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At least 253 records · Page 14

Evaluation of the SPAR thermal analyzer on the CYBER-203 computer

The use of the CYBER 203 vector computer for thermal analysis is investigated. Strengths of the CYBER 203 include the ability to perform, in vector mode using a 64 bit word, 50 million floating point operations per second (MFLOPS) for addition and subtraction, 25 MFLOPS for multiplication and 12.5 MFLOPS for division. The speed of scalar operation is comparable to that of a CDC 7600 and is some 2 to 3 times faster than Langley's CYBER 175s. The CYBER 203 has 1,048,576 64-bit words of real memory with an 80 nanosecond (nsec) access time. Memory is bit addressable and provides single error correction, double error detection (SECDED) capability. The virtual memory capability handles data in either 512 or 65,536 word pages. The machine has 256 registers with a 40 nsec access time. The weaknesses of the CYBER 203 include the amount of vector operation overhead and some data storage limitations. In vector operations there is a considerable amount of time before a single result is produced so that vector calculation speed is slower than scalar operation for short vectors.

Robinson, J. C.↗

DOE/DHS Industrial Control System Cyber Security Programs: A Model for Use in Nuclear Facility Safeguards and Security

Many critical infrastructure sectors have been investigating cyber security issues for several years especially with the help of two primary government programs. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National SCADA Test Bed and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security Program have both implemented activities aimed at securing the industrial control systems that operate the North American electric grid along with several other critical infrastructure sectors (ICS). These programs have spent the last seven years working with industry including asset owners, educational institutions, standards and regulating bodies, and control system vendors. The programs common mission is to provide outreach, identification of cyber vulnerabilities to ICS and mitigation strategies to enhance security postures. The success of these programs indicates that a similar approach can be successfully translated into other sectors including nuclear operations, safeguards, and security. The industry regulating bodies have included cyber security requirements and, in some cases, have incorporated sets of standards with penalties for non-compliance such as the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards. These DOE and DHS programs that address security improvements by both suppliers and end users provide an excellent model for nuclear facility personnel concerned with safeguards and security cyber vulnerabilities and countermeasures. It is not a stretch to imagine complete surreptitious collapse of protection against the removal of nuclear material or even initiation of a criticality event as witnessed at Three Mile Island or Chernobyl in a nuclear ICS inadequately protected against the cyber threat.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A Mathematical Framework for Representing Cyber-Physical System Interdependencies and Resilience

U.S. critical infrastructure is increasingly composed of integrated cyber-physical systems (CPS) whose components are operationally interdependent. These interdependencies can create additional vulnerabilities beyond those that are typically evaluated through independent physical and cyber risk assessments. These additional vulnerabilities, previously undetected at the sub-system and/or component level, could cause cascading effects across both the physical and cyber domains that could lead to infrastructure disruption or failure. This paper will review an initial mathematical framework developed to help understand the dynamics of these interfacing physical and cyber components at a holistic system level. The resulting framework also provides a method for modeling and assessing the resilience of CPS in complex and adaptive systems. It frames the system in terms of mission performance and the potential effects to performance caused by attacks that are cyber, physical, or blended in nature. The framework utilizes a systems-based, state-space modeling approach to reason about risk, resilience, and interdependencies in CPS. Probabilities are applied to each CPS component regarding a threat (both man-made and natural) and the likelihood of that particular component being impacted, along with indirect impact to other interdependent components. These component-level impacts from threats then translate into mission-level impact and systemic state change.

Brigantic, Robert T.↗

Sampling and analysis of cyber media to determine whether it meets the definition of a hazardous waste - 15208

Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) was tasked to support The Department of Energy (DOE) in the disposal of classified cyber media. Certain cyber media have lead and silver. Various cyber media types were identified because they may have a hazardous waste characteristic. The overall objective of this sampling effort is to obtain representative samples of specific types of cyber media and analyze those samples to collect data to determine definitively if the cyber media are hazardous waste. Ten different samples were obtained from the unclassified waste stream and shredded to meet the sampling criteria. The samples were shipped to an offsite analytical laboratory with a Chain of Custody. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Anomaly detection for cyber-physical systems

An anomaly detector is configured to construct cyber and/or physical features comprising information configured to characterize the cyber and/or physical state of a cyber-physical system. The physical features may be based on physical and/or physics-based relationships between a plurality of physical state attributes. A health of the cyber-physical system may be based on an error between estimates of one or more of the physical state attributes and measurements of the one or more physical state attributes. The relationships may be incorporated into machine learning membership functions used to classify cyber and/or physical behavior of the system.

