A data-based private learning framework for enhanced security against replay attacks in cyber-physical systems
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Industries supporting the global nuclear infrastructure striving for cost savings, expansions in efficiency, and convenience are likely to adopt components (e.g., hardware, software) that comprise the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). These devices offer potential improvements along with security challenges. Modern conveniences achieved through application of technology have propagated through society in the form of interconnected devices, from doorbells to microwave ovens, commonly referred to as IoT. IoT devices are often Internet-connected devices that are designed to send data back to a cloud-based server, where a smart phone application then presents device status and control options. Home-based IoT applications carry a different set of risks when compared to a business or security environment, where there is also a history of convenience and interconnection. Industrial settings have long relied on specifically designed Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for process control where IIoT devices are intended to inform business decisions and augment traditional processes. A recent National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report provides a distinction between process control and IIoT in that traditional process control is not replaced by IIoT, but rather IIoT devices are intended to enhance industrial processes through additional monitoring of various sensors and application of data analytics models using artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) (Fagan, Marron, et al. 2021) (Ross, et al. 2021).
Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to transform nuclear security operations, offering opportunities to enhance effectiveness while simultaneously introducing new challenges. As AI technologies rapidly evolve, agencies across the United States Government (USG) are researching, implementing, and evaluating various AI models and systems. Given the broad capabilities and applications of these technologies, it is essential for each agency to identify and articulate those areas where it can make meaningful contributions aligned with its mission and expertise. To address this need for strategic focus, in late Fiscal Year 2025 (FY2025), the Office of International Nuclear Security (INS) established an AI Task Force (AITF) to gather input from subject matter experts (SMEs) regarding the most appropriate role INS could serve in researching, evaluating, or implementing AI for nuclear security. The AITF engaged 15 experts from national laboratories with backgrounds in cyber security, physical security, transport security, insider threat mitigation, nuclear engineering, human-systems engineering, and AI/ML development. This white paper summarizes the insights gathered from these SMEs and presents a potential roadmap for INS engagement with AI technologies. The recommendations outlined here are intended to inform INS leadership as they make strategic decisions about resource allocation and program direction in this rapidly evolving technological domain.
This dataset holds simulated PCAP (packet capture) data from the SCEPTRE validation demonstration model as a set of pairwise communications between devices via specific protocols. All connections should be assumed to be symmetric, as this data is an aggregation of the true PCAP. A mapping is also provided associating each IP address with its true device type.
A smartphone plummeted from a stratospheric height of 36 km, providing a near-real-time record of its rapid descent and ground impact. An app recorded and streamed useful internal multi-sensor data at high sample rates. Signal fusion with external and internal sensor systems permitted a more detailed reconstruction of the Skyfall chronology, including its descent speed, rotation rate, and impact deceleration. Our results reinforce the potential of smartphones as an agile and versatile geophysical data collection system for environmental and disaster monitoring IoT applications. We discuss mobile environmental sensing capabilities and present a flexible data model to record and stream signals of interest. The Skyfall case study can be used as a guide to smartphone signal processing methods that are transportable to other hardware platforms and operating systems.
Cooperative electric utilities represent an integral part of the larger electric grid and are part of the nation’s critical infrastructure. The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) has a unique relationship with approximately 900 cooperatively owned and operated electric utilities and engaged in a program with the Department of Energy (DOE) to promote a culture of cybersecurity and resiliency within the electric cooperative community. The Rural Cooperative Cybersecurity Capabilities (RC3) Program, funded under a Cooperative Agreement with DOE (Project DE-OE-0000807), focused on improving the cybersecurity and resiliency capabilities of small and mid-sized electric distribution cooperatives. This segment of electric utilities faces many challenges, but also embraces a culture of cooperation that presents opportunities. A customized approach is needed to reach these utilities – one that emphasizes collaboration, more focused and personalized training, use of trusted and familiar experts that can be deployed as needed, software security services that require limited in-house cybersecurity expertise, and shared resource models that enable access to more expensive cybersecurity options.
Multiagent Cyber-Physical-Human (CPH) systems in realistic environments operate under uncertain conditions. Communication among agents, aimed at reducing the uncertainty, is itself subject to uncertainty. We propose to manage uncertainties in autonomous, long-duration operations of multiagent systems via a modified Honeybee Foraging (HBF) behavioral scheme. The resulting system, Autonomous Persistent Intelligent Swarm (APIS),incorporates two new behaviors to ameliorate informational uncertainty. When “scouting”, agents are tasked based on informational quality and reliability rather than solely on priorities. When “dancing”, agents are tasked to rendezvous with other dancing agents to exchange information at close range, where successful communication is guaranteed. When coupled with uncertainty-aware modeling across agents, these behaviors improve situational awareness and resilience of the system, enabling it to function under more uncertain conditions arising during long-duration missions.
