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At least 253 records · Page 14

MARSAME Radiological Release Report for Metal Items from Technical Area 53, Set 25

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship Group (EPC-ES) has evaluated the survey results for metal items from the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) at Technical Area 53 (TA-53) and found that the metal items described in Table 1 of this report (identified by Radiation Protection [RP] Tracking Numbers) meet the criteria for unrestricted release under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1 Chg 4, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020) and can be recycled. This conclusion is based on the known history of the metal items and radiation survey data (see the completed RP-Form-031 LANSCE Metals Clearance Log [LANL 2021a] for each item in Attachment 1). None of the items in this report are located within radiological areas. Therefore, the items are considered unencumbered and are not subject to the moratorium suspension on metal recycling from DOE facilities. Additionally, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has determined that there is no practical opportunity for internal DOE reuse of this metal.

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MARSAME Radiological Release Report for Metal Items from Technical Area 53, Set 26

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship Group (EPC-ES) has evaluated the survey results for metal items from the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) at Technical Area 53 (TA-53) and found that the metal items described in Table 1 of this report (identified by Radiation Protection [RP] Tracking Numbers) meet the criteria for unrestricted release under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1 Chg 4, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020) and can be recycled. This conclusion is based on the known history of the metal items and radiation survey data. None of the items in this report are located within radiological areas. Therefore, the items are considered unencumbered and are not subject to the moratorium suspension on metal recycling from DOE facilities. Additionally, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has determined that there is no practical opportunity for internal DOE reuse of this metal. Process knowledge indicates that these metal items were unlikely to ever be in direct contact with the beam and thus are unlikely to have become activated. Surface contamination measurements (both total and removable) showed either no detectable radioactivity or activity levels within the range of background. All measurements for volumetric contamination were indistinguishable from background based on calculated decision limits. Additionally, all gamma isotopic surveys conducted for defense-in depth showed no identifiable gamma radiation from beam activation.

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MARSAME Radiological Release Report for Metal Items from Technical Area 53, Set 28

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship Group (EPC-ES) has evaluated the survey results for metal items from the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) at Technical Area 53 (TA-53) and found that the metal items described in Table 1 of this report (identified by Radiation Protection [RP] Tracking Numbers) meet the criteria for unrestricted release under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1 Chg 4, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020) and can be recycled. This conclusion is based on the known history of the metal items and radiation survey data (see the completed RP-Form-031 LANSCE Metals Clearance Log [LANL 2021a] for each item in Attachment 1). Process knowledge indicates that items were released from radiological areas, including radiation areas, prior to the implementation of the 2000 metals moratorium. Therefore, the items are considered unencumbered and are not subject to the moratorium suspension on metal recycling from DOE facilities. Additionally, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has determined that there is no practical opportunity for internal DOE reuse of this metal. Process knowledge indicates that these metal items were unlikely to ever be in direct contact with the beam and thus are unlikely to have become activated. Surface contamination measurements (both total and removable) showed either no detectable radioactivity or activity levels within the range of background. All measurements for volumetric contamination were indistinguishable from background based on calculated decision limits. Additionally, all gamma isotopic surveys conducted for defense-in depth showed no identifiable gamma radiation from beam activation.

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DOE 2013 occupational radiation exposure

The Office of Analysis within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security (EHSS) publishes the annual DOE Occupational Radiation Exposure Report to provide an overview of the status of radiation protection practices at DOE (including the National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA]). The DOE 2013 Occupational Radiation Exposure Report provides an evaluation of DOE-wide performance regarding compliance with Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), Part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection dose limits and as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) process requirements. In addition, the report provides data to DOE organizations responsible for developing policies for protection of individuals from the adverse health effects of radiation. The report provides a summary and an analysis of occupational radiation exposure information from the monitoring of individuals involved in DOE activities. Over the past five-year period, the occupational radiation exposure information has been analyzed in terms of aggregate data, dose to individuals, and dose by site.

Source record↗

Confirmation of Radiological Non-Impact Status for TA-22 Magazines

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship (EPC-ES) has evaluated radiological process knowledge and surveys and found that the structures and associated building materials in magazines and process building at Technical Area 22 (TA-22) are candidates for unrestricted use and public release. TA-22 magazines included in this analysis are: buildings TA-0011, -0012, -0014, -0015, -0016, -0017, -0019, -0021, -0022, -0023, -0024, -0035, and -0069 and building TA-22-0025, which is an a process building. This finding is consistent with the requirements of DOE Order 458.1 Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment and LANL Procedure FSD-004 Environmental Radiation Protection.