Rieger, Craig G.↗

A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind

Distributed wind is an electric energy resource segment with strong potential to be deployed in many applications, but special consideration of resilience and cybersecurity is needed to address the unique conditions associated with distributed wind. Distributed wind is a strong candidate to help meet renewable energy and carbon-free energy goals. However, care must be taken as more systems are installed to ensure that the systems are reliable, resilient, and secure. The physical and communications requirements for distributed wind mean that there are unique cybersecurity considerations, but there is little to no existing guidance on best practices for cybersecurity risk management for distributed wind systems specifically. This research develops an architecture for the consideration of cyber risks associated with distributed wind systems. The architecture takes into account the configurations, challenges, and standards for distributed wind to create a risk-focused perspective that considers of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, with special emphasis on what sets distributed wind systems apart from other distributed energy resources (DER). We discuss common distributed wind architectures and how they are interconnected to larger power systems. Because cybersecurity cannot exist independently, the cyber-resilience architecture must consider the system holistically. Finally, we discuss the implementation of a risk assessment process that uses the cyber-resilience framework to address challenges specific to distributed wind.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering: The Need for a New Risk Informed and Design Methodology

Current engineering and risk management methodologies do not contain the foundational assumptions required to address the intelligent adversary’s capabilities in malevolent cyber attacks. Current methodologies focus on equipment failures or human error as initiating events for a hazard, while cyber attacks use the functionality of a trusted system to perform operations outside of the intended design and without the operator’s knowledge. These threats can by-pass or manipulate traditionally engineered safety barriers and present false information, invalidating the fundamental basis of a safety analysis. Cyber threats must be fundamentally analyzed from a completely new perspective where neither equipment nor human operation can be fully trusted. A new risk analysis and design methodology needs to be developed to address this rapidly evolving threatscape.

CCE↗

Consider the Consequences: A Powerful Approach for Reducing ICS Cyber Risk

Here, by identifying and analyzing threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts, asset owners can develop a risk profile for their industrial control systems (ICSs). This information is essential in developing, prioritizing, and implementing mitigations to reduce ICS cyber risk. To help bridge the gap between the cyber and physical domains, and gain a better understanding of cascading cyber/physical impacts, this paper will discuss the safety perspective of physical impacts, describe the ICS cyber kill chain model, explain the cyber/physical interface, review the “layers of protection analysis model” from a security perspective, discuss protection layers, and suggest a reference architecture for securing digital control devices.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A distributed voltage inference framework for cyber-physical attacks detection and localization in active distribution grids

The transition to active distribution grids with real-time monitoring and control depends on the proliferation of advanced communication networks and devices. This paradigm shift towards a cyber-physical architecture also introduces new vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit and launch sophisticated cyber-physical attacks targeting grid observability. Current research highlights the challenges in distinguishing attacks on voltage phasor or nodal injection measurements and isolating multi-source attack locations in a multiphase distribution grid. The attack detection and localization methods in literature face accuracy issues, applications across diverse attack scenarios, or scalability limits. Here, to bridge these gaps, this paper proposes a distributed Voltage Inference framework for real-time detection and localization of cyber-physical attacks, addressing scalability, adaptability, and accuracy challenges in state-of-the-art methods. The proposed methodology leverages the distributed nature of the Voltage Inference framework through a two-step process of prediction and correction, together with a tractable graph partitioning approach, providing a reliable solution to identify compromised measurement sources and facilitate isolation. Extensive testing on IEEE 13 and 123-node distribution feeders underscores the algorithm’s efficacy, enhancing the security and resilience of active distribution grids against evolving cyber threats. Additionally, Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) implementation validates the proposed strategy’s practical applicability in real-world scenarios.

active distribution grids↗

Cyber Labeling for Energy Industrial IoT

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security and Emergency Response (CESER), at the request of the Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technologies, Anne Neuberger, initiated research in 2023 to develop a cybersecurity labeling proof-of-concept for energy products to expand on the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) proposed U.S. Cyber Trust Mark program. DOE mobilized researchers from six National Laboratories to develop and gather feedback on a proof-of concept label for solar inverters and smart meters, which serve as representative products for market-facing energy sector Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). This report details the research team’s process across two phases and the resulting findings, which include challenges facing cyber labeling programs and recommendations to implement an expanded IIoT cyber labeling program in the U.S.

