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At least 253 records · Page 14

Stranded Fuel, Orphan Sites, Dead Plants: Transportation Planning Considerations After the BRC Report - 13393

The author explores transportation, packaging and storage questions related to a primary recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future; i.e., that fuel from shutdown plants be removed to consolidated storage as soon as possible to enable final decommissioning and beneficial re-use of those sites. The paper discusses the recommendations of the BRC, the implications and challenges that implementing those recommendations present, and provides recommended solutions for beginning the multi-year planning, coordination, material acquisition, and communications processes that will be needed to move fuel from shutdown plants when a destination site becomes available. Removal of used nuclear fuel from shutdown reactor sites (which are serving no other purpose other than storing SNF and GTCC, at considerable expense) was a central recommendation of the BRC, for a number of reasons. This recommendation was one of the most widely acclaimed that the Commission put forward. However, there are significant challenges (such as availability of fuel canister overpacks, lack of infrastructure, handling constraints and others) that will need to be addressed, apart from the critically important identification of a suitable and workable storage destination site. Resolving these logistical challenges will need to begin even before a destination site is identified, given the long lead-times required for planning and procurement. Based on information available today, it is possible to make informed predictions about what will be needed to modify existing contractual arrangements with utilities, address equipment and infrastructure needs, and begin working with states, tribes and local governments to start initial preparation needs. If DOE, working with industry and other experienced parties, can begin planning and acquisition activities in the near term, overall schedule risk can be reduced and potential cost avoidance achieved. The most immediate benefit will accrue to the operators of the shutdown plants, but beginning to accept fuel as required under the NWPA will reduce the liability to the federal government, and also offer some assurance to other utilities and the public that DOE (or another entity if one is established) is capable of meeting its obligations under the NWPA. The indirect benefits, therefore, will be quite broad. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Frozen Soil Barrier to Control Groundwater Inflow into Damaged Reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station - 16613

Reactor buildings and support facilities at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (F1 Site) were damaged by a March 2011 tsunami. In response, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) is implementing a number of countermeasures to limit the releases and impacts of contaminated water to the surrounding environment. The diverse countermeasures work together in an integrated manner to provide different types, and several levels, of environmental protection. In general, the strategy represents an example of a 'defense in depth' concept that is used for nuclear facilities around the world. One of the key countermeasures is a frozen soil barrier encircling the damaged reactor facilities. The frozen barrier is intended to limit the flow of water into the area, reduce the amount of water entering damaged reactors, and reduce the resulting volume of contaminated water that requires treatment and storage. The frozen soil barrier was designed and installed by a team from TEPCO and Kajima Corporation. A group of scientists and engineers from US Department of Energy National Laboratories provided independent evaluation of the frozen barrier design and operational plans along with technical recommendations to the TEPCO team. The frozen soil barrier design extends to about 30 m depth; the bottom of the barrier is in a low permeability interval, and the total barrier length around the reactors is just over 1.5 km. The barrier required 1927 total boreholes: 1568 for freeze pipes plus 359 for temperature monitoring arrays. Drilling of all of the boreholes was completed November 9, 2015. Construction of the refrigeration plant is complete and all of the above ground piping/manifolds are in the final stages of construction. The DOE laboratory independent assessment of the frozen soil barrier concluded that the technical characteristics of a frozen barrier are relatively well suited to Fukushima-specific hydrogeologic conditions and the need for reducing the inflow of water into damaged reactors at the F1 Site. The scale of the Fukushima barrier is bounded by industry experience and the equipment and infrastructure proposed for the ground freezing is well understood. The on-site pilot test at Fukushima indicated predictable ground freezing and supported the full scale design parameters. These factors increase the confidence in the frozen soil barrier project underway at Fukushima. TEPCO is currently working with the Japanese Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA), providing operational plans/strategies for the frozen soil barrier and modeling results of the projected performance. Full scale frozen soil barrier operations are to begin after authorization from NRA. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites - 2016 Update - 17086

An updated evaluation of removing used or spent nuclear fuel (SNF)2 from 13 shutdown nuclear power reactor sites was conducted during 2016. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites included in the evaluation were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, and Vermont Yankee. The evaluation was divided into four components: (1) characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory, (2) a description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites, (3) an evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and transportation experience, including identification of gaps in information, and (4) an evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. Updates to the evaluation since 2015 include incorporating spent nuclear fuel data from the GC-859 database; updating of Google Earth imagery; incorporating revisions to transportation certificates of compliance; adding information obtained from site visits to the Pacific Sun Railroad and Camp Pendleton, California; adding rail assessments for Kewaunee, Crystal River, and San Onofre to the evaluation; and adding information obtained from the site visit to Vermont Yankee. As additional sites such as Fort Calhoun, Palisades, Clinton, Quad Cities, Pilgrim, Oyster Creek, and Diablo Canyon shut down, these sites will be included in updates to the evaluation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Proposed guidance for preparing and reviewing a molten salt non-power production or utilization facility application