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MARSAME Release Report for TA-03 Building 16

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship (EPC-ES) has determined that materials associated with technical area 3, Buildings 16 and 18 (collectively known as TA-3-16) (Figure 1) do not meet the criteria for unrestricted release to the public under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1, Radiation Protection for the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020) and are to be treated as Low Level Waste (LLW). These conclusions are based on the known history of the building combined with radiation survey data collected in 2020 and 2021, and findings are consistent with DOE Order 458.1 and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Functional Series Document EPC-ES-FSD-004, Environmental Radiation Protection (LANL 2020a). Sampling and data analysis, as described in this report, were sufficient to meet measurement quality objectives under the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment (MARSAME) manual (MARSAME 2000) and LANL procedures (LANL 2020b). Final approvals for waste disposition will come from LANL’s Waste Management Program.

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LANL Environmental ALARA Program Status Report for CY 2016

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) ensures that radiation exposures to members of the public and the environment from LANL operations, past and present, are below regulatory thresholds and are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) through compliance with DOE Order 458.1 Radiation Protection for the Public and the Environment, and LANL Policy 412 Environmental Radiation Protection (LANL2016a). In 2007, a finding (RL.2-F-1) and observation (RL.2-0-1) in the NNSA/ LASO report, September 2007, Release of Property (Land) Containing Residual Radioactive Material Self-Assessment Report, indicated that LANL had no policy or documented process in place for the release of property containing residual radioactive material. In response, LANL developed PD410, Los Alamos National Laboratory Environmental ALARA Program. The most recent version of this document became effective in 2014 (LANL 2014a). The document provides program authorities, responsibilities, descriptions, processes, and thresholds for conducting qualitative and quantitative ALARA analyses for prospective and actual radiation exposures to the public and t o the environment resulting from DOE activities conducted on the LANL site.

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NTS-SS-SNL-NMSITE-2017-0004 "Contamination Monitor Left in Service After Inadequate Calibration" Causes Not Fully Addressed (Causal Analysis Report)

On June 5th, 2020 Sandia National Laboratories signed and recommended for closure the evidence package for the Noncompliance Tracking System NTS—SS-SNL-NMSITE-2017-0004, Contamination Monitor Left in Service After Inadequate Calibration. On July 16th, 2020 the Sandia Field Office sent a follow-up question list to the Radiation Protection Instrumentation Program Lead to clarify some points while reviewing the evidence package. The follow-up questions readily identified deficiencies with all three calibrations of the iPCM12 systems. On July 30th, 2020 Radiation Protection hosted a meeting to better understand the exact nature of the concerns, determine if the iPCM12 machines were out of calibration and therefore would have to be taken out of service. One result of this meeting was to determine if SNL could withdraw the evidence package. SNL transmitted a letter on August 26th, 2020 recalling the evidence package and committed to performing a thorough causal analysis and invoke the required issues management processes to ensure that corrective actions are sustained.

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MARSAME Radiological Release Report for Replacement Water Lines from TA-48 to TA-55

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship (EPC-ES) has determined that only a portion of the soil associated with Replacement Water Lines from Technical Area (TA)-48 to TA55 (Figure 1) meets the criteria for unrestricted release to the public under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1, Radiation Protection for the Public and the Environment (DOE, 2020). The remaining soil did not meet the criteria for unrestricted release and must be managed appropriately. These conclusions are based on the known history of the area combined with soil sample data collected in 2022; the findings are consistent with DOE Order 458.1 and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Functional Series Document EPC-ES-FSD-004, Environmental Radiation Protection (LANL, 2021). Sampling and data analysis, as described in this report, were sufficient to meet measurement quality objectives (MQOs) under the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment (MARSAME) manual (NUREG, 2009) and LANL procedures (LANL, 2020). Final approvals for waste disposition will come from LANL’s Waste Management Program.

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MARSAME Release Report for Replacement Water Lines From TA-48 to TA-55, Revision 2

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship (EPC-ES) has determined that only a portion of the soil associated with Replacement Water Lines from Technical Area (TA)-48 to TA 55 (Figure 1) meets the criteria for unrestricted release to the public under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1, Radiation Protection for the Public and the Environment (DOE, 2020). The remaining soil did not meet the criteria for unrestricted release and must be managed appropriately. These conclusions are based on the known history of the area combined with soil sample data collected in 2022; the findings are consistent with DOE Order 458.1 and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Functional Series Document EPC-ES-FSD-004, Environmental Radiation Protection (LANL, 2021). Sampling and data analysis, as described in this report, were sufficient to meet measurement quality objectives (MQOs) under the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment (MARSAME) manual (NUREG, 2009) and LANL procedures (LANL, 2020). Final approvals for waste disposition will come from LANL’s Waste Management Program.

