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Environmental Surveillance at Los Alamos during 2008

Environmental Surveillance at Los Alamos reports are prepared annually by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (the Laboratory) Environmental Programs Directorate, as required by US Department of Energy Order 450.1, General Environmental Protection Program, and US Department of Energy Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting. These annual reports summarize environmental data that are used to determine compliance with applicable federal, state, and local environmental laws and regulations, executive orders, and departmental policies. Additional data, beyond the minimum required, are also gathered and reported as part of the Laboratory’s efforts to ensure public safety and to monitor environmental quality at and near the Laboratory. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the Laboratory’s major environmental programs and explains the risks and the actions taken to reduce risks at the Laboratory from environmental legacies and waste management operations. Chapter 2 reports the Laboratory’s compliance status for 2007. Chapter 3 provides a summary of the maximum radiological dose the public and biota populations could have potentially received from Laboratory operations and discusses chemical exposures. The environmental surveillance and monitoring data are organized by environmental media (Chapter 4, air; Chapters 5 and 6, water and sediments; Chapter 7, soils; and Chapter 8, foodstuffs and biota) in a format to meet the needs of a general and scientific audience. Chapter 9 provides a summary of the status of environmental restoration work around LANL. A glossary and a list of acronyms and abbreviations are in the back of the report. Appendix A explains the standards for environmental contaminants, Appendix B explains the units of measurements used in this report, Appendix C describes the Laboratory’s technical areas and their associated programs, and Appendix D provides web links to more information.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

SubDyn User's Guide and Theory Manual

SubDyn is a time-domain structural-dynamics module for multimember fixed-bottom substructures created by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) through U.S. Department of Energy Wind and Water Power Program support. The module has been coupled into the FAST aero-hydro-servo-elastic computer-aided engineering (CAE) tool. Substructure types supported by SubDyn include monopiles, tripods, jackets, and other lattice-type substructures common for offshore wind installations in shallow and transitional water depths. SubDyn can also be used to model lattice support structures for land-based wind turbines. This document is organized as follows. Section 1 details how to obtain the SubDyn and FAST software archives and run both the stand-alone SubDyn or SubDyn coupled to FAST. Section 2 describes the SubDyn input files. Section 3 discusses the output files generated by SubDyn; these include echo files, a summary file, and the results file. Section 4 provides modeling guidance when using SubDyn. The SubDyn theory is covered in Section 5. Section 6 outlines future work, and Section 7 contains a list of references. Example input files are shown in Appendixes A and B. A summary of available output channels are found in Appendix C. Instructions for compiling the stand-alone SubDyn program are detailed in Appendix D. Appendix E tracks the major changes we have made to SubDyn for each public release.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Guide for Using ENDF/B-VIII.0 Nuclear Data with MCNP

This report provides guidance for using the ENDF/B-VIII.0 nuclear data that were released in 2018 and 2020 with MCNP. Appendix A: Obtaining and installing the new ENDF/B-VIII.0 ACE nuclear data. Appendix B. Obtaining & using XSDIR files that include ENDF/B-VIII.0 data. Appendix C: ENDF/B-VIII.0-based ACE files for neutron cross-sections. A listing of the available temperatures and ZA numbers for neutron cross-sections (ACE files with suffix .nnC). Appendix D: ENDF/B-VIII.0-based ACE files for thermal scattering law (TSL) data, $S$(α,β). A listing of the available thermal scattering $S$(α,β) data (ACE files with suffix .nnT) The next section below provides guidance for modifying existing $\textit{mcnp}$ input files to use the ENDF/B-VIII.0 data. Detailed results from running several benchmark suites for nuclear criticality safety with both ENDF/B-VII.1 and ENDF/B-VIII.0 nuclear data are reported in. It is important to note that this report deals only with TSL data released in 2020. With the original release of ENDF/B-VIII.0 in 2018, the ACE files for neutron cross-sections were contained in a directory called Lib80X and the ACE files for TSL data were contained in a directory called ENDF80SaB. A few years later, it was determined that many of the TSL data files had been generated with faulty data or with incorrect processing, and a new set of ACE files for TSL data was created, with the corrected files contained in directory ENDF80SaB2.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Environment, Safety, and Health Self-Assessment Report, Fiscal Year 2008

