Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 253 records · Page 14

The Interface of Safety and Security in Transport: A Regional Perspective

Security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport continues to be a challenge for States that are working on strengthening their nuclear security regime. One reason for this is that State regulatory agencies and other organizations lack the resources and trained personnel to dedicate to this field. For over 50 years safety has been a major focus in the use, storage and transport of radioactive material. Only recently, since the late 1990s, has dedicated focus been given to the field of security. One way to assist States to advance nuclear security is to reach out to safety workers (regulators, inspectors, and safety compliance personnel) and showcase the need to better integrate safety and security practices. A recent IAEA regional workshop in Bangkok, Thailand (June 2015) yielded profound results when subject matter experts lectured on both the safety and the security of radioactive material in transport. These experts presented and discussed experiences and best practices for: 1) developing and implementing safety requirements and security recommendations for radioactive material in transport; 2) national and international cooperation; and 3) preventing shipment delays/denials of radioactive material. The workshop participants, who were predominantly from safety organizations, shared that they received the following from this event: 1. A clear understanding of the objectives of the IAEA safety requirements and security recommendations for radioactive material in transport. 2. A general understanding of and appreciation for the similarities and differences between safety requirements and security recommendations for radioactive material in transport. 3. A greater appreciation of the interface between transport safety and security and potential impacts of this interface on the efforts to strengthen the compliance assurance regime for the safe transport of radioactive material. 4. A general understanding of assessing the transport security scenarios and developing transport security plans. Many participants also reported their appreciation of the workshop exercises that specifically focused on practical aspects of safety and security of transport of radioactive material. These workshop outcomes highlight the important role professionals can offer when they receive additional safety training and education for radioactive material in transport. Moreover, these professionals can help to increase capacity in countries with developing nuclear security regimes. This paper explores workshop outcomes and transportation regulations and guidelines for radioactive material.

Welch, Tim↗

Investigating the Depth of Penetration of Radionuclides in Concrete - 16292

This paper focuses on some chemical and structural aspects for mature concrete structural substrate that functions as a barrier to radioactive material migration. Exposure to radioactive material may be a consequence of surface contact, such as resulting from exposure by spills or leaks. In properly-prepared waste storage areas, undamaged paint and sealant helps to protect the structural cement. However, damaged surfaces, cracks, and relatively porous slab seams can offer a preferred migration pathway for spilled contaminates, including radionuclides. The cost of remediation of concrete structures is directly related to the amount of concrete that must be removed and subsequently disposed. A carefully implemented investigative plan can be utilized to determine how much concrete must be removed and the approximate level of volumetric radiological contamination can be used to estimate disposal costs. Normal concrete pore solution is saturated with calcium hydroxide and also contains sodium and potassium hydroxide; the pH is typically 13 to 14. Contaminants (such as uranium) that hydrolyze in alkaline media that form precipitant phases and tend to deposit at the near-surface. However, more soluble contaminants, such as Cs-137 (as Cs{sup +}) and Tc-99 (as the pertechnetate anion TcO{sub 4}{sup -}) diffuse more rapidly (and deeply) into the porous substrate. Profiling the migration of the water-soluble radionuclides into a cure (hardened) cement surface is a challenge, since water-cooled saws, borers and similar implements are often used to excise and/or slice the core. Alternately, dry mechanical fracturing for excavation of cement may introduce the possibility of material cross-contamination and uncertainty for the average sampling depth for the sample collection event, potentially yielding non-representative samples, and may preclude determination of crack formation that may have been present in the native (non-fractured) substrate. Structural concrete is comprised of cement and pozzolan paste, relatively impervious aggregate (typically stone and/or sand), and rebar (iron reinforcement). Near-surface aggregate may act as a hydrolytic barrier, causing contaminants leached into the pore water to by-pass the impervious grains, causing deeper-than expected penetration, especially if there are grain boundary cracks also present to facilitate migration. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

PCP METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING DOSE RATES FOR SMALL GRAM QUANTITIES IN SHIPPING PACKAGINGS