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Confirmation of Non-Impacted Status (TA16-280 Complex)

EPC-ES finds that the materials associated with TA16-280 complex (see Figure 1) are candidates for release to the public for recycle or as sanitary/commercial waste. This finding is consistent with the requirements of DOE Order 458.1 Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment and LANL Policy 412 Environmental Radiation Protection.

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Fabrication and Testing of Habitat Components Using In-Situ Materials for Martian Exploration

The development of Mars for human activity will require the utilization of Martian materials in building habitats and working structures. One approach is to use polymer binders with regolith to form structural elements. Not only can useful composite materials be produced in this way but the radiation protection properties are also increased. This is important since only modest protection from space radiation is provided by the Martian atmosphere. We have studied composites fabricated using Martian regolith simulant and polymers which can be synthesized from local Martian materials for their potential use as radiation shields for manned Mars missions. To validate shielding effectiveness, composites are irradiated with a 55 MeV proton beam and neutron beams up to 800 MeV. Shielding effects on microelectronic devices are measured by placing them behind samples of the composites during irradiation. To measure structural properties of the composites, preliminary characterization and mechanical testing are made for the composites.

Kim, M.-H. Y.↗

MMOD Protection and Degradation Effects for Thermal Control Systems

Micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment overview Hypervelocity impact effects & MMOD shielding MMOD risk assessment process Requirements & protection techniques - ISS - Shuttle - Orion/Commercial Crew Vehicles MMOD effects on spacecraft systems & improving MMOD protection - Radiators Coatings - Thermal protection system (TPS) for atmospheric entry vehicles Coatings - Windows - Solar arrays - Solar array masts - EVA Handrails - Thermal Blankets Orbital Debris provided by JSC & is the predominate threat in low Earth orbit - ORDEM 3.0 is latest model (released December 2013) - http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/ - Man-made objects in orbit about Earth impacting up to 16 km/s average 9-10 km/s for ISS orbit - High-density debris (steel) is major issue Meteoroid model provided by MSFC - MEM-R2 is latest release - http://www.nasa.gov/offices/meo/home/index.html - Natural particles in orbit about sun Mg-silicates, Ni-Fe, others - Meteoroid environment (MEM): 11-72 km/s Average 22-23 km/s.

Christiansen, Eric↗

SNS shielding analyses overview

This paper gives an overview on on-going shielding analyses for Spallation Neutron Source. Presently, the most of the shielding work is concentrated on the beam lines and instrument enclosures to prepare for commissioning, save operation and adequate radiation background in the future. There is on-going work for the accelerator facility. This includes radiation-protection analyses for radiation monitors placement, designing shielding for additional facilities to test accelerator structures, redesigning some parts of the facility, and designing test facilities to the main accelerator structure for component testing. Neutronics analyses are required as well to support spent structure management, including waste characterisation analyses, choice of proper transport/storage package and shielding enhancement for the package if required.

Popova, Irina↗

Optics and Systems Design of the Ring-to-Second Target Transport Beam-Line for the SNS Second Target Station

The Second Target Station (STS) project at the Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) is being developed to provide world-leading cold neutron brightness for next-generation neutron scattering experiments. The STS Accelerator Systems (AS) scope includes the design and implementation of the Ring-to-Second Target (RTST) proton beam transport line, which extracts 1.3 GeV proton beam pulses from the existing Ring-to-Beam Transport (RTBT) system and delivers them to the STS target. The RTST design emphasizes operational reliability [high reliability], low activation [minimum activation of components and the tunnel], maintainability, and compatibility with existing SNS infrastructure through extensive reuse of proven RTBT systems and components. The beamline includes a new extraction region, a transport lattice consisting of dipole, quadrupole, and corrector magnets, beam instrumentation systems, vacuum systems, personnel protection systems, and radiation shielding systems. Beam optics and particle tracking studies were performed using PyORBIT to validate extraction trajectories, beam transport, and target beam spot requirements [60–90 cm² beam spot area]. This paper presents the optics design philosophy, extraction system architecture, transport lattice design, instrumentation strategy, vacuum system approach, and radiation protection integration for the RTST beamline. Particle tracking simulations indicate successful beam transport without beam loss under nominal operating conditions. The RTST is designed to transport 1.3 GeV proton beam pulses at repetition rates up to 15 Hz, delivering nominal beam power of 700 kW to the Second Target Station.

