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Fallout Cloud Regimes

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), and other organizations maintain operational nuclear explosion and atmospheric dispersion models to provide critical guidance on the expected effects of an accidental or deliberate explosion of a nuclear weapon (in this paper simply referred to as “device”). To be effective, these models must represent, as accurately as possible, the complex interactions of the blast, fire, and residual radiological hazards with the environment and population. One hundred atmospheric nuclear tests that form the basis for many models were conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) (now referred to as the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, NNSS) in a dry desert environment. Other environments should be studied, but have less data available and are beyond the scope of the work presented in this paper. The debris clouds produced by the NTS tests, frequently called “mushroom clouds,” are familiar, with common structural elements such as a buoyant cap connected to a skirt of raised dust at the desert surface by a thin, dirt-filled stem. The film scanning project at LLNL has investigated historical film records of nuclear weapons tests. Here, we summarize findings showing that the mushroom cloud behavior for historic U.S. tests conducted in Nevada, has similar characteristics based on the distance of the device from the ground surface or Height of Burst (HOB), scaled by the energy release, or yield, of the device. This scaled height is referred to as the scaled-height-of-burst (SHOB). The findings discussed below show that mushroom clouds look and behave similarly when detonated at the same SHOB. The amount of residual radiation that is produced by a nuclear detonation is proportional to the yield. But, the amount of that residual radiation that actually becomes local fallout is strongly dependent on the SHOB and the type of surface over which the detonation occurs. In order to develop a more comprehensive model that predicts the fraction of the residual radiation that becomes local fallout, it is convenient to define a series of regimes based on SHOB values in which all detonations that occur within a given regime can be modeled using the same algorithms. The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for defining different regimes, and, in a qualitative way, a basic understanding of the fundamental characteristics of each of these regimes.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Estimates of Radioxenon Released from Southern Hemisphere Medical isotope Production Facilities Using Measured Air Concentrations and Atmospheric Transport Modeling

Abstract The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty monitors the atmosphere for radioactive xenon leaking from underground nuclear explosions. Emissions from medical isotope production represent a challenging background signal when determining whether measured radioxenon in the atmosphere is associated with a nuclear explosion prohibited by the treaty. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) operates a reactor and medical isotope production facility in Lucas Heights, Australia. This study uses two years of release data from the ANSTO medical isotope production facility and Xe-133 data from three IMS sampling locations to estimate the annual releases of Xe-133 from medical isotope production facilities in Argentina, South Africa, and Indonesia. Atmospheric dilution factors derived from a global atmospheric transport model were used in an optimization scheme to estimate annual release values by facility. The annual releases of about 6.8×1014 Bq from the ANSTO medical isotope production facility are in good agreement with the sampled concentrations at these three IMS sampling locations. Annual release estimates for the facility in South Africa vary from 1.2×1016 to 2.5×1016 Bq and estimates for the facility in Indonesia vary from 6.1×1013 to 3.6×1014 Bq. Although some releases from the facility in Argentina may reach these IMS sampling locations, the solution to the objective function is insensitive to the magnitude of those releases.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Improving Spectral Image Classification through a Custom Data Sparsing and Pixel Clustering Algorithm

The Underground Nuclear Explosion Signatures Experiment (UNESE) seeks to characterize non-prompt observables from underground nuclear explosions (UNE). As part of this effort, we evaluated the ability of Digital Globe’s World View-3 (WV3) to detect and map UNE signatures. WV3 has proven capabilities in the detection of large-scale, anomalous, man-made features; however, it has relatively limited spectral and spatial resolution as compared to airborne hyperspectral imaging. These limitations impede standard image classifiers from identifying UNE signatures that are spatially small and lack distinct spectral features. In order to improve image classification results, we developed a custom algorithm that increases the true positive rate, while decreasing the false positive rate. Our algorithm’s flexible front-end allows the user to choose the method used to sparse the data. These methods include band-ratio optimization, correlation coefficient threshold, or Adaptive Coherence Estimator (ACE) threshold. The resulting sparsed pixels are clustered into like-objects. A novel weighted-sum of ACE and correlation coefficient scores is used to classify each object based on the average spectrum of its constituent pixels. WV3 and AVIRIS data of Cuprite, Nevada were used as a verification data set. This algorithm improves overall pixel classification accuracy over standard classifiers by up to 14%.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Incorporating Love- and Rayleigh-wave magnitudes, unequal earthquake and explosion variance assumptions and interstation complexity for improved event screening