Development of non-power molten salt reactors (MSRs) are under consideration to further establish an MSR experience base, support the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.43(e), and provide any additional analyses needed for development of a full-scale MSR. Guidance provided in this report is based on MSRs operating with liquid fuel (i.e., fuel dissolved within a molten salt). These reactors, unless owned by the DOE or DOD, will require licensing by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff. Standard review plan (SRP) guidance for large light water reactors (LWRs) is available in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants; Light Water Reactor (LWR) Edition. However, NRC staff observed that NUREG-0800 is very cumbersome to apply to non-power reactors “because of the great differences in complexity and hazards between non-power reactors and nuclear power plants.” Therefore, a program to develop performance-based guidance applicable to non-power reactors was initiated. In 1996, NUREG-1537, Parts 1 and 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, was published. Part 1, the format and content guide, suggests a uniform format for presenting information in non-power reactor applications that is acceptable to the NRC staff, but conformance with the format and content is not required. Part 2, the SRP, ensures the quality and uniformity of the staff review of an application. Unfortunately, the application guidelines and SRP do not provide adequate guidance for all advanced non-LWR technologies and applications. This discrepancy eventually led to the 2012 development of interim staff guidance (ISG) for NUREG-1537, which includes criteria for describing and reviewing aqueous homogeneous reactors (AHRs). Specifically, NUREG-1537 ISG, 2012 expanded the original document to address three areas: 1. updated criteria for heterogeneous non-power reactors, 2. criteria for licensing AHRs, and 3. criteria for licensing a Part 50-licensed isotope production facility. In 2015, the US Department of Energy (DOE) opted to build on the AHR NUREG-1537 ISG experience by performing a gap analysis of the guidance that would be used to license a non-power MSR. MSRs represent one of the advanced non-LWR technologies selected by DOE for development through a multiyear cost share award with Southern Company Services. Under this Advanced Reactor Concepts 2015 (DOE Advanced Reactor Concepts [ARC] 15) award program, the DOE tasked Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the guidance changes that the NRC may need to consider when licensing an MSR non-power reactor. ORNL staff, with support from Boston Government Services, LLC, focused on five system-related chapters in NUREG-1537 that were considered most relevant to inform the effort that would be required for a non-power MSR applicant. ORNL documented this review in a technical report, ORNL/TM-2018/834, Proposed Guidance for Preparing and Reviewing Molten Salt Non-Power Reactor License Applications (NUREG-1537). The report was subsequently shared with industry and the NRC. The 2018 review was limited in scope, focusing on key system chapters based on the expected significance of each chapter relative to expected differences in addressing advanced non-LWR technologies, specifically non-power MSRs, compared with heterogeneously fueled non-power reactors. In the ORNL report, proposed generic adaptations were suggested for the following NUREG-1537 chapters: Chapter 4, “Reactor Description”; Chapter 5, “Reactor Coolant Systems”; Chapter 6, “Engineered Safety Features”; Chapter 9, “Auxiliary Systems”; Chapter 11, “Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management” The inclusion of Chapter 11 in the previous review effort was intended to provide guidance for categorizing the waste-handling process for an MSR operating with homogenous fuel. The introductions from Parts 1 and 2 of the 2012 NUREG-1537 ISG provide guidance for the application and review of production facilities. After a period of operation, non-power MSRs with homogenous fuel will include gaseous and soluble fission products. The gaseous fission products will be collected and held for decay in an off-gas system. There might also be an initiative to polish or filter the soluble fission products in the fuel salt by some mechanical or chemical means. The treatment and handling of fission products in the non-power MSR fuel salt and the description of this process in the safety analysis report (SAR) must be very precise to avoid the waste treatment facility being construed as a co-located special nuclear material (SNM) fuel cycle facility (see Section 2.3 of this report). Subsequent to the release of ORNL/TM-2018/834, NRC staff expressed a desire to continue the regulatory gap analysis that was begun in that report. This would provide additional clarity and information addressed in certain sections of the original report, while also providing new guidance on certain topics not addressed in the original report. This revision would benefit the NRC staff reviewing applications involving non-power MSR designs and would help developers understand how the NRC staff might approach the review of such applications. The focus of this report is to provide infrastructure support to the NRC staff for the regulatory review of non-power MSRs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Addressing Human and Organizational Factors in Nuclear Industry Modernization: An Operationally Focused Approach to Process and Methodology