Baron, Alex [ORNL]↗

Bridging the Radiation Science Divide Between Scientists and First Responders

To be prepared for a response to a complex radiological or nuclear emergency, the first responder community must incorporate radiation protection principles, and be able to conduct tactical operational measurements, assess data, and determine associated health risks. While these actions must occur promptly in the first hours of an unfolding crisis, the on-scene responders must do so with no scientific support from radiation protection experts, such as from the central government. To further the challenges to effectively perform these actions, local hazardous material (HAZMAT) response teams, which are usually the source of technical expertise at the scene of a hazardous materials release, rarely encounter radiological materials or respond to large-scale radiological or nuclear emergencies.

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Safe and Secure Management of Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Egypt - 19063

Radioactive sources offer many benefits in medicine, industry and education but the lack of appropriate long-term management when they eventually become disused has led to accidents, in some cases with serious consequences, and increased their vulnerability for use in a malicious act. This lack is evident in the absence of clearly defined policy and strategy, responsibilities and resources to meet those responsibilities for safe, secure and sustainable management of disused sources. The strengthening of national legislative and regulatory infrastructures globally has led to major improvements in the protection and control of radioactive sources. Nevertheless, in many countries, radioactive sources were in use before such infrastructures had been developed or adequately strengthened and were therefore not under regulatory control. The paper presents some aspects from Egyptian experience related to safe and secure measures for management of Cs-137, Ra-226 and Co-60 sealed sources. Data relating to the disused radioactive sealed sources, DSRS inventory as well as the arrangements made in order to prepare for conditioning of sources is presented. The efforts made by technical staff and radiation protection team for all arrangements and details such as conditioning set-up, working area, leakage test, certified stainless capsules, radiation protection measures and sources characterization in addition to all security measures for stored DSRS are also presented. (authors)

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Optimising National WM Strategies through early consideration of Nuclear Safeguards - 18607

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards stand alongside safety and security as one of the three pillars for prudent management of all nuclear material, including nuclear waste. Although safety considerations, including public and environmental radiation protection, are the traditional drivers of waste management strategies, there is a requirement for nuclear safeguards in shaping and quantifying long-term solutions for special classes of radioactive waste. This is especially important when considering the disposal of nuclear material in a repository that could be released from regulatory oversight for radiation protection after a period of institutional control, as some safeguards oversight would still be required. Failure to consider nuclear safeguards at the early stages of planning may alternatively lead to excessive volumes for disposal or the need to recondition already treated wastes. At the very least, safeguards measures should be considered before countries seek to dispose of legacy nuclear materials, decommissioning wastes and other materials containing uranium, thorium or plutonium in an operating repository. Nuclear safeguards are the set of tools and techniques used by the IAEA to verify that countries comply with their international obligations not to divert nuclear materials to nuclear explosive devices. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear safeguards apply to all uranium, thorium and plutonium held in non-weapons NPT states, with limited exceptions. In nuclear-weapon states, much of their material is likewise subject to IAEA safeguards through conditions in agreements with respective suppliers of the uranium. Under IAEA safeguards, such nuclear material must remain accounted for and accessible for periodic verification-analogous to the safety concepts of reversibility and retrievability. Nevertheless, safeguards requirements can be terminated - provided that the State and the [IAEA] agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable - through dilution or immobilisation in solid form (such as cement, glass or ceramic). This means candidate material can be disposed of as non- nuclear material, with no further safeguards requirements, provided this criterion is met. Unlike radiological wastes where repository design strongly influences pathways for radionuclide migration and overall safety performance, repository design is not a factor in considering the termination of safeguards on nuclear material. This paper looks at similarities and differences in the safety, security and safeguards regulatory requirements for the management of radioactive waste and nuclear material in Australia. In particular, it outlines recent experience gained from participation in Australia's waste acceptance criteria working group for a national low-level waste repository and intermediate-level waste store, as well as from Australia's overall waste management strategy. These items of work have coincided with the IAEA update of its internal policy on termination of safeguards on nuclear material. Australia's experience shows how inclusion of safeguards criteria in the planning process is leading to optimisations in choice of facility concepts, project sequencing and equitable distribution of economic risk. By considering the three pillars-safety, security and safeguards-early on in the planning process, Australia's waste management strategy will provide a benchmark for other states in establishing and updating their own waste acceptance criteria for the disposal of nuclear material. (authors)

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