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Romania: Brand-New Engineering Solutions

The HEU spent nuclear fuel transport from Romania was a pilot project in the framework of the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR), being the first fully certified spent nuclear fuel shipment by air. The successful implementation of the Romanian shipment also brought various new technology in the program, further used by other participating countries. Until 2009, the RRRFR program repatriated to the Russian Federation HEU spent nuclear fuel of Russian origin from many countries, like Uzbekistan, Czech Republic, Latvia, Hungary, Kazakhstan and Bulgaria. The means of transport used were various; from specialized TK-5 train for the carriage of Russian TUK-19 transport casks, to platform trains for 20 ft freight ISO containers carrying Czech Skoda VPVR/M casks; from river barge on the Danube, to vessel on the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean. Initially, in 2005, the transport plan of the HEU spent nuclear fuel from the National Institute for R&D in Nuclear Physics and Nuclear Engineering 'Horia Hulubei' in Magurele, Romania considered a similar scheme, using the specialized TK-5 train transiting Ukraine to the destination point in the Russian Federation, or, as an alternative, using the means and route of the spent nuclear fuel periodically shipped from the Bulgarian nuclear power plant Kosloduy (by barge on the Danube, and by train through Ukraine to the Russian Federation). Due to impossibility to reach an agreement in due time with the transit country, in February 2007 the US, Russian and Romanian project partners decided to adopt the air shipment of the spent nuclear fuel as prime option, eliminating the need for agreements with any transit countries. By this time the spent nuclear fuel inspections were completed, proving the compliance of the burn-up parameters with the international requirements for air shipments of radioactive materials. The short air route avoiding overflying of any other countries except the country of origin and the country of destination also contributed to the decision making in this issue. The efficient project management and cooperation between the three countries (Russia, Romania and USA) made possible, after two and a half years of preparation work, for the first fully certified spent nuclear fuel air shipment to take place on 29th of June 2009, from Romanian airport 'Henri Coanda' to the Russian airport 'Koltsovo' near Yekaterinburg. One day before that, after a record period of 3 weeks of preparation, another HEU cargo was shipped by air from Romanian Institute for Nuclear Research in Pitesti to Russia, containing fresh pellets and therefore making Romania the third HEU-free country in the RRRFR program.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Element 117

An international team of scientists from Russia and the United States, including two Department of Energy national laboratories and two universities, has discovered the newest superheavy element, element 117. The team included scientists from the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research (Dubna, Russia), the Research Institute for Advanced Reactors (Dimitrovgrad), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Vanderbilt University, and the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons in strategic deterrence and competition: A SOCOM perspective. Part of Section: United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Combatant Commands

Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine demonstrates the challenge for strategic deterrence and competition of countering contentious narratives and disinformation about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) during conventional regional wars against a nucleararmed adversary. Moscow uses both tailored, contentious narratives and targeted disinformation about WMD in Ukraine to influence and disrupt local and global perceptions in support of its deterrence and competition objectives vis-à-vis the United States and NATO. Since December 2021, Moscow has made a focal point of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons in its efforts to establish a permissive environment for its military buildup on the border with Ukraine and then its military intervention. These information tactics also demonstrate an opportunity for US Special Operations Forces (SOF). They are a case study for considering how SOF can contribute to strategic deterrence and competition objectives, specifically countering adversary gray-zone information efforts to alter regional security orders.1 Such a role is in line with the 2022 Special Operations Forces Vision and Strategy, which provides a framework for the evolution of SOF into “a force capable of creating strategic, asymmetric advantages for the nation as a key contributor of integrated deterrence” (United States Special Operations Command, 2022). This paper briefly examines this strategic challenge and SOF opportunity, focusing narrowly on the distinction between contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons and the role of SOF in countering these gray-zone information tactics. The nuclear dimension of Moscow’s contentious narratives and disinformation in the “special military operation” is of particular interest because it demonstrates the distinction between strategic efforts to influence and disrupt local and global perceptions in Moscow’s favor. This distinction between influence and disruption is less clear with Russia’s contentious narratives and disinformation about chemical and biological weapons in Ukraine, as disinformation about these two types of WMD appears to overwhelm contentious narratives. We believe this distinction is useful for policymakers and warfighters responsible for countering gray-zone information tactics because it provides a framework for crafting tailored responses to contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons and other WMD. The chapter concludes with a discussion of efforts that could be undertaken by SOF in cooperation with other relevant stakeholders to address this aspect of adversary gray-zone information tactics.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Current status of the development of high density LEU fuel for Russian research reactors

