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At least 253 records · Page 14

Hanford single-shell tanks leak causes and locations - 15509

Historically 67 assumed and known leaking tanks in the single-shell tank (SST) system were identified at the Hanford Site. The US DOE, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC., and the State of Washington, Department of Ecology identified 25 of the 67 tanks as likely having had liner leaks by a comprehensive review of current and historical data. The remaining tanks are those with potential leaks from sources other than liner failures such as overfilling the tanks or the failure of process lines connecting SSTs. The location of the leaks was determined, based largely on logging radiological data from dry wells installed around the tank and/or radiological data from laterals installed under select tanks. The dry wells and laterals provide the best indication of the vicinity of the leak location, but not necessarily the exact location of the leak. Twenty of the 25 liner leaks appear to have occurred at or near the bottom of the tanks. Many of the tanks appeared to have multiple leak locations. Leak locations could not be determined for all tanks with the available data. Three of the tanks showed apparent sidewall leaks. Potential causes for liner leaks that were evaluated included tank design features, tank construction conditions, waste temperature, tank waste chemistry conducive to different types of corrosion (uniform corrosion, nitrate induced stress corrosion cracking, pitting, crevice, and liquid-air interface corrosion), and bulges in the tank bottom. (authors)

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Inspection Technology Advancements for Hanford Double Shell Tank Integrity Verification - 16150

The Hanford double-shell tanks (DSTs) were constructed in southeastern Washington State between 1968 and 1986 to store nuclear waste. Most of the tank waste came from the Hanford nuclear weapons program, which has been stopped for more than 25 years. The tanks will be needed for many years to come until suitable vitrification and permanent storage solutions are developed. These tanks are nominally 45 ft. deep from the dome peak to the floor. The inner tank is nominally 75 ft. dia. and the outer tank is nominally 80 ft. dia., leaving a 2.5 ft. annulus between the two side tank walls. The waste management program (under direction of Washington River Protection Solutions, WRPS) manages inspections of these DSTs from the annulus to justify their continued safe service and to avoid the high cost of new replacement tanks. Over time, the Hanford Tank Farm contractors, currently WRPS, have increased their ultrasound inspections of these tanks. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has worked with the Hanford Tank Farm contractors for more than 15 years to advance applicable tank nondestructive inspection technology for improved performance and cost reduction. Past, present, and planned technology advancements are addressed in this paper, including tank wall ultrasonic testing examination, extreme value statistical analysis, phased array for the tank wall, transmit/receive tandem synthetic aperture focusing technique knuckle examination, and electromagnetic acoustic transducer screening of the tank wall including mill-scale compensation. (authors)

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Cesium Exchange onto Crystalline Silicotitanate from Blended Hanford Tank Wastes

The Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system was developed to filter and remove cesium (Cs and 137 Cs) from Hanford tank waste supernate in preparation for vitrification. The Cs removal will be conducted with crystalline silicotitanate (CST) ion exchange media. Under the planned waste-processing strategy, the tank waste supernate will be queued for TSCR processing in tank 241-AP-107 (AP-107). Once AP-107 tank waste volume is sufficiently depleted, the waste supernate from tank 241-AP-105 (AP-105, the holding tank before transfer to AP-107) will be transferred to tank AP-107. Supernate from another tank will be transferred to the holding tank, AP-105, for eventual transfer to tank AP-107. These supernate streams will undergo blending in tanks AP-107 and AP-105; the volume blend ratios will be driven by how much the tank waste supernate volumes are depleted before the next tank waste is added. The consequence of tank waste blending on Cs uptake by CST was of interest and was tested via batch contacts; results are reported herein.

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SLUDGE BATCH 6 ACCEPTANCE EVALUATION: RADIONUCLIDE CONCENTRATIONS IN TANK 51 SB6 QUALIFICATION SAMPLE PREPARED AT SRNL

Presented in this report are radionuclide concentrations required as part of the program of qualifying Sludge Batch Six (SB6) for processing in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). The SB6 material is currently in Tank 51 being washed and prepared for transfer to Tank 40. The acceptance evaluation needs to be completed prior to the transfer of the material in Tank 51 to Tank 40. The sludge slurry in Tank 40 has already been qualified for DWPF and is currently being processed as SB5. The radionuclide concentrations were measured or estimated in the Tank 51 SB6 Qualification Sample prepared at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). This sample was prepared from the three liter sample of Tank 51 sludge slurry (HTF-51-09-110) taken on October 8, 2009. The sample was delivered to SRNL where it was initially characterized in the Shielded Cells. Under the direction of the Liquid Waste Organization it was then modified by eight washes, nine decants, an addition of Pu from Canyon Tank 16.3, and an addition of NaNO{sub 2}. This final slurry now has a composition expected to be similar to that of the slurry in Tank 51 after final preparations have been made for transfer of that slurry to Tank 40. Determining the radionuclide concentrations in this Tank 51 SB6 Qualification Sample is part of the work requested in Technical Task Request (TTR) No. HLW-DWPF-TTR-2009-0014. The work with this qualification sample is covered by a Task Technical and Quality Assurance Plan and an Analytical Study Plan. The radionuclides included in this report are needed for the DWPF Radiological Program Evaluation, the DWPF Waste Acceptance Criteria (TSR/WAC) Evaluation, and the DWPF Solid Waste Characterization Program (TTR Task I.2). Radionuclides required to meet the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (TTR Task II.2.) will be measured at a later date after the slurry from Tank 51 has been transferred to Tank 40. Then a sample of the as-processed SB6 will be taken and transferred to SRNL for measurement of these radionuclides. The results presented in this report are those necessary for DWPF to assess if the Tank 51 SB6 sample prepared at SRNL meets the requirements for the DWPF Radiological Program Evaluation, the DWPF Waste Acceptance Criteria evaluation, and the DWPF Solid Waste Characterization Program. The sample is the same as that on which the chemical composition was reported. Concentrations are given for thirty-four radionuclides along with total alpha and beta activity. Values for total gamma and total gamma plus beta activities are also calculated. Results also indicate that 99% of the Tc-99 and at least 90% of the I-129 that could have been in this sludge batch have been removed by chemical processing steps in the SRS Canyons or Tank Farm.

