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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 253 records · Page 14
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Stardust-next : Lessons Learned from a Comet Flyby Mission

The Stardust-NExT (New Exploration of Tempel) mission, a follow-on to the Stardust prime mission, successfully completed a flyby of comet Tempel-1 on 2/14/11. However there were many challenges along the way, most significantly low propellant margin and detection of the comet in imagery later than antici-pated. These challenges and their ramifications forced the project to respond with flexibility and ingenuity. As a result, the flyby at an altitude of 178 km was nearly flawless, accomplishing all its science objectives. Lessons learned on Stardust-NExT may have relevance to other spacecraft missions.

Tempel 1↗
NASA NTRS1987

The Solar Maximum Mission repair - Lessons learned

The on-orbit repair sequence of the Solar Maximum Mission in April 1984 is described, and important lessons learned concerning orbital debris are summarized. Scientific results pertaining to a solar flare which occurred just before the repair are reviewed. The implications of the repair experience for serviceability in the design of future spacecraft and instruments are illustrated by the case of the Hubble Space Telescope and its second generation spectrograph.

Woodgate, Bruce E.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Apollo Lesson Sampler: Apollo 13 Lessons Learned

This CD-ROM contains a two-part case study of the Apollo 13 accident. The first lesson contains an overview of the electrical system hardware on the Apollo spacecraft, providing a context for the details of the oxygen tank explosion, and the failure chain reconstruction that led to the conditions present at the time of the accident. Given this background, the lesson then covers the tank explosion and immediate damage to the spacecraft, and the immediate response of Mission Control to what they saw. Part 2 of the lesson picks up shortly after the explosion of the oxygen tank on Apollo 13, and discusses how Mission Control gained insight to and understanding of the damage in the aftermath. Impacts to various spacecraft systems are presented, along with Mission Control's reactions and plans for in-flight recovery leading to a successful entry. Finally, post-flight vehicle changes are presented along with the lessons learned.

Interbartolo, Michael A.↗
NASA NTRS2016

How Do Lessons Learned on the International Space Station (ISS) Help Plan Life Support for Mars?

How can our experience in developing and operating the International Space Station (ISS) guide the design, development, and operation of life support for the journey to Mars? The Mars deep space Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) must incorporate the knowledge and experience gained in developing ECLSS for low Earth orbit, but it must also meet the challenging new requirements of operation in deep space where there is no possibility of emergency resupply or quick crew return. The understanding gained by developing ISS flight hardware and successfully supporting a crew in orbit for many years is uniquely instructive. Different requirements for Mars life support suggest that different decisions may be made in design, testing, and operations planning, but the lessons learned developing the ECLSS for ISS provide valuable guidance.

Lessons learned↗
NASA NTRS2014

Loss of Signal, Aeromedical Lessons Learned from the STS-107 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 2014 presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival on human space flight missions. These lessons were presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space flight. As we embark on the development of new spacefaring vehicles through both government and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make this information available to a wider audience engaged in the design and development of future space vehicles. Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process-the response, recovery, identification, investigative studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft mishaps. The goal of this book is to provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews. This poster presents an outline of Loss of Signal contents and highlights from each of five sections - the mission and mishap, the response, the investigation, the analysis and the future.

Stepaniak, Phillip C.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Best Practices, Lessons Learned, and Examples on the Application of Damage Tolerance in Space Structures

Damage tolerance is an important consideration in space structures applications. The intent of damage tolerance is to demonstrate that the structure is robust to the presence of flaws over the service life of the space vehicle. Damage tolerance requirements in documents such as those in NASA, AIAA, and ISO can be challenging to implement. The intent of this paper is three-fold: (1) Provide best practices in the application of damage tolerance requirements for space applications, (2) Provide lessons learned for each of class of hardware, (3) Provide examples of challenging situations encountered in the application of damage tolerance. Examples cover additive manufacturing, composite overwrapped pressure vessels, pressurized structures, liquid rocket engines, thermal protection systems, and other classes of hardware. The philosophy and limitations of leak before burst and proof test logic are also discussed. Finally, a discussion on elastic-plastic fracture mechanics with comparisons to test data will be presented.

Best Practices↗
NASA NTRS2014

Loss of Signal, Aeromedical Lessons Learned for the STS-I07 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 2014, presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival on human space flight missions. These lessons were presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space flight. As we embark on the development of new spacefaring vehicles through both government and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make this information available to a wider audience engaged in the design and development of future space vehicles. Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process-the response, recovery, identification, investigative studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft mishaps. The goals of this book are to provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews.

Patlach, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2024

Lessons Learned from Particulate Characterization Laboratory Anomalies

The White Sands Test Facility chemistry laboratory provides quality control for cleanroom operations including cleanliness verification of aerospace hardware by particulate counts and non-volatile residue determinations, particulate counts for liquid hypergolic propellants, gaseous helium and nitrogen propellant pressurizing agents used for ground support equipment and flight test article valve actuation, gaseous oxygen primarily used for component testing, and deionized water for refurbished propellant hardware flushing. Cleanliness verification includes particulate counts and non-volatile residue determinations to industry standard, NASA, and program specifications and levels. Particulate counts are typically to customer-specified specifications and levels including JPR 5322.1H (2016) Levels 50 and 100, Orion (MPCV 70156. Revision H (2018)) Level 100, RPTSTD-8070-0001 Revision 3 (2022), and IEST-STD-CC1246E (2013) Levels 50 and 100. The laboratory issues high pressure filter holders containing membrane filters to test operations personnel, who collect samples by flowing the required volumes of fluid through the filter holder, and the filter holder is returned to the lab for counting. A passing particulate count is required before testing may proceed. Rapid data reduction and issuing of reports indicating a pass or fail of the particulate specification are required. Corrective action and resampling invariably occurs if a sample fails. Consequently, the laboratory must maintain the highest degree of reliability to facilitate quality data used to decide if testing may proceed. Experience and continual improvements have enabled reliability. However, anomalies attributed to lab processes and hardware including filter holders, membranes, and Petri dishes have been encountered. This paper presents a summary of problems, solutions, successes, and lessons learned from particle counting experience for over 35 years.

