Dynamic Modeling Requirements for Complex Threats to Climate Security
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Evans, Jenni Lee↗
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Systems Engineering ? Is Security a Feature or a System Requirement?.
Abstract Not Provided
Duggan, Ruth A↗
System Engineering - Is Security a Features or a System Requirement?.
Abstract Not Provided
Snell, Mark K↗
Systems Engineering - Is Security a Feature or a System Requirement?.
Abstract not provided.
Snell, Mark Kamerer↗
Operationally-Relevant Cyber Situational Awareness Tool Development.
Research was undertaken to gain an understanding of the interplay between cyber security professionals and the software tools utilized in performing their jobs. Substantial investments are devoted to purchasing and developing software tools targeting cyber security operations. However, development is largely based on anecdotal knowledge concerning the work processes, cognitive demands, and the needs and requirements of cyber security analysts. The current study first characterized the workflow of a Cyber Security Incidence Response (CSIRT) team, including their use of software tools, and instantiated this workflow within a simulation model. Next, data was collected during cyber security training exercises reflecting the use of software tools. It was discovered that while cyber security professionals rely heavily on specialized software tools, their jobs require that they effectively integrate the use of specialized software tools with the use of general- purpose software tools.
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
Managing Cyber Risk: from the Ground to the Air and Beyond Out There
Experts from the aerospace sector with the focus of presenting current state-of-the-art in aviation cyber security and discussing major challenges, requirements, and developments. A variety of topics will be addressed by the panel, including: Aviation cyber security regulations, standards, and best practices Aviation information sharing and analysis challenges Aircraft systems and avionics cyber security challenges Airline and airport stakeholder cyber perspectives CNSATM cyber security challenges UAS cyber security and privacy requirements Military aviation cyber security issues in the NAS
Davis, Jerry L.↗
Safety and security of radioactive sources in industrial radiography in Bangladesh
Malicious use of radioactive sources can involve dispersal of that material through an explosive device. There has been recognition of the threat posed by the potential malicious misuse of NDT radioactive source by terrorists. The dispersal of radioactive material using conventional explosives, referred to as a 'dirty bomb', could create considerable panic, disruption and area access denial in an urban environment. However, as it is still a relatively new topic among regulators, users, and transport and storage operators worldwide, international assistance and cooperation in developing the necessary regulatory and security infrastructure is required. The most important action in reducing the risk of radiological terrorism is to increase the security of radioactive sources. This paper presents safety and security considerations for the transport and site storage of the industrial radiography sources as per national regulations entitled 'Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control Rules-1997'.The main emphasis was put on the stages of some safety and security actions in order to prevent theft, sabotage or other malicious acts during the transport of the packages. As a conclusion it must be mentioned that both safety and security considerations are very important aspects that must be taking in account for the transport and site storage of radioactive sources used in the practice of industrial radiography. (authors)
07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
Comprehensive Security Briefing for New Clearance Holders [Slides]
Clearance holders are required to complete annual security training.
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
Future DCS objectives in communication network timing and synchronization
The Defense Communication System will be moving rapidly toward providing switched digital service to it's users within the next ten years. The principal driving force in the transition to a digital system is the requirement for high performance secure voice service. Additionally, the anticipated data requirements in this time frame can be handled most effectively by a digital network. The characteristics of a switched digital network which impose timing and synchronization requirements on the system design are presented. Several alternative approaches to implementing a timing subsystem suitable for a switched digital communications system have been considered. These include pulse stuffing, independent stable clocks, and clock correction techniques. The advantages and disadvantages of each approach are discussed relative to both the strategic and tactical communication system requirements.
Mensch, J. R.↗
Smart Barrier Design and Evaluation (ReKonTM: An Integrated Detection and Assessment Perimeter System)
Many government and military sites continue to demand high performance security technologies such as those afforded by a traditional perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system (PIDAS), but require additional standoff beyond the existing perimeter. To meet such varied needs, a perimeter security system needs to be configurable to meet the demands unique to each site, adaptable to the latest sensor technology and security requirements, and scalable to provide for installation at short temporary perimeters just as well as large multi-mile perimeters. ReKonTM is an integrated perimeter security system solution, one that couples access delay with detection and assessment. A prototype system was designed and built that integrated fiber optic break sensors, active infrared sensors, fence disturbance sensors, video motion detection, ground sensors, and vehicle/human delay barriers. ReKonTM uses a machine learning fusion technique to determine whether an alarm event has occurred as opposed to the conventional system which simply triggers an alarm event when any one sensor is activated. This novel perimeter solution was designed to be configurable for use at facilities ranging from high-security military sites to commercial power plants, to petro/chemical facilities of various kinds. ReKonTM was evaluated against a conventional system and logical inference fusion system with a fixed dataset that was collected over five months from the perimeter. ReKon outperformed both systems with respect to nuisance alarm rate and had only one less alarm detection than the conventional system out of a total of 133 total true alarm events. The sensors on the ReKonTM perimeter generated approximately 8.86 nuisance alarms per day using the conventional system. Using the machine learning fusion these were greatly reduced to approximately 0.02 alarms per day. ReKonTM may enable the use of high performance perimeter security for reduced cost in environments previously incapable of achieving such performance due to budget or installation constraints.
