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Atmospheric {sup 41}Ar Plume Tracking of the UF Training Reactor Using a Large-Volume NaI Detector

The ability to track and monitor gaseous radioactive materials is important in the event of a radioactive release such as from a nuclear power plant accident, weapons testing, or other unintended release scenarios. The International Monitoring System (IMS) is currently in place to monitor for weapons testing and has been used to monitor nuclear power plant accidents. However, only 80 radionuclide stations for the IMS exist in the world and are stationary, limiting the resolution of any radioactive plumes detected. Furthermore, the IMS radionuclide stations are designed to be sensitive specifically to atmospheric radio-xenon and no other radionuclides. Historically, monitoring radioactive releases has been limited to the detection of radio-xenon and radio-krypton, both arising as fission products from nuclear fuel. After the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, scientists were interested in finding the dose the public received from released radioactive material. This was achieved by analyzing radiation monitors in the exhaust stack and filters within the reactor building. furthermore, a series of 20 thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD's), 8 air sampling station positioned around Three Mile Island, and a helicopter survey which used a NaI(Tl) detector array provided data on radionuclides, specifically {sup 137}Cs, that escaped the confines of the reactor building. The TLD's and air sampling stations were stationary, and therefore limited the resolution of the radioactive release plume. The helicopter survey using the NaI detectors was limited by the technology available at the time. The NaI detector array output was compressed from 1024 channels to 256 channels, limiting the energy resolution of the spectral data. The helicopter used a microwave ranging system to establish position. Since this survey was taken in October of 1982, advancements in technology allow spectral data to be saved in its full 1024 channel format and the advent of GPS can give a more accurate account of the detector position. An updated mobile system for tracking a radioactive release would help to alleviate these issues as well as gain the ability to track a radioactive release in real-time. We investigate the feasibility of mobile tracking through study and measurement of the {sup 41}Ar plume released from the University of Florida Training Reactor (UFTR) research reactor. We use a large-volume NaI(Tl) detector placed on the roof near the reactor. This detector may also be placed and moved on a cart to survey the area surrounding the reactor. We compare the spectral data taken when the reactor is running at full power to the background to analyze the effectiveness of the detector at identifying atmospheric {sup 41}Ar. Finally we discuss the implications of these measurements with regards to validation of plume models and the capability to track releases over a localized area from the source. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Uranium mining and norm, a North American perspective - 15545

All soils and rocks contain naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM). Many ores and raw materials contain relatively elevated levels of natural radionuclides and processing such materials can further increase the concentrations of natural radionuclides, sometimes referred to as technologically enhanced naturally occurring radioactive materials (TENORM). Examples of NORM minerals include uranium ores, monazite (a source of rare earth minerals), and phosphate rock used to produce phosphate fertilizer. Such activities have the potential to result in above background radiation exposure to workers and the public. Following a brief review of the sources and exposure from NORM in these varied industries, this paper will then present an overview of uranium mining and recovery in North America including discussion on the methods currently being used, production of NORM materials and wastes associated with these uranium recovery methods and the radiological composition of the NORM wastes produced by uranium recovery. The paper includes descriptions of the methods and associated NORM produced by both conventional (underground, open pit) and in situ recovery (ISR) mining methods and identifies the responsible government agencies in the US and Canada assigned the authority to regulate and control these NORM materials. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Risk Based Security Management at Research Reactors

This presentation provides a background of what led to the international emphasis on nuclear security and describes how nuclear security is effectively implemented so as to preserve the societal benefits of nuclear and radioactive materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Radioactive waste repository when contacted by water provides borates that absorb neutrons

A container holds radioactive material. A sub-criticality controller protects the radioactive material from reaching a criticality from contact with the water. The sub-criticality controller includes a metallic composition having at least one metal component and at least one borate component bonded to the at least one metal component. The metallic composition forms borates when the metallic composition contacts the water.