Utility owners and operators of commercial nuclear power plants in the United States (U.S.) are and will be modernizing their nuclear power plants by performing a digital transformation involving design of an integrated set of systems that together enable a technology centric operating plant. The Plant Modernization Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program has a strategic action plan that lays the groundwork for a digital transformation of the nuclear industry. The model for this transformation is an advanced concept of operations, with an end point vision, “To achieve the maximum aggregate benefit enabled by this digital transformation.” To achieve this, the digital infrastructure for a nuclear plant must be designed as an integrated set of systems that together enable a technology centric operating model. The digital transformation process obviously needs to involve technology considerations and systems engineering, but it also needs to include human and organizational expertise. Thus, human and organizational factors, including sociotechnical systems methods and techniques (e.g., Cognitive Systems Engineering, Systems Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes, human systems integration, and Macroergonomics) need to be considered for digital transformation projects in order to effectively integrate human and organizational expertise efforts into the new work system that results from nuclear power plant digital modernization. That is, the work system is the basic unit of sociotechnical systems analysis and contains three components: personnel, technical, and organization and management. These components should be jointly optimized with respect to the interdependence of systems performance criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and safety. Joint optimization can be achieved through the application of three human and organization functions: knowledge representation, knowledge elicitation, and cross-functional integration. This report provides a strategic framework for effective integration of human and organizational expertise within nuclear power plant digital modernization efforts.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security Program: Cybersecurity Scenarios

The use of digital control systems and automation in advanced nuclear power systems introduces different types of vulnerabilities compared to legacy (i.e. analog) control systems that cyber adversaries can exploit. These vulnerabilities pose a challenge to reactor operators and cyber operations staff due to the dynamic nature of the event in which a human response or a lack of response can potentially evolve into a worsening plant condition. Using the Department of Homeland Security Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) critical infrastructure exercise framework, this document presents several cyber security scenarios typical of digital control systems that could be used in advanced reactor designs. These scenarios can be used in tabletop exercises to evaluate cyber security posture or conduct training on different aspects of cyber security, including detection, threat hunting using indicators of compromise, evaluating incident response, risk mitigation, incident reporting, information sharing and recovery.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Data Collection Methods for Validation of Advanced Multi-Resolution Fast Reactor Simulations

In pool-type Sodium Fast Reactors (SFR) the regions most susceptible to thermal striping are the upper instrumentation structure (UIS) and the intermediate heat exchanger (IHX). This project experimentally and computationally (CFD) investigated the thermal mixing in the region exiting the reactor core to the UIS. The thermal mixing phenomenon was simulated using two vertical jets at different velocities and temperatures as prototypic of two adjacent channels out of the core. Thermal jet mixing of anticipated flows at different temperatures and velocities were investigated. Velocity profiles are measured throughout the flow region using Ultrasonic Doppler Velocimetry (UDV), and temperatures along the geometric centerline between the jets were recorded using a thermocouple array. CFD simulations, using COMSOL, were used to initially understand the flow, then to design the experimental apparatus and finally to compare simulation results and measurements characterizing the flows. The experimental results and CFD simulations show that the flow field is characterized into three regions with respective transitions, namely, convective mixing, (flow direction) transitional, and post-mixing. Both experiments and CFD simulations support this observation. For the anticipated SFR conditions the flow is momentum dominated and thus thermal mixing is limited due to the short flow length associated from the exit of the core to the bottom of the UIS. This means that there will be thermal striping at any surface where poorly mixed streams impinge; rather unless lateral mixing is ‘actively promoted out of the core, thermal striping will prevail. Furthermore we note that CFD can be considered a ‘separate effects (computational) test’ and is recommended as part of any integral analysis. To this effect, poorly mixed streams then have potential impact on the rest of the SFR design and scaling, especially placement of internal components, such as the IHX that may see poorly mixed streams. Finally, due to lack or infrastructural support for carrying out sodium experiments, only water experiments and CFD studies were realized in, an otherwise sodium approved facility.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Nuclear Hybrid Energy Systems Regional Studies: West Texas & Northeastern Arizona

