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At least 253 records · Page 14

Measurement of Plutonium Isotopic Composition - MGA

In this module, we will use the Canberra InSpector-2000 Multichannel Analyzer with a high-purity germanium detector (HPGe) and the MGA isotopic anlysis software to assay a variety of plutonium samples. The module provides an understanding of the MGA method, its attributes and limitations. You will assess the system performance by measuring a range of materials similar to those you may assay in your work. During the final verification exercise, the results from MGA will be combined with the 240Pueff results from neutron coincidence or multiplicity counters so that measurements of the plutonium mass can be compared with the operator-declared (certified) values.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Idaho National Laboratory Human Capitol Development Program Summary

The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative HCD Subprogram has successfully employed unique nuclear capabilities and employee expertise through INL to achieve multiple initiatives in FY14. These opportunities range from internship programs to university and training courses. One of the central facets of this work has been the international safeguards pre inspector training course. Another significant milestone is the INL led university engagement effort which resulted in courses being offered at ISU and University of Utah.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Evaluation of Boulder, CO, SmartRegs Ordinance and Better Buildings Program

Under the SmartRegs ordinance in the city of Boulder, Colorado, all rental properties in the city must achieve an energy efficiency level comparable to a HERS Index of approximately 120 points or lower by the year 2019. The City of Boulder received a $12 million grant from the DOE’s Better Buildings initiative to create and incentivize their EnergySmart Program. In this report, the Consortium for Advanced Residential Buildings (CARB) describes its work with the program, including energy audits of rental properties, developing training programs for insulators and inspectors, and conducting interviews with property owners.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Current Status of Helium-3 Alternative Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards

International safeguards inspectorates (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency {IAEA}, or Euratom) rely heavily on neutron assay techniques, and in particular, on coincidence counters for the verification of declared nuclear materials under safeguards and for monitoring purposes. While 3 He was readily available, the reliability, safety, ease of use, gamma-ray insensitivity, and high intrinsic thermal neutron detection efficiency of 3 He-based detectors obviated the need for alternative detector technologies. However, the recent decline of the 3 He gas supply has triggered international efforts to develop and field neutron detectors that make use of alternative materials. In response to this global effort, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Euratom launched a joint effort aimed at bringing together international experts, technology users and developers in the field of nuclear safeguards to discuss and evaluate the proposed 3 He alternative materials and technologies. The effort involved a series of two workshops focused on detailed overviews and viability assessments of various 3 He alternative technologies for use in nuclear safeguards applications. The key objective was to provide a platform for collaborative discussions and technical presentations organized in a compact, workshop-like format to stimulate interactions among the participants. The meetings culminated in a benchmark exercise providing a unique opportunity for the first inter-comparison of several available alternative technologies. This report provides an overview of the alternative technology efforts presented during the two workshops along with a summary of the benchmarking activities and results. The workshop recommendations and key consensus observations are discussed in the report, and used to outline a proposed path forward and future needs foreseeable in the area of 3 He-alternative technologies.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

On-Site Inspection RadioIsotopic Spectroscopy (Osiris) System Development

We have designed and tested hardware and software for the acquisition and analysis of high-resolution gamma-ray spectra during on-site inspections under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The On-Site Inspection RadioIsotopic Spectroscopy—Osiris—software filters the spectral data to display only radioisotopic information relevant to CTBT on-site inspections, e.g.,132I. A set of over 100 fission-product spectra was employed for Osiris testing. These spectra were measured, where possible, or generated by modeling. The synthetic test spectral compositions include non-nuclear-explosion scenarios, e.g., a severe nuclear reactor accident, and nuclear-explosion scenarios such as a vented underground nuclear test. Comparing its computer-based analyses to expert visual analyses of the test spectra, Osiris correctly identifies CTBT-relevant fission product isotopes at the 95% level or better.The Osiris gamma-ray spectrometer is a mechanically-cooled, battery-powered ORTEC Transpec-100, chosen to avoid the need for liquid nitrogen during on-site inspections. The spectrometer was used successfully during the recent 2014 CTBT Integrated Field Exercise in Jordan. The spectrometer is controlled and the spectral data analyzed by a Panasonic Toughbook notebook computer. To date, software development has been the main focus of the Osiris project. In FY2016-17, we plan to modify the Osiris hardware, integrate the Osiris software and hardware, and conduct rigorous field tests to ensure that the Osiris system will function correctly during CTBT on-site inspections. The planned development will raise Osiris to technology readiness level TRL-8; transfer the Osiris technology to a commercial manufacturer, and demonstrate Osiris to potential CTBT on-site inspectors.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Safeguards by Design Challenge