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory's Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) Self-Assessment Program ensures that Integrated Safety Management (ISM) is implemented institutionally and by all divisions. The Self-Assessment Program, managed by the Office of Contract Assurance (OCA), provides for an internal evaluation of all ES&H programs and systems at LBNL. The functions of the program are to ensure that work is conducted safely, and with minimal negative impact to workers, the public, and the environment. The Self-Assessment Program is also the mechanism used to institute continuous improvements to the Laboratory's ES&H programs. The program is described in LBNL/PUB 5344, Environment, Safety, and Health Self-Assessment Program and is composed of four distinct assessments: the Division Self-Assessment, the Management of Environment, Safety, and Health (MESH) review, ES&H Technical Assurance, and the Appendix B Self-Assessment. The Division Self-Assessment uses the five core functions and seven guiding principles of ISM as the basis of evaluation. Metrics are created to measure performance in fulfilling ISM core functions and guiding principles, as well as promoting compliance with applicable regulations. The five core functions of ISM are as follows: (1) Define the Scope of Work; (2) Identify and Analyze Hazards; (3) Control the Hazards; (4) Perform the Work; and (5) Feedback and Improvement. The seven guiding principles of ISM are as follows: (1) Line Management Responsibility for ES&H; (2) Clear Roles and Responsibilities; (3) Competence Commensurate with Responsibilities; (4) Balanced Priorities; (5) Identification of ES&H Standards and Requirements; (6) Hazard Controls Tailored to the Work Performed; and (7) Operations Authorization. Performance indicators are developed by consensus with OCA, representatives from each division, and Environment, Health, and Safety (EH&S) Division program managers. Line management of each division performs the Division Self-Assessment annually. The primary focus of the review is workplace safety. The MESH review is an evaluation of division management of ES&H in its research and operations, focusing on implementation and effectiveness of the division's ISM plan. It is a peer review performed by members of the LBNL Safety Review Committee (SRC), with staff support from OCA. Each division receives a MESH review every two to four years, depending on the results of the previous review. The ES&H Technical Assurance Program (TAP) provides the framework for systematic reviews of ES&H programs and processes. The intent of ES&H Technical Assurance assessments is to provide assurance that ES&H programs and processes comply with their guiding regulations, are effective, and are properly implemented by LBNL divisions. The Appendix B Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan (PEMP) requires that LBNL sustain and enhance the effectiveness of integrated safety, health, and environmental protection through a strong and well-deployed system. Information required for Appendix B is provided by EH&S Division functional managers. The annual Appendix B report is submitted at the close of the fiscal year. This assessment is the Department of Energy's (DOE) primary mechanism for evaluating LBNL's contract performance in ISM.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Density waves in the Calogero model - revisited

The Calogero model bears, in the continuum limit, collective excitations in the form of density waves and solitary modulations of the density of particles. This sector of the spectrum of the model was investigated, mostly within the framework of collective-field theory, by several authors, over the past 15 years or so. In this work we shall concentrate on periodic solutions of the collective BPS-equation (also known as 'finite amplitude density waves'), as well as on periodic solutions of the full static variational equations which vanish periodically (also known as 'large amplitude density waves'). While these solutions are not new, we feel that our analysis and presentation add to the existing literature, as we explain in the text. In addition, we show that these solutions also occur in a certain two-family generalization of the Calogero model, at special points in parameter space. A compendium of useful identities associated with Hilbert transforms, including our own proofs of these identities, appears in Appendix A. In Appendix B we also elucidate in the present paper some fine points having to do with manipulating Hilbert-transforms, which appear ubiquitously in the collective field formalism. Finally, in order to make this paper self-contained, we briefly summarize in Appendix C basic facts about the collective field formulation of the Calogero model.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

International code of nomenclature of prokaryotes

Here, this volume contains the edition of the International Code of Nomenclature of Prokaryotes that was presented in draft form and available for comment at the Plenary Session of the Fourteenth International Congress of Bacteriology and Applied Microbiology (BAM), Montréal, 2014, together with updated lists of conserved and rejected bacterial names and of Opinions issued by the Judicial Commission. As in the past it brings together those changes accepted, published and documented by the ICSP and the Judicial Commission since the last revision was published. Several new appendices have been added to this edition. Appendix 11 addresses the appropriate application of the Candidatus concept, Appendix 12 contains the history of the van Niel Prize, and Appendix 13 contains the summaries of Congresses.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, For Fiscal Year 2010

