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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 253 records · Page 14
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2015

Extended Burnup Credit for BWR Spent Nuclear Fuel in Storage and Transportation Systems

[Full Text] Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission have initiated a multiyear project to investigate the application of burnup credit (BUC) for boiling-water reactor (BWR) fuel in storage and transportation casks. This project includes two phases. The first phase investigates the applicability of peak reactivity methods currently used for spent fuel pools to spent fuel storage and transportation casks and the validation of reactivity (k eff ) calculations and depleted fuel compositions. The second phase focuses on extending BUC beyond peak reactivity. This paper documents work performed to date, investigating some aspects of extended BUC, and it also describes the plan to complete the evaluations. The technical basis for application of peak reactivity methods to BWR fuel in storage and transportation systems is presented in a companion paper. Two reactor operating parameters are being evaluated to establish an adequate basis for extended BWR BUC, including investigation of the axial void profile effect and the effect of control blade utilization during operation. A detailed analysis of core simulator data for one cycle of an operating BWR plant was performed to determine the range of void profiles and the variability of the profile experienced during irradiation. While a single cycle does not provide complete data, the data obtained are sufficient to use to determine the primary effects and identify conservative modeling approaches. Using data resulting from a single cycle, the axial void profile is studied by first determining the temporal fidelity necessary in depletion modeling, and then using multiple void profiles to examine the effect of the void profile on cask reactivity. The results of these studies are being used to develop recommendations for conservatively modeling the void profile effects for BWR depletion calculations. The second operational parameter studied is control blade exposure. Control blades are inserted in various locations and at varying degrees during BWR operation based on the reload design. The presence of control blades during depletion hardens the neutron spectrum locally due to both moderator displacement and introduction of a thermal neutron absorber. The reactivity impact of control blade presence is investigated herein, as well as the effect of multiple (continuous and intermittent) exposure periods. The coupled effects of control blade presence on power density, void profile, or burnup profile have not been considered to date but will be addressed in future work.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Testing of a Transport Cask for Research Reactor Spent Fuel - 13003

Since the beginning of the last decade three Latin American countries that operate research reactors - Argentina, Brazil and Chile - have been joining efforts to improve the regional capability in the management of spent fuel elements from the TRIGA and MTR reactors operated in the region. A main drive in this initiative, sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, is the fact that no definite solution regarding the back end of the research reactor fuel cycle has been taken by any of the participating country. However, any long-term solution - either disposition in a repository or storage away from reactor - will involve at some stage the transportation of the spent fuel through public roads. Therefore, a licensed cask that provides adequate shielding, assurance of subcriticality, and conformance to internationally accepted safety, security and safeguards regimes is considered a strategic part of any future solution to be adopted at a regional level. As a step in this direction, a packaging for the transport of irradiated fuel for MTR and TRIGA research reactors was designed by the tri-national team and a half-scale model equipped with the MTR version of the internal basket was constructed in Argentina and Brazil and tested in Brazil. Three test campaigns have been carried out so far, covering both normal conditions of transportation and hypothetical accident conditions. After failing the tests in the first two test series, the specimen successfully underwent the last test sequence. A second specimen, incorporating the structural improvements in view of the previous tests results, will be tested in the near future. Numerical simulations of the free drop and thermal tests are being carried out in parallel, in order to validate the computational modeling that is going to be used as a support for the package certification. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Experimental test plan for PWR sister rods in the high burnup spent fuel data project

