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National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2020

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. Radionuclides in air from NNSS activities have been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this sources dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of manmade radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), specifically the National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (40 CFR 61, Subpart H, 2020) limits the release of radioactivity from a DOE facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent (EDE) to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS. This alternative was proposed and formerly submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are closer to radionuclide releases than where the public resides so they act as protective substitutes for public receptor locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in Table 2 of 40 CFR 61, Appendix E. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. The EPAapproved air transport model, called the Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) is also used to calculate the effective dose equivalent to the maximally exposed individual from NNSS air emissions. CAP88-PC was also used to calculate the population dose, or the collective EDE (expressed as person-rem [roentgen equivalent man] per year [person-rem/y]) for all individuals combined who reside within 80 kilometers (km) of NNSS emission sources. In 2020, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by both the air sampling data collected at critical receptor air monitoring stations and CAP88-PC modeling. The average concentrations of radioactivity at air critical receptor stations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 4.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. CAP88-PC modeling of all 2020 NNSS radionuclide emissions showed the maximally exposed individual to be in Amargosa Valley and this individual received a potential dose of 0.063 mrem/y. The collective dose was calculated to be 0.29 person-rem/year for the 521,300 people who lived within 80 km of NNSS emission sources.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

MO-F-16A-04: Case Study: Estimation of Peak Skin Dose Following a Physician Reported “High Dose” Case and Sentinel Event Considerations

Purpose: This work offers as a teaching example a reported high dose fluoroscopy case and the workflow the institution followed to self-report a radiation overdose sentinel event to the Joint Commission. Methods: Following the completion of a clinical case in a hybrid OR room with a reported air kerma of >18 Gy at the Interventional Reference Point (IRP) the physicians involved in the case referred study to the institution's Radiation Safety Committee (RSC) for review. The RSC assigned a Diagnostic Medical Physicist (DMP) to estimate the patient's Peak Skin Dose (PSD) and analyze the case. Following the DMP's analysis and estimate of a PSD of >15 Gy the institution's adverse event committee was convened to discuss the case and to self-report the case as a radiation overdose sentinel event to the Joint Commission. The committee assigned a subgroup to perform the root cause analysis and develop institutional responses to the event. Results: The self-reporting of the sentinel event and the associated root cause analysis resulted in several institutional action items that are designed to improve process and safety. A formal reporting and analysis mechanism was adopted to review fluoroscopy cases with air kerma greater than 6 Gy at the IRP. An improved and formalized radiation safety training program for physicians using fluoroscopy equipment was implemented. Additionally efforts already under way to monitor radiation exposure in the Radiology department were expanded to include all fluoroscopy equipment capable of automated dose reporting. Conclusion: The adverse event review process and the root cause analysis following the self-reporting of the sentinel event resulted in policies and procedures that are expected to improve the quality and safe usage of fluoroscopy throughout the institution.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions (CY 2019)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this source dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

STS-81 Flight Day 2

On this second day of the STS-81 mission, the flight crew, Cmdr. Michael A. Baker, Pilot Brent W. Jett, Mission Specialists, John M. Grunsfeld, Marsha S. Ivins, Peter J.K. Wisoff, and Jerry M. Linenger, continue to close in on The Mir Space Station. Payload work involves activating a radiation monitor in addition to the Biorack multipurpose facility which is designed to investigate the effects of microgravity and radiation on plant, tissue, cell and fungus growth. Mission Specialists Jeff Wisoff and John Grunsfeld spend much of their work day setting up and performing initial work in the experiment's glove box.

Source record↗

Chandra X-Ray Observatory's Radiation Environment and the AP-8/AE-8 Model

The Chandra X-ray Observatory (CXO) was launched on July 23, 1999 and reached its final orbit on August 7, 1999. The CXO is in a highly elliptical orbit, approximately 140,000 km x 10,000 km, and has a period of roughly 63.5 hours (approx. 2.6 days). It transits the Earth's Van Allen belts once per orbit during which no science observations can be performed due to the high radiation environment. The Chandra X-ray Observatory Center (CXC) currently uses the National Space Science Data Center's "near Earth" AP-8/AE-8 radiation belt model to predict the start and end times of passage through the radiation belts. However, our scheduling software only uses a simple dipole model of the Earth's magnetic field. The resulting B, L magnet coordinates, do not always give sufficiently accurate predictions of the start and end times of transit of the Van Allen belts. We show this by comparing to the data from Chandra's on-board radiation monitor, the EPHIN (Electron, Proton, Helium Instrument particle detector) instrument. We present evidence that demonstrates this mis- of the radiation belts as well as data that also demonstrate the significant variability of one radiation belt transit to the next as experienced by the CXO. We present an explanation for why the dipole implementation of the AP-8/AE-8 gives inaccurate results. We are also investigating use of the Magnetospheric Specification and Forecast Model (MSM) - a model that also accounts for radiation belt variability and geometry.