The primary objective of this study is to conduct a preliminary dynamic analysis of two realistic hybrid energy systems (HES) including a nuclear reactor as the main baseload heat generator (denoted as nuclear HES or nuclear hybrid energy systems [[NHES]) and to assess the local (e.g., HES owners) and system (e.g., the electric grid) benefits attainable by the application of NHES in scenarios with multiple commodity production and high penetration of renewable energy. It is performed for regional cases not generic examples based on available resources, existing infrastructure, and markets within the selected regions. This study also briefly addresses the computational capabilities developed to conduct such analyses, reviews technical gaps, and suggests some research paths forward.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Nuclear Power Plant Sites - 2018 - 19101

This is a technical paper that does not take into account the contractual limitations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). Under the provisions of the Standard Contract, DOE does not consider spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters to be an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract provisions prevail. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Integrated Waste Management (DOE-IWM) continues to conduct evaluations of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from shutdown nuclear power plant sites. The 14 shutdown sites included in the evaluation to date have nuclear power reactors that have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The 14 shutdown sites are Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, Vermont Yankee, and Fort Calhoun. The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station ceased operations in September 2018 and will be included in future evaluations. The evaluations of the shutdown sites contain four components: - A characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory; - A description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites; - An evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and experience at the shutdown sites - An evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. The primary sources for the inventory of SNF were the DOE GC-859 and RW-859 spent nuclear fuel inventory databases. This inventory has been augmented with data obtained from the shutdown sites for SNF discharges that occurred after June 2013. The primary sources for information on the conditions of site and near-site transportation infrastructure and experience included field observations and information collected during visits to the 14 shutdown sites, information provided by managers and staff at the shutdown sites, and Google Earth imagery. Extensive photographs taken during the shutdown site visits have proven to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at and near the shutdown sites. Tribal and state representatives, State and Regional Group representatives, and Federal Railroad Administration representatives have participated in 11 of the shutdown site visits. In addition to visiting the shutdown site, site visits often include activities such as meeting with local railroads to discuss the near-site railroad infrastructure and meeting with community engagement panels. Oyster Creek permanently ceased power operations on September 17, 2018 and fuel was removed from the reactor vessel on September 25, 2018. Planning for the Oyster Creek site visit has begun and is conducted in three stages. In the first stage, data and documents that are applicable to Oyster Creek are collected. In the second stage, questions are developed based on the data and documents collected during the first stage. These questions are submitted to the Oyster Creek site approximately one month before the site visit. The third stage involves establishing specific schedules and participants. Participants will likely include tribal and state representatives, the Council of State Governments - Eastern Regional Conference, and the Federal Railroad Administration. State participation will likely include a representative of the State Rail Safety Participation Program, the New Jersey Department of Transportation, and the New Jersey Bureau of Nuclear Engineering. The site visit is tentatively expected to occur in April or May of 2019. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Demonstration of an All-Refractory Corrosion-Resistant Molten Salt Pumping and Storage Infrastructure Up to 950 degrees C

Concentrating solar power (CSP) with thermal energy storage (TES) has an estimated cost similar to solar photovoltaics (PV) with lithium-ion batteries (LIB), but CSP + TES has the potential for significantly reduced cost by operating above 700 degrees C. However, this requires a TES medium and containment infrastructure which are chemically compatible and do not degrade above 700 degrees C. MgCl2-KCl-NaCl (MKN) salt is a promising medium, but when MKN salt has small amounts of water and oxygen dissolved in it, it excessively corrodes conventional commercial alloys. Here, we consider refractory materials including graphite, carbon-carbon composite (C/C), and molybdenum because they maintain high mechanical strength at elevated temperatures and are expected to resist corrosion by MKN salt. While selection of refractory materials is often constrained by the need to remain chemically stable in air, this work uses an enclosure filled with inert gas to allow the use of materials like graphite and molybdenum. Notably, graphite components can seal against liquids unlike many brittle refractory materials. We demonstrate a centrifugal pump and mechanical seals made of refractory materials in a laboratory-scale circulation loop, which successfully operated continuously for more than 49 h at temperatures ranging from 750 degrees C to 950 degrees C with no mechanical failures or chemical degradation of the refractory materials. To the best of our knowledge, this is the highest temperature molten salt circulation loop that has been successfully developed, and this refractory infrastructure allows for operation at even much higher temperatures (<1600 degrees C) if a storage medium with a lower vapor pressure is used. The principles of this architecture are relevant to other applications with high temperature flowing metals and salts including Generation IV nuclear fission reactors for power production and molten salt electrolysis reactors for metallurgical processing.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Seismic Isolation Working Meeting Gap Analysis Report