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Overview of Hanford Single Shell Tank (SST) Structural Integrity

To improve the understanding of the single-shell tanks (SSTs) integrity, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS), the USDOE Hanford Site tank contractor, developed an enhanced Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project (SSTIP) in 2009. An expert panel on SST integrity, consisting of various subject matters experts in industry and academia, was created to provide recommendations supporting the development of the project. This panel developed 33 recommendations in four main areas of interest: structural integrity, liner degradation, leak integrity and prevention, and mitigation of contamination migration, Seventeen of these recommendations were used to develop the basis for the M-45-10-1 Change Package for the Hanford Federal Agreement and Compliance Order, which is also known as the Tri-Party Agreement. The structural integrity of the tanks is a key element in completing the cleanup mission at the Hanford Site. There are eight primary recommendations related to the structural integrity of Hanford Single-Shell Tanks. Six recommendations are being implemented through current and planned activities. The structural integrity of the Hanford is being evaluated through analysis, monitoring, inspection, materials testing, and construction document review. Structural evaluation in the form of analysis is performed using modern finite element models generated in ANSYS. The analyses consider in-situ, thermal, operating loads and natural phenomena such as earthquakes. Structural analysis of 108 of 149 Hanford Single-Shell Tanks has concluded that the tanks are structurally sound and meet current industry standards. Analysis of the remaining Hanford Single-Shell Tanks is scheduled for FY2014. Hanford Single-Shell Tanks are monitored through a dome deflection program. The program looks for deflections of the tank dome greater than 1/4 inch. No such deflections have been recorded. The tanks are also subjected to visual inspection. Digital cameras record the interior surface of the concrete tanks, looking for cracks and other surface conditions that may indicate signs of structural distress. The condition of the concrete and rebar of the Hanford Single-Shell Tanks is currently being tested and planned for additional activities in the near future. Concrete and rebar removed from the dome of a 65 year old tank was tested for mechanics properties and condition. Results indicated stronger than designed concrete with additional Petrographic examination and rebar completed. Material properties determined from previous efforts combined with current testing and construction document review will help to generate a database that will provide indication of Hanford Single-Shell Tank structural integrity.

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Tank 11H Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution and Inhalation Dose Potential Analyses at Savannah River Site – 26018

Currently, there is approximately 34 million gallons of high-level radioactive tank waste in the Tank Farm at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The ultimate goal of operations at the Tank Farm is to remove the high level waste (HLW) from the tanks followed by stabilization of the waste through vitrification of the HLW into glass or grouting the decontaminated waste into saltstone. After bulk removal of the HLW consisting of sludge, saltcake, and supernatant, further efforts are made to reduce the residual waste present in the tank in order to declare preliminary cease waste removal (PCWR) signifying completion of HLW removal. These reduction efforts can include tank washing to remove soluble salts and radioisotopes and dissolution of solids including aluminum. Aluminum in the form of gibbsite and boehmite is relatively insoluble in water. Through addition of aqueous sodium hydroxide, the aluminum can be dissolved at mild temperatures. In order for the waste tank to meet closure mode requirements of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities (CSTF), which includes the Tank Farm, Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), a component of the safety basis, the inhalation dose potential (IDP) and the radiolytic hydrogen generation rate of the stored waste must be demonstrated to be lower than their respective designated limits. These parameters are calculated from measured radiochemical analyses of isotopes that emit a high amount of radioactivity including Cs-137, Sr-90, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-241, Am-241, and Cm-244. Following the low temperature aluminum dissolution (LTAD) process, Tank 11H slurry samples were pulled from the tank and sent to Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to measure the extent of aluminum dissolution, hydroxide concentration, densities of slurry and supernatant, weight percent solids analyses, and radionuclide activities. The analyses of the composite sample found that approximately 90% of the total aluminum in the slurry was dissolved, indicating successful reduction of the insoluble aluminum in the waste tank. Additionally, the weight percent insoluble solids (slurry basis) measurement of the composite sample was found to be approximately 1%, demonstrating that minimal solids still remain in the tank. Finally, the radiochemical analyses of the composite sample determined that the waste contents of the tank met the IDP and radiolytic hydrogen generation rate requirements of the CSTF DSA. These measurements have shown that the LTAD process in Tank 11H was successful in waste reduction efforts and a positive step towards declaring PCWR and tank closure at SRS.