The High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project (herein referred to as the 'project'), sponsored by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), is focused on experimentally defining the effects of long-term storage and transportation on high burnup (HBU) pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel (>45 gigawatt days per metric ton uranium). The goals of the project are to provide confirmatory data for model validation and potential improvement; to provide input to future dry storage cask design; to support license renewals and new licenses for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation facilities; and to support transportation licensing for high burnup used fuel. In support of these project goals, an instrumented TN-32B bolted-lid cask at the North Anna reactor site will be loaded with intact, HBU PWR fuel assemblies (project assemblies) having four different kinds of cladding: standard Zircaloy-4, low-tin Zircaloy-4, ZIRLO, and M5. In approximately 10 years, the instrumented cask will be opened for inspection and several fuel rods from the project assemblies will be characterized. To support the project goals, the project pulled 25 'sister rods', 9 from the project assemblies and 16 from similar HBU assemblies, for characterization. The 25 sister rods are all high burnup and cover the range of cladding alloys. The 25 sister rods were shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in early 2016 for detailed nondestructive and destructive examination. Examinations are intended to provide baseline data on the initial physical state of the cladding and fuel prior to the loading, drying, and long-term dry storage process. Further examinations are focused on determining the effects of temperatures encountered during and following drying. Similar tests will be performed on rods taken from the project assemblies at the end of the storage period (the 'cask rods') to identify any significant changes in the fuel rods that may have occurred during the dry storage period. Additionally, some of the sister rods will be used for separate effects testing to expand the applicability of the project data to the fleet, and to address some of the data-related gaps associated with extended storage and subsequent transportation of high burnup fuel. A draft test plan is being developed that describes the experimental work to be conducted on the sister rods. This paper summarizes the draft test plan and necessary coordination activities for the multi-year experimental program to supply data relevant to the assessment of the safety of long-term storage followed by transportation of high burnup used fuel. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Combined Raman imaging and {sup 18}O tracer analysis for the study of high temperature oxidation of pre-oxidized Zircaloy-4 in spent fuel pool accident - 6.4 STP-2016-0037

Oxidation at high temperature of Zr-based cladding materials is expected to be the primary cause of the fuel assemblies' degradation in Spent Fuel Storage Pool loss of cooling accidents. Differently from Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) in reactor vessel, presence of air in the atmosphere in case of a spent fuel pool accident is known to be an aggravating factor because of the 'catalytic' role of nitrogen on the oxidation. 'Low temperature' oxidation scales simulating corrosion oxide formed during normal operation have been observed to have a protective effect regarding subsequent high temperature oxidation, in steam as well as in air and air + steam atmospheres. However, in the presence of nitrogen, this protective effect is lost much earlier than in pure steam or pure oxygen. We present results on oxygen transport through such corrosion oxide layers studied using an {sup 18}O tracer technique. Experiments were performed in {sup 18}O{sub 2} alone as well as in mixed {sup 18}O{sub 2} + N{sub 2} atmospheres, at 850 deg. C, a temperature for which nitrogen is known to have a strong effect on the Zr-based alloys oxidation. Post-test investigations of the specimens were performed by means of micro-Raman profiling or imaging, giving simultaneous information on the {sup 18}O distribution and on structural factors such as composition and stresses in the scales. Raman imaging gave clear evidence for different characteristic distributions of {sup 18}O in the scales. Some of them have been correlated with the development of cracks and porosity in the oxide which allows oxygen to locally penetrate in the scales. Although nitrogen appears to have no or limited influence on the oxygen diffusion, it is observed to reach the metal/oxide interface much faster than oxygen. A mechanism explaining the role of nitrogen on the loss of the protective effect and the kinetic acceleration observed by TGA is proposed. (authors)

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2017

Reviewing Spent Nuclear Fuel Dry Cask Storage Programs to Identify Challenges for an Integrated Waste Management System - 17535

Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has responsibility for removing commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from nuclear power plant sites and disposing of the SNF in a deep geologic repository. However, the methods used by commercial nuclear power plants for onsite storage of their SNF define the starting conditions for DOE efforts to develop a waste management system that includes packaging, transportation, storage, and disposal of commercial SNF. The NWPA (as amended) also charges the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (Board) with evaluating the technical and scientific validity of DOE activities related to the management and disposal of SNF and high-level radioactive wastes (HLW). DOE's efforts related to developing an integrated program for storing, transporting, and disposing of SNF and HLW were the focus of a public meeting held by the Board on August 24, 2016, in Washington, D.C. To prepare for the public meeting, the Board's staff compiled information on the dry cask storage systems in service at nuclear power plant sites in order to identify issues that would need to be addressed by DOE in planning to transport SNF away from the sites. This paper is based on a briefing presented to the Board members by the Board's staff before the public meeting. Post-meeting findings and recommendations of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board are documented in the Board letter to the Department of Energy dated December 8, 2016. A note about terminology: in this paper, the phrase 'dry cask storage system' is generic and applies to a complete system used for dry storage of commercial SNF.Within these storage systems, commercial SNF is sealed inside a container called either a cask or a canister depending upon the specific type of storage system used. This distinction is discussed in more detail in the body of this paper. When referring to the containers holding SNF in particular systems, this paper uses the terms 'casks' or 'canisters,' as appropriate. When discussing the collective group of all containers, this paper uses the phrase 'casks and canisters'. Dry cask storage of SNF is a widespread practice throughout the U.S. commercial nuclear industry. As of August 1, 2016, more than 2300 storage casks and canisters were loaded at U.S. commercial nuclear power plant sites. This number is expected to increase by more than 200 casks and canisters annually, reaching a total of approximately 4500 by 2025. Multiple vendors have developed their own unique designs of dry cask storage and transportation systems. The majority of storage system designs (75 percent) feature SNF loaded in welded stainless steel canisters that are stored in ventilated concrete overpacks that allow for convection cooling. Some older dry cask storage system designs do not include a welded stainless steel canister; instead, SNF is loaded directly into a heavily shielded metal cask to minimize radiation exposure to workers and prevent atmospheric release of radionuclides. These types of systems are sealed by O-rings compressed under a bolted lid. After loading, dry cask storage systems are located on concrete pads at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) at nuclear power plant sites and will remain there until the time when they will be transported to a consolidated interim storage facility or a deep geologic repository. Eventual transportation of canistered SNF will include removing the stainless steel canisters from the concrete overpacks, possibly repackaging the SNF, and loading the canisters into specially designed transportation casks for shipment by truck, rail, or barge. In the case of the non-canistered casks, some are approved for transportation and can be shipped after impact limiters are installed on the casks. SNF will need to be removed from casks not approved for transportation and transferred to transport-approved casks. This paper highlights five issues and challenges presented by the nuclear industry's use of dry cask storage systems that will need to be addressed by DOE in developing an integrated waste management system. One example, among the five, is that several dry-storage casks and canisters have received Nuclear Regulatory Commission certificates of compliance for storage only and do not have certificates of compliance for transportation. This will pose a challenge when the SNF must be moved to a consolidated interim storage facility or a deep geologic repository. Another example is that, when loaded with SNF, the total weight of new, larger transportation cask designs will exceed 142 metric tonnes (156 tons) which, when combined with the weight of the rail-car, will exceed the gross weight limit for unrestricted operation on some rail lines. This will also affect future transportation planning for shipments of SNF. All five issues and challenges are discussed in detail in the body of the paper. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Thermo-Hydro-Geochemical Evolution Influences on the Concrete Cask in Long-Term Storage Facility of Spent Fuel - 16171

Due to humid environment and weather condition in Taiwan's island, as well as the acid rain environment resulting from sulfur dioxide emissions, the concrete cask might be damaged or degraded under the effect of humid, salt, acid rain, and sulfate attack on cementitious materials. These degradation factors could influence the safety design of the long-term spent fuel storage facility. Due to the long-term decay heat of spent fuel and severe environments to be encountered, the thermo-hydro-geochemical evolution could play an important role in the safety assessment of concrete-cask storage facility. The effects of humid, salt, acid rain, and sulfate attack on the degradation of cementitious materials of concrete-cask facility in thermo-hydro-geochemical evolution under rain water quality conditions have been investigated. The results show that the main processes responsible for concrete degradation are species induced from hydrogen ion, sulfate and chloride. For most storage and disposal casks and conditions, the American Concrete Institute nuclear safety code requirements (ACI-349 Appendix A) specify a bulk-concrete shield temperature limit of 150 deg. F (65.5 deg. C). However, localized temperatures at the inner walls of the shielding casks could reach 200-300 deg. F (93-149 deg. C). Simulation of geochemical degradation reactions for 100 years of cask storage under two temperature scenarios was performed. The results indicate that the hydrogen ion, sulfate anion, and chloride do not result in the dissolution of portlandite, or formation of ettringite and Friedel's salt. Therefore, these results indicate the concrete cask may remain in a durable condition. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Used Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Components for Shutdown Plants to Expedite Defueling of Spent Fuel Pool - 18378

