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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 253 records · Page 14
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Grid-scale Energy Storage Hazard Analysis & Design Objectives for System Safety

Battery based energy storage systems are becoming a critical part of a modernized, resilient power system. However, batteries have a unique combination of hazards that can make design and engineering of battery systems difficult. This report presents a systematic hazard analysis of a hypothetical, grid scale lithium-ion battery powerplant to produce sociotechnical "design objectives" for system safety. We applied system's theoretic process analysis (STPA) for the hazard analysis which is broken into four steps: purpose definition, modeling the safety control structure, identifying unsafe control actions, and identifying loss scenarios. The purpose of the analysis was defined as to prevent event outcomes that can result in loss of battery assets due to fires and explosions, loss of health or life due to battery fires and explosions, and loss of energy storage services due to non- operational battery assets. The STPA analysis resulted in identification of six loss scenarios, and their constituent unsafe control actions, which were used to define a series of design objectives that can be applied to reduce the likelihood and severity of thermal events in battery systems. These design objectives, in all or any subset, can be utilized by utilities and other industry stakeholders as "design requirements" in their storage request for proposals (RFPs) and for evaluation of proposals. Further, these design objectives can help to protect firefighters and bring a system back to full functionality after a thermal event. We also comment on the hazards of flow battery technologies.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Review of Sandia Energy Storage Research Capabilities and Opportunities (2020 to 2030)

Large-scale integration of energy storage on the electric grid will be essential to enabling greater penetration of intermittent renewable energy sources, modernizing the grid for increased flexibility security, reliability, and resilience, and enabling cleaner forms of transportation. The purpose of this report is to summarize Sandia's research and capabilities in energy storage and to provide a preliminary roadmap for future efforts in this area that can address the ongoing program needs of DOE and the nation. Mission and vision statements are first presented followed by an overview of the organizational structure at Sandia that provides support and activities in energy storage. Then, a summary of Sandia's energy storage capabilities is presented by technology, including battery storage and materials, power conversion and electronics, subsurface-based energy storage, thermal/thermochemical energy storage, hydrogen storage, data analytics/systems optimization/controls, safety of energy storage systems, and testing/demonstrations/model validation. A summary of identified gaps and needs is also presented for each technology and capability.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Automated Cyber Security Testing Platform for Industrial Control Systems

Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) are a complex system of coupled physics controlled by a network of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). These PLCs communicate process data across the network to coordinate control actions with each other and inform the operators of process variables and control decisions. Networking the PLCs allows more effective process control and provides the operator more information which results in more efficient plant operation. This interconnectivity creates new security issues, as operators have more access to the plant controls, so will bad actors. As plant networks become more digitized and encompass more sophisticated controllers, the network surface exposed to cyber interference grows. Understanding the dynamics of these coupled systems of physics, control logic, and network communications is critical to their protection. The research into the cybersecurity of the Operational Technologies of NPPs is developing and requires a platform that can allow high fidelity physics simulations to interact with digital networks of controllers. This will require three main components: a network simulation environment, a physics simulator, and virtual PLCs (vPLC) that represent typical industry hardware. A platform that incorporates these three components to provide the most accurate representation of actual NPP networks and controllers is developed in this paper.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Secondary Aerosol Formation in an Arctic Oil Field (Campaign Report)

Atmospheric aerosols contribute significantly to arctic warming, yet significant differences in aerosol concentration levels and seasonal cycles often exist between models and observations. Recent studies of cloud properties across the North Slope of Alaska show the significant, regional influence of oil field emissions. Development across the Arctic motivates the need to characterize these oilfield emissions to further predict their roles in changing future arctic climate. Our previous August-September 2016 Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) user facility field campaign resulted in improved understanding of atmospheric particles emitted within the North Slope of Alaska (NSA) oil fields, as well as the aging of sea spray aerosol. Following Polar Sunrise during arctic spring, chlorine chemistry is active, and we hypothesize that oxidation of oil field hydrocarbons by chlorine atoms (Cl) generates oxygenated volatile organic compounds (OVOCs) leading to springtime arctic secondary organic aerosol (SOA) formation.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

I.6.C Battery Safety Testing

Abuse tests are designed to determine the safe operating limits of HEV\PHEV energy storage devices. Testing is intended to achieve certain worst-case scenarios to yield quantitative data on cell\module\pack response, allowing for failure mode determination and guiding developers toward improved materials and designs. Standard abuse tests with defined start and end conditions are performed on all devices to provide comparison between technologies. New tests and protocols are developed and evaluated to more closely simulate real world failure conditions. While robust mechanical models for vehicles and vehicle components exist, there is a gap for mechanical modeling of EV batteries. The challenge with developing a mechanical model for a battery is the heterogeneous nature of the materials and components (polymers, metals, metal oxides, liquids).