Dekarske, John [Savannah River National Laboratory↗

Analysis of Tank 13H (HTF-13-14-156, 157) Surface and Subsurface Supernatant Samples in Support of Enrichment Control, Corrosion Control and Sodium Aluminosilicate Formation Potential Programs

The 2H Evaporator system includes mainly Tank 43H (feed tank) and Tank 38H (drop tank) with Tank 22H acting as the DWPF recycle receipt tank. The Tank 13H is being characterized to ensure that it can be transferred to the 2H evaporator. This report provides the results of analyses on Tanks 13H surface and subsurface supernatant liquid samples to ensure compliance with the Enrichment Control Program (ECP), the Corrosion Control Program and Sodium Aluminosilicate Formation Potential in the Evaporator. The U-235 mass divided by the total uranium averaged 0.00799 (0.799 % uranium enrichment) for both the surface and subsurface Tank 13H samples. This enrichment is slightly above the enrichment for Tanks 38H and 43H, where the enrichment normally ranges from 0.59 to 0.7 wt%. The U-235 concentration in Tank 13H samples ranged from 2.01E-02 to 2.63E-02 mg/L, while the U-238 concentration in Tank 13H ranged from 2.47E+00 to 3.21E+00 mg/L. Thus, the U-235/total uranium ratio is in line with the prior 2H-evaporator ECP samples. Measured sodium and silicon concentrations averaged, respectively, 2.46 M and 1.42E-04 M (3.98 mg/L) in the Tank 13H subsurface sample. The measured aluminum concentration in Tanks 13H subsurface samples averaged 2.01E-01 M.

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Refinement of Modeling Techniques for the Structural Evaluation of Hanford Single-Shell Nuclear Waste Storage Tanks

ABSTRACT Several tanks at the Hanford Site (in Washington State, USA) belong to the first generation of underground nuclear waste storage tanks known as single shell tanks (SSTs). These tanks were constructed between 1943 and 1964 and are well beyond their design life. This article discusses the structural analysis approach and modeling challenges encountered during the ongoing analysis of record (AOR) for evaluating the structural integrity of the SSTs. There are several geometrical and material nonlinearities and uncertainties to be dealt with while performing the modern finite element analysis of these tanks. The analysis takes into account the temperature history of the tanks and allowable mechanical operating loads of these tanks for proper estimation of creep strains and thermal degradation of material properties. The loads prescribed in the AOR models also include anticipated loads that these tanks may see during waste retrieval and closure. Due to uncertainty in a number of inputs to the models, sensitivity studies were conducted to address questions related to the boundary conditions to realistically or conservatively represent the influence of surrounding tanks in a tank farm, the influence of backfill excavation slope, the extent of backfill and the total extent of undisturbed soil surrounding the backfill. Because of the limited availability of data on the thermal and operating history for many of the individual tanks, some of the data was assumed or interpolated. However, the models developed for the analysis of record represent the bounding scenarios and include the loading conditions that the tanks were subjected to or anticipated. The modeling refinement techniques followed in the AOR resulted in conservative estimates for force and moment demands at various sections in the concrete tanks. This article discusses the modeling aspects related to Type-II and Type-III SSTs. The modeling techniques, methodology and evaluation criteria developed for evaluating the structural integrity of SSTs at Hanford are in general applicable to any similar tanks or underground concrete storage structures.

Waste Managament, Single Shell Tanks, Structural E↗

One System Integrated Project Team: Retrieval and Delivery of Hanford Tank Wastes for Vitrification in the Waste Treatment Plant - 13234

The One System Integrated Project Team (IPT) was formed in late 2011 as a way for improving the efficiency of delivery and treatment of highly radioactive waste stored in underground tanks at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) 586-square-mile Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State. The purpose of the One System IPT is to improve coordination and integration between the Hanford's Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) contractor and the Tank Operations Contractor (TOC). The vision statement is: One System is a WTP and TOC safety-conscious team that, through integrated management and implementation of risk-informed decision and mission-based solutions, will enable the earliest start of safe and efficient treatment of Hanford's tank waste, to protect the Columbia River, environment and public. The IPT is a formal collaboration between Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), which manages design and construction of the WTP for the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (DOEORP), and Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), which manages the TOC for ORP. More than fifty-six (56) million gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste are stored in one hundred seventy-seven (177) aging, underground tanks. Most of Hanford's waste tanks - one hundred forty-nine (149) of them - are of an old single-shell tank (SST) design built between 1944 and 1964. More than sixty (60) of these tanks have leaked in the past, releasing an estimated one million gallons of waste into the soil and threatening the nearby Columbia River. There are another twenty-eight (28) new double-shelled tanks (DSTs), built from 1968 to 1986, that provide greater protection to the environment. In 1989, DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) signed a landmark agreement that required Hanford to comply with federal and state environmental standards. It also paved the way for agreements that set deadlines for retrieving the tank wastes and for building and operating the WTP. The tank wastes are the result of Hanford's nearly fifty (50) years of plutonium production. In the intervening years, waste characteristics have been increasingly better understood. However, waste characteristics that are uncertain and will remain as such represent a significant technical challenge in terms of retrieval, transport, and treatment, as well as for design and construction of WTP. What also is clear is that the longer the waste remains in the tanks, the greater the risk to the environment and the people of the Pacific Northwest. The goal of both projects - tank operations and waste treatment - is to diminish the risks posed by the waste in the tanks at the earliest possible date. About two hundred (200) WTP and TOC employees comprise the IPT. Individual work groups within One System include Technical, Project Integration and Controls, Front-End Design and Project Definition, Commissioning, Nuclear Safety and Engineering Systems Integration, and Environmental Safety and Health and Quality Assurance (ESH and QA). Additional functions and team members will be added as the WTP approaches the operational phase. The team has undertaken several initiatives since its formation to collaborate on issues: (1) alternate scenarios for delivery of wastes from the tank farms to WTP; (2) improvements in managing Interface Control Documents; (3) coordination on various technical issues, including the Defense Nuclear Facilities Nuclear Safety Board's Recommendation 2010-2; (4) deployment of the SmartPlant{sup R} Foundation-Configuration Management System; and (5) preparation of the joint contract deliverable of the Operational Readiness Support Plan. (authors)

