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At least 253 records · Page 14

Development of a Methodology to Assess the Impact of Non-Conventional Waste Streams Following a Radiological Incident - 18271

The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Waste Estimation Support Tool (WEST) is a Geographic Information System (GIS)-based decision support tool for estimating waste generated from remediation and cleanup activities following a radiological incident. WEST uses the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Hazus-MH software's infrastructure information combined with image classification capabilities to estimate the quantity of waste and debris that may result from a radiological incident. WEST can be used to create customized decontamination strategies that allow end-users to evaluate different means of decontamination and how those strategies may impact the resulting waste stream in each geographical locality. This capability can potentially reduce the response/recovery time frame and cost. One of the key observations from past applications of WEST is that planning scenarios are site-specific, especially when dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) waste management issues. Furthermore, site-specific issues are not limited to resource limitations or response bottlenecks but should also account for differences in an area's geography and urban footprint, a phenomenon observed during the Fukushima response. For instance, a recent WEST case study found that the amount of waste generated per unit of affected area, for a given decontamination approach, is largely a function of the building surface area in the affected area (relative to the ground surfaces). However, differences in the geometry and density of contaminated objects in the landscape may impact the amount and characteristics of the waste stream. Although buildings typically constitute a large portion of the surface area in urban environments, other objects such as vehicles and trees can be just as prominent. For example, seasonal changes in the amount of foliage present can alter the non-structural surface area calculated for an area like New York City by 20-30%. Very little is known about the impact that these non-conventional waste streams have on overall remediation strategies, or to what extent differences in characteristics of urban versus rural environments, traffic activities, or seasonal variations may have on these factors. This paper will present the proposed methodology to incorporate into WEST the impacts that niche, nonconventional waste streams might have from rural and urban environments following a nuclear power plant incident or detonation of a radiological dispersal device or improvised nuclear device. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Probabilistic risk evaluation of cyber-attacks on a nuclear power plant safety - 205.5

By adopting digital technology in nuclear power plants (NPPs), the cyber-attack has been introduced as one of the newest dangerous threats. It is required to develop efficient defense strategies against possible cyber-attacks on NPPs. However, it is difficult to expect when, where, and how the cyber-attacks will occur because they are intended attacks. Therefore, the risk of cyber-attacks on NPP is getting more and more important. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), which is one of the most widely used methods in NPPs to assess the risk, is introduced. However, it is difficult to evaluate the risk of NPPs by cyber-attacks from only the existing PRA method. In this research, a new PSA method, which is based on existing PRA, is used for evaluating of cyber-attacks on NPP. In addition, the case studies were performed for the feasibility study using nuclear power plant PRA model. Through this study, the risk assessment of the cyber-attacks on the NPP is tried by using a previous PRA model. Also, several scenarios are assumed to proceed the risk assessment. The risk-assessment should be performed in future work containing more specific cyber-attack scenarios, and if possible, the risk assessment model should be developed. Finally, the risk of cyber-attacks on NPPs could be evaluated quantitatively. Also, the defense strategies could be deducted by a risk assessment based on the risk assessment results which is based on the proposed method. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Nuclear power plant risk-informed surveillance frequency control program implementation at the Duke Catawba nuclear plant with a focus on instrumentation and control systems - 333

This paper summarizes an updated process for risk-informed surveillance frequency control program (SFCP) implementation at the Catawba Nuclear Power Plant in the past year. This program includes selection and prioritization of specific target surveillance test interval extensions; and development, review, and implementation of surveillance test risk informed documented evaluation (STRIDE) packages designed to support extension of conventional surveillance requirement test intervals, in accordance with 'Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 5b, Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies, Industry Guideline,' NEI 04-10, Revision 1 . The scope of work associated with STRIDE development includes probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) case studies, deterministic assessment (DA) evaluations, and, where required, instrument drift evaluation (IDE). The STRIDE implementation efforts have also included support of independent decision-making panel (IDP) meetings at the implementing power stations and IDP member training. The purpose of this paper is to provide a presentation of a refined process for STRIDE development with a focus on instrumentation and control systems based on author experience, which includes support for the development of multiple STRIDE packages for the Catawba Nuclear Plant. This paper outlines a framework for practical implementation of an SFCP within the context of an integrated risk-informed performance-based regulation application program with emphasis on instrumentation and control systems. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