For plants that have announced plans to shut down, their main priority is to off-load the Used Nuclear Fuel from the spent fuel pool to dry storage at an ISFSI so that they can proceed to 'Safe store' or other storage options, and start their decommissioning process as soon as possible. One of the major expenses for a decommissioned plant is the cost of maintenance of the spent fuel pool. Therefore, the ability of the dry storage system to store short cooled fuel is an important aspect of dry storage system for shutdown plants. When a shutdown plant evaluates the dry storage options, total cost of the transferring the fuel from the pool to ISFSI site needs to be evaluated. One of the major costs to the utility for dry storage is the cost of ISFSI pad (basemat) along with the cost of dry storage system hardware. Smaller ISFSI footprint saves utility for the cost of ISFSI site excavation, cost of engineered backfill and cost of ISFSI pad. In order to minimize the cost of dry storage systems, besides the size of the ISFSI pad as described above, other important considerations is to use high capacity systems. The highest capacity systems available in the dry storage market today are with 37 PWR or 89 BWR used fuel assemblies per canister. These dry storage systems are expected to be at the plant sites for extended duration due to the unavailability of Interim Storage Facilities or a permanent disposal sites like Yucca Mountain. Maintaining the integrity of the dry storage systems canisters and storage overpack so that they can safely protect the fuel and integrity of used nuclear fuel is maintained during storage period is of utmost importance. Robust Aging Management Program is an important aspect for dry storage systems not only at the shutdown plants but also at the operating plants. This paper will provide the update of a reduced footprint version of TN Americas NUHOMS{sup R} System with MATRIX HSM and NUHOMS{sup R} EOS Canisters that addresses the need for maximizing safety, ISFSI capacity while optimizing cost. It will provide an update on the current capabilities, design features and current status of the licensing and deployment of NUHOMS{sup R} EOS System. It will provide the current status of the MATRIX HSM along with the significant enhancement included for a robust Canister Evolved Safety Program for Aging Management. It will also describe the construction sequence; loading operations, and inspections during extended storage as a part of aging management program. The compact version of TN Americas NUHOMS{sup R} System with MATRIX HSM offers a 'Universal' Storage Overpack which is designed to accept all different designs dry storage canisters available in the industry. As UNF storage continues to drives the industry towards innovations that address the need for optimized dry storage systems, compact ISFSIs and prudent aging management programs, this new evolution of the TN Americas NUHOMS{sup R} system with MATRIX HSM and EOS Canisters offers a significant leap forward in addressing all of these challenges. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

Development of Non Destructive Assay Approach for Characterization of Spent Fuel Debris at Fukushima - 18543