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Structural Analysis Results of Thermal, Operating and Seismic Analysis for Hanford Single-Shell Tank Integrity - 12261

Since Hanford's 149 Single-Shell Tanks (SSTs) are well beyond their design life, the U.S. Department of Energy has commissioned a state of the art engineering analysis to assess the structural integrity of the tanks to ensure that they are fit for service during the cleanup and closure phase. The structural integrity analysis has several challenging factors. There are four different tank sizes in various configurations that require analysis. Within each tank type there are different waste level and temperature histories, soil overburden depths, tank floor arrangements, riser sizes and locations, and other on-tank structures that need to be addressed. Furthermore, soil properties vary throughout the tank farms. This paper describes the structural integrity analysis that was performed for the SSTs using finite element models that incorporate the detailed design features of each tank type. The analysis was performed with two different models: an ANSYS static model for the Thermal and Operating Loads Analysis, and an ANSYS dynamic model for the seismic analysis. The TOLA analyses simulate the waste level and thermal history and it included a matrix of analysis cases that bounded the material property uncertainties. The TOLA also predicts the occurrence of concrete thermal degradations and cracking, reinforcement yielding, and soil plasticity. The seismic analysis matrix included uncertainty in waste properties, waste height and the soil modulus. In seismic analysis the tank concrete was modeled as a linear elastic material that was adjusted for the present day degraded conditions. Also, the soil was treated as a linear elastic material while special modeling techniques were used to avoid soil arching and achieve proper soil pressure on the tank walls. Seismic time histories in both the horizontal and vertical directions were applied to the seismic model. Structural demands from both Thermal and Operating Loads Analysis and seismic models were extracted in the form of section forces and moments for sections throughout the tank under the appropriate load combinations. These demands were evaluated against the American Concrete Institute (ACI) code requirements for nuclear safety-related concrete structures as defined in ACI-349-06. Structural integrity analysis of Hanford's Type II and Type III Single-Shell Tanks (SSTs) was performed using finite element models (ANSYS software) that incorporate the detailed design features of each tank type. The analysis was performed with two different models: a static model for the Thermal and Operating Loads Analysis, and a dynamic model for the seismic analysis. Structural demands from both Thermal and Operating Loads Analysis and seismic models were evaluated against the American Concrete Institute (ACI) code requirements for nuclear safety-related concrete structures as defined in ACI-349-06. The ratio of demand to capacity (D/C) was reported as a measure of structural integrity for the applicable ACI-349-06 load combinations. Although the Type II and Type III analysis matrix showed varying demands depending on the material combinations, all of the tank regions that are critical to structural stability passed the ACI 349-06 acceptance criteria. This was true for the conservative combination of maximum recorded thermal loads and maximum soil overburden depth combined with the analysis matrix of bounding material property combinations. (authors)

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The Corrective Maintenance Paradigm Shift at Hanford's Tank Farms - 20077