A Risk Assessment Framework for Cyber-Physical Security in Distribution Grids with Grid-Edge DERs

Integration of inverter-based distributed energy resources (DERs) is reshaping the landscape of distribution grids to fulfill the socioeconomic, environmental, and sustainability goals. Addressing the technological challenges of DER grid integration requires an adaptive communication layer for efficient DER management and control. This transition has given rise to a cyberphysical system (CPS) architecture within the distribution system, causing new vulnerabilities for cyberphysical attacks. To better address potential threats, this paper presents a comprehensive risk assessment framework for cyberphysical security in distribution grids with grid-edge DERs. The framework incorporates a detailed CPS model accounting for dynamic DER characteristics within the distribution grid. It identifies vulnerabilities in DER communication systems, models attack scenarios, and addresses communication latency crucial for inverter control timescales. Subsequently, the quantification of attack impacts employs an attack probability model including both the vulnerability and criticality of cyber components. The proposed risk assessment framework was validated through testing on the modified IEEE 13-node and 123-node test feeders.

cyberattack↗

A methodology to quantify the release of spent nuclear fuel from dry casks during security-related scenarios

Assessing the risk to the public and the environment from a release of radioactive material produced by accidental or purposeful forces/environments is an important aspect of the regulatory process in many facets of the nuclear industry. In particular, the transport and storage of radioactive materials is of particular concern to the public, especially with regard to potential sabotage acts that might be undertaken by terror groups to cause injuries, panic, and/or economic consequences to a nation. For many such postulated attacks, no breach in the robust cask or storage module containment is expected to occur. However, there exists evidence that some hypothetical attack modes can penetrate and cause a release of radioactive material. This report is intended as an unclassified overview of the methodology for release estimation as well as a guide to useful resource data from unclassified sources and relevant analysis methods for the estimation process.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Supply Chain Binary Program Assessment Annual Report

Secure environments face a steadily increasing threat from the introduction of scientific equipment that includes extensive software components. Devices such as powerful microscopes, 3d printers, programmable logic controllers, and many others, increase our capability and scientific output. Unfortunately, they now frequently include an entire computing stack with custom software bundled along with entire operating systems. Our ability to introspect and understand binary software is extremely limited, opening up the possibility of malicious third-parties including software that compromises our critical missions.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Validating a Dynamic PWR Safety and Security Model?

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are assessed for safety and security using separate models that cannot capture how an attacker's decisions and a plant's response unfold together in real time, leaving regulators and operators without a complete picture of true plant vulnerability. Traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods treat adversarial events as fixed initiators with predetermined outcomes, and are structurally incapable of representing the time-dependent interplay between physical security events, safety system response, and operator mitigative actions. At Idaho National Laboratory (INL), I contributed to the development and validation of Modeling and Analysis for Safety and Security using the Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). Where static PRA relies on event-tree logic that cannot evolve mid-scenario, MASS-DEF couples a time-dependent dynamic PRA tool EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams) with attack simulation software, allowing attacker behavior, plant system states, and operator actions to interact across time. My work focused on validating a general Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) model. I traced model logic against PWR plant to identified errors in logic and confirm accuracy. I then built and tested attack scenarios against a general PWR model to verify that the model produced expected outcomes across all logical pathways. I also contributed a section to a related technical paper applying the same EMRALD platform to radiation dose modeling. Results show that MASS-DEF can quantitatively demonstrate that many plants exceed their regulatory security thresholds. This demonstrated margin provides a technically defensible basis for reducing the number of guards without compromising regulatory compliance. Physical security costs represent roughly 10% of annual operating budgets, making such reductions directly meaningful to INL's mission of sustaining existing commercial NPPs. This internship strengthened my understanding of nuclear systems, probabilistic modeling, and technical writing, and has solidified my pursuit of a career at a national laboratory.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

The Arctic as a test case for an assessment of climate impacts on national security.

