commands, a peer-assisted strategy is proposed. When the control commands from control center is detected as anomalous, i.e. either missing or the payload of which have been manipulated, the generating unit utilizes the peer data to infer and estimate a new generation adjustment value as replacement. Linear regression is utilized to obtain the relation of control values received by different generating units, Moving Target Defense (MTD) is adopted during the peer selection and 1-dimensional clustering is performed with the inferred control values, which are followed by the final control value estimation. The mitigation strategy proposed requires that generating units can communicate with each other in a peer-to-peer manner. Evaluation results suggest the efficacy of the proposed solution in counteracting data availability and data integrity attacks targeting the generation controls. However, the strategy stays effective only if less than half of the generating units are compromised and it is not able to mitigate cyber attacks targeting the measurements involved in the generation control.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2007

Emergency Flight Control of a Twin-Jet Commercial Aircraft using Manual Throttle Manipulation

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created the PCAR (Propulsion-Controlled Aircraft Recovery) project in 2005 to mitigate the ManPADS (man-portable air defense systems) threat to the commercial aircraft fleet with near-term, low-cost proven technology. Such an attack could potentially cause a major FCS (flight control system) malfunction or other critical system failure onboard the aircraft, despite the extreme reliability of current systems. For the situations in which nominal flight controls are lost or degraded, engine thrust may be the only remaining means for emergency flight control [ref 1]. A computer-controlled thrust system, known as propulsion-controlled aircraft (PCA), was developed in the mid 1990s with NASA, McDonnell Douglas and Honeywell. PCA's major accomplishment was a demonstration of an automatic landing capability using only engine thrust [ref 11. Despite these promising results, no production aircraft have been equipped with a PCA system, due primarily to the modifications required for implementation. A minimally invasive option is TOC (throttles-only control), which uses the same control principles as PCA, but requires absolutely no hardware, software or other aircraft modifications. TOC is pure piloting technique, and has historically been utilized several times by flight crews, both military and civilian, in emergency situations stemming from a loss of conventional control. Since the 1990s, engineers at NASA Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) have studied TOC, in both simulation and flight, for emergency flight control with test pilots in numerous configurations. In general, it was shown that TOC was effective on certain aircraft for making a survivable landing. DHS sponsored both NASA Dryden Flight Research Center (Edwards, CA) and United Airlines (Denver, Colorado) to conduct a flight and simulation study of the TOC characteristics of a twin-jet commercial transport, and assess the ability of a crew to control an aircraft down to a survivable runway landing using TOC. The PCAR project objective was a set of pilot procedures for operation of a specific aircraft without hydraulics that (a) have been validated in both simulation and flight by relevant personnel, and (b) mesh well with existing commercial operations, maintenance, and training at a minimum cost. As a result of this study, a procedure has been developed to assist a crew in making a survivable landing using TOC. In a simulation environment, line pilots with little or no previous TOC experience performed survivable runway landings after a few practice TOC approaches. In-flight evaluations put line pilots in a simulated emergency situation where TOC was used to recover the aircraft, maneuver to a landing site, and perform an approach down to 200 feet AGL. The results of this research, including pilot observations, procedure comments, recommendations, future work and lessons learned, will he discussed. Flight data and video footage of TOC approaches may also be shown.

Cole, Jennifer H.↗
DOE OSTI2015

Framework for Modeling High-Impact, Low-Frequency Power Grid Events to Support Risk-Informed Decisions