Virani, S. N.↗

2016 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data include direct radiation exposure, as well as radiation from the air, groundwater, meteorology, and vadose zone. This report summarizes the 2016 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports, developed by National Security Technologies, LLC Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS were all below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection system at the mixed low-level waste cell were below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2016, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 8% below average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 8% above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Vadose zone monitoring on Area 5 and Area 3 RWMS cell covers shows no evidence of precipitation percolating through the covers to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 150 centimeters (cm) (5 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS. During 2016, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. Forty-four percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter, which received 3 times the natural precipitation. All 2016 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

RCT Continuing Training: Radiological Emergency Response

Objectives: 1) List the revised initial response and supplemental actions while responding to a major injury inside of a radiological area; 2) List the initial response and supplemental actions while responding to a minor injury inside of a radiological area; 3) List the initial response and supplemental actions for responding to a Continuous Air Monitoring (CAM) alarm; 4) List the initial response and supplemental actions for responding to a radioactive spill; 5) List the initial response and supplemental actions of responding to an Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) alarm; 6) List the initial response and supplemental actions of an Electronic Personal Dosimeter (EPD) dose and dose rate alarm; 7) List the initial response and supplemental actions of responding to a Stationary Contamination Monitor (SCM) alarm; 8) Identify the methods to perform personnel decontamination.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

The Evolution of the Federal Monitoring and Assessment Center

The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) is a federal emergency response asset whose assistance may be requested by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and state and local agencies to respond to a nuclear or radiological incident. It is an interagency organization with representation from the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other federal agencies. FRMAC, in its present form, was created in 1987 when the radiological support mission was assigned to the DOE’s Nevada Operations Office by DOE Headquarters. The FRMAC asset, including its predecessor entities, was created, grew, and evolved to function as a response to radiological incidents. Radiological emergency response exercises showed the need for a coordinated approach to managing federal emergency monitoring and assessment activities. The mission of FRMAC is to coordinate and manage all federal radiological environmental monitoring and assessment activities during a nuclear or radiological incident within the United States in support of state ,local, tribal governments, DHS, and the federal coordinating agency. Radiological emergency response professionals with the DOE’s national laboratories support the Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC), the Aerial Measuring System (AMS), and the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS). These teams support the FRMAC to provide: Atmospheric transport modeling; Radiation monitoring; Radiological analysis and data assessments; and Medical advice for radiation injuries In support of field operations, the FRMAC provides geographic information systems, communications, mechanical, electrical, logistics, and administrative support. The size of the FRMAC is tailored to the incident and is comprised of emergency response professionals drawn from across the federal government. State and local emergency response teams may also integrate their operations with FRMAC, but are not required to.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Study on the biological effect of cosmic radiation and the development of radiation protection technology (L-11)

NASDA is now participating in a series of flight experiments on Spacelab missions. The first experiment was carried out on the first International Microgravity Laboratory Mission (IML-1) January 1992, and the second experiment will be conducted on the Spacelab-J Mission, First Materials Processing Test (FMPT). The equipment or Radiation Monitoring Container Devices (RMCD) includes passive dosimeter systems and biological specimens. The experiments using this hardware are designed by NASDA to measure and investigate the radiation levels inside spacecraft like space shuttle and to look at the basic effects of the space environment from the aspect of radiation biology. The data gathered will be analyzed to understand the details of biological effects as well as the physical nature of space radiation registered in the sensitive Solid-State Track Detectors (SSTD).

Nagaoka, Shunji↗

Offshore Radiation Observations for Climate Research at the CERES Ocean Validation Experiment