The Small Gram Quantity (SGQ) concept is based on the understanding that small amounts of hazardous materials, in this case radioactive materials, are significantly less hazardous than large amounts of the same materials. This study describes a methodology designed to estimate an SGQ for several neutron and gamma emitting isotopes that can be shipped in a package compliant with 10 CFR Part 71 external radiation level limits regulations. These regulations require packaging for the shipment of radioactive materials perform, under both normal and accident conditions, the essential functions of material containment, subcriticality, and maintain external radiation levels within regulatory limits. 10 CFR 71.33(b)(1)(2)&(3) state radioactive and fissile materials must be identified and their maximum quantity, chemical and physical forms be included in an application. Furthermore, the U.S. Federal Regulations require application contain an evaluation demonstrating the package (i.e., the packaging and its contents) satisfies the external radiation standards for all packages (10 CFR 71.31(2), 71.35(a), & 71.47). By placing the contents in a He leak-tight containment vessel, and limiting the mass to ensure subcriticality, the first two essential functions are readily met. Some isotopes emit sufficiently strong photon radiation that small amounts of material can yield a large external dose rate. Quantifying of the dose rate for a proposed content is a challenging issue for the SGQ approach. It is essential to quantify external radiation levels from several common gamma and neutron sources that can be safely placed in a specific packaging, to ensure compliance with federal regulations. The Packaging Certification Program (PCP) Methodology for Determining Dose Rate for Small Gram Quantities in Shipping Packagings described in this report provides bounding mass limits for a set of proposed SGQ isotopes. Methodology calculations were performed to estimate external radiation levels for the 9977 shipping package using the MCNP radiation transport code to develop a set of response multipliers (Green's functions) for 'dose per particle' for each neutron and photon spectral group. The source spectrum for each isotope generated using the ORIGEN-S and RASTA computer codes was folded with the response multipliers to generate the dose rate per gram of each isotope in the 9977 shipping package and its associated shielded containers. The maximum amount of a single isotope that could be shipped within the regulatory limits contained in 10 CFR 71.47 for dose rate at the surface of the package is determined. If a package contains a mixture of isotopes, the acceptability for shipment can be determined by a sum of fractions approach. Furthermore, the results of this analysis can be easily extended to additional radioisotopes by simply evaluating the neutron and/or photon spectra of those isotopes and folding the spectral data with the Green's functions provided.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The Importance of Technical Reachback in the Adjudication of Radiation Alarms

The large-scale deployment of radiation sensors at borders, ports-of-entry and other locations carries two disparate priorities: the reliable detection and identification of threat materials and the rapid characterization of non-threat materials comprised of naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) and legitimate radioactive materials in streams of commerce. These priorities are partially achieved through the technologies contained in the detection systems and the procedures developed for their operation. However, questions and ambiguities will occur. Without established capabilities and procedures for the operators of these detector systems to 'reach back' to trained spectroscopists and appropriate subject matter experts, the system will likely experience an unacceptable number of response operations and delays resolving alarms. Technical reachback operations need to be able to address the priorities discussed above while causing minimal perturbations in the flow of legitimate streams of commerce. Yet when necessary, reachback needs to be able to rapidly mobilize the appropriate response assets.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Distinguishing Between Site Waste, Natural, and Other Sources of Contamination at Uranium and Thorium Contaminated Sites - 12274

Uranium and thorium processing and milling sites generate wastes (source, byproduct, or technically enhanced naturally occurring material), that contain contaminants that are similar to naturally occurring radioactive material deposits and other industry wastes. This can lead to mis-identification of other materials as Site wastes. A review of methods used by the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency to distinguish Site wastes from potential other sources, enhanced materials, and natural deposits, at three different thorium mills was conducted. Real case examples demonstrate the importance of understanding the methods of distinguishing wastes. Distinguishing between Site wastes and enhanced Background material can be facilitated by establishing and applying a formal process. Significant project cost avoidance may be realized by distinguishing Site wastes from enhanced NORM. Collection of information on other potential sources of radioactive material and physical information related to the potential for other radioactive material sources should be gathered and reported in the Historical Site Assessment. At a minimum, locations of other such information should be recorded. Site decision makers should approach each Site area with the expectation that non site related radioactive material may be present and have a process in place to distinguish from Site and non Site related materials. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Developing Waste Characterization Capabilities in Support of the Near Surface Disposal Facility - 19245