Multiagent Cyber-Physical-Human (CPH) systems in realistic environments operate under uncertain conditions. Communication among agents, aimed at reducing the uncertainty, is itself subject to uncertainty. We propose to manage uncertainties in autonomous, long-duration operations of multiagent systems via a modified Honeybee Foraging (HBF) behavioral scheme. The resulting system, Autonomous Persistent Intelligent Swarm (APIS),incorporates two new behaviors to ameliorate informational uncertainty. When “scouting”, agents are tasked based on informational quality and reliability rather than solely on priorities. When “dancing”, agents are tasked to rendezvous with other dancing agents to exchange information at close range, where successful communication is guaranteed. When coupled with uncertainty-aware modeling across agents, these behaviors improve situational awareness and resilience of the system, enabling it to function under more uncertain conditions arising during long-duration missions.
In industrial control systems (ICS), programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are used to automate physical processes such as nuclear plants and power grid stations, and are often subject to cyber attacks. As in conventional IT domain, the memory analysis of the PLCs can help answer important forensic questions about the attack, such as the presence of malicious firmware, injection of modified control logic (the program running on the PLC), and manipulation of I/O devices (e.g., sensors and actuators). Unlike conventional IT domain, PLCs have heterogeneous hardware architecture, proprietary firmware and control software, making it challenging to employ a unified framework for their memory forensics. For merely extracting artifacts of forensic importance, reverse-engineering the firmware is a tedious task, and the effort needs to be repeated for every PLC model. As a community, a step-wise approach to tackle this challenge is to analyze the memory of specific PLCs, and subsequently find a generic framework applicable to all PLCs. Our work is a step forward in this direction. By following a methodology that focuses on the functional layer of PLCs instead of reverse engineering the firmware, we analyze the digital forensic artifacts available in a common PLC, Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1756-L61. Before diving into the memory dump, we analyze the PLC control software to create a list of important artifacts that are sure to exist in the PLC memory dump. The approach employs a setup where PLC control software RSLogix-5000 is connected to the PLC, and the memory dump can be obtained as and when needed. We create test cases that sequentially highlight each category of artifacts, followed by an examination of the resultant impact on memory. After attaining the listed artifacts, we employ conventional string and known data searches to extract interesting information present in this PLC's memory. The memory analysis profile, presented as a Python library and shared with the community, can help a forensic investigator to readily extract forensic artifacts from the same model's controller. The adopted approach may help researchers in creating memory profile of other PLCs, and ultimately formulating a generic PLC memory analysis framework.
Event-driven contexts in manufacturing occur pervasively as a result of interactions among involved entities such as machines, workers, materials, and environment. One of the primary tasks in smart manufacturing is to derive a context-aware system conveniently incorporating worker knowledge for generating timely actionable intelligence for workers on factory floor and supervisors to respond. In this paper, we propose to design a human-and-machine interaction recognition framework by using a causality concept to collect contextual data for classifications of normal and abnormal machine operations. The causes and effects are between workers and machines for this initial research. To apply the causality to recognize worker interactions, initially a reliable way to identify the states of machines is necessary. The proposed contextual sensor system, consisting of a power meter for measuring machine operation conditions, a visual camera for capturing worker and machine interactions via a finite state machine model, and an algorithm for determining power signatures of individual components via energy disaggregation is implemented on semiconductor fabrication machines (manual or PLC controlled) each with multiple components. The experiment results demonstrate its context extraction capability such as components states and their corresponding energy usage in real time as well as its ability to identify anomalous operation conditions.
The main goal of the project is to develop an AI-based process layer cybersecurity suite for detection, isolation and mitigation of cyber-attack effects on operation of building energy management systems (BEMS). The following constituent key technologies were developed under the program towards fulfilling the program objectives: (1) developed a high fidelity BEMS testbed for generation of training data and validation of developed technologies; (2) developed a physics informed ML based attack detection and localization module (ADL) capable of detecting high impact stealthy attacks (HISA - attacks causing 30% energy utilization but no immediate visible impact otherwise) with 98% accuracy; (3) developed a methodology to determine ’representative days’ to limit the data required for training; (4) developed a virtual sensing system that can reconstruct affected sensors with 10% error for the same HISA set; (5) developed a resilient model predictive control system that can continue operation of the BEMS without jeopardizing stability for the HISA set; and (6) integrated and deployed all the constituent modules and demonstrated the efficacy of the technology in real-time in a hardware in loop simulation.