One of the main directions of the Russian RERTR program is to develop U-Mo fuel and fuel elements/FA with this fuel. The development is carried out both for existing reactors, and for new advanced designs of reactors. Many organizations in Russia, i.e. 'TVEL', RDIPE, RIAR, IRM, NPCC participate in the work. Two fuels are under development: dispersion and monolithic U-Mo fuel, as well two types of FA to use the dispersion U-Mo fuel: with tubular type fuel elements and with pin type fuel elements. The first stage of works was successfully completed. This stage included out-pile, in-pile and post irradiation examinations of U-Mo dispersion fuel in experimental tubular and pin fuel elements under parameters similar to operation conditions of Russian design pool-type research reactors. The results received both in Russia and abroad enabled to go on to the next stage of development which includes irradiation tests both of full-scale IRT pin-type and tube-type fuel assemblies with U-Mo dispersion fuel and of mini-fuel elements with modified U-Mo dispersion fuel and monolithic fuel. The paper gives a generalized review of the results of U-Mo fuel development accomplished by now. (author)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Progress in Norwegian-Russian Regulatory Cooperation in Management of the Nuclear Legacy

The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) and the Federal Medical-Biological Agency (FMBA) of the Russian Federation have a collaboration programme which forms part of the Norwegian government's Plan of Action to improve radiation and nuclear safety in northwest Russia. The background to the NRPA-FMBA collaboration programme has been described in previous WM presentations. This paper presents the substantial progress made within that programme, describes ongoing progress within specific projects and sets out the value arising from wider involvement in the programme of other organisations such as NATO and the technical support derived from other national agencies such as the IAEA, and regulatory authorities from the USA, the UK and France. The main activities of the cooperation projects are concerned with the management of the nuclear legacy in northwest Russia, in particular the remediation of facilities, and related spent fuel and radioactive waste management, at the former Shore Technical Bases at Andreeva Bay and Gremikha Village. New regulatory guidance documents have been developed, necessary because of the special abnormal situation at these sites, now designated as Sites of Temporary Storage (STS), but also because of the transition from military to civilian regulatory supervision and the evolving regulatory system in the Russian Federation. The work has involved major technical inputs from the Russian Federation Institute of Biophysics, as well as review and advice on international recommendations and good practice in other countries provided by other technical support organisations. Projects on-going in 2007 are described which involve regulatory guidance on very Low-Level Waste management, specifically for the licensing and operation of new VLLW disposal facilities; optimisation of operational radiation protection, particularly in areas of high ambient radiation dose rate as are found in some parts of the STSs; determination of factors which can be used to identify when to apply emergency procedures before the full emergency is obvious; and development of the radio-ecological basis for identifying radiation supervision area boundaries. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Modernization of existing VVER-1000 surveillance programs

According to generally accepted world practice, evaluation of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) material behavior during operation is carried out using tests of surveillance specimens. The main objective of the surveillance program consists in insurance of safe RPV operation during the design lifetime and lifetime-extension period. At present, the approaches of pressure vessels residual life validation based on the test results of their surveillance specimens have been developed and introduced in Russia and are under consideration in other countries where vodo-vodyanoi energetichesky reactors- (VVER-) 1000 are in operation. In this case, it is necessary to ensure leading irradiation of surveillance specimens (as compared to the pressure vessel wall) and to provide uniformly irradiated specimen groups for mechanical testing. Standard surveillance program of VVER-1000 has several significant shortcomings and does not meet these requirements. Taking into account program of lifetime extension of VVER-1000 operating in Russia, it is necessary to carry out upgrading of the VVER-1000 surveillance program. This paper studies the conditions of a surveillance specimen's irradiation and upgrading of existing sets to provide monitoring and prognosis of RPV material properties for extension of the reactor's lifetime up to 60 years or more. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Russian Experience in the Regulatory Supervision of the Uranium Legacy Sites - 12441