The ultimate goal in nuclear facility and nuclear power plant operations is operating safety during normal operations and maintaining core cooling capabilities during off-normal events including external hazards. Understanding the impact external hazards, such as flooding and earthquakes, have on nuclear facilities and NPPs is critical to deciding how to manage these hazards to expectable levels of risk. From a seismic risk perspective the goal is to manage seismic risk. Seismic risk is determined by convolving the seismic hazard with seismic fragilities (capacity of systems, structures, and components (SSCs)). There are large uncertainties associated with evolving nature of the seismic hazard curves. Additionally there are requirements within DOE and potential requirements within NRC to reconsider updated seismic hazard curves every 10 years. Therefore opportunity exists for engineered solutions to manage this seismic uncertainty. One engineered solution is seismic isolation. Current seismic isolation (SI) designs (used in commercial industry) reduce horizontal earthquake loads and protect critical infrastructure from the potentially destructive effects of large earthquakes. The benefit of SI application in the nuclear industry is being recognized and SI systems have been proposed, in the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 4 standard, to be released in 2014, for Light Water Reactors (LWR) facilities using commercially available technology. However, there is a lack of industry application to the nuclear industry and uncertainty with implementing the procedures outlined in ASCE-4. Opportunity exists to determine barriers associated with implementation of current ASCE-4 standard language.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Nondestructive Evaluation of Concrete within Nuclear Applications

Structural defects that develop over the lifetime of nuclear power plants (NPPs) could threaten the safety and security of the concrete infrastructure. Developing a reliable nondestructive evaluation (NDE) method to evaluate the damage in NPPs and their associated structures will greatly improve the long-term operation and safety of NPPs. The purpose of the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability program is to develop technologies and other solutions that can improve the reliability, sustain the safety, and extend the operating lifetimes of NPPs beyond 60 years. This report describes the progress made toward growing NDE capabilities for NPPs. It also documents expanded collaborations with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and future opportunities to collaborate with industry partners (i.e., vendors and utilities) and university partners. These collaborations will continue to stand as a framework to provide value to stakeholders by reducing uncertainties and potential delayed maintenance costs in NPPs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Innovations in Nuclear Infrastructure and Education

The decision to implement the Innovation in Nuclear Infrastructure and Engineering Program (INIE) was an important first step towards ensuring that the United States preserves its worldwide leadership role in the field of nuclear science and engineering. Prior to INIE, university nuclear science and engineering programs were waning, undergraduate student enrollment was down, university research reactors were being shut down, while others faced the real possibility of closure. For too long, cutting edge research in the areas of nuclear medicine, neutron scattering, radiochemistry, and advanced materials was undervalued and therefore underfunded. The INIE program corrected this lapse in focus and direction and started the process of drawing a new blueprint with positive goals and objectives that supports existing as well the next generation of educators, students and researchers.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Simulation of Wave Propagation for Nuclear Facility Acoustic Communications

Elastic waves are often used in non-destructive testing (NDT) to detect material defects in metal pipes. In NDT methodology, high-frequency elastic waves are launched into a pipe with an ultrasonic transducer. Material defects comparable in size to wavelength scatter ultrasonic waves, and analysis of scattered signal allows quantifying the defect and its location. As a variation of NDT technology, ultrasonic transducers placed at the ends of a pipe, and operating at wavelengths larger than typical micro-crack sizes, can act as a transmitter and receiver of information. By modulating transducer signal to send information encoded with elastic waves across a metal pipe, we attempt to create a communication channel. By taking advantage of existing piping infrastructure of thermal hydraulic systems, such communication links would allow the transmission of information across physical barriers in a nuclear facility.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Instrumentation, Controls, and Human-Machine Interface Technology Development Roadmap in Support of Grid Appropriate Reactors