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs): (1) CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; (2) CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; (3) CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; (4) CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; and (5) CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. The locations of the sites are shown in Figure 1. This report covers fiscal year 2010 (October 2009-September 2010). The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0021 and summarized in each CAU-specific section in Section 1.0 of this report. Site inspections are conducted semiannually at CAUs 90 and 91 and quarterly at CAUs 92, 110, and 112. Additional inspections are conducted at CAU 92 if precipitation occurs in excess of 0.50 inches in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units and identification of any deficiencies that may compromise the integrity of the units. The condition of covers, fencing, signs, gates, and locks is documented. In addition, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted at CAU 110. The results of the inspections, summary of maintenance activities, results of vegetations surveys, and analysis of monitoring data are presented in this report. Copies of the inspection checklists are included as Appendix A. Field notes completed during each inspection are included in Appendix B. Photographs taken during the site inspections are included in Appendix C.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTCs 1-2, Revision 0

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. The corrective action sites (CASs) within CAU 539 are located within Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada National Security Site. Corrective Action Unit 539 comprises the following CASs: • 25-99-21, Area 25 Railroad Tracks • 26-99-05, Area 26 Railroad Tracks The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provide data confirming that the closure objectives for CASs within CAU 539 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Reviewed documentation on historical and current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Conducted radiological walkover surveys of railroad tracks in both Areas 25 and 26. • Collected ballast and soil samples and calculated internal dose estimates for radiological releases. • Collected in situ thermoluminescent dosimeter measurements and calculated external dose estimates for radiological releases. • Removed lead bricks as potential source material (PSM) and collected verification samples. • Implemented corrective actions as necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly disposed of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Implemented an FFACO use restriction (UR) for radiological contamination at CAS 25-99-21. The approved UR form and map are provided in Appendix F and will be filed in the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO), Facility Information Management System; the FFACO database; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. From November 29, 2010, through May 2, 2011, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) to determine COCs for CAU 539. Assessment of the data generated from closure activities revealed the following: • At CAS 26-99-05, the total effective dose for radiological releases did not exceed the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at three locations. A corrective action of clean closure was implemented at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. • At CAS 25-99-21, the total effective dose for radiological releases exceeds the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at eight locations. A corrective action was implemented by removing the lead bricks and soil above FALs at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. Pieces of debris with high radioactivity were identified as PSM and remain within the CAS boundary. A corrective action of closure in place with a UR was implemented at this CAS because closure activities showed evidence of remaining soil contamination and radioactive PSM. Future land use will be restricted from surface and intrusive activities. Closure activities generated waste streams consisting of industrial solid waste, recyclable materials, low-level radioactive waste, and mixed low-level radioactive waste. Wastes were disposed of in the appropriate onsite landfills. The NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • Clean closure is required at CAS 26-99-05. • Closure in place is required at CAS 25-99-21. • A UR is required at CAS 25-99-21. • A Notice of Completion to the NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 539. • Corrective Action Unit 539 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada for Fiscal Year 2011 (October 2010-September 2011)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs): • CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; • CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; • CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; • CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; and • CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. This report covers fiscal year 2011 (October 2010-September 2011). The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and summarized in each CAU-specific section in Section 1.0 of this report. Site inspections are conducted semiannually at CAUs 90 and 91 and quarterly at CAUs 92, 110, and 112. Additional inspections are conducted at CAU 92 if precipitation occurs in excess of 0.50 inches in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units and identification of any deficiencies that may compromise the integrity of the units. The condition of covers, fencing, signs, gates, and locks is documented. In addition, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted at CAU 110. The results of the inspections, summary of maintenance activities, results of vegetations surveys, and analysis of monitoring data are presented in this report. Copies of the inspection checklists are included as Appendix A. Field notes completed during each inspection are included in Appendix B. Photographs taken during the inspections are included in Appendix C. It is recommended to continue semiannual inspections at CAUs 90 and 91; quarterly inspections at CAUs 92, 110, and 112; and additional inspections at CAU 92 if precipitation occurs in excess of 0.50 inches in a 24-hour period. At CAU 92, it is recommended to remove the wave barriers, as they have not proven to be necessary to protect the cover. At CAU 110, it is recommended to continue annual vegetation monitoring and soil moisture monitoring, and to reduce the frequency of subsidence surveys from twice per year to once every other year (biennially).