Hanford's Tank Farms facilities have been used to safely store waste for over 70 years, with the first single-shell tanks being constructed in 1943. Tank Farm facilities consist of 149 single-shell tanks, 28 double-shell tanks, an evaporator facility, and wastewater treatment facilities. Tank Farm facilities are aging, with a tremendous corrective maintenance burden on the Tank Farm contractor. The mission of Tank Farm facilities is soon changing from waste storage to waste staging for the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). WTP operations will demand a significant increase in Tank Farm facility operations, in which corrective maintenance outage windows will shrink drastically. This realization has forced the Tank Farm contractor to consider a paradigm shift in Tank Farm facilities Maintenance planning, and the use of reliability Engineering tools. The Tank Farm Production Operations Engineering Cognizant System Engineering (CSE) organization has led the way in motivating this paradigm shift. This shift has been realized through the use of: 1) technical exchange with other Department of Energy (DOE) contractors to develop improvements in the CSE program, 2) a shift from the use of lagging to leading system health indicators, and 3) a Plant Health Committee to unite Engineering, Operations, and Maintenance personnel toward a productive maintenance strategy. The CSE organization has held several technical exchanges with other DOE contractors to discuss CSE concepts, and how to better maintain aging infrastructure. The technical exchange with other contractors has greatly reduced the time required to make improvements in the Tank Farm CSE program. Other DOE contractors have already faced issues surrounding aging infrastructure, and have vast experience in improving the reliability and usable life of structures and components in nuclear facilities. The past CSE program used lagging health indicators to determine the health of systems. The key lagging indicator used to determine system health was availability, which is the percentage of time that a facility was ready for operation compared to the time the facility was demanded for operation. Availability was a good indicator of health in the waste storage mission of Tank Farms, where safe storage was the most important function of the facility, and where maintenance outage windows were typically long-duration. In current and future operations, outage windows are reducing, resulting in the need for much more reliable systems. Systems that have had high availability may suddenly become inoperable due to a failed component or sub-system. In several instances, the use of availability as an indicator of system health failed to predict system/equipment failure before its occurrence. In discussions with other DOE contractors, a set of reliability tools, including leading indicators of health, has been implemented in the CSE program. This primarily involves the use of failure modes and effects analysis and the study of equipment failure to develop system monitoring plans that focus on trending data to detect oncoming equipment failure ahead of time. In addition, the use of a Plant Health Committee has added significantly to the paradigm shift from a corrective maintenance philosophy to the use of predictive and preventive maintenance. The Plant Health Committee is a chartered team consisting of Engineering, Operations, and Maintenance personnel. CSEs use this forum to present the results of their performance monitoring, including the presentation of health via leading health indicators. The most positive aspect of this committee is the communication that it creates within these critical organizations. The Operations and Maintenance organization benefit from focusing maintenance on the reliability-centered focus provided by Engineering. Engineering benefits from the operational experience of the Operations organization and from the failure data that can be provided by Maintenance personnel. The continued use of the Plant Health Committee is expected to further decrease maintenance outage times, in better support of oncoming 24/7 operations. (authors)

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2009 PILOT SCALE FLUIDIZED BED STEAM REFORMING TESTING USING THE THOR (THERMAL ORGANIC REDUCTION) PROCESS: ANALYTICAL RESULTS FOR TANK 48H ORGANIC DESTRUCTION - 10408

The Savannah River Site (SRS) must empty the contents of Tank 48H, a 1.3 million gallon Type IIIA HLW storage tank, to return this tank to service. The tank contains organic compounds, mainly potassium tetraphenylborate that cannot be processed downstream until the organic components are destroyed. The THOR{reg_sign} Treatment Technologies (TTT) Fluidized Bed Steam Reforming (FBSR) technology, herein after referred to as steam reforming, has been demonstrated to be a viable process to remove greater than 99.9% of the organics from Tank 48H during various bench scale and pilot scale tests. These demonstrations were supported by Savannah River Remediation (SRR) and the Department of Energy (DOE) has concurred with the SRR recommendation to proceed with the deployment of the FBSR technology to treat the contents of Tank 48H. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) developed and proved the concept with non-radioactive simulants for SRR beginning in 2003. By 2008, several pilot scale campaigns had been completed and extensive crucible testing and bench scale testing were performed in the SRNL Shielded Cells using Tank 48H radioactive sample. SRNL developed a Tank 48H non-radioactive simulant complete with organic compounds, salt, and metals characteristic of those measured in a sample of the radioactive contents of Tank 48H. FBSR Pilot Scaled Testing with the Tank 48H simulant has demonstrated the ability to remove greater than 98% of the nitrites and greater than 99.5% of the nitrates from the Tank 48H simulant, and to form a solid product that is primarily alkali carbonate. The alkali carbonate is soluble and, thus, amenable to pumping as a liquid to downstream facilities for processing. The FBSR technology was demonstrated in October of 2006 in the Engineering Scale Test Demonstration (ESTD) pilot scale steam reformer at the Hazen Research Inc. (HRI) facility in Golden, CO. Additional ESTD tests were completed in 2008 and in 2009 that further demonstrated the TTT steam reforming process ability to destroy organics in the Tank 48 simulant and produce a soluble carbonate waste form. The ESTD was operated at varying feed rates and Denitration and Mineralization Reformer (DMR) temperatures, and at a constant Carbon Reduction Reformer (CRR) temperature of 950 C. The process produced a dissolvable carbonate product suitable for processing downstream. ESTD testing was performed in 2009 at the Hazen facility to demonstrate the long term operability of an integrated FBSR processing system with carbonate product and carbonate slurry handling capability. The final testing demonstrated the integrated TTT FBSR capability to process the Tank 48 simulant from a slurry feed into a greater than 99.9% organic free and primarily dissolved carbonate FBSR product slurry. This paper will discuss the SRNL analytical results of samples analyzed from the 2008 and 2009 THOR{reg_sign} steam reforming ESTD performed with Tank 48H simulant at HRI in Golden, Colorado. The final analytical results will be compared to prior analytical results from samples in terms of organic, nitrite, and nitrate destruction.