Grid Appropriate Reactors (GARs) are a component of the U.S. Department of Energy s (DOE s) Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program. GARs have smaller output power (<~600 MWe), than those intended for deployment on large, tightly coupled grids. This smaller size is important in avoiding grid destabilization, which can result from having a large fraction of a grid s electrical generation supplied by a single source. GARs are envisioned to be deployed worldwide often in locations without extensive nuclear power experience. DOE recently sponsored the creation of an Instrumentation, Controls, and Human-Machine Interface (ICHMI) technology development roadmap emphasizing the specific characteristics of GARs [1]. This roadmapping effort builds upon and focuses the recently developed, more general nuclear energy ICHMI technology development roadmap [2]. The combination of the smaller plant size, smaller grids, and deployment in locations without extensive prior nuclear power experience presents particular infrastructure, regulation, design, operational, and safeguards challenges for effective GAR deployment. ICHMI technologies are central to efficient GAR operation and as such are a dimension of each of these challenges. Further, while the particular ICHMI technologies to be developed would be useful at larger power plants, they are not high-priority development items at the larger plants. For example, grid transient resilience would be a useful feature for any reactor/grid combination and indeed would have limited some recent blackout events. However, most large reactors have limited passive cooling features. Large plants with active safety response features will likely preserve trip preferential grid transient response. This contrasts sharply with GARs featuring passive shutdown cooling, which can safely support grid stability during large grid transients. ICHMI technologies ranging from alternative control algorithms to simplified human-interface system designs are key to enabling GARs to respond properly and thereby stabilize the grid during transients.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Crossroads of Nonproliferation and Safeguarding Technologies for Implementation in Molten Salt Reactors

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) recently conducted a workshop endorsed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under the auspices of the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D (DNN R&D) Office's Safeguards Portfolio. The workshop's primary objective was to foster an engaging dialogue among researchers, with a specialized emphasis on the safeguards pertaining to molten salt reactors. At INL, the installation of the state-of-the-art Molten Salt Thermophysical Examination Capability (MSTEC) is underway. This shielded argon glovebox facility, designed for both irradiated and non-irradiated actinide materials, represents the cutting edge of research infrastructure. MSTEC is poised to serve as a pivotal research platform in the realm of molten salt technology, with significant implications for safeguards applications. Participants of the workshop had the opportunity to tour the facilities, including the site where MSTEC is being installed, as well as to observe the INL's molten salt and pyroprocessing research hot cells. The event featured insightful presentations delving into molten salt chemistry and the MSTEC project. Each participating laboratory contributed to the discourse with presentations on their respective research efforts addressing safeguards in relation to molten salt reactors. The workshop culminated with a generative brainstorming session, where participants shared their thoughts on strategic integration with partner agencies, aiming to synergize efforts in advancing the field of nuclear safeguards.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Status of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Software Development and Application (FY2024)

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 is a simulation tool used to perform deterministic analysis of anticipated events as well as design basis and beyond design basis accidents for advanced liquid-metal-cooled nuclear reactors. With its origin as SAS1A in the late 1960s, the SAS series of codes has been under continuous use and development for over fifty years. It has been identified as a critical element of safety analysis capabilities for the U.S. Department of Energy and is utilized within industry to perform the transient safety analyses required to support the licensing of Liquid Metal-cooled Fast Reactors (LMFRs). This report summarizes the code development and update activities carried out during FY2024. In FY2024, programmatic activities focused on key improvements to software useability, such as enhanced user interfaces for reactivity feedback modeling, improvements in stability/useability of the Code Manual, and improvements to the acceptance testing infrastructure, including automation of acceptance testing and generation of the Acceptance Testing Report. To support end user applications, an open training was held, a semi-public forum was maintained, and a practical benchmarking and validation matrix was developed which allowed limitations of existing testing capabilities to be assessed. The existing fuel models were also enhanced with improved modeling capabilities and testing for the oxide and annular fuel models.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Test and Evaluation of Radiofrequency Tamper Indicating Devices for Remote Monitoring of Advanced/Small Modular Reactors

Advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs), due to their versatile nature, are likely to be used in remote locations to provide electrical power or other services in regions that are difficult to access or have limited transportation infrastructure. This will result in limited on-site staff, therefore driving A/SMR vendors to consider remote monitoring as a solution to support nuclear security. Maintaining Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of nuclear material quantities and locations is vital to nuclear security, and remote monitoring of active tamper indicating devices (TIDs) has been well established as a component of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards since the early 2000s. Active TIDs, such as radiofrequency TIDs (RFTIDs), immediately alarm upon unauthorized access attempts, promoting timely detection. In contrast, passive TIDs require a surveillance regime and offer delayed detection. Active TIDs deter insiders and enable prompt detection of malicious acts. They can be used on nuclear material containers and controlled entry points like vaults and toolboxes. Therefore, the implementation of RFTIDs into security programs bolsters overall nuclear material control, and provides a visible deterrent, with primary efficacy in mitigating the insider threat and potentially allowing for Security by Design considerations. They are a strong candidate technology for maintaining nuclear security of A/SMRs but need to be evaluated for feasibility and implementation into the wider physical protection system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