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Closure Report for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of the 92-Acre Area, which includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' This CR provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that the closure objectives were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]). Closure activities began in January 2011 and were completed in January 2012. Closure activities were conducted according to Revision 1 of the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for the 92-Acre Area and CAU 111 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2010). The following closure activities were performed: (1) Construct an engineered evapotranspiration cover over the boreholes, trenches, and pits in the 92-Acre Area; (2) Install use restriction (UR) warning signs, concrete monuments, and subsidence survey monuments; and (3) Establish vegetation on the covers. UR documentation is included as Appendix C of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in Revision 1 of the CADD/CAP for the 92-Acre Area and CAU 111, and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. When the next request for modification of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit NEV HW0101 is submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), the requirements for post-closure monitoring of the 92-Acre Area will be included. NNSA/NSO requests the following: (1) A Notice of Completion from NDEP to NNSA/NSO for closure of CAU 111; and (2) The transfer of CAU 111 from Appendix III to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, of the FFACO.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 574: Neptune, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 574 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as 'Neptune' and consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune); and (2) CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca). This Closure Report presents information supporting closure of CAU 574 according to the FFACO (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]) and the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 574 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2011). The following activities were performed to support closure of CAU 574: (1) In situ external dose rate measurements were collected using thermoluminescent dosimeters at CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca). (2) Total effective dose rates were determined at both sites by summing the internal and external dose rate components. (3) A use restriction (UR) was implemented at CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune). Areas that exceed the final action level (FAL) of 25 millirems per year (mrem/yr) based on the Occasional Use Area exposure scenario are within the existing use restricted area for CAU 551. The 25-mrem/yr FAL is not exceeded outside the existing CAU 551 UR for any of the exposure scenarios (Industrial Area, Remote Work Area, and Occasional Use Area). Therefore, the existing UR for CAU 551 is sufficient to bound contamination that exceeds the FAL. (4) An administrative UR was implemented at CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca) as a best management practice (BMP). The 25-mrem/yr FAL was not exceeded for the Remote Work Area or Occasional Use Area exposure scenarios; therefore, a UR is not required. However, because the 25-mrem/yr FAL was exceeded for the Industrial Area exposure scenario, an administrative UR was established as a BMP. UR documentation is included as Appendix B. The UR at CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune), is within the existing UR for CAU 551. Additional postings were not installed, and annual post-closure inspections will be performed in conjunction with the inspections performed for CAU 551. At CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca), the administrative UR does not require postings or inspections. NNSA/NSO requests the following: (1) A Notice of Completion from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to NNSA/NSO for closure of CAU 574; and (2) The transfer of CAU 574 from Appendix III to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, of the FFACO

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

MCNP5 Calculations Replicating ARH-600 Nitrate Data

This report serves to extend the previous document: "MCNP Calculations Replicating ARH-600 Data" by replicating the nitrate curves found in ARH-600. This report includes the MCNP models used, the calculated critical dimension for each analyzed parameter set, and the resulting data libraries for use with the CritView code. As with the ARH-600 data, this report is not meant to replace the analysis of the fissile systems by qualified criticality personnel. The MCNP data is presented without accounting for the statistical uncertainty (although this is typically less than 0.001) or bias and, as such, the application of a reasonable safety margin is required. The data that follows pertains to the uranyl nitrate and plutonium nitrate spheres, infinite cylinders, and infinite slabs of varying isotopic composition, reflector thickness, and molarity. Each of the cases was modeled in MCNP (version 5.1.40), using the ENDF/B-VI cross section set. Given a molarity, isotopic composition, and reflector thickness, the fissile concentration and diameter (or thicknesses in the case of the slab geometries) were varied. The diameter for which k-effective equals 1.00 for a given concentration could then be calculated and graphed. These graphs are included in this report. The pages that follow describe the regions modeled, formulas for calculating the various parameters, a list of cross-sections used in the calculations, a description of the automation routine and data, and finally the data output. The data of most interest are the critical dimensions of the various systems analyzed. This is presented graphically, and in table format, in Appendix B. Appendix C provides a text listing of the same data in a format that is compatible with the CritView code. Appendices D and E provide listing of example Template files and MCNP input files (these are discussed further in Section 4). Appendix F is a complete listing of all of the output data (i.e., all of the analyzed dimensions and the resulting k eff values).