There is an increased need for onboard decision-making capabilities in cyber-physical systems be it in energy, automotive, aviation, space, or other industries as they aim for increased efficiency, resiliency, and mission assurance capabilities. Emerging next-gen technologies such as multi-rover planetary missions, distributed satellites, unmanned ground and aerial vehicle operations and smart grid systems rely on in-time risk assessment and autonomous decision-making. One critical piece of the autonomy puzzle is reliable prediction of system behavior under time-varying and potentially uncertain environmental conditions. Further, if agent states change during operation such as initiation of faults or degradation, reliable diagnostic tools need to be investigated. In this tutorial, we will revise approaches that integrates existing physics-based and data-driven models of agents interacting with probability models of the environment and component operation state. Role of existing PHM methodologies as they feed into decision-making under uncertainty will be studied. Balancing critical trade-offs between high-fidelity prognostic models, prediction time-horizons and the computational requirements for in-time cost-effective decision-making will be discussed through the implementation of surrogate models. Finally, the audience will be introduced to a real-time application of in-time trajectory planning of an unmanned aerial system (UAS) based on its PHM assessments under uncertain and varying wind conditions.
Supply chain cyber-attacks, such as the SolarWinds Orion attack, are occurring with greater frequency. These attacks compromise a digital device before it is sent to customers, bypassing traditional security controls to remain persistent and undetected in operational environments. While supply chain attacks are prevalent, methods for analyzing the risk of these attacks are currently unavailable. This paper proposes new supply chain cyber-attack difficulty and risk metrics to evaluate the relative risk of an attack throughout the supply chain lifecycle. Difficulty metrics for each stakeholder in a digital device’s supply chain (e.g., hardware manufacturing, firmware development, software development, storage, and distribution entities) are calculated using scores from cybersecurity maturity questionnaires in a Bayesian Network leaky Noisy-MAX model. These difficulty metrics are then used to calculate an overall supply chain cyber-attack risk. Vulnerability and recoverability metrics are also proposed to evaluate the relative stakeholder influence in the attack risk. These proposed relative risk metrics enable continuous supply chain monitoring, provide decision-makers with information necessary for improved supplier selection, and help drive improvements in the cybersecurity posture of the stakeholders in their supply chain.
Autonomous systems governed by a variety of adaptive and nondeterministic algorithms are being planned for inclusion into safety-critical environments, such as unmanned aircraft and space systems in both civilian and military applications. However, until autonomous systems are proven and perceived to be capable and resilient in the face of unanticipated conditions, humans will be reluctant or unable to delegate authority, remaining in control aided by machine-based information and decision support. Proving capability, or trustworthiness, is a necessary component of certification. Perceived capability is a component of trust. Trustworthiness is an attribute of a cyber-physical system that requires context-driven metrics to prove and certify. Trust is an attribute of the agents participating in the system and is gained over time and multiple interactions through trustworthy behavior and transparency. Historically, artificial intelligence and machine learning systems provide answers without explanation - without a rationale or insight into the machine “thinking”. In order to function as trusted teammates, machines must be able to explain their decisions and actions. This transparency is a product of both content and communication. NASA’s Autonomy Teaming & TRAjectories for Complex Trusted Operational Reliability (ATTRACTOR) project seeks to build a basis for certification of autonomous systems via establishing metrics for trustworthiness and trust in multi-agent team interactions, using AI (Artificial Intelligence) explainability and persistent modeling and simulation, in the context of mission planning and execution, with analyzable trajectories. Inspired by Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MMORPG) and Serious Gaming, the proposed ATTRACTOR modeling and simulation environment is similar to online gaming environments in which player (aka agent) participants interact with each other, affect their environment, and expect the simulation to persist and change regardless of any individual agent’s active participation. This persistent simulation environment will accommodate individual agents, groups of self-organizing agents, and large-scale infrastructure behavior. The effects of the emerging adaptation and coevolution can be observed and measured to building a basis of measurable trustworthiness and trust, toward certification of safety-critical autonomous systems.