Our objective is to improve seismic event screening using the properties of surface waves, We are accomplishing this through (1) the development of a Love-wave magnitude formula that is complementary to the Russell (2006) formula for Rayleigh waves and (2) quantifying differences in complexities and magnitude variances for earthquake and explosion-generated surface waves. We have applied the M{sub s} (VMAX) analysis (Bonner et al., 2006) using both Love and Rayleigh waves to events in the Middle East and Korean Peninsula, For the Middle East dataset consisting of approximately 100 events, the Love M{sub s} (VMAX) is greater than the Rayleigh M{sub s} (VMAX) estimated for individual stations for the majority of the events and azimuths, with the exception of the measurements for the smaller events from European stations to the northeast. It is unclear whether these smaller events suffer from magnitude bias for the Love waves or whether the paths, which include the Caspian and Mediterranean, have variable attenuation for Love and Rayleigh waves. For the Korean Peninsula, we have estimated Rayleigh- and Love-wave magnitudes for 31 earthquakes and two nuclear explosions, including the 25 May 2009 event. For 25 of the earthquakes, the network-averaged Love-wave magnitude is larger than the Rayleigh-wave estimate. For the 2009 nuclear explosion, the Love-wave M{sub s} (VMAX) was 3.1 while the Rayleigh-wave magnitude was 3.6. We are also utilizing the potential of observed variances in M{sub s} estimates that differ significantly in earthquake and explosion populations. We have considered two possible methods for incorporating unequal variances into the discrimination problem and compared the performance of various approaches on a population of 73 western United States earthquakes and 131 Nevada Test Site explosions. The approach proposes replacing the M{sub s} component by M{sub s} + a* {sigma}, where {sigma} denotes the interstation standard deviation obtained from the stations in the sample that produced the M{sub s} value. We replace the usual linear discriminant a* M{sub s}+b*{sub m{sub b}} with a* M{sub s}+b*{sub m{sub b}} + C*{sigma}. In the second approach, we estimate the optimum hybrid linear-quadratic discriminant function resulting from the unequal variance assumption. We observed slight improvement for the discriminant functions resulting from the theoretical interpretations of the unequal variance function. We have also studied the complexity of the ''magnitude spectra'' at each station. Our hypothesis is that explosion spectra should have fewer focal mechanism-produced complexities in the magnitude spectra than earthquakes. We have developed an intrastation ''complexity'' metric {Delta}M{sub s}, where {Delta}M{sub s} = M{sub s}(i)-M{sub s}(i+1) at periods, i, which are between 9 and 25 seconds. The complexity by itself has discriminating power but does not add substantially to the conditional hybrid discriminant that incorporates the differing spreads of the earthquake and explosion standard deviations.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Abatement Case Study

Radioxenon emissions from industrial sources such as fission based medical isotope production (MIP) facilities and nuclear reactors are generally known to be well below levels of public health and safety concern. However, the global background of radioxenon produced by MIP interferes with nuclear explosion monitoring by the International Monitoring System (IMS) developed for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) (CTBTO, 2024). It was calculated that xenon emissions levels of 5×10 9 Bq/day 133 Xe were low enough to have minimal impact on International Monitoring System (IMS) stations (Bowyer et al, 2013). There are several technologies currently used to abate radioactive xenon emissions to meet regulatory release levels, and some alternative methods have been investigated to reduce xenon release levels well below required regulatory levels (Doll et al, 2014, Gueibe, et al, 2014). While MIP producers are sympathetic to the issue of radioxenon interference with IMS monitoring, the cost to implement and maintain additional abatement systems has resulted in limited implementation. Therefore, more cost-effective options for xenon abatement are needed to help reduce the impact of these emissions on nuclear explosion monitoring.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Nuclear Test Scenarios for Discussion of On-Site Inspection Technologies

