Role of In Situ Process Monitoring in Managing Risk of AM Space Hardware
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We will discuss NASA’s interest in qualifying in situ monitoring and NDE methods for certification of AM space hardware. NASA is interested in qualifying in situ monitoring for complex, critical parts that are difficult to inspect using traditional NDE.
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Program Managers (PM) can protect program resources and improve chances of success by anticipating, understanding and managing risks. Understanding the range of potential risks helps one to avoid or manage the risks. A PM must choose which risks to accept to reduce fire fighting, must meet the expectations of stakeholders consistently, and avoid falling into costly "black holes" that may open. A good risk management process provides the PM more confidence to seize opportunities save money, meet schedule, even improve relationships with people important to the program. Evidence of managing risk and sound internal controls can mean better support from superiors for the program by building a trust and reputation from being on top of issues. Risk managers have an obligation to provide the PM with the best information possible to allow the benefits to be realized (Small Business Consortium, 2004). The Institute for Chartered Accountants in England and Wales sees very important benefits for companies in providing better information about what they do to assess and manage key business risks. Such information will: a) provide practical forward-looking information; b) reduce the cost of capital; c) encourage better risk management; and d) improve accountability for stewardship, investor protection and the usefulness of financial reporting. We are particularly convinced that enhanced risk reporting will help listed companies obtain capital at the lowest possible cost (The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England &Wales, June 2002). Risk managers can take a significant role in quantifying the success of their department and communicating those figures to executive (program) management levels while pushing for a broader risk management role. Overall, risk managers must show that risk management work matters in the most crucial place-the bottom line- as they prove risk management can be a profit center (Sullivan, 2004).
This presentation reviews recommended practices for marine energy risk management based on NLR's recent risk management framework publication (https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy24osti/90212.pdf). This presentation will include a demonstration of risk management processes and techniques that everyone in the marine energy industry can use to successfully meet their project objectives. This presentation will include a description of methods to identify and manage risks that are specific to marine energy, while demonstrating this through tools such as risk registers, failure modes effects and criticality analysis (FMECA), and more tools that are currently being developed. The goal of this presentation is for the participants to have knowledge and access to tools to help them manage the risks specific to their marine energy projects.
If power systems transition to integrate higher amounts of variable renewable energy sources, storage technologies, and distributed energy resources (DERs), new risk management frameworks are necessary to ensure cost-effective and reliable power system operations. Projects funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) Performance-based Energy Resource Feedback, Optimization, and Risk Management (PERFORM) program aim to contribute new risk management frameworks by developing methods to quantify and manage risk at grid asset and system levels. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) led a PERFORM project in collaboration with the Johns Hopkins University, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), kWh Analytics, Packetized Energy, and Imperial Consultants (ICON). The project addressed two challenges related to risk management in electricity markets: managing net load imbalances and flexibility from DERs. This final technical report presents a list of project accomplishments, activities, and outputs.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s (ORNL’s) Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF) continues to surpass its operational target goals of supporting users; delivering fast, reliable computational ecosystems; creating innovative solutions for high-performance computing (HPC) needs; contributing to the community to build the next generation HPC workforce, and managing risks, safety, and security associated with operating some of the most powerful computers in the world. The results can be seen in the cutting-edge science conducted by users and the praise from the research community. Calendar year (CY) 2021 saw continued excellence in research supported by the OLCF’s leadership-class computing resources, including Summit (the nation’s most powerful supercomputer), the global scratch file system Alpine, the Scalable Protected Infrastructure (SPI), the Exploratory Visualization Environment for Research in Science and Technology (EVEREST), and the archival mass-storage resource High-Performance Storage System (HPSS). While maintaining access and exceptional user support for Summit, the OLCF continued to make progress on the installation and deployment of Frontier, which will be the nation’s first exascale system when it comes online at the start of CY 2023. Users have already begun running and optimizing scientific codes on Crusher, the OLCF test and development system equipped with Frontier’s architecture. Throughout the year, the OLCF maintained a strong culture of operational excellence, including risk management, workplace safety, and cybersecurity. The OLCF’s rigorous risk management strategy anticipated and mitigated risks, and at this time there are no high-priority operational risks. Similarly, ORNL and the OLCF were committed to operating under the US Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) safety regulations that ensure a safe workplace. Technical staff tracked and monitored existing threats and vulnerabilities within the OLCF while continually developing tools and practices to enhance operations without increasing the facility’s risk. CY 2021 was filled with outstanding results and accomplishments, including a very high rating from users on overall satisfaction for the eighth consecutive year; a tremendous number of node hours delivered to 1,671 researchers on Summit; and the successful delivery of the allocation split of roughly 60%, 20%, and 20% of core-hours offered for the Innovative and Novel Computational Impact on Theory and Experiment (INCITE), Advanced Scientific Computing Research Leadership Computing Challenge (ALCC), and Director’s Discretionary (DD) programs, respectively (Section 2). COVID-19 research remained a focus in 2021, and the ALCC and DD programs allocated over 1 million Summit hours to the COVID-19 High Performance Computing Consortium. These accomplishments, coupled with the high utilization rates (i.e., overall and capability usage), represent the fulfillment of the promise of leadership class machines: efficient facilitation of leadership-class computational applications.