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Updated Subsurface Data Base For Bear Creek Valley, Chestnut Ridge, And Parts Of Bethel Valley On The U.S. Department of Energy Oak Ridge Reservation

This document represents a compilation of location, construction, and hydrologic information relating to boreholes, groundwater monitoring wells, and surface water locations that have been installed/established at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) through August 2013. To date, a total of 1422 boreholes and wells have been installed in and around the Y-12 area. Of those, 835 existing boreholes and wells continue to be utilized for groundwater monitoring programs, research, remedial investigations, plume characterization and delineation studies, and various other hydrogeologic endeavors. In addition, 215 surface water locations, such as rivers, streams, seeps, springs, lakes, ponds, and building sumps are included in this database. General data about boreholes and wells included in the database are survey coordinates, survey system, elevations, alternative names and well status. Surface water location information (Appendix I) includes name, alias, functional area, northing and easting coordinates, survey system, map number and sampling history. Tabulated construction data include total depth, completion method, borehole diameter, casing and screen materials, casing and screen diameters, casing and screen depths, filter pack depths, open-hole intervals, and open-hole diameters. Hydrogeological data summarized in this document include the aquifer monitored by the completion interval, depth to weathered and fresh bedrock, formations penetrated, well sampling history, and whether rock core and geophysical logs were obtained. This document (which is the sixth revision to Y/TS–881 and the ninth overall update of a previous compilation) is published on a regular basis by the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP), which serves as custodian of drilling records and well construction data for the network of wells and other groundwater monitoring stations at Y-12. The tabulations in this database are arranged in appendices of like information. An example application of the data compiled in this document would be the evaluation of the suitability of wells for continued use in groundwater investigations and monitoring studies. Other uses may include: the siting of hydrogeological characterization activities, background evaluations of sites prior to initiation of new drilling activities, and hydrogeological review of selected sites prior to the initiation of remedial actions or new construction activity. Existing boreholes, wells, and surface water locations are presented on a series of maps (Appendix K). Boreholes and wells that have been plugged and abandoned, destroyed, could not be located, or otherwise are of unknown status/condition appear on a second series of maps of identical coverage (Appendix L).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada. For Calendar Year 2015, Revision 0

This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed corrective action units (CAUs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2015 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following CAUs; CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR); CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR); CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR); CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR); and CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR) Inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved closure reports and subsequent correspondence with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. The post-closure inspection plans and subsequent correspondence modifying the requirements for each CAU are included in Appendix B. The inspection checklists are included in Appendix C. Field notes are included in Appendix D. The annual post-closure inspections were conducted on May 12, 2015. Maintenance was required at CAU 453. Cracking along the north trench was repaired. One monument is missing at CAU 424; it will be replaced in 2016. Postings at CAUs 407, 424, 453, and 487 contain contact information for TTR Security. It was noted that protocols may not be in place to ensure that the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) is notified if access is needed at these sites. NNSA/NFO is working with the U.S. Air Force and Sandia to determine whether more appropriate contact information or new protocols are warranted for each CAU. Based on these inspections, there has not been a significant change in vegetation, and vegetation monitoring was not recommended at CAU 400 or CAU 407 in 2015.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Production Facility Prototype Blower 1000 Hour Test Results