The purpose of the ISS OSI Invited Meeting being held in Vienna March 24-27, 2009 is to obtain a better understanding of the phenomenology of underground nuclear explosions for On-Site Inspection (OSI) purposes. In order to focus the technology discussions, we have developed two very general scenarios, or models, of underground nuclear test configurations and phenomena that will help us explore the application of OSI methodologies and techniques. The scenarios describe testing environments, operations, logistics, equipment, and facilities that might be used in conducting an underground nuclear test. One scenario involves emplacement of a nuclear device into a vertical borehole in an area with relatively flat terrain; the other involves emplacement within a tunnel (horizontally) in an area with mountainous terrain. Vertical borehole geometry The example for this scenario is an intermediate yield nuclear explosion carried out in a flat desert area. The ground was cleared and smoothed over a 200 X 200 m fenced area for operational support activities, access to the borehole, and in order to place a few structures to house diagnostics equipment and control functions. Power lines were provided for local electrical power. The vertical emplacement borehole was 2 m in diameter and bored to a depth of 350 m. The emplacement hole was lined with steel pipe in order to keep the hole open and to avoid cave-ins during emplacement of the nuclear device. Emplacement was above the local water table, and the top of the saturation zone is about 30 m below the bottom of the emplacement hole. The detonation point was at a depth of 340 m. All of the rock material removed while drilling the borehole was removed to another place. Diagnostics and control for the test were relatively simple: about 2 dozen high capacity coaxial cables feed from the down hole instruments to the surface and then about 100 m laterally to a diagnostics trailer. Two strong steel cables were used to emplace the device and diagnostic instruments and to support the down hole cables. The borehole was stemmed after the device was emplaced. The stemming material was relatively simple: the hole was backfilled with sand or gravel about 20-30 m above the nuclear experiment package, a grouted plug about 3 m thick is added, and the hole backfilled with a mixture of sand and gravel to the surface. After the test, the testing party removed all structures and power lines and covered the top of the borehole with a small building. Geologic environment before the test--The geology for the test consists of flat-lying alluvium and tuff, with 50 m of poorly consolidated alluvium near the surface and moderately welded tuff from 50 m depth to 50 m below the bottom of the hole. The upper tuff is underlain by a densely welded tuff unit, with basement Paleozoic sedimentary rock beginning at a depth of about 1000 m. The tuff is intact with a few fractures. There are no known faults located within 500 m of the borehole. Alteration of the underground environment--The blast created a spherical or near spherical cavity with a lens of vitrified material at the bottom. There are several zones surrounding the detonation point with decreasing levels of rock damage. The zones are: (1) the crushed zone (several tens of meters)where the rock has lost all prior integrity; (2) the fractured zone (out to a couple of hundred meters) characterized by radial and concentric fissures; and (3) the zone of irreversible strain (out to a couple of thousand meters) with local media deformation. A collapse chimney formed one hour after the detonation, in which overlying material fell into the explosion cavity. This chimney zone reached up to within 50 m of the surface and a small apical void formed (10 m high and 80 m in diameter) at the top of the rubble chimney. The rubble chimney is dry and density is about 20% less than the surrounding intact rock. Alteration at the surface--No surface depression formed, but there is significant 'fluffing' of the surface soil from the effects of the initial shock wave. A few radial and concentric fractures formed from the shock effects within a radius of 200 m of the borehole. Radionuclide environment--No particulates or aerosol radiological material reached the surface. However, the stemming is not completely impervious to gas release and a small amount of gas and vapor was released along the emplacement pipe immediately after the explosion and before the rubble chimney formed. Most of the gas venting stopped as soon as cavity collapse occurred. After the rubble chimney formed and the pressure in the explosion cavity reached equilibrium, gases began to migrate up through the rubble chimney aided by barometric pumping. There is also an unknown fault located 300 m from the explosion cavity that provided another gas migration pathway between the damage zone of the cavity and the surface.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Project ν x B: Novel Application of Neutrinos to Evaluate U.S. Nuclear Weapons Performance

In this white paper, we discuss the feasibility of diagnosing a nuclear explosion using a neutrino detector. This idea was first proposed by Reines and Cowan to observe the then hypothesized neutrino. Since then, the neutrino was discovered and over the decades the field of neutrino research has matured and many properties of the neutrino have been measured such as interaction cross sections, masses, abundances, etc. The neutrino has been observed from the sun, supernova, nuclear reactors, accelerators, and even the Earth’s core. Interestingly, one of the most prolific sources of neutrinos, a man-made nuclear explosion, has yet to be detected.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Discrimination of Small Earthquakes and Buried Single-Fired Chemical Explosions at Local Distances (<150 km) in the Western United States from Comparison of Local Magnitude ( M L ) and Coda Duration Magnitude ( M C )