Xiong, Yongliang↗

Breakdown-prone volume in terahertz wave beams

This study was motivated by the recently proposed concept of remote detection of concealed radioactive materials by a focused terahertz (THz) radiation [V. L. Granatstein and G. S. Nusinovich, J. Appl. Phys. 108, 063304 (2010)]. According to this concept, a high-power THz radiation should be focused in a small spot where the field intensity exceeds the breakdown threshold. In the presence of free electrons in such a breakdown-prone volume, a THz discharge will occur there. However, this volume should be so small that in the absence of ionizing sources in its vicinity the probability to have there any free electrons is low. Then, the increased breakdown rate in a series of THz pulses would indicate the presence of hidden radioactive materials in the vicinity of the focused spot. For this concept, it is important to accurately determine the breakdown-prone volume created by a focused THz radiation. This problem is analyzed in this paper, first, for the case of a single wave beam and, then, for the case of crossing wave beams of different polarizations. The problem is studied first ignoring the diffraction spread of wave beams in the vicinity of the focal plane and, then, with the account for the diffraction spreading. Then, relations between the THz wave power, the range of such a system and the breakdown-prone volume are analyzed. Finally, the effect of the atmospheric turbulence on propagation and focusing of THz wave beams in air is considered.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Maximum Inner Container Dose Rate That Will Ensure Meeting Regulatory Limit at Package Surface - 19206

Often, the shipper of radioactive material does not know the exact radioactive isotopic composition of the materials that need to be shipped. This is especially important for legacy materials that need to be removed from a site that is in the process of being decommissioned. A method of determining the acceptability of such material for shipment before it is placed in into the shipping package will allow more flexibility in planning for decommissioning activities. A series of Monte-Carlo calculations were performed to calculate the dose rate at the surface of a convenience container or a shielding pig separately and then at the surface of a new shipping package being designed by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). The purpose of these calculations is to determine the maximum dose rate at the surface of the convenience container or the shielded pig that will ensure the dose rate at the outer surface the shipping package is less that the regulatory limit of 2 mSv/h. The calculations also considered the effect of shape of the radioactive material and its possible movement inside the convenience container along with movement of the convenience container inside the confinement vessel of the shipping package. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Thermal analysis to determine acceptable package loading and spatial configurations of high-heat-generating wastes - 15411

The inventory of radioactive materials planned for geological disposal in the UK is diverse. This inventory includes a range of high-heat-generating wastes and other radioactive materials not currently declared as waste including some spent nuclear fuel and separated uranium and plutonium. To ensure that safe disposal solutions can be developed, it will be necessary to understand the influence of this heat on engineered barrier systems for the range of generic disposal concepts being considered in the UK. For these reasons, Radioactive Waste Management Limited has established a dedicated project to enhance understanding of the factors affecting geological disposal of high-heat-generating wastes with a view to supporting future decision making and concept selection. One of the priority areas to be addressed within the High-heat-generating Waste Project (Project Ankhiale) concerns the effect of heat on the engineered barrier systems. The core focus of the work is to identify the thermal constraints on specific outline conceptual designs, building upon the findings of other work activities aimed at understanding the influence of heat on buffer materials. The constraints on the design relate to important features of the engineered barrier system and parameters such as waste package loading, package dimensions and package spacing. Work is underway to identify an acceptable range of designs and parameters for waste package disposal concepts and layout of the GDF. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Comparison of RESRAD and GoldSim Models for Assessing Radiological Dose for a RCRA Landfill - 20418

US Ecology Idaho (USEI) operates a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle C, Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal (TSD) Facility on a 640-acre property in Owyhee County, Idaho. USEI accepts a wide variety of RCRA-exempt low activity radioactive wastes, including naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) and technologically enhanced NORM (TENORM) (USEI 2009). The performance of the landfill with regard to radiological operating permit requirements was previously assessed using a model constructed with the residual radioactivity (RESRAD) computer program, developed by Argonne National Laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). RESRAD supports the evaluation of several environmental transport pathways related to a radionuclide-contaminated soil source term, but it was not conceived as a model for the evaluation of landfill radiological performance. A more comprehensive and realistic model is desired in order to better support submissions to both the State of Idaho's Department of Environmental Quality as well as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. A Performance Assessment (PA) computer model was developed using GoldSim software for the USEI RCRA Subtitle C landfill. The RESRAD computer model was specifically developed for calculating soil cleanup criteria and radiological dose and cancer risk from residual radioactive material in soil. To evaluate site-specific conditions, users may select from among a number of available environmental transport and exposure pathways and modify 'default' parameter values. In GoldSim, a user must construct the model 'from scratch.' However, this modeling is facilitated by a number of specialized elements available in GoldSim to support a radiological mass transport model. These include elements for defining radiological decay and ingrowth, container failure and radiological release, advective and diffusive transport, and other processes. Advantages afforded by the use of RESRAD for modeling radiological dose for a RCRA Subtitle C landfill include ease of use and reasonable flexibility in specifying site-specific conditions. GoldSim allows for considerably more flexibility and site-specificity than RESRAD, including evaluation of potentially relevant environmental transport processes not supported in RESRAD. The probabilistic modeling capabilities of GoldSim also far exceed those of RESRAD. The pros and cons of RESRAD and GoldSim for this modeling problem are explored with a focus on identifying approaches and critical factors in identifying the appropriate platform. The capabilities of RESRAD and GoldSim for mathematically modeling the disposal system will be contrasted and compared. For example, the existing RESRAD radiological safety assessment evaluated potentially complete exposure pathways related to infiltration to groundwater and upwards diffusion of radon. Additional transport pathways identified in the USEI Idaho facility Conceptual Site Model include deposition of radon decay products in cover material, root uptake of radionuclides in disposed wastes by native plants, and mixing of cover material by burrowing animals. Results of the two models and how the different transport and dose pathways affect results will be discussed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Packaging and Transportation Regulatory Inconsistencies and Challenges - 20485