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SLUDGE BATCH 7 ACCEPTANCE EVALUATION: RADIONUCLIDE CONCENTRATIONS IN TANK 51 SB7 QUALIFICATION SAMPLE PREPARED AT SRNL

Presented in this report are radionuclide concentrations required as part of the program of qualifying Sludge Batch Seven (SB7) for processing in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). The SB7 material is currently in Tank 51 being washed and prepared for transfer to Tank 40. The acceptance evaluation needs to be completed prior to the transfer of the material in Tank 51 to Tank 40. The sludge slurry in Tank 40 has already been qualified for DWPF and is currently being processed as SB6. The radionuclide concentrations were measured or estimated in the Tank 51 SB7 Qualification Sample prepared at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). This sample was prepared from the three liter qualification sample of Tank 51 sludge slurry (HTF-51-10-125) received on September 18, 2010. The sample was delivered to SRNL where it was initially characterized in the Shielded Cells. With consultation from the Liquid Waste Organization, the qualification sample was then modified by several washes and decants, which included addition of Pu from H Canyon and sodium nitrite per the Tank Farm corrosion control program. This final slurry now has a composition expected to be similar to that of the slurry in Tank 51 after final preparations have been made for transfer of that slurry to Tank 40. Determining the radionuclide concentrations in this Tank 51 SB7 Qualification Sample is part of the work requested in Technical Task Request (TTR) No. HLW-DWPF-TTR-2010-0031. The radionuclides included in this report are needed for the DWPF Radiological Program Evaluation, the DWPF Waste Acceptance Criteria (TSR/WAC) Evaluation, and the DWPF Solid Waste Characterization Program (TTR Task I.2). Radionuclides required to meet the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (TTR Task III.2.) will be measured at a later date after the slurry from Tank 51 has been transferred to Tank 40. Then a sample of the as-processed SB7 will be taken and transferred to SRNL for measurement of these radionuclides. The results presented in this report are those necessary for DWPF to assess if the Tank 51 SB7 sample prepared at SRNL meets the requirements for the DWPF Radiological Program Evaluation, the DWPF Waste Acceptance Criteria evaluation, and the DWPF Solid Waste Characterization Program. Concentrations are given for thirty-four radionuclides along with total alpha and beta activity. Values for total gamma and total gamma plus beta activities are also calculated.

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Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) Simulations of Jet Mixing in Tanks of Different Scales

For long-duration in-space storage of cryogenic propellants, an axial jet mixer is one concept for controlling tank pressure and reducing thermal stratification. Extensive ground-test data from the 1960s to the present exist for tank diameters of 10 ft or less. The design of axial jet mixers for tanks on the order of 30 ft diameter, such as those planned for the Ares V Earth Departure Stage (EDS) LH2 tank, will require scaling of available experimental data from much smaller tanks, as well designing for microgravity effects. This study will assess the ability for Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) to handle a change of scale of this magnitude by performing simulations of existing ground-based axial jet mixing experiments at two tank sizes differing by a factor of ten. Simulations of several axial jet configurations for an Ares V scale EDS LH2 tank during low Earth orbit (LEO) coast are evaluated and selected results are also presented. Data from jet mixing experiments performed in the 1960s by General Dynamics with water at two tank sizes (1 and 10 ft diameter) are used to evaluate CFD accuracy. Jet nozzle diameters ranged from 0.032 to 0.25 in. for the 1 ft diameter tank experiments and from 0.625 to 0.875 in. for the 10 ft diameter tank experiments. Thermally stratified layers were created in both tanks prior to turning on the jet mixer. Jet mixer efficiency was determined by monitoring the temperatures on thermocouple rakes in the tanks to time when the stratified layer was mixed out. Dye was frequently injected into the stratified tank and its penetration recorded. There were no velocities or turbulence quantities available in the experimental data. A commercially available, time accurate, multi-dimensional CFD code with free surface tracking (FLOW-3D from Flow Science, Inc.) is used for the simulations presented. Comparisons are made between computed temperatures at various axial locations in the tank at different times and those observed experimentally. The affect of various modeling parameters on the agreement obtained are assessed.

Breisacher, Kevin↗

One System Integrated Project Team: Retrieval And Delivery Of The Hanford Tank Wastes For Vitrification In The Waste Treatment Plant