47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
Summary of a joint US-Japan study of potential approaches to reduce the attractiveness of various nuclear materials for use in a nuclear explosive device by a terrorist group
This paper summarizes the results of a joint US-Japan study to establish a mutual understanding, through scientific-based study, of potential approaches to reduce the attractiveness of various nuclear materials for use in a terrorist nuclear explosive device (NED). 4 approaches that can reduce materials attractiveness with a very high degree of effectiveness are: -) diluting HEU with natural or depleted U to an enrichment of less than 10% U-235; -) storing Pu in nuclear fuel that is not man portable and with a dose rate greater or equal to 10 Gy/h at 1 m; -) storing Pu or HEU in heavy items, i.e. not transportable, provided the removal of the Pu or HEU from the item requires a purification/processing capability; and -) converting Pu and HEU to very dilute forms (such as wastes) that, without any security barriers, would require very long acquisition times to acquire a Category I quantity of Pu or of HEU. 2 approaches that can reduce materials attractiveness with a high degree of effectiveness are: -) converting HEU-fueled research reactors into LEU-fueled research reactors or dilute HEU with natural or depleted U to an enrichment of less than 20% U-235; -) converting U/Al reactor fuel into U/Si reactor fuel. Other approaches have been assessed as moderately or totally inefficient to reduce the attractiveness of nuclear materials.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Integrating science for water security governance
Hydrological extremes are intensifying globally, increasing the complexity of decisions required to ensure water security. Advances in hydrological science, modeling, and data systems have expanded the technical frontier of water research, yet uptake of scientific insights in policy and management decisions remains limited. This persistent science–policy gap is not primarily a failure of knowledge generation or robustness, but an institutional challenge shaped by how scientific and governance systems are organized, coordinated, and connected to support the effective use of scientific knowledge. These challenges are particularly pronounced in multi-level and transboundary water governance, where decisions span jurisdictions and require coordination across institutional and political boundaries. We synthesize research at the science–policy interface and evidence from water security initiatives to show how institutional arrangements, scientific tool development, and research practices enable or constrain the sustained use of scientific knowledge in water-security governance processes. Building on these insights, we develop ‘shared decision infrastructure’ as a framing to describe how scientific knowledge is embedded within the institutional, relational, and procedural arrangements that connect science to decision-making processes over time. We translate this framing into a practical intervention roadmap centered on institutional design, tool translation, sustained co-production, and outcome-oriented evaluation to support the integration of science into ongoing governance processes. By positioning science as shared decision infrastructure, the roadmap clarifies how researchers can design scientific efforts that support more coordinated, accountable, and adaptive water security decisions amid deepening uncertainty.
M whitney, Kristen [NASA Goddard Space Flight Cent↗
Security Self-Assessment Toolkit for Nuclear Materials Facilities: Focus on Insider Threat Mitigation
Theft or sabotage of weapons-usable nuclear materials is a global concern. To minimize this threat, establishing and maintaining an effective nuclear security regime is required to protect against criminal or other negligent acts. Use of a formalized insider threat mitigation program is one such security measure. Individuals who have or held authorized access to an organization's critical assets, such as nuclear materials, are considered "insiders." Insider threats, or insider adversaries, are motivated individuals who possess access, authority, and knowledge to conduct a malicious act or facilitate that of an external party. To thwart insider threats (both intentional and unintentional), organizations can formalize an enterprise-wide approach to identify and mitigate the unique risks presented by insiders. This report provides an approach to evaluate an insider threat mitigation program at facilities with nuclear materials. Formal program evaluations serve many purposes and can be designed using several different methods and techniques. This report presents a self-assessment approach to program evaluation whereby an organization can assess its strengths, identify key gaps, and set priorities for ongoing improvement efforts to mitigate insider threats. Results of the self-assessment can provide critical information to contribute to the continuous improvement of an organization’s insider threat mitigation program within eight specific domain areas.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Assessment on security system of radioactive sources used in hospitals of Thailand
Unsecured radioactive sources have caused deaths and serious injuries in many parts of the world. In Thailand, there are 17 hospitals that use teletherapy with cobalt-60 radioactive sources. They need to be secured in order to prevent unauthorized removal, sabotage and terrorists from using such materials in a radiological weapon. The security system of radioactive sources in Thailand is regulated by the Office of Atoms for Peace in compliance with Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), U.S. DOE, which has started to be implemented since 2010. This study aims to perform an assessment on the security system of radioactive sources used in hospitals in Thailand and the results can be used as a recommended baseline data for development or improvement of hospitals on the security system of a radioactive source at a national regulatory level and policy level. Results from questionnaires reveal that in 11 out of 17 hospitals (64.70%), there were a few differences in conditions of hospitals using radioactive sources with installation of the security system and those without installation of the security system. Also, personals working with radioactive sources did not clearly understand the nuclear security law. Thus, government organizations should be encouraged to arrange trainings on nuclear security to increase the level of understanding. In the future, it is recommended that the responsible government organization issues a minimum requirement of nuclear security for every medical facility using radioactive sources.