Management of the uranium legacy is accompanied with environmental impact intensity of which depends on the amount of the waste generated, the extent of that waste localization and environmental spreading. The question is: how hazardous is such impact on the environment and human health? The criterion for safety assurance is adequate regulation of the uranium legacy. Since the establishment of the uranium industry, the well done regulatory system operates in the FMBA of Russia. Such system covers inter alia, the uranium legacy. This system includes the extent laboratory network of independent control and supervision, scientific researches, regulative practices. The current Russian normative and legal basis of the regulation and its application practice has a number of problems relating to the uranium legacy, connected firstly with the environmental remediation. To improve the regulatory system, the urgent tasks are: -To introduce the existing exposure situation into the national laws and standards in compliance with the ICRP system. - To develop criteria for site remediation and return, by stages, to uncontrolled uses. The similar criteria have been developed within the Russian-Norwegian cooperation for the purpose of remediation of the sites for temporary storage of SNF and RW. - To consider possibilities and methods of optimization for the remediation strategies under development. - To separate the special category - RW resulted from uranium ore mining and dressing. The current Russian RW classification is based on the waste subdivision in terms of the specific activities. Having in mind the new RW-specific law, we receive the opportunity to separate some special category - RW originated from the uranium mining and milling. Introduction of such category can simplify significantly the situation with management of waste of uranium mining and milling processes. Such approach is implemented in many countries and approved by IAEA. The category of 'RW originated from uranium mining and milling' is to be introduced as the legal acts and regulatory documents. The recent ICRP recommendations provide the flexible approaches for solving of such tasks. The FMBA of Russia recognizes the problems of radiation safety assurance related to the legacy of the former USSR in the uranium mining industry. Some part of the regulatory problems assumes to be solved within the EurAsEC inter-state target program 'Reclamation of the territories of the EurAsEC member states affected by the uranium mining and milling facilities'. Using the example of the uranium legacy sites in Kyrgyz and Tajikistan which could result in the tran-boundary disasters and require urgent reclamation, the experience will be gained to be used in other states as well. Harmonization of the national legislations and regulative documents on radiation safety assurance is envisaged. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Recycle of Am-241 obtained from long term stored plutonium for use in radioisotope power systems - 15035

Pu-238 has been used as a power source for spacecraft since the early days of space exploration. It has proven to be an effective source of power where the use of solar generated power is impractical. Its application for use in spacecraft power systems was developed by the USA and Russia who have spent many $ 100s of millions on its development and production. However, the original facilities for the production of Pu-238 are no longer in use and existing worldwide stockpiles have reduced to levels sufficient for only one or two further missions. Production of Pu-238 requires considerable facilities including a nuclear reactor and reprocessing plants that are very expensive to build and operate. The European Space Agency (ESA) has assessed the options for post-launch power generation in future European space missions and has made the decision to pursue the use of Am-241 as an alternative isotope to power future European Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS). What makes Am-241 attractive for the European market is its 100% isotopically pure production from the decay of Pu-241 in separated civil plutonium stockpiles. Historically, Europe has relied on collaborations with the USA or Russia to access these nuclear power sources. During 2009, the European Space Agency (ESA) funded a project to examine the cost and practicality of establishing a European source of material suitable for Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS). The study concluded that a small number of radioisotopes could be used in RPSs. On further review two leading candidates, Am-241 and Pu-238, were selected for further study. Whilst Pu-238 was recognized as the isotope of choice for use in RPSs, the costs of setting up a European based production facility was prohibitively expensive. Although Am-241 has a number of limitations compared to Pu-238, the much reduced production costs make Am-241 an attractive option for European based production of RPSs. Despite its lower power density of ∼ 0.11 Wth/g, Am-241 is viewed as a potential alternative to Pu-238 because of its availability within the nuclear fuel cycle. During the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel plutonium is separated as a chemically pure PuO{sub 2} product, containing around 3-11% w/w of the Pu-241 isotope, and placed into storage. During storage the Pu-241 isotope beta decays to Am-241 with a half-life of 14.4 years. {sub 94}{sup 241}Pu → (β 14.4 y) {sub 95}{sup 241}Am. This process has resulted in many 100 kgs of americium growing into the civil plutonium stockpile in the UK; material that is of value in generating heat sources and is able to be recycled. The key benefit of Am-241 as a potential European RPS source isotope is the availability of feed material along with the facilities to process it. It is expected that aged civil PuO{sub 2} will contain 25-50 g Am-241 per kg PuO{sub 2} depending on the source. A conceptual flowsheet using facilities for separating americium from plutonium is expected to produce on average 8.4 kg Am/year. ESA are now following their published road-map of studies to develop flight ready RTGs and RHUs. This has included the development and testing of the flowsheet to be used for production of Am-241. The project has focused on underpinning the conceptual flowsheet, using aged plutonium in NNL's PuMA laboratory. This has underpinned the design of a plant to produce a steady supply of Am-241. The scope of the overall project is 'store to store' - the starting point is aged plutonium currently housed in existing Sellafield stores and the end point is the storage of separated plutonium and americium powders on the Sellafield site. The full scale process is planned to be housed within the NNL's Central Laboratory in an existing facility designed for plutonium active operations. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Preliminary Conceptual Neutronic, Thermal, and Mechanical Design for {sup 238}Pu ATR Targets