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nondestructive Assay Data Integration with the SKB-50 Assemblies - FY16 Update

A project to research the application of non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques for spent fuel assemblies is underway at the Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel (for which the Swedish acronym is Clab) in Oskarshamn, Sweden. The research goals of this project contain both safeguards and non-safeguards interests. These nondestructive assay (NDA) technologies are designed to strengthen the technical toolkit of safeguard inspectors and others to determine the following technical goals more accurately; Verify initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of facility declaration for spent fuel assemblies; Detect replaced or missing pins from a given spent fuel assembly to confirm its integrity; and Estimate plutonium mass and related plutonium and uranium fissile mass parameters in spent fuel assemblies. Estimate heat content, and measure reactivity (multiplication).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Assess How Changes in Fuel Cycle Operation Impact Safeguards

Since the beginning of commercial nuclear power generation in the 1960s, the ability of researchers to understand and control the isotopic content of spent fuel has improved. It is therefore not surprising that both fuel assembly design and fuel assembly irradiation optimization have improved over the past 50+ years. It is anticipated that the burnup and isotopics of the spent fuel should exhibit less variation over the decades as reactor operators irradiate each assembly to the optimum amount. In contrast, older spent fuel is anticipated to vary more in burnup and resulting isotopics for a given initial enrichment. Modern fuel therefore should be more uniform in composition, and thus, measured safeguards results should be easier to interpret than results from older spent fuel. With spent fuel ponds filling up, interim and long-­term storage of spent fuel will need to be addressed. Additionally after long periods of storage, spent fuel is no longer self-­protecting and, as such, the IAEA will categorize it as more attractive; in approximately 20 years many of the assemblies from early commercial cores will no longer be considered self-­protecting. This study will assess how more recent changes in the reactor operation could impact the interpretation of safeguards measurements. The status quo for spent fuel assay in the safeguards context is that the overwhelming majority of spent fuel assemblies are not measured in a quantitative way except for those assemblies about to be loaded into a difficult or impossible to access location (dry storage or, in the future, a repository). In other words, when the assembly is still accessible to a state actor, or an insider, when it is cooling in a pool, the inspectorate does not have a measurement database that could assist them in re-­verifying the integrity of that assembly. The spent fuel safeguards regime would be strengthened if spent fuel assemblies were measured from discharge to loading into a difficult or impossible to access location. The primary driver for suggesting this shift in approach is the change in robotic technology and information technology in general. It should be possible, with minimal impact to the facility, to measure each assembly every time that it is moved in the pool, with the first measurements being made at discharge. The following conclusions were reached: The total neutron count rate can be accurately predicted at any future moment in time based upon the measured count rate at discharge, provided the initial enrichment and burnup of the assembly is known at discharge. It is expected that the total neutron count rate measured at discharge will be indicative of the initial enrichment and burnup of that assembly. If the automated robot were to focus on measuring the assemblies in the rack without moving them, the time available would increase immensely.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Possible Nuclear Safeguards Applications: Workshop on Next-Generation Laser Compton Gamma Source

These are a set of slides for the development of a next-generation photon source white paper. The following topics are covered in these slides: Nuclear Safeguards; The Nuclear Fuel Cycle; Precise isotopic determination via NRF; UF 6 Enrichment Assay; and Non-Destructive Assay of Spent Nuclear Fuel. In summary: A way to non-destructively measure precise isotopics of ~kg and larger samples has multiple uses in nuclear safeguards; Ideally this is a compact, fieldable device that can be used by international inspectors. Must be rugged and reliable; A next-generation source can be used as a testing ground for these techniques as technology develops.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Upgrading FLIR NanoRaider with the next Generation of CdZnTe Detectors. Goal - Integrate VFG detectors into FLIR R200. Advanced Virtual Grid ASIC (AVG-ASIC).

This document presents motivations, goals and the current status of this project; development (fabrication, performance) of position-sensitive virtual Frisch-grid detectors proposed for nanoRaider, an instrument commonly used by nuclear inspectors; ASIC developments for CZT detectors; and the electronics development for the detector prototype..