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2021

PD21A680: Additive Manufacturing Process Optimization and Qualification FY21 Year-end Report

This project builds upon knowledge gained from previous projects on Additive Manufacturing (AM) operation, process control and monitoring, repeatability, and process improvement. This project will exclusively focus on metal powder bed additive manufacturing (PBAM). Objective 1: Advance metal powder bed AM R&D capabilities. Perform enhanced R&D on increased build volumes and throughput, safety and handling controls, process monitoring, and diagnostics with a focus on production end-states. Objective 2: Build upon knowledge gained from previous PDRD projects to develop deeper understanding of process controls, essential for transitioning metal AM processes for future applications. Objective 3: Maintain business development and research advantages through collaborations with external industry and university partners.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2022

ASER Annual Site Environmental Report 2020 Summary

We are committed to act as stewards of our environment to achieve our mission in accordance with all applicable environmental requirements. We set continual improvement objectives and targets, measure and document our progress, and share ourresults with our workforce, sponsors, and public. We reduce our environmental risk through legacy cleanup, pollution prevention, and long-term sustainability programs.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cyber-Physical Risks for Advanced Reactors

Cybersecurity for industrial control systems is an important consideration that advance reactor designers will need to consider. How cyber risk is managed is the subject of on-going research and debate in the nuclear industry. This report seeks to identify potential cyber risks for advance reactors. Identified risks are divided into absorbed risk and licensee managed risk to clearly show how cyber risks for advance reactors can potentially be transferred. Absorbed risks are risks that originate external to the licensee but may unknowingly propagate into the plant. Insights include (1) the need for unification of safety, physical security, and cybersecurity risk assessment frameworks to ensure optimal coordination of risk, (2) a quantitative risk assessment methodology in conjunction with qualitative assessments may be useful in efficiently and sufficiently managing cyber risks, and (3) cyber risk management techniques should align with a risked informed regulatory framework for advance reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Advance Reactor Operational Technology Architecture Categorization

Seven generation III+ and generation IV nuclear reactor types, based on twelve reactor concepts surveyed, are examined using functional decomposition to extract relevant operational technology (OT) architecture information. This information is compared to existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) OT architectures to highlight novel and emergent cyber risks associated with next generation NPPs. These insights can help inform operational technology architecture requirements that will be unique to a given reactor type. Next generation NPPs have streamlined OT architectures relative to the current generation II commercial NPP fleet. Overall, without compensatory measures that provide sufficient and efficient cybersecurity controls, next generation NPPs will have increased cyber risk. Verification and validation of cyber-physical testbeds and cyber risk assessment methodologies may be an important next step to reduce cyber risk in the OT architecture design and testing phase. Coordination with safety requirements can result in OT architecture design being an iterative process.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Joint Cyber/Safety Risk in Nuclear Power Systems

This report presents an analysis of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) for a generic Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)-4 NPP. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed Hazards and Consequences Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS) process is applied to the ECCS and its subsystems to identify unsafe control actions (UCAs) which act as possible cyber events of concern. The analysis is performed for two design basis events: Small-break Loss of Coolant Accident (SLOCA) and general transients (TRANS), such as unintended reactor trip. In previous work, HAZCADS UCAs were combined with other cyber-attack analysis to develop a risk-informed approach; however, this was for a single system. This report explores advanced systems engineering modeling approaches to model the interactions between digital assets across multiple systems which may be targeted by cyber adversaries. The complex and interdependent design of digital systems has the potential to introduce emergent cyber properties that are generally not covered by hazard analyses nor formal nuclear Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The R&D and supporting analysis presented here explores approaches to predict and manage how interdependent system properties effect risk. To show the potential impact of a successful cyber-attack to formal PRA event tree probabilities, HAZCADS analysis was also used. HAZCADS was also used to model the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automatic actuation. This analysis extended to an integrated system analysis for common-cause failure (CCF). In this aspect, the HAZCADS analysis continued by analyzing plant design details for system connectivity in support of critical plant functions. A dependency matrix was developed to depict the integrated functionality of the interconnected systems. Areas of potential CCF are indicated. Future work could include adversary attack development to show how CCF could be caused, resulting in PRA events. Across the multiple systems that comprise the ECCS, the analysis shows that the change in such probabilities was very different between systems. This indicates that some systems have a larger potential risk impact from successful cyber-attack or digital failure, which indicates a need for these systems to have a higher priority for design and defensive measures. Furthermore, we were able to establish that a risk analysis using any arbitrary threat model establishes an ordering of components with regard to cyber-risk. This ordering can be used to influence the overall system design with an eye to lowering risk, or as a way to understand real-time risk to operational systems based on a current threat landscape. Expert knowledge of both the analysis process and the system being analyzed is required to perform a HAZCADS analysis. The need for a tiered risk analysis is demonstrated by the results of this report.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