Seismologists distinguish underground nuclear explosions from more commonly occurring earthquakes using moment tensor inversion, high-frequency P/S amplitude ratios, m b :M s comparisons, and P–pP differential travel times. These methods are generally successful for large seismic events (M >3-4) well recorded at regional-to-teleseismic distances (>150 km); however, it is unclear whether they can be modified to work for small events (M <3) well recorded only at local distances (<150 km). Here, we evaluate a recently proposed, local-distance seismic source discriminant—the difference between local magnitude (M L ) and coda duration magnitude (M C )—using seismograms of earthquakes and buried, single-fired chemical explosions recorded in three regions of the western United States. The quantity M L –M C was previously found to be sensitive to source depth, effectively discriminating mine blasts, induced earthquakes, and very shallow tectonic earthquakes from deeper crustal earthquakes. In this study, we report the first evaluation of M L –M C as a depth discriminant using data from buried, single-fired explosions that, unlike the seismic sources studied earlier, are good analogs for underground nuclear explosions. We find that even when using generic, uncalibrated methods of assigning magnitudes, M L –M C separates single-fired explosions and earthquakes. The area under the receiver operating characteristic curve is 0.92 for 19 explosions and 14 earthquakes in Washington, 0.90 for 22 explosions and 90 earthquakes in Wyoming, and 0.99 for three explosions and 149 earthquakes in Nevada. Finally, M L :M C comparisons have the potential to enhance discrimination based on high-frequency P/S amplitudes ratios—which perform less well at local than regional distances—because the two metrics have complementary sensitivities.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Measurements of radioxenon activities during periods of gaseous release from an advanced gas-cooled reactor

Activities of radioxenon isotopes are reported from an Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) during periods of gaseous release. Xenon isotopes are relevant to the monitoring regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). These releases may affect detections from the International Monitoring System (IMS) by influencing the radioxenon background. Time series activity plots have been produced from both in-core monitoring and direct measurement at the point of release using a stack monitor system. Ratio plots using both data sets have been produced with results compared with a commonly chosen nuclear explosion “discrimination line.” The reported results improve the understanding of radionuclide emissions from civil nuclear power plants. This work is being performed as part of the Xenon Environmental Nuclide Analysis at Hartlepool (XENAH) collaboration between the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE, UK), EDF Energy (UK), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL, USA), and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Surrogate Post-Detonation Urban Debris (SPUD): Standard Reference Materials 4600 and 4601

If a terrorist nuclear explosion were to occur in the United States, high-quality (accurate and precise) legally defensible nuclear forensics measurements will be required to assure the certainty and confidence needed, for conclusions drawn from these data will be coupled with law enforcement and intelligence information for the purposes of attribution and retribution. Standard Reference Materials (SRMs)/Certified Reference Materials (CRMs) establish the traceability, accuracy, and precision of nuclear forensic measurements and provide the ability to benchmark measurement methods essential to meeting the requirements of legal scrutiny. Currently there is a critical shortage of key SRMs/CRMs required for accurate and precise measurements that are fundamental to nuclear measurements supporting pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics. Supplies either do not exist, are not good enough, are in short supply, and/or are very expensive. The radionuclide measurement techniques and data quality objectives for pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics are quite different than the applications for which the current suite of available SRMs/CRMs was developed. Specifically, 1) modern mass spectrometry methods have largely replaced traditional activity-based measurement methods for quantifying small quantities of long-lived radionuclides and most trace radionuclide SRMs/CRMs are certified for activity and are thus not adequate for current applications, 2) modern instrumental methods are capable of higher precision than historic measurement techniques, and in some cases exceed the precision of the available SRMs/CRMs, and 3) the quality assurance requirements for pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics are such that the existing cadre of SRMs/CRMs does not adequately support the needs for method validation. There are numerous governmental stakeholders both within the US (DOE, DoD) and internationally (IAEA, JRC-ITU) whose missions are either directly involved with nuclear forensics measurements or rely on the forensic data obtained to make the exacting policy decisions (DOJ (FBI), DHS, CIA, DIA, DoD) associated with disrupting the production of illicit nuclear materials, interdicted nuclear materials or a nuclear/radiological detonation event. Starting in 2008 the DHS NTNFC, in collaboration with NBL and NIST, took on the production of suitable SRMs/CRMs for the pre-detonation nuclear forensics community. Two CRMs have been released since the start of this effort and two more are slated for completion in 2016. More recently, NIST, as a part of its mission as the US National Metrology Institute (NMI) to deliver standards (providing traceability) and foster homeland security, has launched the first certification campaign of a measurement traceable post nuclear detonation SRM. NIST, in cooperation with partner labs (AFIT (DoD), FBI (DOJ), and NPL) and with support from the FBI, has developed two Surrogate Post-Detonation Urban Debris (SPUD) Standard Reference Materials (SRMs) - SRM 4600 and 4601. These SRMs have been developed to simulate the expected debris mixture from the detonation of an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) in an urban environment, which is capable of producing fresh fission as well as activation products. The elemental composition of the vitrified debris materials is a composite of minerals and metals characteristic of the concrete and steel, the building materials that would be exposed to a nuclear detonation and whose resulting activation products would be found in rubble samples collected for forensics evidence and attribution. Additionally, because post-detonation samples would also contain short-lived fission products, the debris materials have been doped with Uranium (U). To create the nuclear fission products, samples of the SPUD materials can be placed in a well-characterized nuclear reactor and exposed to a set neutron flux and energy, causing the encased U atoms to split and yield short-lived fission products. Because a known amount of U is added to the SPUD materials it is feasible to determine the concentration of the resulting fission products. The subsequent irradiated SPUD glass would be chemically similar to samples that would be generated in an actual detonation, and thus can serve as a standardized reference material for nuclear forensic post detonation measurements. (authors)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Post-Closure Environmental Sampling and Inspection at the Amchitka Island, Alaska, Site - 17251