Upon approval from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) Proposed Near Surface Disposal Facility (NSDF) to be constructed at CNL's Chalk River Laboratories will be the first permanent disposal facility in Canada for the disposal of low level radioactive waste. The NSDF is currently in the approval process and as such, a preliminary Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) has been implemented for the proposed facility. Waste currently generated at CNL is being characterized to verify that it meets the WAC and will be 'disposal ready' once the NSDF is operational. A robust waste characterization program is required for the following reasons: 1. Improved waste segregation to support waste minimization and recycling to ensure non-radioactive waste is reliably segregated and removed from radioactive waste streams destined for the NSDF. This includes characterization and discrimination of Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM) and anthropogenic radioactive material. 2. To ensure low level waste (LLW) is properly characterized as per the limits stipulated within the WAC to ensure criteria is met for NSDF packaging requirements 3. To ensure intermediate level waste is reliably segregated from NSDF destined wastes streams The purpose of this paper is to provide a review of the development of a waste characterization program strategy at Chalk River Laboratories and applicability of various waste streams; including consideration of important factors such as measurement methods, techniques, and the management of data. Emphasis is necessarily placed on non-destructive gamma spectrometry systems which are central to CNL's approach. A review of near-term developments is also provided. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Low-Tech, Low-Budget Storage Solution for High Level Radioactive Sources

The need for safe, secure, and economical storage of radioactive material becomes increasingly important as beneficial uses of radioactive material expand (increases inventory), as political instability rises (increases threat), and as final disposal and treatment facilities are delayed (increases inventory and storage duration). Several vendor-produced storage casks are available for this purpose but are often costly — due to the required design, analyses, and licensing costs. Thus the relatively high costs of currently accepted storage solutions may inhibit substantial improvements in safety and security that might otherwise be achieved. This is particularly true in areas of the world where the economic and/or the regulatory infrastructure may not provide the means and/or the justification for such an expense. This paper considers a relatively low-cost, low-technology radioactive material storage solution. The basic concept consists of a simple shielded storage container that can be fabricated locally using a steel pipe and a corrugated steel culvert as forms enclosing a concrete annulus. Benefits of such a system include 1) a low-tech solution that utilizes materials and skills available virtually anywhere in the world, 2) a readily scalable design that easily adapts to specific needs such as the geometry and radioactivity of the source term material), 3) flexible placement allows for free-standing above-ground or in-ground (i.e., below grade or bermed) installation, 4) the ability for future relocation without direct handling of sources, and 5) a long operational lifetime . ‘Le mieux est l’ennemi du bien’ (translated: The best is the enemy of good) applies to the management of radioactive materials – particularly where the economic and/or regulatory justification for additional investment is lacking. Development of a low-cost alternative that considerably enhances safety and security may lead to a greater overall risk reduction than insisting on solutions that remain economically and/or politically ‘out of reach’.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Biota Dose Assessment at LANL for 2011

Beginning with the Manhattan Project, the earliest work with radioactive material was located in what is now the center of Los Alamos townsite, and some of those materials were released into the environment or disposed of as waste. These radioactive materials have been extensively studied and assessed in many reports during the past 60 years. The assessments consider many activities relevant to dose assessment, such as adventurous children who burrow into and eat the soil, as well as the activities of pets and wildlife. Even for the most extreme scenarios, the doses are less than a few mrem per year, well below the DOE limit for the public, and four orders of magnitude below the DOE limit to terrestrial animals, which is 0.1 rad per day. Locations that pose even a very small risk to humans or pets are fenced, locked, and posted as controlled areas. However, it is recognized that biota such as plants, birds, mice, and worms live in these controlled areas. The DOE standard is intended to protect these biota. Contaminated sites in and near Los Alamos consist of areas known as solid waste management units (SWMU) and areas of concern (AoC) that have been identified and studied extensively in many reports. LA-UR-90-4300 lists these locations, and many subsequent reports provide extensive details and assessments. Between these areas, the levels of detectable radioactive materials are many orders of magnitude smaller. Because they are not a focus of concern, the areas outside of SWMUs and AoCs have not been as extensively studied or sampled. The highest concentrations of radioactive materials resulting from historic LANL operations are buried in material disposal areas (MDAs) such as MDA A, B, C, G, T, etc. Much of this material is sealed in containers that are not accessible to biota (McNaughton 2005). In some cases, it is buried below the reach of tree roots or burrowing animals, and in some cases it is encased or embedded in concrete. Of particular relevance to the present report, the hills to the west of LANL, where the Las Conchas fire burned, are not contaminated with LANL‐derived substances. The radioactivity in these hills consists of naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) and global fallout.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Gamma Spectroscopy Detector Candidates and Radioisotope Identification Algorithms for Use in National Security Applications