This paper presents regulatory inconsistencies within and between various regulatory agencies. These inconsistencies relate to the packaging and transportation of radioactive materials typically encountered during decommissioning including mixed wastes that are required to be compliant with more than one regulatory agency during shipment. At least one possible solution is presented for consideration. The following four examples are presented: - Packaging discrepancies for radioactive material meeting the DOT definition of Radioactive LSA-I that also contain lead may be compliant when shipped unpackaged per Department of Transportation (DOT) rules in 173.427 paragraph C. However, since they contain lead, they are required to be shipped in a package per the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Hazardous Waste Manifest (HWM) instructions. - The difference between the units of measure used in 49 CFR Part 172.101 Appendix A and 40 CFR, Part 355, Appendices A and B. - The requirement for outer packaging for radioactive gauges meeting all other requirements of 49 CFR 173.424 and 173.425. - E-Manifesting EPA system difficult for waste materials containing both radioactive class 7 and PCBs. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Plant security during decommissioning; challenges and lessons learned from German phase out decision

Purpose of this paper is to point out the security challenges that may occur during the decommissioning, based on the issues and lessons learned from the German phase out decision. Though national regulations may be different in other countries the basic problems and issues will be the same. Therefore presented solutions will be applicable in other countries as well. The radioactive material remaining at the NPP during decommissioning has the most influence on how the security measures have to be designed. The radioactive material defines the risk potential of the plant and this determines the needed security level. The following aspects have been challenging in Germany: - Scenarios varying from those, used for plants in operation, due to changed operating conditions - Spent fuel will stay in the spent fuel pool for a quite long period before it can be removed from the plant. Risk potential of the plant stays high and requires a high level of security measures - Security measures according to the existing operating license have to stay in place as they are, unless the first license for decommissioning is given respective the spent fuel is removed from the plant site. This even led to the question if improvements of security measures, planned and announced with focus on a plant remaining in operation for another couple of years, need to be done although they will not be required after removing the spent fuel from the plant. A further important aspect for the security design is the fact that a plant under decommissioning has completely different and strongly varying operating procedures, compared to the stable ones of an operating plant. This leads to different needs concerning workspace, infrastructure on plant site, access to buildings etc. An optimized and highly flexible security concept is needed to ensure an adequate level of security as well as an efficient decommissioning. A deep analysis of the vital plant functions, depending on the different decommissioning stages, is required to determine the vital equipment, its location and its need for protection. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Preliminary study of nuclear fuel element testing based on coded source neutron imaging

Neutron radiography (NR) is one of the most important nondestructive testing methods, which is sensitive to low density materials. Especially, Neutron transfer imaging method could be used to test radioactivity materials refraining from γ effect, but it is difficult to realize tomography. Coded source neutron imaging (CSNI) is a newly NR method developed fast in the last several years. The distance between object and detector is much longer than traditional NR, which could be used to test radioactivity materials. With pre-reconstruction process from fold-cover projections, CSNI could easily realize tomography. This thesis carries out preliminary study on the nuclear fuel element testing by coded source neutron imaging. We calculate different enrichment, flaws and activity in nuclear fuel elements tested by CSNI with Monte-Carlo simulation. The results show that CSNI could be a useful testing method for nuclear fuel element testing. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Radiation Source Mapping with Bayesian Inverse Methods