In the 1960's and early 1970's, three underground nuclear tests were conducted on Amchitka Island, Alaska. In 1965, the US Department of Defense-in conjunction with the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)-conducted the first of these nuclear tests, Long Shot, to provide data that would improve US capabilities for detecting underground nuclear explosions. In 1969, AEC conducted the second test, Milrow, to explore the feasibility of detonating a much larger device. In 1971, AEC conducted the third test, Cannikin, which was the largest underground test ever conducted by the US. The Long-Term Surveillance Plan (LTSP) for the Amchitka, Alaska, Site details how the US Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management (LM) intends to fulfill its mission to protect human health and the environment at and around the Amchitka Island site. The LTSP calls for monitoring to be performed every 5 years, at least during the initial phase of the project. The purpose of the monitoring is to develop a baseline of activity concentrations for selected radionuclides in biota, water, and soil, both on Amchitka Island and at the reference location on Adak Island, approximately 322 kilometers (200 miles) northeast of Amchitka. In addition to the environmental monitoring activities, seven mud pit caps that contain diesel-contaminated soils are inspected. The plan for biological and water sampling (both seawater and freshwater) during the May 2016 sampling event was developed through close coordination with the primary stakeholders, including the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, the Aleutian Pribilof Islands Association, and the US Fish and Wildlife Service. The environmental sampling in 2016 is a continuation of LM's evaluation of Amchitka Island's environment. Previous results from similar monitoring programs in 2004 and 2011 indicate that the environment is not being impacted by radionuclide migration and uptake from the underground nuclear testing conducted beneath Amchitka Island; consequently, subsistence and commercial-catch seafood is safe for human consumption. The collection of biota samples (rockfish, Irish lords, greenling, and rockweed) for cesium-134 ({sup 134}Cs), cesium-137 ({sup 137}Cs), plutonium-239 ({sup 239}Pu), plutonium-240 ({sup 240}Pu), and freshwater and seawater samples for {sup 134}Cs, {sup 137}Cs, and tritium ({sup 3}H) was the primary objective of the 2016 sampling effort. Rockfish, Irish lords, and greenling are resident, nonmigratory fish species that spend their entire life cycle in the marine environment, and rockweed is an inter-tidal species that may concentrate cesium. The seawater samples were collected primarily to determine if leakage from the Long Shot detonation could be detected and, secondarily, to compare with the background seawater samples collected from Adak Island. Cesium isotopes are also being analyzed to better understand the potential impact that the Fukushima-Daiichi release might have on the Amchitka and Adak environments. The target detection limits used for the 2016 sampling are lower than those used in previous studies. The lower detection limits make it possible for LM to delineate background activity levels for the radionuclides of interest. Data from the 2016 sampling event go beyond assessing food safety and focus on detecting leakage from the underground nuclear explosions. Additionally, the baseline activity concentrations obtained for the reference area (Adak Island) will enable identification of quantitative statistical trends in the results of future sampling programs. Sampling programs conducted in 2021 and beyond will have an objective to assess the statistical trends of radioactivity levels in the Amchitka Island environment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Watchmen 3.1.0 Users Guide: Revision 7