The Arctic region is rapidly changing in a way that will affect the rest of the world. Parts of Alaska, western Canada, and Siberia are currently warming at twice the global rate. This warming trend is accelerating permafrost deterioration, coastal erosion, snow and ice loss, and other changes that are a direct consequence of climate change. Climatologists have long understood that changes in the Arctic would be faster and more intense than elsewhere on the planet, but the degree and speed of the changes were underestimated compared to recent observations. Policy makers have not yet had time to examine the latest evidence or appreciate the nature of the consequences. Thus, the abruptness and severity of an unfolding Arctic climate crisis has not been incorporated into long-range planning. The purpose of this report is to briefly review the physical basis for global climate change and Arctic amplification, summarize the ongoing observations, discuss the potential consequences, explain the need for an objective risk assessment, develop scenarios for future change, review existing modeling capabilities and the need for better regional models, and finally to make recommendations for Sandia's future role in preparing our leaders to deal with impacts of Arctic climate change on national security. Accurate and credible regional-scale climate models are still several years in the future, and those models are essential for estimating climate impacts around the globe. This study demonstrates how a scenario-based method may be used to give insights into climate impacts on a regional scale and possible mitigation. Because of our experience in the Arctic and widespread recognition of the Arctic's importance in the Earth climate system we chose the Arctic as a test case for an assessment of climate impacts on national security. Sandia can make a swift and significant contribution by applying modeling and simulation tools with internal collaborations as well as with outside organizations. Because changes in the Arctic environment are happening so rapidly, a successful program will be one that can adapt very quickly to new information as it becomes available, and can provide decision makers with projections on the 1-5 year time scale over which the most disruptive, high-consequence changes are likely to occur. The greatest short-term impact would be to initiate exploratory simulations to discover new emergent and robust phenomena associated with one or more of the following changing systems: Arctic hydrological cycle, sea ice extent, ocean and atmospheric circulation, permafrost deterioration, carbon mobilization, Greenland ice sheet stability, and coastal erosion. Sandia can also contribute to new technology solutions for improved observations in the Arctic, which is currently a data-sparse region. Sensitivity analyses have the potential to identify thresholds which would enable the collaborative development of 'early warning' sensor systems to seek predicted phenomena that might be precursory to major, high-consequence changes. Much of this work will require improved regional climate models and advanced computing capabilities. Socio-economic modeling tools can help define human and national security consequences. Formal uncertainty quantification must be an integral part of any results that emerge from this work.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Water Management Planning

Lessons learned from the Y-12 National Security Complex Water Assessment

Lessons learned from the Y-12 National Security Co↗

Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment and game theory for cyber security risk analysis in nuclear power plants

Nuclear Power Plants and energy systems have become more prone to cyber-attacks with their digitalization and the increased use of smart equipment. Hence, it is important to quantify the risk associated with cyber-attacks in such systems. Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment which involves studying the evolution of a system due to random events and operator and attacker actions during a cyber-attack by employing a physics-based model of the system is a suitable framework to quantify cybersecurity risk in nuclear power plants. In addition to the plant dynamics, it is also important to model the strategies of the attackers and plant operators for an effective cybersecurity risk assessment. Game theory provides a set of necessary tools to model such strategic interactions. In this research, a framework that integrates dynamic probabilistic risk assessment with game theory for cybersecurity risk analysis in nuclear power plants is presented. The mathematical formulation is derived based on the theory of continuous event trees. We propose a game theory based action model, that utilizes physics-based rewards to define the strategies of attackers and operators at every decision epoch. As a case study, the risk associated with cyber-attacks on the digital components in the secondary side of a pressurized water reactor is studied using a reduced order model. A set of attacker actions and a set of operator actions are defined for the system. The operator and attacker interactions were modelled using simultaneous game, their action policies were computed using the concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and the evolution of the system was studied.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