Fukushima is considering options for decommissioning the damaged reactor. One of the technical challenges is the accurate characterization of fissile isotopes in the spent fuel debris. This is due to the fissile content, high gamma and neutron emission and uncertainties regarding the fuel burnup and unknown, heterogeneous mixture of materials that may be present. These requirements lead to significant challenges for potential measurement approaches with regard to the requirements for shielding and remote operation that result from plant and operational constraints. Mirion Technologies (MTKK) has been working to perform feasibility and concept design studies for a non-destructive assay (NDA) system that could be used to characterize the fissile content of retrieved samples of fuel debris. The main advantage of using an NDA technique is that the entire volume of the sample is interrogated so the method is not reliant upon assumptions of representativeness of samples retrieved and sent for laboratory analysis. The proposed technique comprises a combination of gamma spectroscopy and combined passive / active neutron interrogation with advanced data analysis algorithms in order to determine the maximum available data on the spent fuel properties and obtain a full radionuclide characterization of each sample. This includes quantification of individual fissile nuclides with validated uncertainties. In this paper we describe the NDA techniques and systems that are proposed, their benefits and limitations, and how they may be implemented into a full-scale system for fuel element debris characterization. We describe the studies that were performed based on experience of real systems and research supplemented with extensive computer modelling work to represent the expected fuel element debris properties. The work benefits from Mirion's extensive global physics and engineering expertise in designing, supplying and operating a wide range of NDA systems for diverse applications and in different challenging physical and operational environments. We describe how the advanced and innovative physics techniques that have resulted from Mirion's collective experience in these areas, can be deployed in an NDA system. The final approach that has been developed provides a means for determining the masses of the individual fissile isotopes with robust uncertainties and capable of implementation into an NDA system that meets the expected requirements for an operational plant. We focus on the techniques that have been developed and describe how they are of wider relevance and interest for projects that include challenges for characterisation of fuel residues. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Management and Disposal of U.S. Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel - 19133

Congress created the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB) in the 1987 Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act (Public Law 100-203) to evaluate the technical and scientific validity of activities undertaken by the Secretary of Energy to implement the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. In accordance with this mandate, the NWTRB reviewed the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to manage the inventory of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is under its control (DOE SNF) at several facilities around the country: the Hanford Site in Washington, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in Idaho, the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, and the Fort St. Vrain independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) in Colorado. While disposal of SNF and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) in a deep geologic repository remains the ultimate objective of the DOE nuclear waste management program, there is significant uncertainty about when such a repository will be constructed in the United States. Until disposal occurs, it is essential to manage DOE SNF in a way that will facilitate its eventual disposal, and it is also important to improve understanding of processes related to packaging and storage of the SNF that could affect its future transportation and disposal. The NWTRB's review, which was a multi-year effort, was documented in a report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy and is summarized here. The NWTRB reviewed the quantities and characteristics of DOE SNF at each of the four sites. It also examined DOE packaging and storage activities and plans at each of the sites. The NWTRB highlighted three main issue areas in its review. First, the review identified issues related to managing the aging of DOE SNF and the facilities used to store the DOE SNF. Second, the review addressed issues related to packaging of stored non-naval DOE SNF into a standard canister. Third, the NWTRB assessed issues that could affect disposal of DOE SNF if DOE continues to evaluate a range of repository settings. Based on the information and findings developed as part of its review, the NWTRB made six recommendations to Congress and the Secretary of Energy related to aging management, packaging, and disposal of DOE SNF. DOE has begun to address some of the NWTRB recommendations. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

An Experimental Feasibility Study on Applying Neutron Tomography to Encapsulated Spent Nuclear Fuel - 20050