In this work, we present a method to map the spectral and spatial distributions of radioactive sources using a limited number of detectors. Locating and identifying radioactive materials is important for border monitoring, in accounting for special nuclear material in processing facilities, and in cleanup operations following a radioactive material spill. Most methods to analyze these types of problems make restrictive assumptions about the distribution of the source. In contrast, the source mapping method presented here allows an arbitrary three-dimensional distribution in space and a gamma peak distribution in energy. To apply the method, the problem is cast as an inverse problem where the system’s geometry and material composition are known and fixed, while the radiation source distribution is sought. A probabilistic Bayesian approach is used to solve the resulting inverse problem since the system of equations is ill-posed. The posterior is maximized with a Newton optimization method. The probabilistic approach also provides estimates of the confidence in the final source map prediction. A set of adjoint, discrete ordinates flux solutions, obtained in this work by the Denovo code, is required to efficiently compute detector responses from a candidate source distribution. These adjoint fluxes form the linear mapping from the state space to the response space. The test of the method’s success is simultaneously locating a set of 137 Cs and 60 Co gamma sources in a room. This test problem is solved using experimental measurements that we collected for this purpose. Because of the weak sources available for use in the experiment, some of the expected photopeaks were not distinguishable from the Compton continuum. However, by supplanting 14 flawed measurements (out of a total of 69) with synthetic responses computed by MCNP, the proof-of-principle source mapping was successful. The locations of the sources were predicted within 25 cm for two of the sources and 90 cm for the third, in a room with an ~4-x 4-m floor plan. Finally, the predicted source intensities were within a factor of ten of their true value.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

SSR-6 Marking, Labelling, and Placarding of transport vehicle

This report discusses the proper methods of marking, labelling, and placarding radioactive material transport vehicles, using Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2018 Edition, Specific Safety Requirements, No. SSR-6 (Rev. 1).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Neutron radiation shielding material polyethylene: consequences of gamma irradiation - 15062

High and ultra-high molecular weight polyethylenes are high performance materials, which are predestined for a wide range of applications due to characteristics like high density, low weight, good dimensional stability, high chemical resistance, and high hydrogen content. These polymers are used in two demanding areas: as implant material in medical technology (only ultra-high molecular weight polyethylenes) and as a component for neutron shielding purposes in casks for storage and transport of radioactive waste. In the medical field (joint replacements) as well as during neutron radiation shielding application, high and ultra-high molecular weight polyethylenes are exposed to gamma irradiation: in the first case requested as sterilization process and for surface-crosslinking and in the second case existing as a side effect of inserting the radioactive material in the cask. Given that polyethylene as shielding material has to withstand any type of degradation affecting safety relevant aspects to be applicable for long-term radiation shielding purposes for instance over a period of 40 years, the durability of the material is of special interest. High molecular weight polyethylene (HMW-PE; LUPOLEN 5261Z; Lyondell Basell) and ultra-high molecular weight polyethylene (UHMW-PE; GUR 4120; Ticona) were subjected to gamma radiation and afterwards thermally treated. The gamma doses used are in the range of 50 to 600 kGy and irradiation takes place at RT using a Co-60 source. The planned thermal treatment will take place at a temperature of 125 deg.C for periods of minimum 30 days and maximum of five years. With the applied conventional analytical techniques it is possible to detect structural changes of both types of polyethylene induced by gamma irradiation and certainly of thermal treatment. Through gamma irradiation melting temperature, crystallinity, and density, respectively increased. Furthermore both polyethylenes get oxidized and cross-linked. With regard to the special application as neutron radiation shielding material in casks for storage and transport of radioactive materials, the impact of irradiation lead to changes of material properties. A consolidated view indicates that the detected changes of the irradiated (U)HMW-PE are not safety relevant for long-term neutron radiation shielding purposes over a period of 40 years in Germany. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Systematic study of variation in radiation data in cluttered environments

There are many challenges to overcome during nuclear nonproliferation measurements, including a wide variety of clutter sources that may be introduced into a scene during acquisition. The ability to understand how the dissimilarity of various objects, or clutter, obscures a detector’s field of view and affects the measured response of the detector improves the input to detection alarm and nuclide identification algorithms. Additionally, having the capability to input clutter variation into radiation transport models would allow for more real-world scenarios to be modeled and understood. Efforts at Oak Ridge National Laboratory have been exploring the ability to determine specific natural background radiation contributions from surroundings, such as buildings, soil, asphalt, and concrete, and use those source terms in large-scale (100 + m) models. The capability to quantify different clutter terms, ranging from humans to large vehicles, allows researchers to inject realistic noise into these models. The work reported herein seeks to explore the effects that clutter introduces to quantify the expected signal variation inherent to both controlled and uncontrolled scenarios, specifically how the introduction of clutter into a scene introduces a variation in signals due to the attenuation of naturally occurring radioactive material distributed within the scene or by introducing non-threatening radioactive materials into the scene. Controlled measurements aim to quantify how different types of clutter of varying size and composition affects the response of a radiation detector. Using results from various controlled tests, the systematic effects of clutter and its effect on radiation readings is analyzed.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Nondestructive Assay Technical Infrastructure Program Mission and Vision