The roots blower in use at ANL for in-beam experiments and also at LANL for flow tests was sized for 12 mm diameter disks and significantly less beam heating. Currently, the disks are 29 mm in diameter, with a 12 mm FWHM Gaussian beam spot at 42 MeV and 2.86 μA on each side of the target, 5.72 μA total. The target design itself is reported elsewhere. With the increased beam heating, the helium flow requirement increased so that a larger blower was needed for a mass flow rate of 400 g/s at 2.76 MPa (400 psig). An Aerzen GM 12.4 blower was selected, and is now installed at the LANL facility for target and component flow testing. Two extended tests of >1000 hr operation have been completed. Those results and discussion thereof are reported herein. Also included in Appendix A is the detailed description of the blower and its installation, while Appendix B documents the pressure vessel design analysis. The blower has been operated for 1000 hours as a preliminary investigation of long-term performance, operation and possible maintenance issues. The blower performed well, with no significant change in blower head or mass flow rate developed under the operating conditions. Upon inspection, some oil had leaked out of the shaft seal of the blower. The shaft seal and bearing race have been replaced. Test results and conclusions are in Appendix B.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Institute for Clean Energy Technology Mississippi State University NSR&D Aged HEPA Filter Study Final Report

Data have demonstrated that filter media lose tensile strength and the ability to resist the effects of moisture as a function of age. Testing of new and aged filters needs to be conducted to correlate reduction of physical strength of HEPA media to the ability of filters to withstand upset conditions. Appendix C of the Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook provides the basis for DOE’s HEPA filter service life guidance. However, this appendix also points out the variability of data, and it does not correlate performance of aged filters to degradation of media due to age. Funding awarded by NSR&D to initiate full-scale testing of aged HEPA filters addresses the issue of correlating media degradation due to age with testing of new and aged HEPA filters under a generic design basis event set of conditions. This funding has accelerated the process of describing this study via: (1) establishment of a Technical Working Group of all stakeholders, (2) development and approval of a test plan, (3) development of testing and autopsy procedures, (4) acquiring an initial set of aged filters, (5) testing the initial set of aged filters, and (6) developing the filter test report content for each filter tested. This funding was very timely and has moved the project forward by at least three years. Activities have been correlated with testing conducted under DOE-EM funding for evaluating performance envelopes for AG-1 Section FC Separator and Separatorless filters. This coordination allows correlation of results from the NSR&D Aged Filter Study with results from testing new filters of the Separator and Separatorless Filter Study. DOE-EM efforts have identified approximately 100 more filters of various ages that have been stored under Level B conditions. NSR&D funded work allows a time for rigorous review among subject matter experts before moving forward with development of the testing matrix that will be used for additional filters. The NSR&D data sets are extremely valuable in as much as establishing a selfimproving, NQA-1 program capable of advancing the service lifetime study of HEPA filters. The data and reports are available for careful and critical review by subject matter experts before the next set of filters is tested and can be found in the appendices of this final report. NSR&D funds have not only initiated the Aged HEPA Filter Study alluded to in Appendix C of the NACH, but have also enhanced the technical integrity and effectiveness of all of the follow-on testing for this long-term study.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

The SURE House (Solar Decathlon 2015)