New initiatives in materials security

NRC Mission: To license and regulate the Nation's civilian use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, promote the common defense and security, and protect the environment. Scope of Responsibility: NRC's regulatory mission covers three main areas: - Reactors: commercial reactors for generating electric power and non-power reactors used for research, testing, and training; - Materials: uses of nuclear materials in medical, industrial, and academic settings and facilities that produce nuclear fuel; - Waste: transportation, storage, and disposal of nuclear materials and waste, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities from service. A Changing Environment: - National security is dominant concern; - Obtain appropriate balance between safety and Security initiatives and Operational activities; - Multiple layers of systems, infrastructures for various licensees. Effective Communication: Not easy; Sound bites galore; Nuclear 'phobia'; Acceptability of risk; Balance of cost and benefits; Responsibility of the regulator, licensees and radiation protection professionals. Prioritized Licensee Groups: - High priority: Panoramic irradiators; manufacturers/distributors; - Medium priority: medical and research facilities, radiography, well-logging, broad-scope licenses, self-shielded irradiators, open-field irradiators, and other licensees; - Low priority: Portable gauges. Increased Security Measures: Security Zone; Control Access; Monitor, Detect, Assess, and Respond; Transportation Security; Additional control to secure portable and mobile devices; Liaison with Local Law Enforcement Agencies; Background Investigations and Fingerprinting; License Verification; Document Retention; Information Protection; Orders/Legally binding requirements to more than 3000 licensees. Orders Issued: Large Panoramic Irradiators Security Measures (60 Orders issued 6/03, Inspections done); Manufacturing and Distribution Licensees Security Measures (61 Orders issued 1/04, Inspections done); Transportation of Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern (167 Orders Issued 07/05, Inspections done); Orders for Increased Control Measures for other types of sources by categories of licenses (1,098 NRC Orders and 1782 binding State requirements issued by 12/05, Implemented 06/06, Inspections done by NRC and States). Security Inspection Results: All first year Increased Control inspections completed; NRC Information Notice (IN) 2007-16 issued May 2007; Since IN 2007-16 was issued, {approx}50% of the NRC inspections performed resulted in violations; Licensees misinterpreted or incompletely implemented requirements; Common theme: failure to properly document actions or programs when implementing the Increased Controls. Energy Policy Act of 2005: Established Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force: cooperative effort with 14 Federal agencies, 2 State organizations; Comprehensive analysis of the security of radiation sources in the U.S.; Directed NRC to contract with National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study on radiation source use and replacement; Report to the President and Congress issued 8/06 and every 4 years thereafter. Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force: Need higher priority on international transport security; Evaluate feasibility of using new and existing technologies to detect and discourage theft during transport; Conduct a feasibility study on the possible phase out of CsCl in highly dispersible forms; Further evaluate potential alternative technologies; Expedite completion of fingerprint requirements in Act. National Source Tracking System: Joint NRC/DOE 2003 report on Radiological Dispersal Devices recommended development of a national source tracking system; IAEA Code of Conduct recommended establishment of a national registry; U.S. Energy Policy Act of 2005 placed requirements for NRC to issue regulations establishing a mandatory tracking system. New Fingerprinting Requirements: Orders were issued to NRC Increased Control licensees on Dec 5, 2007; Licensees have 60 days to notify the NRC if they are unable to comply or if compliance is unnecessary; Licensees have 90 days to fingerprint and approve a Trustworthiness and Reliability Official; Licensees will have 180 days to implement program; 34 Agreement Stated Increased Control Licensees will receive similar requirements within 180 days. 2007 GAO Investigation: Formed Bogus Company and Obtained NRC License; Altered NRC License; Two Suppliers Agreed to Sell Material; Parallel Attempt to Obtain Agreement State; License Aborted When Notified of Site Visit. Short-Term Actions Taken: Terminated the NRC License; Stopped issuance of new NRC licenses until Interim Guidance was issued; Mandatory pre-Licensing visits or meetings for new applicants; Performed consequence assessment; Coordinated with Federal and State Partners; Retrospective exam ensure licensees are legitimate. Action Plan: Independent, 120-day external review Issued 2/11/08 for comment; National Source Tracking System - Jan 2009; Web-Based Licensing; General Licenses and Outreach; Pre-Licensing and Materials Working Groups; Agreement State Partnership; Comprehensive Internal Assessment. Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS 2008-02): Issued February 1, 2008; Latest developments in materials security; Highlights Energy Policy Act 2005, GAO report and National Academy pending Feb 2008 report; New efforts with DHS, DOE/NNSA and manufacturers on additional security enhancements for Cs-137 irradiators; Low-cost, easily implemented physical security improvements. Enhanced State, Federal and International Partnerships: Federal, State and local interface; DHS' Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 'Securing the Cities' Initiative; DHS Protective Action Guides for RDDs and INDs; DOE/NNSA's Securing the Sources Initiative; International nuclear security outreach activities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