07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
Potential Disposition Options for a Salt Fueled Molten Salt Reactor At the INL (A White Paper)
The molten salt reactor (MSR) design concept has been the focus of significant research and development efforts, both in the U.S. and around the world. There are generally two types of MSRs, salt fueled MSRs that have the fuel dissolved within the salt and solid fueled MSRs that only use the molten salt as a coolant. The range of conceptual designs and the flexibility of operations of MSRs results in a wide range of potential waste streams from salt fueled MSRs; all of which require safe and secure storage and eventual disposition. This white paper will 1) survey the range of salt fueled MSR designs, 2) recognize the implications of design, on the resulting waste streams, and 3) identify the definitions and regulations that apply to the safe and secure management, storage, and disposal of these streams. Research in MSR waste streams is young and the focus of intense research that requires more funding and time to become mature enough to fully support design decisions. Once a specific design is selected, a more detailed management and disposition effort must be performed.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
SPAN security policies and guidelines
A guide is provided to system security with emphasis on requirements and guidelines that are necessary to maintain an acceptable level of security on the network. To have security for the network, each node on the network must be secure. Therefore, each system manager, must strictly adhere to the requirements and must consider implementing the guidelines discussed. There are areas of vulnerability within the operating system that may not be addressed. However, when a requirement or guideline is discussed, implementation techniques are included. Information related to computer and data security is discussed to provide information on implementation options. The information is presented as it relates to a VAX computer environment.
Sisson, Patricia L.↗
Decommissioning, Decontamination, and Disposal of LLW-LL, and ILW-LL at a Former Rare Earths Processing Facility in Malaysia - 19087
Geosyntec Consultants, Inc. (Geosyntec) was the design-build Contractor for a project involving the remediation and disposal of low level (LLW-LL and ILW-LL) NORM and TENORM wastes at a former rare earth processing facility in Malaysia. These sites were associated with a plant that extracted rare earth elements from local tin ores. Because of the naturally occurring radioactivity contained in the raw materials, these productions resulted in by-products and residues containing LLW-LL and ILW-LL thorium hydroxide and uranium hydroxide. The total mass of uranium (∼120 tons) and thorium (∼1,200 tons) managed in a single repository required the project design incorporate requirements related to inventory, security and safeguards around nuclear precursor materials. The requirement to consider a performance over a period of more than 10,000 years led to significant challenges in design and modeling of the disposal facility as this disposal facility was purposely designed and permitted as a final disposal for the LLW-LL and ILW-LL. The first phase of the project was the decommissioning, decontamination, and demolition of the 14- acre former rare earth processing plant and excavation of contaminated soils, construction of an engineered cell at the repository for waste disposal, and transportation and disposal of the waste materials into the cell. Final status surveys were carried out to allow the site to be successfully released by the Malaysian regulatory authorities as a clean site for re-development as common industrial use. Over 11,000 loads of material, including approximately 75,000 cubic meters of excavated soils and plant debris, were transported in specially designed steel transport boxes on public roads for disposal in the engineered cell. The second phase of the project included the design and construction of a second engineered cell, enhanced with protective barrier systems and a final cover system constructed of natural materials. Ancillary facilities such as substations, offices, processing buildings, and wastewater treatment plants were constructed to support retrieval and processing of the materials from more than 87,000 individual drums using a semi-automated process. The drums, waste packages, and other materials in the storage facility were systematically extracted, sorted, inventoried, solidified using Portland cement, transported, and disposed in the cell. All temporary facilities were decontaminated, demolished, and disposed in the cell. Radiological inventory and radiation safety programs were implemented to quantify the waste activity and to control exposure to workers and the public during the project. The total mass of radioactive contaminated waste disposed in the two projects is nearly 200,000 tons. The projects were carried out under a high level of scrutiny from Malaysian and international regulatory bodies. Between 2014 and 2017, performance monitoring and modeling activities were carried out to demonstrate that the disposal facility was performing in accordance with design requirements established by regulatory agencies. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors
What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.
Kovacic, Donald N↗