Coastal towns and cities across the Northeastern US, with their high population density, aged utility infrastructure, and unique geography, are increasingly vulnerable to climate change related storm events. In October 2012 superstorm Sandy highlighted the fragility of our current coastal building types and made clear the need for a new model of design and construction which works to understand and mitigate these weaknesses. Dramatic changes in public policy, championed by both The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) are driving the rebuilding of these shore communities, often resulting in costly renovations, un-sustainable neighborhood configurations and in direct conflict with concurrent government policies such as The American with Disabilities Act (ADA). The SURE HOUSE demonstrates a series of new design solutions to these conflicting public policies and environmental imperatives. At Stevens Institute of Technology, the 2015 Solar Decathlon started with the challenge: Can we design a home for coastal New Jersey that dramatically reduces its energy use while protecting itself from the realities of a changing, more extreme climate? The SURE HOUSE merges the iconic 20th century shore home with 21st century building science. Utilizing innovative renewable energy technologies, a ‘Passive House’ level building envelope, and rugged glass-fiber-composite materials to flood-proof the home, the SURE HOUSE is a high-performance, net-zero-energy home, armored against extreme weather, designed for the contemporary lifestyle of the Jersey Shore and other vulnerable coastal communities. SUSTAINABLE At Stevens, we recognize that energy use in the home and workplace is directly connected to the growing problem of climate change. Reducing our energy consumption by designing higher performing, compact homes that are both functional, comfortable and desirable is the first critical step towards a modern, sustainable architecture for New Jersey and beyond. This is what informed the architectural design of the house. Configured about a compact form, thickly insulated and air-sealed walls eliminate thermal bridging and minimize energy losses while advanced glazing brings in free solar heat during the winter months. As a result of these passive design strategies, the SURE HOUSE has a greatly reduced carbon footprint requiring 91% less energy than a typical New Jersey home. Photovoltaic (PV) arrays on both the rooftop and operable shutters easily provide energy in excess of the home’s modest demands. The Stevens team considers a truly sustainable home in the era of climate change, one that prioritizes low energy use, and integrates right-sized renewable generation to supply the home’s needs. Low consumption, low production. RESILIENT In October of 2012, Hurricane Sandy wreaked havoc along the east coast of the US. In New Jersey alone there was an estimated 29.4 billion dollars in damages, 346,000 homes affected, and almost two and a half million people left without power, in some cases for over 10 days. Recovery from this storm and associated flooding is ongoing to this day, as many New Jersey homeowners grapple with the large costs of rebuilding and struggle to adapt to complicated new home building regulations. Damage from this storm to Hoboken, the home of the Stevens Institute of Technology’s campus, and to the New Jersey shore was extensive and many students on the SURE HOUSE team were directly affected by this historic event. The Stevens design team recognizes that in a world of more frequent and stronger storms, the ability to absorb and adapt to change is more important than ever. Successfully weathering the next storm and its aftermath is one of the primary goals in the design of the SURE HOUSE prototype. The SURE HOUSE introduces unique ‘dry flood-proofing’ methods to residential construction. Innovative wall and floor flood-proofing, utilizing durable composite sheathing materials adapted from the boating industry, were developed by the student team to render the SURE House’s building envelope flood proof up to the FEMA AE 6/7 Zone (+ 6/7 feet of water above sea-level). Designed and fabricated utilizing glass-fiber composite materials, the custom storm shutter system serves to protect the large glazed openings of the home from both air-borne debris impact and water infiltration during a storm event while also providing deterrence from the vandalism that often occurs in the aftermath of a calamitous event. During extended power outages, a ‘resilient’ solar array is capable of supplying critical amounts of energy and hot water to the home, without the use of battery storage or grid infrastructure. PV Description AC GRID-TIED PV SYSTEM The SURE HOUSE solar system consists of two distinct arrays, the grid-tied rooftop array which produces AC Powerand the shutter-mounted array which converts DC power generated by the modules directly into usable heat for the domestic hot water (DHW). The roof-mounted AC grid-tied array is comprised of three strings, two 11 module strings connected to an SMA SB 5000TL-US-223 inverter and a single 10 module string equipped and an SMA SB 3000TL-US-22 central inverter. All modules for the rooftop AC array are LG MonoX 2804 watt solar panels, chosen for their durability and efficiency. Inverter sizing and string size are optimized to the electrical characteristics of the chosen PV modules and the desired energy production, see Appendix 5B. The SURE HOUSE is projected to produce 12,353 kWh per year to meet 6,157 kWh per year of estimated consumption. Solar modules for the two AC grid-tied sub arrays are mounted on the main roof surface of the SURE HOUSE with a 10 degree tilt angle using a partially-ballasted polyethylene roof mounting system made by Renusol, which is particularly suited to the corrosive salt air of a coastal environment. This method was chosen for its installation simplicity and to limit detrimental roof penetrations. The 10 degree tilt optimizes the energy generated per roof area at a lower price, see Appendix 5A, and ensures that there is minimal wind uplift. DC SOLAR ELECTRIC DOMESTIC HOT WATER The SURE HOUSE’s approach to sustainable and resilient domestic hot water (DHW) consists of a unique, custom engineered DC solar electric hot water system. Employing the use of Advanced Energy’s DC electric PV heater (DCPVH)5 to heat domestic water well beyond the draw temperature, the SURE HOUSE is able to obtain a remarkably high solar fraction of 75% or more. The custom modified 80 gallon Vaughn DHW tank acts as a large solar ‘battery’ that stores heat energy in the form of hot water at almost 150 degrees, harvesting energy when the sun is out for use later in the day or overnight. The system, which uses electricity rather than heated fluid, is distinct from traditional ‘solar thermal’ systems by eliminating the dangers and associated maintenance issues of fluid based systems. By forgoing the use of external fluid loops, overheated solar collectors and pipes are not an issue for the SURE HOUSE system which never needs any yearly or seasonal flushing. In weather conditions where the integrated DCPVH unit cannot produce enough hot water via solar energy alone, the Vaughn hot water tank comes factory made with an AC powered 2.6 COP heat pump and a AC heating coil that serve as back-up heating elements. The DCPVH is powered by a DC array consisting of 10 custom-made Solbian by PVilion 180 watt, monocrystalline, flexible solar modules6. The Solbian modules are directly mounted to the top half of the operable storm shutters on the south façade of the SURE HOUSE. The SURE HOUSE team worked closely with PVillion, a PV system designer specializing in flexible architectural photovoltaics, to design an adhesive system that works with the glass-fiber storm shutter surface in a reliable manner over an extended period. Because this system operates in DC-only mode and never connects to the municipal power grid, the system can continue to create hot water safely and effectively even during grid disruption events. This hot water, and the energy stored within it, could be used for a range of activities including washing and cooking to more elaborate hydronic heating systems as desired. See Appendix 6 for system engineering, sizing and modeling.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program, U.S. Efforts in Support of Examinations at Fukushima Daiichi-2017 Evaluations