32 - ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZA↗

Grid Cyber-Security Strategy in an Attacker-Defender Model

The progression of cyber-attacks on the cyber-physical system is analyzed by the Probabilistic, Learning Attacker, and Dynamic Defender (PLADD) model. Although our research does apply to all cyber-physical systems, we focus on power grid infrastructure. The PLADD model evaluates the effectiveness of moving target defense (MTD) techniques. We consider the power grid attack scenarios in the AND configurations and OR configurations. In addition, we consider, for the first time ever, power grid attack scenarios involving both AND configurations and OR configurations simultaneously. Cyber-security managers can use the strategy introduced in this manuscript to optimize their defense strategies. Specifically, our research provides insight into when to reset access controls (such as passwords, internet protocol addresses, and session keys), to minimize the probability of a successful attack. Our mathematical proof for the OR configuration of multiple PLADD games shows that it is best if all access controls are reset simultaneously. For the AND configuration, our mathematical proof shows that it is best (in terms of minimizing the attacker's average probability of success) that the resets are equally spaced apart. We introduce a novel concept called hierarchical parallel PLADD system to cover additional attack scenarios that require combinations of AND and OR configurations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Phase-Space Detection of Cyber Events

Energy Delivery Systems (EDS) are a network of processes that produce, transfer and distribute energy. EDS are increasingly dependent on networked computing assets, as are many Industrial Control Systems. Consequently, cyber-attacks pose a real and pertinent threat, as evidenced by Stuxnet, Shamoon and Dragonfly. Hence, there is a critical need for novel methods to detect, prevent, and mitigate effects of such attacks. To detect cyber-attacks in EDS, we developed a framework for gathering and analyzing timing data that involves establishing a baseline execution profile and then capturing the effect of perturbations in the state from injecting various malware. The data analysis was based on nonlinear dynamics and graph theory to improve detection of anomalous events in cyber applications. The goal was the extraction of changing dynamics or anomalous activity in the underlying computer system. Takens' theorem in nonlinear dynamics allows reconstruction of topologically invariant, time-delay-embedding states from the computer data in a sufficiently high-dimensional space. The resultant dynamical states were nodes, and the state-to-state transitions were links in a mathematical graph. Alternatively, sequential tabulation of executing instructions provides the nodes with corresponding instruction-to-instruction links. Graph theorems guarantee graph-invariant measures to quantify the dynamical changes in the running applications. Results showed a successful detection of cyber events.

cyber anomaly detection↗

Cyber-Resilient Distributed Autonomous Energy Grid

The aim of Cyber-Resilient Distributed Autonomous Grid research initiative is to advance fundamental science and engineering approaches for cyber-resilient design, control, and operation of a distributed, highly interconnected, and autonomous energy grid of the future. From increasing penetration of DERs, smart homes and building with highly controllable loads at the distribution layer, to the interconnection of bulk renewables at the transmission layer the fundamental nature of the energy grid is changing, and these changes are enabled by rapid increase in dependence on the communication infrastructure and independent third parties for control and operation of the grid. NREL's Integrated Energy Pathways critical objective correctly identifies that there are fundamental cyber-resilience challenges inherent in the grid's evolution, and this effort is establishing strong and novel integrated cyber-resilience framework and approaches to address these new and fundamental challenges.

controls↗

Overview of Security and Privacy in Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are used across domains to enable process optimization and previously unachievable functionality. The combination of networked digital systems and analog physical processes creates unique characteristics that change how security theory is applied. Neither cyber nor physical security concepts alone can protect CPS because the crossover effects can introduce unexpected vulnerabilities. Physical attacks may allow access to critical assets resulting in damage or compromise of information being processed by the device, while cyber attacks may cause physical malfunctions resulting in real-world consequences. Therefore, security and privacy are key concerns for CPS design, development, and operation. In this chapter, we discuss how CPS security and privacy differ from that of pure cyber or physical systems and what may be done to secure these systems. Our goal is to help designers of emerging CPS to build more secure, privacy-enhanced products in the future.