With the expected advent of new entrants including Unmanned Aerial Systems, Commercial Launch Vehicles and Urban Air Mobility aircraft, the future United States National Airspace System will have to evolve to include their operations along with the current commercial, general aviation and military operations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration are working together to provide a vision for aviation operations in the future—2045 and beyond. Their National Airspace System Horizons initiative seeks to provide stakeholders a list of operational scenarios and technologies, concepts and strategies needed for supporting that vision. They have identified cybersecurity as one of the seven strategic interest areas for realizing this vision. Consequently, NASA is studying cyber resiliency for secure airspace operations. This paper examines cyber security vulnerabilities of Urban Air Mobility operations. While there are many pathways to attack a cyber physical system such as Urban Air Mobility, their effect is expressed in modification or corruption of data/information used for controlling vehicles and making operational decisions. The paper describes cybersecurity technologies of Encryption, Blockchain, Virtual Information Fabric Infrastructure, Trusted Platform Module and Anomaly Detection for protecting the data, thus, improving the cyber resiliency of the current and future air traffic management system.
This paper examines cyber security vulnerabilities of Urban Air Mobility operations. With the expected advent of new entrants including Unmanned Aerial Systems, Commercial Launch Vehicles and Urban Air Mobility aircraft, the future United States National Airspace System will have to evolve to include their operations along with the current commercial, general aviation and military operations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration are working together to provide a vision for aviation operations in the future—2045 and beyond. Their National Airspace System Horizons initiative seeks to provide stakeholders a list of operational scenarios and technologies, concepts and strategies needed for supporting that vision. They have identified cybersecurity as one of the seven strategic interest areas for realizing this vision. Consequently, NASA is studying cyber resiliency for secure airspace operations. While there are many pathways to attack a cyber physical system such as Urban Air Mobility, their effect is expressed in modification or corruption of data/information used for controlling vehicles and making operational decisions. The paper describes cybersecurity technologies of Encryption, Blockchain, Virtual Information Fabric Infrastructure, Trusted Platform Module and Anomaly Detection for protecting the data, and the cyber resiliency of the current and future air traffic management system.
This paper examines cyber security vulnerabilities of Urban Air Mobility operations. With the expected advent of new entrants including Unmanned Aerial Systems, Commercial Launch Vehicles and Urban Air Mobility aircraft, the future United States National Airspace System will have to evolve to include their operations along with the current commercial, general aviation and military operations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration are working together to provide a vision for aviation operations in the future—2045 and beyond. Their National Airspace System Horizons initiative seeks to provide stakeholders a list of operational scenarios and technologies, concepts and strategies needed for supporting that vision. They have identified cybersecurity as one of the seven strategic interest areas for realizing this vision. Consequently, NASA is studying cyber resiliency for secure airspace operations. While there are many pathways to attack a cyber physical system such as Urban Air Mobility, their effect is expressed in modification or corruption of data/information used for controlling vehicles and making operational decisions. The paper describes cybersecurity technologies of Encryption, Blockchain, Virtual Information Fabric Infrastructure, Trusted Platform Module and Anomaly Detection for protecting the data, and the cyber resiliency of the current and future air traffic management system.
The report summarizes key tasks performed to develop a toolkit for detecting cyber-attack events in instrumentation and control (I&C) systems of nuclear power plants. The toolkit connects the state-of-the-art GPWR Simulator with the RELAP5 code providing best-estimate nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) analyses, via the application programming interface (API), and allows users to introduce potential cyber-attack scenarios into power plant operational simulation. This summary for the project reflects topical reports submitted during the project as well as a journal paper published in 2022. The focus areas of the summary include: (1) modeling I&C systems for the AP1000 Generation III+ nuclear plant and GPWR simulator, (2) simulation and monitoring of plant response to cyber-attack events, (3) API structure for the toolkit interfacing the GPWR simulator and RELAP5 code, and (4) restructuring of the three-loop NSSS software of GPWR to model the two-loop AP1000 structure. Discussed in some details are (a) the attack tree analysis assessing the susceptibility of the AP1000 I&C system, resulting in reactor trips, in terms of the attack possibility and component sensitivity and (b) realistic estimation of the time to steam generator trip due to cyber-intrusions in the GPWR Simulator. Finally, sample demonstrations of the cyber-security tool kit, in the form of the GPWR-RELAP5 API, are summarized.