The One System Integrated Project Team (IPT) was formed in late 2011 as a way for improving the efficiency of delivery and treatment of highly radioactive waste stored in underground tanks at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) 586-square-mile Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State. The purpose of the One System IPT is to improve coordination and integration between the Hanford's Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) contractor and the Tank Operations Contractor (TOC). The vision statement is: One System is a WTP and TOC safety conscious team that, through integrated management and implementation of risk-informed decision and mission-based solutions, will enable the earliest start of safe and efficient treatment of Hanford's tank waste, to protect the Columbia River, environment and public. The IPT is a formal collaboration between Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), which manages design and construction of the WTP for the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (DOEORP), and Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), which manages the TOC for ORP. More than fifty-six (56) million gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste are stored in one hundred seventy-seven (177) aging, underground tanks. Most of Hanford's waste tanks - one hundred forty-nine (149) of them - are of an old single-shell tank (SST) design built between 1944 and 1964. More than sixty (60) of these tanks have leaked in the past, releasing an estimated one million gallons of waste into the soil and threatening the nearby Columbia River. There are another twenty-eight (28) new double-shelled tanks (DSTs), built from 1968 to 1986, that provide greater protection to the environment. In 1989, DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) signed a landmark agreement that required Hanford to comply with federal and state environmental standards. It also paved the way for agreements that set deadlines for retrieving the tank wastes and for building and operating the WTP. The tank wastes are the result of Hanford's nearly fifty (50) years of plutonium production. In the intervening years, waste characteristics have been increasingly better understood. However, waste characteristics that are uncertain and will remain as such represent a significant technical challenge in terms of retrieval, transport, and treatment, as well as for design and construction ofWTP. What also is clear is that the longer the waste remains in the tanks, the greater the risk to the environment and the people of the Pacific Northwest. The goal of both projects - tank operations and waste treatment - is to diminish the risks posed by the waste in the tanks at the earliest possible date. About two hundred (200) WTP and TOC employees comprise the IPT. Individual work groups within One System include Technical, Project Integration & Controls, Front-End Design & Project Definition, Commissioning, Nuclear Safety & Engineering Systems Integration, and Environmental Safety and Health and Quality Assurance (ESH&QA). Additional functions and team members will be added as the WTP approaches the operational phase. The team has undertaken several initiatives since its formation to collaborate on issues: (1) alternate scenarios for delivery of wastes from the tank farms to WTP; (2) improvements in managing Interface Control Documents; (3) coordination on various technical issues, including the Defense Nuclear Facilities Nuclear Safety Board's Recommendation 2010-2; (4) deployment of the SmartPlant Foundation-configuration Management System; and (5) preparation of the joint contract deliverable of the Operational Readiness Support Plan.

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Estimating Residual Solids Volume In Underground Storage Tanks

The Savannah River Site liquid waste system consists of multiple facilities to safely receive and store legacy radioactive waste, treat, and permanently dispose waste. The large underground storage tanks and associated equipment, known as the 'tank farms', include a complex interconnected transfer system which includes underground transfer pipelines and ancillary equipment to direct the flow of waste. The waste in the tanks is present in three forms: supernatant, sludge, and salt. The supernatant is a multi-component aqueous mixture, while sludge is a gel-like substance which consists of insoluble solids and entrapped supernatant. The waste from these tanks is retrieved and treated as sludge or salt. The high level (radioactive) fraction of the waste is vitrified into a glass waste form, while the low-level waste is immobilized in a cementitious grout waste form called saltstone. Once the waste is retrieved and processed, the tanks are closed via removing the bulk of the waste, chemical cleaning, heel removal, stabilizing remaining residuals with tailored grout formulations and severing/sealing external penetrations. The comprehensive liquid waste disposition system, currently managed by Savannah River Remediation, consists of 1) safe storage and retrieval of the waste as it is prepared for permanent disposition; (2) definition of the waste processing techniques utilized to separate the high-level waste fraction/low-level waste fraction; (3) disposition of LLW in saltstone; (4) disposition of the HLW in glass; and (5) closure state of the facilities, including tanks. This paper focuses on determining the effectiveness of waste removal campaigns through monitoring the volume of residual solids in the waste tanks. Volume estimates of the residual solids are performed by creating a map of the residual solids on the waste tank bottom using video and still digital images. The map is then used to calculate the volume of solids remaining in the waste tank. The ability to accurately determine a volume is a function of the quantity and quality of the waste tank images. Currently, mapping is performed remotely with closed circuit video cameras and still photograph cameras due to the hazardous environment. There are two methods that can be used to create a solids volume map. These methods are: liquid transfer mapping / post transfer mapping and final residual solids mapping. The task is performed during a transfer because the liquid level (which is a known value determined by a level measurement device) is used as a landmark to indicate solids accumulation heights. The post transfer method is primarily utilized after the majority of waste has been removed. This method relies on video and still digital images of the waste tank after the liquid transfer is complete to obtain the relative height of solids across a waste tank in relation to known and usable landmarks within the waste tank (cooling coils, column base plates, etc.). In order to accurately monitor solids over time across various cleaning campaigns, and provide a technical basis to support final waste tank closure, a consistent methodology for volume determination has been developed and implemented at SRS.

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2020 Vision for Tank Waste Cleanup (One System Integration) - 12506