Visual inspection makes easier to ensure the integrity and safety of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) than any classical techniques. Various classical techniques have been applied but there are no reliable methods to qualitatively and quantitatively verify spent fuel in dry storage. Thus, the present authors have developed the prototype safeguards apparatus for dry storage employing the array of He-4 gas scintillation detectors (S670E, Arktis Radiation Detectors Ltd., Switzerland), newly designed to simultaneously measure thermal and fast neutrons without any moderators. The S670E detector has a cylindrical shape with a diameter of 52 mm and active length of 600 mm (total length: 875 mm). The detector is filled by He-4 gas with an approximate pressure of 180 bar for fast neutron detection, and its inner wall is coated by Li-6 for thermal neutron detection. The scintillation lights generated via Li-6 nuclear reaction and elastic scattering are collected by 24 SiPMs linearly paired at the center of the detector. The detector delivers a TTL (Transistor-Transistor Logic) output for pulse readout and UART (Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter) for device control. In order to assess feasibility of the apparatus, an experimental system has been designed, built, and optimized via computational studies. Cf-252 neutron sources and linearly arrayed detectors, working as a single detector, were occupied for this study due to the difficulties in working with SNF. The laboratory scale cask (diameter: 0.67 m, height: 1.5 m), minimized by a factor of 10 compared to the actual thickness of a commercial TN-32 cask, was also manufactured. The detector array was designed to rotate the lab-scale cask and obtain 36 image profiles at every 10 degrees. All profiles were aligned in single frame image called a sinogram, and the cross-sectional image was then fabricated by the inverse radon transform algorithm. These experiments have been repeated with different configurations and numbers of sources. Some gamma-ray sources were also measured with neutron sources in order to distinguish between neutron and gamma-ray pulses. Basically, a He-4 detector is designed to run on Linux OS so it is difficult to directly apply to Windows-based equipment widely used in S. Korea. Therefore, a new data acquisition board working on Windows OS was designed and built. The board mainly consists of FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) and SoC (System on Chip) for TTL pulse readout, sorting measured data, and transferring data to a user interface. In conclusion, the tomographic system at lab-scale has shown considerable potential to detect a partial or gross defect of encapsulated assemblies in dry storage. Next steps of this study will be to 1) repeatedly carry out experiments to demonstrate scientific reliability and validity, and 2) numerically integrate signals with weight factors to enhance the image quality since the suggested system based on passive interrogation method requires longer measurement time. Finally, the system will apply to a commercial dry storage phased out soon in S. Korea. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2015

Criticality safety analysis of spent fuel storage or handling disposals using burnup credit - loading curve calculation - 14445

MILLENNIUM and REEL SAS Companies have shared their own experience to develop a neutron and criticality calculations chain in order to perform isotopic composition predictions of spent fuel after irradiation in a reactor and criticality analysis of fuel storages taking into account burnup credit. The whole calculation sequence is divided into three steps, all calling SCALE 6.1.2 modules. The first two steps are dedicated to the evaluation of isotopic compositions of burnt fuel. As transport and depletion calculations in three dimensions appears to be way too long for the whole core (about several months), dealing with each fuel assembly one by one is the alternative solution MILLENNIUM and REEL SAS commonly chose to study. Therefore, the first step aims at determining the axial burnup profile of a given fuel assembly using a 3-D model with infinite reflections on lateral axes. The T6-depl sequence of TRITON module coupling KENO-VI and ORIGEN-S was used in this step. Sensitivity studies confirmed that addition of the 8 closest neighbors of the studied fuel assembly in the model has an insignificant impact on the axial burnup profile. However, fuel assemblies in the peripheral zone of the core must be treated separately with a model including the nearest fuel assemblies and the effect of peripheral water. Then, the second phase evaluates the isotopic compositions of each fuel assemblies at the center of the active height with a 2-D model under conservative core conditions. The T-depl sequence of the TRITON module coupling NEWT to ORIGEN-S is called in this step. Each fuel assembly must be studied separately to consider loading pattern changes occurring at each cycle. An infinite model with reflections on lateral axes is used and the closest neighbors of the fuel assembly are limited to 2 pins - which is around the size of the neutrons mean free path in the core. This is an innovative physical trick aiming at compensating for a limited computing power. Finally, isotopic compositions calculated are combined with the axial burnup profile of the first step to extrapolate the concentrations along the whole active length. Data can then be added in any criticality model, such as a spent fuel pit or any disposal handling fuel assemblies. Criticality analyses of burnt fissile material using burnup credit can be managed within a reasonable amount of time, on condition that sufficient proofs of code qualification for the studied range of parameters are provided, especially on fission products isotopic compositions calculation. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Criticality safety analysis of as-loaded spent nuclear Fuel Casks - 14589