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer’s Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer's Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRS2012

Lessons Learned for Improving Spacecraft Ground Operations

NASA has a unique history in processing the Space Shuttle fleet for launches. Some of this experience has been captured in the NASA Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS). This tool provides a convenient way for design engineers to review lessons from the past to prevent problems from reoccurring and incorporate positive lessons in new designs. At the Kennedy Space Center, the LLIS is being used to design ground support equipment for the next generation of launch and crewed vehicles. This paper describes the LLIS process and offers some examples.

Bell, Michael A.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Selected Lessons Learned over the ISS Design, Development, Assembly, and Operations: Applicability to International Cooperation for Standardization

This slide presentation reviews some of the lessons learned in the sphere of international cooperation during the development, assembly and operation of the International Space Station. From the begining all Partners shared a common objective to build, operate and utilize a crewed laboratory in low orbit as an international partnership. The importance of standards is emphasized.

Hirsch, David B.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Lessons Learned in the Specification, Purchase, Validation and Final Installation Process of a Replacement PCM Bit Synchronizer

This paper intends to describe the lessons learned while specifying validating and installing a bit sync to replace the 30 year old Aydin Model 335a PCM bit sync used in the Space Shuttle Launch Control Center. The engineer had to analyze the original requirements and specifications and then create new requirements documentation that more correctly described our needs. One issue to consider was the removal of unnecessary requirements such as various data formats when only one format is used. The conversion to a system that no longer has an assortment of analog rotary switches required retraining of the operators. Finally, post-procurement corrections for undisclosed user requirements and missed design requirements required close contact with a manufacturer who was willing to accommodate the changes.

Price, Richard N.↗
DOE OSTI2025

High-Temperature Aquifer Thermal Energy Storage (HT-ATES) Projects in Germany and the Netherlands—Review and Lessons Learned

Aquifer thermal energy storage (ATES) is a concept that can help to address heating and cooling needs through the use of the subsurface as a seasonal thermal energy storage (STES) system. Over 2800 ATES systems have been deployed with storage temperatures typically below 25 °C and only a few with higher temperatures (>40 °C), which would increase the energy density and utility of the stored thermal fluids. Until now, only a few high-temperature aquifer thermal energy storage (HT-ATES) projects have been initiated and are still in operation. These HT-ATES projects have encountered a range of technical and non-technical challenges. This study reviews ten such projects: four in Germany and six in the Netherlands. The non-technical issues include public acceptance, a lack of regulatory framework for these systems, managing overlapping uses of the subsurface, managing changes with the providers and off-takers of thermal energy, and obtaining financing to implement these projects. Common technical issues include geological factors such as incomplete characterization of the subsurface and reservoir heterogeneity; geochemical issues such as mineral scaling, corrosion, and biofouling; lower than expected thermal recovery; and issues with system design and reliability. This review highlights benefits and challenges faced by HT-ATES projects with the goal to use the lessons learned to improve the siting, design, development, and operation of such systems. Recommendations include improved initial subsurface site characterization, use of coupled process models to optimize system design and predict system performance, cascaded uses of stored thermal energy to better utilize the stored heat, monitoring networks to provide feedback on system performance, and expanded system scale to allow for continued operation even when maintenance of some system components is required. Techno-economic modeling and risk analysis could be used to optimize such HT-ATES project design and identify key factors that will affect sustained economic viability. In addition, design flexibility is important for these systems to allow for changing conditions regarding the supply and demand of thermal energy. Adopting these findings should improve the performance and reduce the risks for future HT-ATES projects worldwide.

15 - GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗
NASA NTRS1994

Composite chronicles: A study of the lessons learned in the development, production, and service of composite structures

A study of past composite aircraft structures programs was conducted to determine the lessons learned during the programs. The study focused on finding major underlying principles and practices that experience showed have significant effects on the development process and should be recognized and understood by those responsible for using of composites. Published information on programs was reviewed and interviews were conducted with personnel associated with current and past major development programs. In all, interviews were conducted with about 56 people representing 32 organizations. Most of the people interviewed have been involved in the engineering and manufacturing development of composites for the past 20 to 25 years. Although composites technology has made great advances over the past 30 years, the effective application of composites to aircraft is still a complex problem that requires experienced personnel with special knowledge. All disciplines involved in the development process must work together in real time to minimize risk and assure total product quality and performance at acceptable costs. The most successful programs have made effective use of integrated, collocated, concurrent engineering teams, and most often used well-planned, systematic development efforts wherein the design and manufacturing processes are validated in a step-by-step or 'building block' approach. Such approaches reduce program risk and are cost effective.

Vosteen, Louis F.↗