Natural and man-made hazardous events resulting in loss of grid infrastructure assets challenge the electric power grid’s security and resilience. However, the planning and allocation of appropriate contingency resources for such events requires an understanding of their likelihood and the extent of their potential impact. Where these events are of low likelihood, a risk-informed perspective on planning can be problematic as there exists an insufficient statistical basis to directly estimate the probabilities and consequences of their occurrence. Since risk-informed decisions rely on such knowledge, a basis for modeling the risk associated with high-impact low frequency events (HILFs) is essential. Insights from such a model can inform where resources are most rationally and effectively expended. The present effort is focused on development of a HILF risk assessment framework. Such a framework is intended to provide the conceptual and overarching technical basis for the development of HILF risk models that can inform decision makers across numerous stakeholder sectors. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 2014 Standard TPL-001-4 considers severe events for transmission reliability planning, but does not address events of such severity that they have the potential to fail a substantial fraction of grid assets over a region, such as geomagnetic disturbances (GMD), extreme seismic events, and coordinated cyber-physical attacks. These are beyond current planning guidelines. As noted, the risks associated with such events cannot be statistically estimated based on historic experience; however, there does exist a stable of risk modeling techniques for rare events that have proven of value across a wide range of engineering application domains. There is an active and growing interest in evaluating the value of risk management techniques in the State transmission planning and emergency response communities, some of this interest in the context of grid modernization activities. The availability of a grid HILF risk model, integrated across multi-hazard domains which, when interrogated, can support transparent, defensible and effective decisions, is an attractive prospect among these communities. In this report, we document an integrated HILF risk framework intended to inform the development of risk models. These models would be based on the systematic and comprehensive (to within scope) characterization of hazards to the level of detail required for modeling risk, identification of the stressors associated with the hazards (i.e., the means of impacting grid and supporting infrastructure), characterization of the vulnerability of assets to these stressors and the probabilities of asset compromise, the grid’s dynamic response to the asset failures, and assessment of subsequent severities of consequence with respect to selected impact metrics, such as power outage duration and geographic reach. Specifically, the current framework is being developed to;1. Provide the conceptual and overarching technical paradigms for the development of risk models; 2. Identify the classes of models required to implement the framework - providing examples of existing models, and also identifying where modeling gaps exist; 3. Identify the types of data required, addressing circumstances under which data are sparse and the formal elicitation of informed judgment might be required; and 4. Identify means by which the resultant risk models might be interrogated to form the necessary basis for risk management.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2018

Regulatory and Licensing Strategy for Microreactor Technology

With electricity demand on the rise, an increase in the use of nuclear energy is needed in order to meet future energy demands. The use of nuclear energy will not only begin to positively address this demand, but will also mitigate the negative impacts of carbon-induced climate change and provide energy security to the United States. An appropriate option to address the increasing energy demand is the use of advanced reactor systems like microreactors. Microreactors, often referred to as special-purpose reactors or vSMRs, are neutronically simple, factory manufacturable, easily transportable, and designed to produce less than 20 MWt (for classification as Hazard Category 2 per 10 CFR 830, DOE STD 1027). These reactors are decentralized energy sources that have the ability to provide sustainable and affordable power to remote communities and to industrial users, while having self-contained geometry that requires very low maintenance care. In order for microreactors to be approved for operation, they must abide by and successfully complete a rigorous regulatory and licensing process monitored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of Energy (DOE), or the Department of Defense (DoD). Because microreactors are a relatively new and disruptive technology, there is no clear licensing path for them to follow. Current licensing frameworks are tailored specifically to large, traditional light water reactors (LWRs) that have been developed and understood by the nuclear industry for many years. Unlike LWRs, microreactors have major design differences, specifically in the materials, coolant, reflectors and potential technology applications used. They also have higher in-core operating temperatures, which have the potential to push the materials used past their allowable limits. Because they are much smaller, safety margins, the amount of space required for assembly, and the distances required to meet dose-based regulatory criteria can technically be altered to better fit their new size. The following strategies and recommendations are intended to assure that key licensing issues do not influence the path to microreactor development, demonstration, and commercialization: Nuclear Regulatory Commission • The NRC should address the lack of knowledge and support of risk informed decision-making concepts from staff members and continue to advance and communicate risk initiatives using their Risk Informed Steering Committee • More research should be done into whether or not microreactors, which are small Class 103 facilities, can be licensed using Class 104-type guidance (e.g., NUREG 1537) • The NRC should use frequency-consequence curves to incrementally reduce regulatory uncertainty and risk to facilitate future construction and operation of advanced reactor designs Department of Energy • The DOE should continue to implement their multi-step Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table process in order to help detect and recommend the major design and technology work needed for licensing future reactor systems • The DOE should consider a joint licensing approach with the NRC where microreactors first go through the DOE process, then finish with the NRC process, providing an advantage for both applicants and NRC staff Department of Defense • The DoD should invest in personnel with sufficient expertise, incorporate their military reactors into tactical power systems, and self-regulate using Section 91b of the Atomic Energy Act Transportation • Licensees should convert enriched uranium hexafluoride into metal or oxide at an enrichment facility and then transport them to a fabrication facility • To avoid transportation issues altogether, licensees should consider positioning the enrichment and fabrication facilities on the same site • The DOE should provide their support in developing new shipping packages for safe transport, criticality benchmark data needed to license high-assay low-enriched uranium fuel facilities and transport packages, and provide financial and technical help to the Department of Transportation; and, • The NRC should help transportation efforts by finalizing and developing guidance for implementing 10 CFR 73 and 10 CFR 74 specifically for Category 2 Special Nuclear Material.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014

The Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Thyssenkrupp Steel Mill cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In December 2014, the German Government’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report detailing a cyber attack on a German steel mill that occurred earlier that year, though exact dates and details of the attack were not revealed. While the report did not specify the name of the company, multiple sources identified the victim as one of Europe’s largest steel manufacturers, Thyssenkrupp AG. Further, Thyssenkrupp announced on 16 May of that year that Europe’s largest blast furnace, “Schwelgern 2,” located at its facility in Duisburg, Germany, would be offline for several weeks for repairs and upgrades, suggesting Schwelgern 2 was likely the target of the attack. The attack began in early 2014, when adversaries infiltrated the victim steel mill’s Information Technology (IT) network via a spearphishing campaign, then worked their way into the Operational Technology (OT) environment, where they executed software that caused denial of service, denial of control, and eventually a loss of control. This led to the blast furnace shutting down without proper safety procedures, resulting in catastrophic physical damage. No lives were lost in the incident, but ThyssenKrupp suffered $4 million in damage to the blast furnace and an additional $6 million in lost revenue. The adversaries required specialized knowledge and expertise in steel production, which enabled them to compromise a variety of internal systems and components across both IT and OT networks. The attack also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the industrial control systems (ICS) and production processes being used. This combination resulted in one of the earliest known publicly reported cybersecurity incidents resulting in physical damage to ICS equipment. Researchers and analysts identified 19 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 20 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 454 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the Thyssenkrupp cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 369 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 316 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 120 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility Capability eXpansion (DCX) Strategy

This document details the strategy proposed to meet the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) requirement for the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility Sustainment and Modernization projects identified in multiple NNSA Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) reports to Congress [NNSA, 2020; 2021; 2022; 2023; 2024]. DARHT has become indispensable for the certification of the primaries of U.S. nuclear weapons since the current U.S. moratorium halted underground nuclear testing more than 30 years ago. However, aging facilities, evolving technology, and other issues are limiting or threatening the capability of DARHT to meet NNSA’s expanding mission needs now and into the future. This DARHT Capability eXpansion (DCX) strategy was developed to address NNSA needs by extending DARHT’s reliability and resilience, increasing the quality and quantity of DARHT data, and enabling hydrodynamic measurements in complex environments. The strategy can be implemented through integration of line-item projects, acquisition of major items of equipment, and other actions coordinated with the execution of the SSMP. This strategy document is intended for U.S. Government officials, particularly authorizers, appropriators, and program leaders. It may also be furnished to DARHT users, customers, collaborators, stakeholders, and visitors as needed

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