The final safety analysis report (FSAR) or the safety analysis report (SAR) for a particular spent nuclear fuel (SNF) cask (both bare fuel and canister-based) system documents models and calculations used to demonstrate that a system meets the regulatory requirements under all normal, off-normal, and accident conditions of spent fuel storage, as well as the normal and accident conditions of transportation. FSAR/SAR calculations and approved content specifications are intended to be bounding in nature to certify cask systems for a variety of fuel characteristics with simplified SNF loading requirements. Therefore, in general, loaded cask systems possess excess and uncredited criticality margins (i.e., the difference between the licensing basis and the as-loaded calculations). This uncredited margin could be quantified by (1) employing more detailed cask-specific evaluations that credit the actual as-loaded cask inventory and (2) taking into account full (actinide and fission product) burnup credit. This uncredited criticality margin could be used to offset uncertainties in the safety basis to account for the effects of system aging during extended dry storage prior to transportation. Additionally, the uncredited criticality margin could also potentially be credited to offset increases in SNF system reactivity that may occur over a repository performance period (e.g., 10,000 years or more) as the system undergoes degradation and internal geometry changes. This paper summarizes an assessment of cask-specific as-loaded criticality margins for 215 loaded casks of SNF stored at eight reactor sites under fully flooded conditions to assess the margins available during transportation after extended storage. It is observed that the calculated k{sub eff} margin varies from 0.05 to almost 0.3 Δk{sub eff} for the eight selected reactor sites, demonstrating that significant uncredited safety margins are present. In addition, this paper evaluates the sufficiency of this excess margin in applications involving direct disposal of currently loaded SNF canisters (for canister-based systems) in a repository. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Analysis of the Human Biohazard of Long-Lived Fission Products and Actinides for BREST-OD-300 Spent Fuel

The aim of this work is to perform a comparative analysis of the biohazard for the population of long-lived fission products and actinides from BREST-OD-300 reactor spent fuel taking account of the time required for different radionuclides to reach Earth’s surface by migrating from a deep disposal site. It was found that the biohazard of fission products is significantly greater than that of actinides for a long time (20000 years according to the accepted scenario of radionuclide migration). The radiological impact on the population is predicted after {sup 99}Tc – radionuclide with high migration capability – reaches the soil surface. {sup 137}Cs and {sup 90}Sr will not appreciably affect the dose load because of their relatively short half-life. In order to maintain radio-ecological balance between long-lived wastes and native uranium during the entire possible time period, it is sufficient to extract from the BREST-OD-300 spent fuel 90% of the technetium and 75% of the americium with 99.9% of the fissile materials extracted.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Numerical Modeling of the Thermal State of a Metal–Concrete Container with Spent Nuclear Fuel During Its Transportation

In the work, the authors have presented the procedure and have given results of numerical modeling of the thermal state of a metal–concrete container with spent nuclear fuel during its transportation in a special car. Maximum temperatures of fuel-element sheaths have been determined for several versions of loading of the container with fuel including spent nuclear fuel, with short storage periods.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2017

SFCOMPO-2.0: An OECD NEA database of spent nuclear fuel isotopic assays, reactor design specifications, and operating data

SFCOMPO-2.0 is the new release of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) database of experimental assay measurements. These measurements are isotopic concentrations from destructive radiochemical analyses of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) samples. We supplement the measurements with design information for the fuel assembly and fuel rod from which each sample was taken, as well as with relevant information on operating conditions and characteristics of the host reactors. These data are necessary for modeling and simulation of the isotopic evolution of the fuel during irradiation. SFCOMPO-2.0 has been developed and is maintained by the OECD NEA under the guidance of the Expert Group on Assay Data of Spent Nuclear Fuel (EGADSNF), which is part of the NEA Working Party on Nuclear Criticality Safety (WPNCS). Significant efforts aimed at establishing a thorough, reliable, publicly available resource for code validation and safety applications have led to the capture and standardization of experimental data from 750 SNF samples from more than 40 reactors. These efforts have resulted in the creation of the SFCOMPO-2.0 database, which is publicly available from the NEA Data Bank. Our paper describes the new database, and applications of SFCOMPO-2.0 for computer code validation, integral nuclear data benchmarking, and uncertainty analysis in nuclear waste package analysis are briefly illustrated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Coupled chemical–CFD modeling of unsealed dry storage of advanced test reactor spent fuel