In 2006, the United States Congress mandated for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to screen all cargo containers to protect against terrorist acts and ensure the safety and security of the nation. Containers are screened by gamma and neutron detectors to ensure threat material is not smuggled into the country. However, because commerce is radioactive, detecting the presence of radioactive materials is not sufficient in ensuring the safety and security of the nation. Radioactive materials must also be identified in real time, thus distinguishing threat sources (Uranium-235 and Plutonium-230) from non-threat sources (kitty litter, pot ash, medical isotopes). Screening cargo containers can be considered a two-step process (1) alerting to the presence of radioactive material when gamma counts exceed a threshold setting, and (2) once alerted, identifying the type of radioactive material, which is done by collecting a gamma spectra and analyzing it with an analysis tool/algorithm. For this reason, it is important to evaluate not only emerging technology in neutron and gamma detection, but also investigate new advances in algorithm development for radioisotope identification (RIID). New candidates in detection and on-board algorithm analysis might offer opportunities to make the scanning, detection, and identification process more efficient while still ensuring the health and safety of the public. This research will investigate emerging technology in radiation detection focused on gamma spectroscopy capabilities and RIID algorithms for DHS applications.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

SU-F-P-24: Radiological Disperse Device

Purpose: We are now living in a society of constant fear of terrorism. This topic is pertaining to give a general knowledge of what is a radiological dispersion device or RDD and in case of its detonation, what are the options open to public for a safe action in terms of reducing the exposure and knowing the proper steps. These RDD are also called dirty bombs. Methods: Compared to nuclear weapons, dirty bombs are easy to make. In order for a terrorist organization to construct and detonate a dirty bomb, it must acquire radioactive material by stealing it or buying it through legal or illegal channels. Possible RDD material could come from the millions of radioactive sources used in the industry, for medical purposes and in academic applications mainly for researches. These are, americium-{sup 241}, californium-{sup 252}, caesium-{sup 137}, cobalt-{sup 60}, iridium-{sup 192}, plutonium-{sup 238}, polonium-{sup 210}, radium-{sup 226} and strontium-{sup 90}. Results: Prompt detection of the type of radioactive material used will greatly assist advising people on the protective measures, like sheltering in place, or quickly leaving the immediate area. The effects of radiation are determined by:°the amount of radiation absorbed by body°the type of radiation °the distance from the radiation to an individual°the means of exposure absorbed by the skin, inhaled, or ingested; and length of time exposed. Conclusion: In any facility it is now much more important to keep a log list of all radioactive materials in use. In case there is a dirty bomb explosion, the chaos and economic cost could be enormous. The economic cost for the evaluation of the contamination, survey of people and surroundings and the after treatment, decontamination cost and effort will be a big challenge in any country. So awareness and preparation is the start to face this new type of challenge.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Radiation Dispersal Devices. A brief overview [Slides]

In this presentation I lump together the "classified RDD" - a dispersion of aerosolized radioactive material - with the nefarious use of radioactive materials. This can include other means of dispersal as well as an RED - a Radiological Exposure Device. This combination is because the threat is the nefarious use of radioactive material, and most of our concerns are in regards to the loss of control of the material, potential(s) for misuse, and detection.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Transportation scenarios for risk analysis.