The mission of the Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (ORP) is to safely retrieve and treat the 56 million gallons of Hanford's tank waste and close the Tank Farms to protect the Columbia River. The millions of gallons of waste are a by-product of decades of plutonium production. After irradiated fuel rods were taken from the nuclear reactors to the processing facilities at Hanford they were exposed to a series of chemicals designed to dissolve away the rod, which enabled workers to retrieve the plutonium. Once those chemicals were exposed to the fuel rods they became radioactive and extremely hot. They also couldn't be used in this process more than once. Because the chemicals are caustic and extremely hazardous to humans and the environment, underground storage tanks were built to hold these chemicals until a more permanent solution could be found. The Cleanup of Hanford's 56 million gallons of radioactive and chemical waste stored in 177 large underground tanks represents the Department's largest and most complex environmental remediation project. Sixty percent by volume of the nation's high-level radioactive waste is stored in the underground tanks grouped into 18 'tank farms' on Hanford's central plateau. Hanford's mission to safely remove, treat and dispose of this waste includes the construction of a first-of-its-kind Waste Treatment Plant (WTP), ongoing retrieval of waste from single-shell tanks, and building or upgrading the waste feed delivery infrastructure that will deliver the waste to and support operations of the WTP beginning in 2019. Our discussion of the 2020 Vision for Hanford tank waste cleanup will address the significant progress made to date and ongoing activities to manage the operations of the tank farms and WTP as a single system capable of retrieving, delivering, treating and disposing Hanford's tank waste. The initiation of hot operations and subsequent full operations of the WTP are not only dependent upon the successful design and construction of the WTP, but also on appropriately preparing the tank farms and waste feed delivery infrastructure to reliably and consistently deliver waste feed to the WTP for many decades. The key components of the 2020 vision are: all WTP facilities are commissioned, turned-over and operational, achieving the earliest possible hot operations of completed WTP facilities, and supplying low-activity waste (LAW) feed directly to the LAW Facility using in-tank/near tank supplemental treatment technologies. A One System Integrated Project Team (IPT) was recently formed to focus on developing and executing the programs that will be critical to successful waste feed delivery and WTP startup. The team is comprised of members from Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), Washington River Protection Solutions LLC (WRPS), and DOE-ORP and DOE-WTP. The IPT will combine WTP and WRPS capabilities in a mission-focused model that is clearly defined, empowered and cost efficient. The genesis for this new team and much of the 2020 vision is based on the work of an earlier team that was tasked with identifying the optimum approach to startup, commissioning, and turnover of WTP facilities for operations. This team worked backwards from 2020 - a date when the project will be completed and steady-state operations will be underway - and identified success criteria to achieving safe and efficient operations of the WTP. The team was not constrained by any existing contract work scope, labor, or funding parameters. Several essential strategies were identified to effectively realize the one-system model of integrated feed stream delivery, WTP operations, and product delivery, and to accomplish the team's vision of hot operations beginning in 2016: - Use a phased startup and turnover approach that will allow WTP facilities to be transitioned to an operational state on as short a timeline as credible. - Align Tank Farm (TF) and WTP objectives such that feed can be supplied to the WTP when it is required for hot operations. - Ensure immobilized waste and waste recycle streams can be received by the TF when required to support 2016 production of immobilized low-activity waste (ILAW). - Ensure the required baseline and additional funding is provided beginning in fiscal year 2011. - Modify TF and WTP contracts to adequately address this vision. The 2020 Vision provides a summary of strategies and key actions that optimize the approach to startup, commissioning, and turnover of WTP facilities. This vision focuses on the legally enforceable requirement to achieve the Consent Decree milestones of starting radioactive operations in 2019, and achieving initial WTP operations in 2022. (authors)

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Feasibility Study for Cathodic Protection of Waste Tanks at Hanford

The Hanford Nuclear Reservation site contains approximately 211 million liters of radioactive and chemically hazardous waste arising from nuclear weapons production, beginning with World War II, and continuing through the Cold War. The waste is stored in 177 carbon-steel underground storage tanks, of which 149 are single-shell tanks (SSTs) and the remaining are double-shell tanks (DSTs). The mission of an ongoing River Protection Project is to retrieve the waste from the underground storage tanks and then treat and immobilize (i.e., vitrify) it for disposal. Waste from the older SSTs is being progressively retrieved into the newer DSTs for storage pending treatment, immobilization, and disposal. Waste chemistry controls are in place to mitigate general corrosion, pitting corrosion, and stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and minimize corrosion risks to the carbon steel tank liners of DST at the Hanford Site. The chemistry control program focuses on preserving liner integrity while balancing the need for caustic/nitrite additions that have large downstream impacts on vitrification. Some of the DSTs store salt cake or sludge waste layers contain out-of-specification interstitial liquids that contact the primary tank bottom or sidewall. Remediation of such layers through chemical additions is not practical. At the present time, the most significant leak integrity concern at Hanford is for corrosion of the tank bottoms of DSTs where the solids layer is out of specification because of hydroxide ion depletion and consequently, pH values that are less than 12. Cathodic protection (CP) has been proposed as a possible way to protect the liners of such tanks against corrosion. The objective of this project was to investigate the feasibility of applying CP to Hanford DSTs to mitigate internal corrosion of the carbon steel tank primary liners. The scope of the project included (1) a literature review on the application of CP to storage tank systems, in general, and to waste tanks at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Hanford, (2) a review of the finite element analysis (FEA) model recently developed to evaluate potentials for a DST, and (3) the development of a boundary element analysis (BEA) model for CP for a DST. Tank AN-107, one of the Hanford DSTs, was selected for this work because (1) the bottommost waste layer in the tank is out-of-specification, and (2) electrochemical and resistivity data, based on recent waste sampling and testing, are available for this tank. The overarching conclusion of this study is that, based on the available information, it is feasible to apply CP to mitigate internal corrosion of the primary liners of the Hanford DSTs. However, significant additional information and work are required before a CP system can be designed. Recommendations for next steps in the design of the CP system will be presented.

WIERSMA, BRUCE↗