When radiometers on a satellite are pointed towards the planet with the goal of understanding a phenomenon quantitatively, rather than just creating a pleasing image, the task at hand is often problematic. The signal at the detector can be affected by scattering, absorption, and emission; and these can be due to atmospheric constituents (gases, clouds, and aerosols), the earth's surface, and subsurface features. When targeting surface phenomena, the remote sensing algorithm needs to account for the radiation associated with the atmospheric constituents. Likewise, one needs to correct for the radiation leaving the surface, when atmospheric phenomena are of interest. Rigorous validation of such remote sensing products is a real challenge. In visible and near infrared wavelengths, the jumble of effects on atmospheric radiation are best accomplished over dark surfaces with fairly uniform reflective properties (spatial homogeneity) in the satellite instrument's field of view (FOV). The ocean's surface meets this criteria; land surfaces - which are brighter, more spatially inhomogeneous, and more changeable with time - generally do not. NASA's Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy System (CERES) project has used this backdrop to establish a radiation monitoring site in Virginia's coastal Atlantic Ocean. The project, called the CERES Ocean Validation Experiment (COVE), is located on a rigid ocean platform allowing the accurate measurement of radiation parameters that require precise leveling and pointing unavailable from ships or buoys. The COVE site is an optimal location for verifying radiative transfer models and remote sensing algorithms used in climate research; because of the platform's small size, there are no island wake effects; and suites of sensors can be simultaneously trained both on the sky and directly on ocean itself. This paper describes the site, the types of measurements made, multiple years of atmospheric and ocean surface radiation observations, and satellite validation results.

Rutledge, Charles K.↗

Nevada National Security Site 2011 Waste Management Monitoring Report, Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data are associated with radiation exposure, air, groundwater, meteorology, and vadose zone. This report summarizes the 2011 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports. Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data show tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are only slightly above detection limits and background levels. The measured levels of radionuclides in air particulates and moisture are below derived concentration guides for these radionuclides. During the last 2 weeks of March 2011, gamma spectroscopy results for air particles showed measurable activities of iodine-131 ( 131 I), cesium-134 ( 134 Cs), and cesium-137 ( 137 Cs). These results are attributed to the release of fission products from the damaged Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan. The remaining gamma spectroscopy results for air particulates collected at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS were below minimum detectable concentrations. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS were all below established investigation levels. The 86.3 millimeters (mm) (3.40 inches [in.]) of precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS during 2011 is 44% below the average of 154.1 mm (6.07 in.), and the 64.8 mm (2.55 in.) of precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS during 2011 is 47% below the average of 122.4 mm (4.82 in.). Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Automated vadose zone monitoring on Area 5 RWMS operational waste covers was not done during 2011 due to construction of the final evapotranspiration cover at these monitoring locations. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 122 centimeters (4 feet) in the vegetated final mono-layer cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS before being removed by evapotranspiration. During 2011, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 feet) of soil from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. Ten percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter that received 3 times natural precipitation. All 2011 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facility PAs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site 2012 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area: 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data are associated with radiation exposure, air, groundwater, meteorology, and vadose zone. This report summarizes the 2012 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports (National Security Technologies, LLC, 2012; 2013a; 2013b). Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data show tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are only slightly above detection limits and background levels. The measured levels of radionuclides in air particulates and moisture are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS were all below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection system at the mixed low-level waste cell were below established contaminant regulatory limits. The 133.9 millimeters (mm) (5.27 inches [in.]) of precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS during 2012 is 12% below the average of 153.0 mm (6.02 in.), and the 137.6 mm (5.42 in.) of precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS during 2012 is 11% below the average of 122.4 mm (4.82 in.). Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Automated vadose zone monitoring on Area 5 and Area 3 RWMS cell covers show no evidence of precipitation percolating through the cover to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 60 centimeters (cm) (2 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS, and moisture from precipitation and irrigation did not percolate below 45 cm (1.5 ft) on the 92-Acre Area final cover. Irrigation was applied to this cover for seed germination and plant growth. During 2012, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. Twenty percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter that received 3 times natural precipitation. All 2012 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facility PAs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site 2013 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These data are associated with radiation exposure, air, groundwater, meteorology, and vadose zone. This report summarizes the 2013 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports (National Security Technologies, LLC, 2013; 2014a; 2014b). Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data show tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are close to detection limits and background levels. The measured levels of radionuclides in air particulates and moisture are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS were all below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection system at the mixed low-level waste cell were below established contaminant regulatory limits. The 105.8 millimeters (mm) (4.17 inches [in.]) of precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS during 2013 is 30% below the average of 150.3 mm (5.92 in.), and the 117.5 mm (4.63 in.) of precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS during 2013 is 5% below the average of 123.6 mm (4.86 in.). Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Automated vadose zone monitoring on Area 5 and Area 3 RWMS cell covers show no evidence of precipitation percolating through the cover to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 60 centimeters (cm) (2 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS, and moisture from precipitation and irrigation did not percolate below 45 cm (1.5 ft) on the 92-Acre Area final cover. Irrigation was applied to this cover for seed germination and plant growth. During 2013, there was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. Twenty percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter that received 3-times natural precipitation. All 2013 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facility PAs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Application of MODIS-Derived Active Fire Radiative Energy to Fire Disaster and Smoke Pollution Monitoring