We report given the current lack of long-term disposal for spent nuclear fuel storage in the United States, the current inventory of advanced test reactor (ATR) fuel at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is expected to be stored in a dry storage facility for an extended storage period. As part of an effort to understand the conditions during a 50-year period, a three-dimensional computational fluid dynamics (CFD) of the unsealed canisters packed with spent fuel in the storage facility was constructed, this CFD model is coupled with radiolytic chemical reactions associated with water vapor and other species. The coupled model is simulated over a range of sensitivity parameters for the fuel decay heat, relative humidity, and oxyhydroxide film thickness for undried and fully-dried fuel. The most important parameter was the initial fuel decay heat. Over the range of cases, the hydrogen and nitric acid concentrations are low enough no significant impact is expected.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

An approach for spent nuclear fuel containment integrity verification using gas tagging

Verification of containment integrity is required for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) managed by the commercial nuclear industry and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), especially after extended storage. Certain SNF storage systems, such as the DOE road-ready dry storage system, hold several packaged containments within a welded over-canister. These packaged containments are called Department of Energy Standard Canisters (DOESCs). DOESC leakage identification is challenging because their containment boundary cannot be accessed for testing and their contents (i.e., SNF and fill gas) are often similar. There are concerns that this could result in costly characterization and repackaging operations of DOE road-ready dry storage systems if compromised DOESCs are suspected. Here, to address these concerns, this paper presents an approach for applying a gas tagging process using xenon to uniquely identify compromised inaccessible containments following extended storage. The containments considered for this application are seven DOESCs, each packaged within a single over-canister. Two different SNF loading configurations from the Advanced Test Reactor and Fort Saint Vrain nuclear power plant are considered. These configurations are used to represent research reactor aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) and TRi-structural ISOtropic (TRISO) SNF types. Results for this application show that for ASNF and TRISO type fuels for which the selected fuels are representative, the volume of taggant required at loading is determined primarily by the lower detection limit and leak rate of taggant from a compromised DOESC, rather than the amount of fission-generated xenon in the loaded fuel. While the application presented is suited for larger leaks, smaller leaks could be detected by modifying certain design parameters. This gas tagging approach can also be applied to other DOE containments and advanced reactor SNF storage systems.

07 - ISOTOPES AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Decay heat analysis for advanced reactor spent fuel transportation and storage applications

Accurate characterization of nuclide inventories and decay heat in spent nuclear fuel is critical for ensuring its safe handling, storage, transportation, and disposal. Although extensive research has been conducted on light-water reactor fuel, advanced reactors present unique challenges due to their diverse core configurations, fuel characteristics, neutron energy spectra, and burnup levels. Building upon previous efforts that developed representative reactor core models for various advanced reactor types and fuels, this study evaluates reactor-specific decay heat characteristics. The results highlight significant variations across advanced reactor types as well as across reactor designs within the same reactor type, and they provide comparison to typical commercial light-water reactor fuel. For example, thermal-spectrum reactor fuels were observed to have an approximately 100-fold decrease in decay heat over the first decade of cooling, whereas the reduction was 10-fold for fast-spectrum reactor fuels. Mass-specific decay heat at discharge can differ by three orders of magnitude among the fast and thermal reactor systems considered. Overall, for the analyzed advanced reactor fuel, fewer than 17 nuclides account for over 99% of total decay heat at 0.5 years, and that number drops to fewer than 7 nuclides at 100 years of cooling. By quantifying reactor-specific decay heat trends and nuclide contributions, this work provides a technical basis to support the development of spent fuel management strategies for advanced reactor fuels as well as safety evaluations for storage, transportation, and long-term waste disposal.

Advanced reactors↗