Watchmen is a research software application developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) that incorporates the scientific and operational expertise for reviewing data from treaty monitoring radionuclide stations. The radionuclide stations are part of the International Monitoring System (IMS), a worldwide network to monitor for nuclear explosions. The data the IMS produces are critical to determine if a radionuclide release event is from a nuclear explosion. Stations deliver their measurements and system status to the International Data Centre (IDC), which forwards it via email to all subscribers. Watchmen is capable of processing data from several radioxenon station types.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Watchmen 3.0.0 Users Guide: Revision 6

Watchmen is a research software application developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) that incorporates the scientific and operational expertise for reviewing data from treaty monitoring radionuclide stations. The radionuclide stations are part of the International Monitoring System (IMS), a worldwide network to monitor for nuclear explosions. The data the IMS produces are critical to determine if a radionuclide release event is from a nuclear explosion. Stations deliver their measurements and system status to the International Data Centre (IDC), which forwards it via email to all subscribers. Watchmen is capable of processing data from several radioxenon station types.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Watchmen v3.2.0 User Guide: Revision 8

Watchmen is a research software application developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) that incorporates the scientific and operational expertise for reviewing data from treaty monitoring radionuclide stations. The radionuclide stations are part of the International Monitoring System (IMS), a worldwide network to monitor for nuclear explosions. The data the IMS produces are critical to determine if a radionuclide release event is from a nuclear explosion. Stations deliver their measurements and system status to the International Data Centre (IDC), which forwards it via email to all subscribers. Watchmen is capable of processing data from several radioxenon station types.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Watchmen 3.3.0 User Guide: Revision 9

Watchmen is a research software application developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) that incorporates the scientific and operational expertise for reviewing data from treaty monitoring radionuclide stations. The radionuclide stations are part of the International Monitoring System (IMS), a worldwide network to monitor for nuclear explosions. The data the IMS produces are critical to determine if a radionuclide release event is from a nuclear explosion. Stations deliver their measurements and system status to the International Data Centre (IDC), which forwards it via email to all subscribers. Watchmen is capable of processing data from several radioxenon station types.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

When the dust settles: stable xenon isotope constraints on the formation of nuclear fallout

Nuclear weapons represent one of the most immediate threats of mass destruction. In the event that a procured or developed nuclear weapon is detonated in a populated metropolitan area, timely and accurate nuclear forensic analysis and fallout modeling would be needed to support attribution efforts and hazard assessments. In this work, we demonstrate that fissiogenic xenon isotopes retained in radioactive fallout generated by a nuclear explosion provide unique constraints on (1) the timescale of fallout formation, (2) chemical fractionation that occurs when fission products and nuclear fuel are incorporated into fallout, and (3) the speciation of fission products in the fireball. Our data suggest that, in near surface nuclear tests, the presence of a significant quantity of metal in a device assembly, combined with a short time allowed for mixing with the ambient atmosphere (seconds), may prevent complete oxidation of fission products prior to their incorporation into fallout. Xenon isotopes thus provide a window into the chemical composition of the fireball in the seconds that follow a nuclear explosion, thereby improving our understanding of the physical and thermo-chemical conditions under which fallout forms.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

Chemical Fractionation is not a Constant: Revisiting Bomb Vapor Chemistry

The debris produced by a nuclear explosion forms a hazard to response, can serve as a record used to interpret the event, and may persist in the environment necessitating long term management. Hence, understanding the radiochemical inventory of nuclear debris remains an important area of study, particularly the behavior and resulting distribution of actinides and fission products. Despite formation in a high energy environment, it has been recognized for decades that the chemical and isotopic composition of debris rarely, if ever, captures a homogenized blend of the bomb products. Instead, during cooling and debris formation, a variety of chemical processes cause separation of the different constituents. This process of chemical fractionation creates debris with a variety of different radionuclide inventories. Here we provide an overdue re-examination of our historic basis for understanding chemical fractionation in nuclear explosions through the context of new characterization of a large set of historical nuclear test data. Finally, we then discuss the implications of our findings for advancing models of radionuclide distribution and postdetonation chemical fractionation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