Although the accident signatures from each unit at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS) [Daiichi] differ, much is not known about the end-state of core materials within these units. Some of this uncertainty can be attributed to a lack of information related to cooling system operation and cooling water injection. There is also uncertainty in our understanding of phenomena affecting: a) in-vessel core damage progression during severe accidents in boiling water reactors (BWRs), and b) accident progression after vessel failure (ex-vessel progression) for BWRs and Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). These uncertainties arise due to limited full scale prototypic data. Similar to what occurred after the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, these Daiichi units offer the international community a means to reduce such uncertainties by obtaining prototypic data from multiple full-scale BWR severe accidents. Information obtained from Daiichi is required to inform Decontamination and Decommissioning activities, improving the ability of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Incorporated (TEPCO Holdings) to characterize potential hazards and to ensure the safety of workers involved with cleanup activities. This document, which has been updated to include FY2017 information, summarizes results from U.S. efforts to use information obtained by TEPCO Holdings to enhance the safety of existing and future nuclear power plant designs. This effort, which was initiated in 2014 by the Reactor Safety Technologies Pathway of the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Light Water Reactor (LWR) Sustainability Program, consists of a group of U.S. experts in LWR safety and plant operations that have identified examination needs and are evaluating TEPCO Holdings information from Daiichi that address these needs. Each year, annual reports include examples demonstrating that significant safety insights are being obtained in the areas of component performance, fission product release and transport, debris end-state location, and combustible gas generation and transport. In addition to reducing uncertainties related to severe accident modeling progression, these insights are being used to update guidance for severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency planning. Furthermore, reduced uncertainties in modeling the events at Daiichi will improve the realism of reactor safety evaluations and inform future D&D activities by improving the capability for characterizing potential hazards to workers involved with cleanup activities. Highlights in this FY2017 report include new insights with respect to the forces required to produce the observed Daiichi Unit 1 (1F1) shield plug endstate, the observed leakage from 1F1 components, and the amount of combustible gas generation required to produce the observed explosions in Daiichi Units 3 and 4 (1F3 and 1F4). This report contains an appendix with a list of examination needs that was updated after U.S. experts reviewed recently obtained information from examinations at Daiichi. Additional details for higher priority, near-term, examination activities are also provided. This report also includes an appendix with a description of an updated website that has been reformatted to better assist U.S. experts by providing information in an archived retrievable location, as well as an appendix summarizing U.S. Forensics activities to host the TMI-2 Knowledge Transfer and Relevance to Fukushima Meeting that was held in Idaho Falls, ID, on October 10-14, 2016.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