Pu-238 is a valuable heat source material used to manufacture radioisotope power systems (RPSs), which are needed to provide electrical power for space exploration and other missions. Before 1989, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) produced Pu-238 at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina in nuclear reactors that are now decommissioned. From 1989 through 2009, existing DOE inventories of Pu- 238 were supplemented by quantities of Pu-238 purchased from Russia; however, supplies available for purchase from Russia are limited. DOE has restored domestic production to meet future demand; otherwise, NASA will be in danger of not being able to use RPSs in future missions. The Pu-238 Supply Program has the objective of reestablishing the domestic capability for producing Pu-238. In order to meet the quantities of Pu-238 needed to support NASA space mission and other federal users the ATR is being considered as an important asset to achieve the desired production of the radioisotope. In order to determine the constraints and parameters needed to maximize the production of Pu-238 at ATR a preliminary conceptual design target design was performed. The preliminary conceptual design had two principal goals: 1. Perform a trade study to determine an ATR target length that maximizes production as well as minimize the need to modify ORNL's target. 2. Evaluate the selected preliminary design from the standpoint of the ATR nuclear safety basis. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Used Nuclear Fuel Management in Asia

Used fuel discharged from nuclear reactors are presently stored in wet pools or in dry cask at-reactor and/or away-from- reactor sites. Only a few countries reprocess their civilian used fuel, notably France, Russia, and UK. No country has yet operated a geologic repository to dispose of civilian used fuel or high-level radioactive wastes (HLW). As a result, the management and disposal of used fuel and HLW are viewed as the Achilles' heel of nuclear power. Figure 1 shows the used fuel inventory in the United States (US) and East Asian nuclear power programs. The inventory is estimated based on that in 2010 and the projected growth of nuclear power in these programs to 2020 and 2030. Figure 1 indicates that in 2010, the US had about 63,900 tons of used fuel from light-water reactors (LWR), more than the statutory limit of what was supposed to go into the now-abandoned Yucca Mountain Repository, and accounting for more than 33% of global used LWR fuel total. Currently, about 2,000 tons of used fuel are generated in the existing US LWRs annually. Russia had 25,100 tons of used fuel in 2010. Based on a modest growth of nuclear power, its used fuel inventory is expected to increase to about 31,800 and 38,000 tons by 2020 and 2030, respectively. The nuclear energy programs in East Asia (China, Japan, ROK, and Taiwan) account for 19% of global used LWR fuel inventory in 2010. China's used fuel inventory in 2010 was relatively small at 1,900 tons, but is expected to grow rapidly to {approx}12,400 and {approx}31,000 tons in 2020 and 2030, respectively, based on its expanding nuclear power program (from the current installed capacity of 21.8 GW to {approx}60 and {approx}200 GW in 2020 and 2030, respectively). Besides PWRs, China also operates 2 Candu reactors which each produces roughly 8 times more used fuel in tons than a PWR of the same power. The used Candu fuel inventory would increase from 950 tons in 2010 to 2,850 and 4,750 tons in 2020 and 2030, respectively. Used fuel in Japan, ROK, and Taiwan are US-obligated. Japan's future trends of used fuel inventory are uncertain due to the unknown numbers and timing of the currently-shutdown nuclear power plants that would be allowed for restart, and the uncertain future of Japan's reprocessing at Rokkasho. Under two scenario cases (a no-nuke/no-reprocessing and a 80%-nuke with reprocessing), the Japanese used fuel inventory could be capped from 2020 to 2030 to {approx}21,500 tons for the first case, and to {approx}22,500 tons for the second. The ROK's used PWR fuel inventory would increase from 4,900 tons in 2010 to about 8,800 and 14,000 tons in 2020 and 2030, respectively. Its used Candu fuel inventory would also increase from 5,900 tons in 2010 to about 9,700 and 13,500 tons in 2020 and 2030, respectively. The Taiwan used fuel inventory should be kept at current level as nuclear power is being phase out. Its growth should be modest from 3,000 tons in 2010 to about 4,300 and 5,000 tons in 2020 and 2030, respectively even if the 4. nuclear power station would start and the operation of existing LWRs is extended. Used fuel inventory in other East Asian countries (DPRK, Vietnam, etc.) should be small, if any before 2030.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