Transportation risk, like any risk, is defined by the risk triplet: what can happen (the scenario), how likely it is (the probability), and the resulting consequences. This paper evaluates the development of transportation scenarios, the associated probabilities, and the consequences. The most likely radioactive materials transportation scenario is routine, incident-free transportation, which has a probability indistinguishable from unity. Accident scenarios in radioactive materials transportation are of three different types: accidents in which there is no impact on the radioactive cargo, accidents in which some gamma shielding may be lost but there is no release of radioactive material, and accident in which radioactive material may potentially be released. Accident frequencies, obtainable from recorded data validated by the U.S. Department of Transportation, are considered equivalent to accident probabilities in this study. Probabilities of different types of accidents are conditional probabilities, conditional on an accident occurring, and are developed from event trees. Development of all of these probabilities and the associated highway and rail accident event trees are discussed in this paper.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Designing Flexibility into the Authorized Radioactive Contents of the 9982 Shipping Package

The 9982 radioactive material package is being designed to safely transport small gram quantities of radioactive material within the United States. Typically, such shipping packages are designed to ship only a single radioactive material content within the U.S., which greatly limits the type of radioactive material allowed for shipment. The 9982’s content, however, is designed around bounding limits for numerous radionuclides, which will allow many more content variations to be shipped in a single package compared to other package designs. Here, contents from 3013, 9977, and 9978 packages are analyzed to determine if they are qualified for shipment in the 9982 using a sum-of-the-fractions methodology to see if the sum of the ratios of the masses of the radionuclides over the mass limits exceeds a value of one (1). Since all three of the example contents meet satisfy this method, the maximum content that could be shipped in a 9982 was determined. For the 3013 package, up to between 199.96 grams and 200 grams of a plutonium mixture could be shipped depending on the weight percentages of the isotopes. The 9977 material resulted in a 174-gram content that satisfies the summations for either metal or oxide form and regardless of whether a shielding pig is present or not. Lastly, the 9978 materials, two different americium standards, have a maximum content mass of 200 grams regardless of whether the americium-241 and americium-243 are shipped together or separately. These three applications of the 9982 exemplify the use for a package with multiple approved contents since the functions of three separate packages are fulfilled by one new package, reducing the need for separate operational procedures.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Intrinsic Dosimetry: Elemental Composition Effects on the Thermoluminescence of Commercial Borosilicate Glass

Intrinsic dosimetry is the method of measuring total absorbed dose received by the walls of a container holding radioactive material. By considering this dose in tandem with the physical characteristics of the radioactive material housed within the container, this method can provide enhanced pathway information for interdicted radioactive samples. Thermoluminescence (TL) dosimetry was used to measure ionizing radiation dose effects on stock borosilicate glass. Differences in TL glow curve shape and intensity were observed for glasses from different geographical origins. The different TL signatures strongly correlated with the concentration of alkaline earth metals and the ratio of sodium to the total amount of alkali metal present in the borosilicate glass.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

AUTHORIZING THE DOT SPECIFICATION 6M PACKAGING FOR CONTINUED USE AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M packaging was in extensive use for more than 40 years for in-commerce shipments of Type B quantities of fissile and radioactive material (RAM) across the USA, among the Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories, and between facilities in the DOE production complex. In January 2004, the DOT Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) Agency issued a final rule in the Federal Register to ammend requirements in the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) pertaining to the transportation of radioactive materials. The final rule became effective on October 1, 2004. One of those changes discontinued the use of the DOT specification 6M, along with other DOT specification packagings, on October 1, 2008. A main driver for the change was due to the fact that 6M specification packagings were not supported by a Safety Analysis Report for Packagings (SARP) that was compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 71 (10 CFR 71). The regulatory rules for the discontinued use have been edited in Title 49 of the CFR Parts 100-185, 2004 edition and thereafter. Prior to October 1, 2008, the use of the 6M within the boundaries of the Savannah River Site (SRS), called an onsite transfer, was governed by an onsite transportation document that referenced 49 CFR Parts 100-185. SRS had to develop an Onsite Safety Assessment (OSA) which was independent of 49 CFR in order to justify the continued use of the DOT Specification 6M for the transfer of radioactive material (RAM) at the SRS after October 1, 2008. This paper will discuss the methodology for and difficulties associated with authorizing the DOT Specification 6M Packaging for continued use at the Savannah River Site.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