Space flight is a risky business. This truism has been bandied about since the earliest days of the space program. When asked by the young daughter of a coworker, one of the Mercury astronauts likened launching into space to "riding a Roman candle" -- it was both exciting and dangerous. Even in these more technologically advanced days, the solid rocket boosters and external tanks of the space shuttle provide a no less exciting, or dangerous, ride into space. However much the phrase "risk mitigation" is bandied about within the U.S. space program, there is still the history of the Apollo 1 fire during a ground test at Cape Canaveral, Fla., the loss of the shuttle Challenger during liftoff, and the loss of the shuttle Columbia when returning to Earth to remind us that while we give lip-service to risk management, we have not learned to manage risk as well as we ought. Moreover, there are many more less dramatic, but equally critical, incidents that have occurred in association with the space program that also highlight our inability to accurately gauge and manage risk. Why do we seem caught in a senseless spiral in which we focus most on risk only after a tragedy? Why do we repeat serious mishaps and not learn from our mistakes? This paper reviews some possible explanations for our risk-taking behavior and provides examples of interest to the NASA centers, while also discussing inter center and intra-center opportunities for sharing information to mitigate risk.
In wholesale electricity markets today, flexibility from a limited number of distributed energy resources (DERs) is offered daily, and the value of flexibility is not yet recognized for economic hedging of delivery risk. Under a three-year project funded by the ARPA-E PERFORM program, a collaborative team is working towards developing an integrated risk management framework that will leverage flexibility from distributed and bulk resources to cost-effectively and reliably manage delivery risk of intermittent resources. Two concepts are at the core of the proposed integrated risk management framework: (A) flexibility options, which are a novel type of options and enable wholesale electricity market participants to hedge uncertainty by buying flexibility. (B) DER flexibility scores, which provide a way for utilities or aggregators to classify assets in groups with different likelihood of delivering contracted flexibility. This report presentation will focus on the proposed ISO-product "flexibility options," which is complementary to ramp and other products being introduced by ISOs/RTOs to manage net load uncertainties. Participating resources with imbalance risk can buy flexibility options to hedge their production, whereas grid-connected resources that can provide physical flexibility can offer flexibility options. We will present basics of the formulation for a day-ahead ISO market that matches buyers and sellers of this hedge in coordination with existing capabilities to schedule energy and ancillary services, and outline how their settlements mitigate the impact of imbalance risk.
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Propulsion system hardware and monitoring/control software constitute a given manned or unmanned aerospace system's primary risk-management issue. The present inquiry into the reasons for this dominance attempts to identify development routes to the reduction of propulsion-related management risk issues. A 'life management plan' for propulsion systems would give attention to service life requirements, criteria for the monitoring and evaluation of useful life, a method for the tracking of service life, criteria for hardware reusability and operations inspection, and hardware preassembly screening practices.
This article uses ten case studies to illustrate the information needs, various communication approaches, and the communicator's role in explaining environmental health risks from a variety of hazards, to a variety of audiences, over time frames from days to years, using in person consultation, lectures, zooms, and email formats. Events often had a long history before the communication began and may have had a long tail afterward. Audiences may be public officials, companies, workers, communities, or individuals. Each individual may have their own understanding or mental model regarding the hazard, exposure, and risk. The communicator's role or intention may be to reassure an audience that has unrealistic exaggerated concerns or fears or to protect a client if the fears are realistic. Or it may be altruistic to inform a complacent audience to take the risks it faces more seriously. Although risk assessment research has advanced the techniques for communicating abstruse probabilities to audiences with low numeracy, in my experience, audiences are unimpressed by precise–sounding probability numbers, and are more interested in whether exposure is occurring or may occur and how to stop it. Often audiences have reason to be outraged and may be more concerned about punishing wrong doers than about the hazard itself, particularly when the exposure is past and cannot be undone. Thus, there is a difference between discussing the riskiness of a situation (risk communication) and what you are going to do about the situation (risk management). Risk communication is successful when the audience responds as intended, calming down or taking action. These case studies are drawn from a large number of risk communication experiences that I and my Rutgers colleagues have engaged in over the past four decades. Through the 20th century, New Jersey was the most densely industrialized State in United States. New Jersey experienced growth of the chemical and petrochemical industries and the unfortunately profligate disposal of toxic wastes. Having the most Superfund sites of any state is a dubious distinction, but New Jersey also has the most experience in evaluating and responding to these hazards.
[This is part of a hypothetical scenario-based exercise for workshop participants, based on the fictitious country "Centralia."] In prior years, as a part of efforts to strengthen and better sustain nuclear security within the State, Centralia requested through the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) framework that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conduct an expert mission on establishing and operating a national nuclear security support centre (NSSC). After the IAEA conducted the NSSC expert mission, members of the Centralia Committee on Nuclear Security (CNS) agreed to initiate the feasibility determination phase of establishing an NSSC, in line with the systematic process recommended by the IAEA. Centralia Nuclear Regulatory Authority (CNRA), as the designated lead organization for coordinating the feasibility determination process, prepared a Feasibility Report in collaboration with members of the CNS and based on input gathered among relevant national stakeholders. The report was presented to the National Security Advisor (NSA), who reviewed and approved the proposal for Centralia to proceed with establishing an NSSC. After Centralia moved into the planning phase for the Centralia Nuclear Security Support Centre (CNSSC), per REF, the primary stakeholders of the centre jointly developed this strategy implementation plan, which provides an outline of the organizational structure, needs analysis, programme objectives, financial and project management, risk management, and other key aspects of the centre. This document will be reviewed and updated as necessary on a semi-annual basis during the project implementation period of establishing CNSSC.