THE DOE OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE PROGRAM: OVERVIEW OF TECHNICAL TASKS AND RESULTS

The DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) Office of Engineering and Technology is responsible for implementing EM's International Cooperative Program. Over the past 15 years, collaborative work has been conducted through this program with researchers in Russia, Ukraine, France, United Kingdom and Republic of Korea. Currently, work is being conducted with researchers in Russia and Ukraine. Efforts aimed at evaluating and advancing technologies to support U.S. high-level waste (HLW) vitrification initiatives are being conducted in collaboration with Russian researchers. Work at Khlopin Radium Institute (KRI) is targeted at improving the throughput of current vitrification processes by increasing melting rate. These efforts are specifically targeted at challenging waste types identified at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Hanford Site. The objectives of current efforts at SIA Radon are to gain insight into vitrification process limits for the cold crucible induction melter (CCIM) technology. Previous demonstration testing has shown that the CCIM offers the potential for dramatic increases in waste loading and waste throughput. However, little information is known regarding operational limits that could affect long-term, efficient CCIM operations. Collaborative work with the Russian Electrotechnical University (ETU) 'LETI' is aimed at advancing CCIM process monitoring, process control and design. The goal is to further mature the CCIM technology and to establish it as a viable HLW vitrification technology. The greater than two year effort conducted with the International Radioecology Laboratory in the Ukraine recently completed. The objectives of this study were: to assess the long-term impacts to the environment from radiation exposure in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (ChEZ); and to provide information on remediation guidelines and ecological risk assessment within radioactively contaminated territories around the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) based on the results of long-term field monitoring, analytical measurements, and numerical modeling of soils and groundwater radioactive contamination.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Russian University Education in Nuclear Safeguards and Security

As safeguards and security (S&S) systems are installed and upgraded in nuclear facilities throughout Russia, it becomes increasingly important to develop mechanisms for educating future Russian nuclear scientists and engineers in the technologies and methodologies of physical protection (PP) and nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A). As part of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) program to secure nuclear materials in Russia, the Education Project supports technical S&S degree programs at key Russian universities and nonproliferation education initiatives throughout the Russian Federation that are necessary to achieve the overall objective of fostering qualified and vigilant Russian S&S personnel. The Education Project supports major educational degree programs at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) and Tomsk Polytechnic University (TPU). The S&S Graduate Program is available only at MEPhI and is the world’s first S&S degree program. Ten classes of students have graduated with a total of 79 Masters Degrees as of early 2009. At least 84% of the graduates over the ten years are still working in the S&S field. Most work at government agencies or research organizations, and some are pursuing their PhD. A 5½ year Engineering Degree Program (EDP) in S&S is currently under development at MEPhI and TPU. The EDP is more tailored to the needs of nuclear facilities. The program’s first students (14) graduated from MEPhI in February 2007. Similar-sized classes are graduating from MEPhI each February. All of the EDP graduates are working in the S&S field, many at nuclear facilities. TPU also established an EDP and graduated its first class of approximately 18 students in February 2009. For each of these degree programs, the American project team works with MEPhI and TPU to develop appropriate curriculum, identify and acquire various training aids, develop and publish textbooks, and strengthen instructor skills. The project has also supported the instruction of policy-oriented nonproliferation courses at various Russian universities. These courses are targeted towards future workers in the nuclear field to help build an effective nonproliferation awareness within the nuclear complex. A long-range goal of this project is to assist the educational programs at MEPhI and TPU in becoming self-sustainable and therefore able to maintain the three degree programs without DOE support. This paper describes current development of these education programs and new initiatives. The paper also describes general nonproliferation education activities supported by DOE that complement the more technical S&S degree programs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Thermal and structural stability of medium energy target carrier assembly for NOvA at Fermilab