The Nondestructive Assay Program (NDAP) mission and vision is achieved by identifying and accomplishing a set of programmatic goals that correspond with eight broad technical program elements. The NDAP was created as a result of Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Recommendation 2007-1, entitled “Safety-Related In Situ Nondestructive Assay of Radioactive Materials,” which emphasized the need to improve in situ measurements of radioactive material at US Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. An NDAP five-year plan will define tasks to accomplish specific goals identified in the NDAP mission and vision. This mission and vision is applicable for eight technical program elements: Hardware/Software Development, Algorithm Development and Nuclear Data, Uncertainty Quantification, Nuclear Materials, Staffing, Personnel, And Training, Data Management, Requirement and Standards, and Information Preservation and Dissemination. An additional program element is technical support, which provides daily execution management support for the NDAP, site scope, and deliverable tracking via site task managers, along with technical advisement and support from the technical support group. The NDAP mission and vision provides attributes with specific goals for each program element, and some goals benefit multiple program elements. The goals and attributes defined herein are implemented via an NDAP five-year execution plan that defines site work scope, budget, and deliverables, all of which are updated annually. The NDAP is designed to benefit nondestructive assay (NDA) needs to support DOE nuclear criticality safety programs, ensuring that NDA technology is sufficiently capable of guaranteeing the safety of those who handle, store, process, or transport fissionable materials in the complex. Especially important for the NDAP is to maximize capabilities to identify, characterize, and manage in situ fissile material deposits in process equipment to ensure nuclear criticality safety at processing facilities.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Induced Radioactivity in Recovered Skylab Materials

Four radioactive isotopes found in aluminum and stainless steel samples from Skylab debris were recovered in Australia. The low-level activity was induced by high-energy protons and neutrons in the space environment. Measurements of the specific activities are given.

Fishman, G. J.↗

User’s Manual for RESRAD-BUILD Code V.4: Vol. 1 – Methodology and Models Used in RESRAD-BUILD Code

The RESRAD-BUILD computer code models radionuclide release and transport in indoor environments and performs pathway analyses to evaluate the potential radiological dose and risk incurred by an individual who works or lives in a building contaminated with radioactive material or housing radioactively contaminated furniture or equipment. The code provides four geometries to characterize a radiation source: point, line, area, and volume, in which radionuclides are homogeneously distributed. Radionuclides contained in a source are considered to be released to the indoor air due to various processes including erosion (mechanically or weathering), diffusion (for tritium and radon in a volume source), or emanation (radon in a point, line, or area source). The release can proceed through different time phases with different rates. In RESRAD-BUILD Version 4.0, a dynamic ventilation model is implemented to simulate the fate and transport of source material particles and radionuclides after their releases. This dynamic ventilation model considers (1) air exchange between rooms in the building and between the rooms and the outdoor environment, (2) deposition from air to floor, (3) resuspension from the floor to the air, and (4) periodical vacuuming that reduces the floor deposition. The fate and transport modeling provides estimates of radionuclide concentrations in the source, in the air, and on the floor at different times, which are then integrated over the exposure duration for the calculation of radiation doses and cancer risks. A single run of the RESRAD-BUILD code can model a building with up to 9 rooms, 10 sources, and 10 receptors. The potential radiation dose and cancer risk incurred by each receptor are calculated for seven exposure pathways: (1) external radiation directly from the sources (accounting for shielding), (2) external radiation from radioactive particles deposited on the floors, (3) external radiation from airborne radionuclides, (4) inhalation of airborne radionuclides, (5) inhalation of radon and radon progenies, (6) inadvertent ingestion of radioactive particles directly from the source, and (7) ingestion of radioactive particles deposited on the floors. Various exposure scenarios can be modeled with RESRAD-BUILD, including but are not limited to, office worker, renovation worker, decontamination worker, building visitor, and resident. Both deterministic and probabilistic analyses can be performed to obtain results in both text reports and graphic displays.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