How to Reinvigorate US Commercial Nuclear Energy

United States policy and approach that underpinned the growth of global commercial nuclear trade and the development of a robust global commercial nuclear energy industry, while effectively addressing the threat of non-peaceful uses of commercial technologies, are in desperate need of modernization. Decades-old policies, incrementally evolved and implemented over the years, no longer provide the necessary bases for effective U.S. industrial engagement in global markets of increasingly complex strategic importance to U.S. national security interests and commerce. This year marks the sixtieth anniversary of commercial nuclear energy, and the sixty-fourth year since the introduction of the ground-breaking Atoms for Peace program. Much has changed in over half a century; and U.S. leadership and influence in nuclear energy is now at a tipping point, with substantial new national security implications at stake. It is time to re-assess the national security equation for U.S. involvement in global nuclear trade, re-value our engagement based on a modern calculation of national security benefit from such engagement, and modernize our trade and related policies accordingly. In this paper, we review the relevant historical context, provide a modern national security structure and rationale from which to view U.S. leadership in commercial nuclear energy, and suggest actions that might be taken to enhance U.S. interests.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

The AgMIP Coordinated Global and Regional Assessments (CGRA) of Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture and Food Security

The Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project (AgMIP) has been working since 2010 to construct a protocol-based framework enabling regional assessments (led by regional experts and modelers) that can provide consistent inputs to global economic and integrated assessment models. These global models can then relay important global-level information that drive regional decision-making and outcomes throughout an interconnected agricultural system. AgMIPs community of nearly 800 climate, crop, livestock, economics, and IT experts has improved the state-of-the-art through model intercomparisons, validation exercises, regional integrated assessments, and the launch of AgMIP programs on all six arable continents. AgMIP is now launching Coordinated Global and Regional Assessments (CGRA) of climate change impacts on agriculture and food security to link global and regional crop and economic models using a protocol-based framework. The CGRA protocols are being developed to utilize historical observations, climate projections, and RCPsSSPs from CMIP5 (and potentially CMIP6), and will examine stakeholder-driven agricultural development and adaptation scenarios to provide cutting-edge assessments of climate changes impact on agriculture and food security. These protocols will build on the foundation of established protocols from AgMIPs 30+ activities, and will emphasize the use of multiple models, scenarios, and scales to enable an accurate assessment of related uncertainties. The CGRA is also designed to provide the outputs necessary to feed into integrated assessment models (IAMs), nutrition and food security assessments, nitrogen and carbon cycle models, and additional impact-sector assessments (e.g., water resources, land-use, biomes, urban areas). This presentation will describe the current status of CGRA planning and initial prototype experiments to demonstrate key aspects of the protocols before wider implementation ahead of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report.

models↗

Situated Usability Testing for Security Systems

While usability testing is well established, assessing the usability of security software, tools, or methods deserves more careful consideration. It has been argued that dealing with security has become too difficult for individuals or organizations to manage effectively or to use conveniently. As difficult as it is for system administrators and developers to deal with, security is even more challenging for casual users. Indeed, it is much too easy for casual/home users to configure the security of their systems in non-optimal ways that leave their systems inadvertently insecure. This is exacerbated by the fact that casual users are focused on matters other than security, and likely would prefer not even to think about security. This brief report argues that when security and/or privacy are part of the equation, traditional methods for usability testing should be re-considered. The purpose of this brief report is to argue for and outline a method associated with a new approach to usability testing for examining usable security issues.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Assessing the dimensionality of food-security measures

Here, we explore the dimensionality of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s household food security survey module among households with children. Using a novel methodological approach to measuring food security, we find that there is multidimensionality in the module for households with children that is associated with the overall household, adult, and child dimensions of food security. Additional analyses suggest official estimates of food security among households with children are robust to this multidimensionality. However, we also find that accounting for the multidimensionality of food security among these households provides new insights into the correlates of food security at the household, adult, and child levels of measurement.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