Cyber-physical systems, security, privacy↗

Cyber–physical vulnerability and resiliency analysis for DER integration: A review, challenges and research needs

High penetration of renewable and sustainable Distributed Energy Resources (DER) into the traditional distribution system requires a well-coordinated control strategy for the improvement of system-wide reliability and resiliency. Implementation of such a holistic control architecture requires a flexible, near real-time, and bi-directional communication framework for facilitating the participation of various agents in a multi-vendor heterogeneous smart grid. While the sustainability of energy generation is ensured, this exposes the smart grid to extrinsic cyber threats, and appropriate defense mechanism(s) must be deployed to guarantee continued reliability and resiliency of the power grid. Further, the comprehensive literature review presented in this paper discusses the latest trends in the DER control schemes with fast communication requirements and their accompanying cyber–physical vulnerabilities. These control schemes are compared and contrasted for various traits. A three-level DER system architecture has been depicted, facilitating the deployment of these control schemes. The current developments of standard communication protocols, key security mechanisms, and best practices along major standards and guidelines are explored. The impacts of different attack types with miscellaneous DER functions based on various control schemes and associated mitigation solutions are also provided. Finally, challenges and future research directions for limiting cyber-power susceptibility to enhance resiliency are summarized. The work presented here will help us enabling a cyber-resilient and sustainable smart electric grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Model-based Cyber-attack Detection for Voltage Source Converters in Island Microgrids

With the upgrading of communication and control in microgrids, cyber threats on the power converters are increasing. Here, in this paper, a novel model-based cyber-attack detection methodology is proposed for each voltage source converter in microgrids. The Harmonics State Space Matrix (H-Matrix) is used to build the closed-loop transfer function, providing model-based estimation with the grid voltage and control reference. Then, the space phase model (SPM) is used to calculate residual to detect cyber-attacks in voltage source converter (VSC). As controller and converter parameters are included in the H-matrix, the proposed method also could detect cyber-attacks when voltage fluctuation occurs in the grid. To verify the feasibility of the proposed method, several attacks targeting VSC in an islanded microgrid are simulated in MATLAB. Simulation and detection results are introduced to demonstrate the resilience and feasibility of the proposed method.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Towards A Network-of-Networks Framework for Cyber Security

Networks-of-networks (NoN) is a graph-theoretic model of interdependent networks that have distinct dynamics at each network (layer). By adding special edges to represent relationships between nodes in different layers, NoN provides a unified mechanism to study interdependent systems intertwined in a complex relationship. While NoN based models have been proposed for cyber-physical systems, in this paper we build towards a three-layer NoN model for an enterprise cyber system. Each layer captures a different facet of a cyber system. We then discuss the potential benefits of graph-theoretic analysis enabled from such a model. Our goal is to provide a novel and powerful tool for modeling and analyzing problems in cyber security.

cyber security↗

Cyber-Physical Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control for the Power Grid

Cyber security and resiliency of Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) applications is critically important to ensure secure, reliable, and economic operation of the bulk power system. WAMPAC relies heavily on the security of measurements and control commands transmitted over wide-area communication networks for real-time operational, protection, and control functions. Also, the current “N-1 security criteria” for grid operation is inadequate to address malicious cyber events and therefore it is important to fundamentally redesign WAMPAC and to enhance Energy Management System (EMS) applications to make them attack-resilient. In this paper, we propose an end-to-end defense-in-depth architecture for attack-resilient WAMPAC that addresses resilience at both the infrastructure layer and the application layers. Also, we propose an attack-resilient cyber-physical security framework that encompasses the entire security life cycle including risk assessment, attack prevention, attack detection, attack mitigation, and attack resilience. The overarching objective of this paper is to provide a broad scope that comprehensively describes most of the major research issues and potential solutions in the context of cyber-physical security of WAMPAC for the power grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