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

2015 Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) Title ll Annual Report, L-Bar, New Mexico Disposal Site

The L-Bar, New Mexico, Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) Title II Disposal Site was inspected on August 18, 2015. The tailings impoundment was in excellent condition. Erosion and vegetation measurements to monitor the condition of the impoundment cover indicated that no erosion is occurring, and perennial vegetation foliar cover at the measurement plots increased substantially compared to previous years due to above-average precipitation for the year. A short segment of the perimeter fence near the site entrance was realigned in spring 2015 because a gully was undermining the fence corner. Loose fence strands at another location were repaired during the inspection, and a section of fence needs to be realigned to avoid areas affected by deep gullies and sediment deposition. Inspectors identified no other maintenance needs or cause for a follow-up inspection. Groundwater monitoring is required every 3 years. The next monitoring event will be in 2016.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Lakeview, Oregon, Disposal Site

9.1 Compliance Summary The Lakeview, Oregon, Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) Title I Disposal Site was inspected September 16 and 17, 2015. Other than some ongoing concern with erosion-control rock riprap degradation, the disposal cell was in good condition. Some minor fence repairs and vegetation removal, and minor erosion repair work along the west site fence is planned. Inspectors identified no other maintenance needs or cause for a follow-up or contingency inspection. Disposal cell riprap is evaluated annually to ensure continued long-term protection of the cell from erosion during a severe precipitation event. Degradation of the rock riprap was first observed at the site in the mid-1990s. Rock gradation monitoring of the riprap on the west side slope has been performed as part of the annual inspection since 1997 to determine the mean diameter (D 50 ) value. As prescribed by the monitoring procedure, the rock monitoring is routinely conducted at random locations. However, at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) request, the 2015 rock monitoring approach deviated from the normal procedure by using a pre-established monitoring grid in a subset area of the west side slope. This changed the monitoring approach from random sampling to biased sampling. The D 50 value measured during the 2015 gradation monitoring is 2.39 inches, which falls below the original D 50 design size range of 2.7–3.9 inches for the Type B size side slope riprap. At NRC’s request, rock durability monitoring was added to the gradation monitoring in 2009 to monitor durability by rock type. Results of the 2015 durability monitoring showed that74 percent of the total rock sampled is durability class code A rock with an assigned durability class of “highly durable” or durability class code B “durable” rock, and that over 90 percent of the 3-inch or larger rock is durability class code A or B. The rock durability classifications are further explained in Section 9.4.2.2.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Comparison Of 252 Cf Time Correlated Induced Fisssion With AmLi Induced Fission On Fresh MTR Research Reactor Fuel

The effective application of international safeguards to research reactors requires verification of spent fuel as well as fresh fuel. To accomplish this goal various nondestructive and destructive assay techniques have been developed in the US and around the world. The Advanced Experimental Fuel Counter (AEFC) is a nondestructive assay (NDA) system developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) combining both neutron and gamma measurement capabilities. Since spent fuel assemblies are stored in water, the system was designed to be watertight to facilitate underwater measurements by inspectors. The AEFC is comprised of six 3 He detectors as well as a shielded and collimated ion chamber. The 3 He detectors are used for active and passive neutron coincidence counting while the ion chamber is used for gross gamma counting. Active coincidence measurement data is used to measure residual fissile mass, whereas the passive coincidence measurement data along with passive gamma measurement can provide information about burnup, cooling time, and initial enrichment. In the past, most of the active interrogation systems along with the AEFC used an AmLi neutron interrogation source. Owing to the difficulty in obtaining an AmLi source, a 252 Cf spontaneous fission (SF) source was used during a 2014 field trail in Uzbekistan as an alternative. In this study, experiments were performed to calibrate the AEFC instrument and compare use of the 252 Cf spontaneous fission source and the AmLi (α,n) neutron emission source. The 252 Cf source spontaneously emits bursts of time-correlated prompt fission neutrons that thermalize in the water and induce fission in the fuel assembly. The induced fission (IF) neutrons are also time correlated resulting in more correlated neutron detections inside the 3 He detector, which helps reduce the statistical errors in doubles when using the 252 Cf interrogation source instead of the AmLi source. In this work, two MTR fuel assemblies varying both in size and number of fuel plates were measured using 252 Cf and AmLi active interrogation sources. This paper analyzes time correlated induced fission (TCIF) from fresh MTR fuel assemblies due to 252 Cf and AmLi active interrogation sources.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Pressure Safety Orientation Live #769

Pressure Safety Orientation (course #769) introduces workers at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to the Laboratory Pressure Safety Program and to pressure-related hazards. This course also affords a hands-on exercise involving the assembly of a simple pressure system. This course is required for all LANL personnel who work on or near pressure systems and are exposed to pressure-related hazards. These personnel include pressure-system engineers, designers, fabricators, installers, operators, inspectors, maintainers, and others who work with pressurized fluids and may be exposed to pressure-related hazards.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Non-RF Chain of Custody Item Monitor (CoCIM) User Manual.