The NOvA project will upgrade the existing Neutrino at Main Injector (NuMI) project beamline at Fermilab to accommodate beam power of 700 kW. The Medium Energy (ME) graphite target assembly is provided through an accord with the State Research Center of Russia Institute for High Energy Physics (IHEP) at Protvino, Russia. The effects of proton beam energy deposition within beamline components are considered as thermal stability of the target carrier assembly and alignment budget are critical operational issues. Results of finite element thermal and structural analysis involving the target carrier assembly is provided with detail regarding the target's beryllium windows.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

AIR SHIPMENT OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL FROM ROMANIA AND LIBYA

In June 2009 Romania successfully completed the world’s first air shipment of highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel transported in Type B(U) casks under existing international laws and without special exceptions for the air transport licenses. Special 20-foot ISO shipping containers and cask tiedown supports were designed to transport Russian TUK 19 shipping casks for the Romanian air shipment and the equipment was certified for all modes of transport, including road, rail, water, and air. In December 2009 Libya successfully used this same equipment for a second air shipment of HEU spent nuclear fuel. Both spent fuel shipments were transported by truck from the originating nuclear facilities to nearby commercial airports, were flown by commercial cargo aircraft to a commercial airport in Yekaterinburg, Russia, and then transported by truck to their final destinations at the Production Association Mayak facility in Chelyabinsk, Russia. Both air shipments were performed under the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR) as part of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). The Romania air shipment of 23.7 kg of HEU spent fuel from the VVR S research reactor was the last of three HEU fresh and spent fuel shipments under RRRFR that resulted in Romania becoming the 3rd RRRFR participating country to remove all HEU. Libya had previously completed two RRRFR shipments of HEU fresh fuel so the 5.2 kg of HEU spent fuel air shipped from the IRT 1 research reactor in December made Libya the 4th RRRFR participating country to remove all HEU. This paper describes the equipment, preparations, and license approvals required to safely and securely complete these two air shipments of spent nuclear fuel.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Supporting the President's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agenda: Transparency and Verification for Nuclear Arms Reductions