In situ liquid SIMS analysis of uranium oxide

Trace analysis of nuclear materials in solid particles collected in the environment or particles in liquid slurry generated in nuclear material manufacturing processes can pinpoint elemental, organic, and isotopic signatures of nuclear fuel cycle activities and processes. Such information can support nuclear safeguards programs by increasing our ability to detect undeclared nuclear materials, routine activities for safeguarding at declared facilities, and illicit activities. However, trace radioactive material analysis in liquids and slurries is challenging using bulk approaches. For example, one drawback of sensitive analysis such as inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) is that sample is consumed or destroyed as a result of the technical approach. We developed a vacuum compatible microfluidic interface to enable surface analysis of liquids and liquid-solid interactions using time-of-flight secondary ion mass spectrometry (ToF-SIMS). In this work, we illustrate initial results of liquid standards containing uranium using in situ liquid SIMS. Specifically a series of diluted uranium standards used for ICPMS analysis were studied and the limit of detection was estimated. Since the liquid SIMS analysis is almost nondestructive, the same sample can be analyzed by other more destructive approaches afterwards or saved for future references. Consequently, multimodal analysis is possible. Our results demonstrate that in situ liquid SIMS can be used as a new approach to analyze radioactive materials in liquid and slurry forms of relevance to the IAEA safeguards missions.

In situ liquid ToF-SIMS, uranium, limit of detecti↗

Risks of Hazardous Substances in Radioactive Waste for the Konrad Repository in Germany - 17522

When disposing of radioactive waste with negligible heat generation, the activity of the radionuclides is limited. However, the waste including radioactive material comprises a certain proportion of non-radioactive material. The risk of hazardous contamination of the groundwater by non-radioactive substances must be taken into account. It must be ascertained that the non-radioactive material cannot affect near-surface groundwater, which is a resource for drinking water supply. To achieve this, limit values on the amount of hazardous substances in the total waste volume shall be determined. In 2002 a regulatory approval was granted to the 'Konrad' final storage facility for radioactive waste with negligible heat generation according to the German Water Resources Act. This approval is embedded in the license (plan-approval decision) based on the German Atomic Energy Act. The approval is based on the model of a possible discharge of contaminants from the final storage facility. In a long-term simulation spanning 300,000 years, contact of the waste with the groundwater in the surrounding rock formations over the postoperational phase was conservatively assumed. The maximum amount of allowable disposal of substances - such that no concern of affecting the near-surface groundwater arises - can be derived from the solubility of the respective substances. Implementing the permit according to the Water Resources Act requires: - classification of the waste through delivery declaration obligations - monitoring the substance inspection in the waste to assess its suitability for the disposal, and - stock keeping procedures for the disposal waste by the operator. While the repository is operated by the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) (http://www.bfs.de./EN/home/home{sub n}ode;), reporting to the Federal Environment Ministry, the statutory water permit is issued and applied by the State of Lower Saxony as responsible state authority. A waste package/container list supplements a comprehensive list of substances. From this - depending on the respectively conditioned waste - material vectors can be derived. For this purpose, BfS provides a database with a substances and container list to the waste owners. In the meantime, first experiences have been collected in applying the approval. More than 540 waste containers with a total mass of almost 6,000 Mg have been controlled and are ready for disposal. In our presentation we will show the recent development in supervising the preparation for the disposal of mixed waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

An Aerial Survey of the 200 East and 200 West Areas of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation - October 2016

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Aerial Measuring System (AMS), based at the Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) in Las Vegas, Nevada, performed an aerial survey of the 200 West and 200 East Areas of the DOE Hanford Site during September 2015. The survey was performed using the RSL Bell 412 helicopter equipped with twelve 2"x4"x16" thallium-activated sodium iodide (NaI) logs with their spectra summed to form a single detector and a mechanically-cooled high-purity germanium (HPGe) detector. Both detectors collected gamma ray spectra from naturally-occurring radioactive materials and from anthropogenic radioactive materials present due to activities at the site. Data was collected over the site during the 30 hours of survey flight time, resulting in approximately 100,000 one-second spectra collected by both the NaI array and the HPGe detector. These data have been analyzed to map the distribution of anthropogenic radioactivity and identify the isotopes responsible for that activity.

200 East↗