The radiative energy emitted by large fires and the corresponding smoke aerosol loading are simultaneously measured from the MODIS sensor from both the Terra and Aqua satellites. Quantitative relationships between the rates of emission of fire radiative energy and smoke are being developed for different fire-prone regions of the globe. Preliminary results are presented. When fully developed, the system will enable the use of MODIS direct broadcast fire data for near real-time monitoring of fire strength and smoke emission as well as forecasting of fire progression and smoke dispersion, several hours to a few days in advance.

Ichoku, Charles↗

Verification of Dosimetry Measurements with Timepix Pixel Detectors for Space Applications

The current capabilities of modern pixel-detector technology has provided the possibility to design a new generation of radiation monitors. Timepix detectors are semiconductor pixel detectors based on a hybrid configuration. As such, the read-out chip can be used with different types and thicknesses of sensors. For space radiation dosimetry applications, Timepix devices with 300 and 500 microns thick silicon sensors have been used by a collaboration between NASA and University of Houston to explore their performance. For that purpose, an extensive evaluation of the response of Timepix for such applications has been performed. Timepix-based devices were tested in many different environments both at ground-based accelerator facilities such as HIMAC (Heavy Ion Medical Accelerator in Chiba, Japan), and at NSRL (NASA Space Radiation Laboratory at Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton, NY), as well as in space on board of the International Space Station (ISS). These tests have included a wide range of the particle types and energies, from protons through iron nuclei. The results have been compared both with other devices and theoretical values. This effort has demonstrated that Timepix-based detectors are exceptionally capable at providing accurate dosimetry measurements in this application as verified by the confirming correspondence with the other accepted techniques.

Kroupa, M.↗

Local Radiation Shielding Design Methodology

The NSLS-II accelerators are housed within a radiation enclosure of normal concrete (and in some places high density concrete) that has been designed to reduce the radiation generated from an assumed operational beam loss or bulk shielding current (BCS) from each accelerator. The beam loss model used to estimate the thickness of this bulk shielding, assumed a beam energy at the expected operating energy and a current loss based on reasonable assumptions for the fraction of the expected operating current. The thickness of the shield was determined to be the amount required to reduce the radiation outside the shield to a maximum dose rate of <0.5mrem/hr. for occupied areas for these normal operational losses. These assumed beam losses and the bulk shielding thicknesses required are given in reference [1]. Abnormal operating conditions generating higher than normal beam losses must also be considered, and additional engineering controls will be required depending on the magnitude of the radiation levels generated during the abnormal condition. Additional local shielding subject to configuration control may be utilized to reduce radiation levels associated with these abnormal loss conditions. Interlocked area radiation monitors are another means to prevent continued operation with higher than an acceptable level. The NSLS-II Shielding Policy requires that an engineered system be utilized to mitigate an abnormal condition producing radiation levels greater than 100 mR/h, and that two systems are required if the projected radiation levels during a fault condition are > 2000 mR/h. It is intended that shielding limits the dose rate to < 0.5 mR/h in occupied areas for normal operational losses, and the combination of administrative and engineered controls for abnormal losses will maintain radiation exposure to trained personnel working at the NSLS-II facility to as low as reasonably achievable. It is anticipated that all individual exposures will be well within the planned administrative control level of 100mrem/year. This technical note presents the method used to identify these potential high beam loss locations, evaluate the potential radiation risk these losses create outside the enclosure shield and the design process that specifies the required local radiation shielding needed to reduce this risk below the maximum dose rate of the bulk shield design, listed above. If shielding can’t be adequately provided or if other fault initiated losses could occur, then the necessary engineering controls will be indicated that will limit the energy, current or duration of the beam transport that constitute this high beam loss risk.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2018 (Revision 0)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; and CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. The locations of the sites are shown in Figure ES-1. This report covers calender year 2018. The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted annually at CAUs 90, 91, and 112; semiannually at CAUs 92 and 110; and quarterly at CAU 111. Additional inspections are conducted at CAUs 92 and 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inch in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. At CAUs 110 and 111, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted in addition to the visual inspections. At CAU 110 the site fence, gate, lock and use restriction signs are evaluated. At CAU 111, an ecological survey, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are also conducted. This report will address all monitoring item notes above except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 6 of Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remains in effect until December 10, 2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