The President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda is still evolving and the details of initiatives supporting it remain undefined. This means that DOE, NNSA, NA-20, NA-24 and the national laboratories can help define the agenda, and the policies and the initiatives to support it. This will require effective internal and interagency coordination. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda is broad and includes the path-breaking goal of creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for various elements of the agenda will be widely scattered across the interagency. Therefore an interagency mapping exercise should be performed to identify the key points of engagement within NNSA and other agencies for creating effective policy coordination mechanisms. These can include informal networks, working groups, coordinating committees, interagency task forces, etc. It will be important for NA-20 and NA-24 to get a seat at the table and a functional role in many of these coordinating bodies. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda comprises both mature and developing policy initiatives. The more mature elements such as CTBT ratification and a follow-on strategic nuclear arms treaty with Russia have defined milestones. However, recent press reports indicate that even the START follow-on strategic arms pact that is planned to be complete by the end of 2009 may take significantly longer and be more expansive in scope. The Russians called for proposals to count non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Other elements of the agenda such as FMCT, future bilateral nuclear arms reductions following a START follow-on treaty, nuclear posture changes, preparations for an international nuclear security summit, strengthened international safeguards and multilateral verification are in much earlier stages of development. For this reason any survey of arms control capabilities within the USG should be structured to address potential needs across the near-term (1-4) years and longer-term (5-10) years planning horizons. Some final observations include acknowledging the enduring nature of several key objectives on the Obama Administration's arms control and nonproliferation agenda. The CTBT, FMCT, bilateral nuclear arms reductions and strengthening the NPT have been sought by successive U.S. Administrations for nearly thirty years. Efforts towards negotiated arms control, although de-emphasized by the G.W. Bush Administration, have remained a pillar of U.S. national security strategy for decades and are likely to be of enduring if not increasing importance for decades to come. Therefore revitalization and expansion of USG capabilities in this area can be a positive legacy no matter what near-term arms control goals are achieved over the next four years. This is why it is important to reconstruct integrated bureaucratic, legislative, budgetary and diplomatic strategies to sustain the arms control and nonproliferation agenda. In this endeavor some past lessons must be taken to heart to avoid bureaucratic overkill and keep interagency policy-making and implementation structures lean and effective. On the Technical side a serious, sustained multilateral program to develop, down select and performance test nuclear weapons dismantlement verification technologies and procedures should be immediately initiated. In order to make this happen the United States and Russia should join with the UK and other interested states in creating a sustained, full-scale research and development program for verification at their respective nuc1ear weapons and defense establishments. The goals include development of effective technologies and procedures for: (1) Attribute measurement systems to certify nuclear warheads and military fissile materials; (2) Chain-of-custody methods to track items after they are authenticated and enter accountability; (3) Transportation monitoring; (4) Storage monitoring; (5) Fissile materials conversion verification. The remainder of this paper focuses on transparency and verification for nuclear arms and fissile material reductions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Three different directions in which the European Union could replace Russian natural gas

Russia's invasion of Ukraine fuelled an energy crisis, which considerably impacted Europe given its heavy reliance on Russian natural gas imports. This study uses an ensemble of four global integrated assessment models, which are further soft-linked to two sectoral models, and explores the synergies and trade-offs among three approaches to living without Russian gas in Europe: (a) replacing with other gas imports, (b) boosting domestic energy production, and (c) reducing demand and accelerating energy efficiency. We find that substituting Russian gas from other trade partners would miss an opportunity to accelerate decarbonisation in end-use sectors while risking further fossil-fuel lock-ins, despite featuring the lowest gas price spikes and potentially reducing heating costs for end-users in the near term. Boosting domestic, primarily renewable, energy production on the other hand would instead require considerable investments, potentially burdening consumers. Energy demand reductions, however, could offer considerable space for further emissions cuts at the lowest power-sector investment costs; nonetheless, an energy efficiency-driven strategy would also risk relocation of energy-intensive industries, an aspect of increasing relevance to EU policymakers.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Simple model for the reconstruction of radionuclide concentrations and radiation exposures along the Techa River

The Techa River (Southern Urals, Russia) was contaminated in 1949-1956 by liquid radioactive wastes from the Mayak complex, the first Russian facility for the production of plutonium. The measurements of environmental contamination were started in 1951. A simple model describing radionuclide transport along the free-flowing river and the accumulation of radionuclides by bottom sediments is presented. This model successfully correlates the rates of radionuclide releases as reconstructed by the Mayak experts, hydrological data, and available environmental monitoring data for the early period of contamination (1949-1951). The model was developed to reconstruct doses for people who lived in the riverside communities during the period of the releases and who were chronically exposed to external and internal irradiation. The model fills the data gaps and permits reconstruction of external gamma-exposure rates in air on the river bank and radionuclide concentrations in river water used for drinking and other household needs in 1949-1951.

Non-NASA Center↗

Retrospective dosimetry related to chronic environmental exposure

Radioactive contamination of the environment occurred in the early fifties as a result of the releases from the Mayak plutonium production complex (Southern Urals, Russia). The releases of liquid wastes into the Techa river resulted in chronic exposure of 30,000 residents of the riverside communities. Since 1951 90Sr body burdens have been measured for over half of this cohort. This paper presents the analysis of data on 90Sr in humans and describes the reconstruction of internal doses for these people.

NASA Discipline Radiation Health↗