This User Manual contains a description of the wired and infrared (IR) variants of the Chain of Custody Item Monitor (CoCIM), the Coordinator for reading stored messages, and the inspector Message Viewer user interface (UI) software, as well as instructions for use. This manual does not include descriptions or use instructions for the radio frequency (RF) variant of the CoCIM. The intended audience is planners and participants in treaty verification exercises where chain of custody (CoC) elements are required.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Solar Energy Technology Office Portfolio Review: Promotion of PV Soft Cost Reductions in the Southeastern US

From 2016-2021, the installed solar capacity in South Carolina will mushroom from less than 20 megawatts to more than 300 megawatts. Concurrently, the number of customer-sited, load-centered solar generation is expected to grow from less than 500 statewide to as many as 10,000 by 2021. This growth is anticipated to be the direct result of a landmark state policy initiative, Act 236, passed by the South Carolina General Assembly and signed into law by the Governor in June of 2014. Local policy makers in South Carolina are ill-equipped to handle the onslaught of solar permitting and zoning requests expected over the next five years. Similarly, the state’s building inspectors, first responders, and tax assessors know little about photovoltaic (PV) technology and best practices. Finally, South Carolina’s workforce and workforce trainers are underprepared to benefit from the tremendous opportunity created by the passage of Act 236. Each of these deficits in knowledge of and preparedness for solar PV translates into higher “soft costs” of installed solar PV in South Carolina. Currently, we estimate that the installed costs of residential rooftop solar are as much as 25 percent higher than the national average. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), together with almost a dozen electricity stakeholders in the Southeast, proposes to create a replicable model for solar PV soft cost reduction in South Carolina through human capacity-building at the local level and direct efforts to harmonize policy at the inter-county or regional level. The primary goal of this effort is to close the gap between South Carolina installed costs of residential rooftop solar and national averages. The secondary goal is to develop a portable and replicable model that can be applied to other jurisdictions in the Southeastern US.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Far-field Wireless Energy Harvesting for Increased Safeguards Equipment Battery Life.

Modern unattended safeguards equipment (e.g. seals) incorporates many low-power electronic circuits, which are typically powered by expensive and toxic lithium thionyl chloride (LiSOCL2) batteries. The limited life of these batteries necessitates their periodic replacement. This replacement must be performed before total battery discharge to avoid potential loss of continuity of knowledge. Thus, the effective battery capacity becomes significantly less than the actual usable capacity. Additionally, such maintenance is a radiological hazard to personnel, as well as a monetary burden to a safeguards inspectorate. Energy harvesting, a commercially available technology, could extend the operational life of batterypowered equipment to achieve significant efficiencies for safeguards deployments. Energy harvesting is the scavenging and storage of ambient energy sources, such as solar, thermal, and kinetic for use in lowpower electronic applications. While the amount of scavenged energy per unit time may be small, it most often comes from a source that will not be depleted throughout the deployment of the harvesting device. The best-known energy harvesters are solar panels and wind turbines. Recently, far-field wireless energy harvesting has become a commercially available option. Far-field wireless energy harvesting provides consistent, predictable, and un-tethered power over distances up to 50 feet. This process converts radio frequency (RF) energy, both intentionally emitted and ambient, into usable direct current (DC) power. Incorporating far-field wireless energy harvesting into safeguards equipment can significantly extend the equipment’s battery life and perhaps make it indefinite. Furthermore, additional functionality can be added to safeguards equipment without lowering its operational life expectancy. This paper explores the benefits and drawbacks of integrating far-field wireless energy harvesting into a chosen safeguards seal: the Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA). Specifically, it examines the performance of a commercially available RF harvesting system from Powercast, as well as commercial and custom antenna solutions.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Plutonium particle analysis by LG-SIMS and LA-MC-ICP-MS for environmental safeguards

During nuclear facility inspections, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors collect dust particles using cotton swipes. Analysis of these swipes is an extremely powerful tool with which to confirm treaty compliance or identify treaty violations. Through particle analysis it is possible to identify individual particles representative of nuclear activities. Uranium particle analysis is a reasonably mature technique used by IAEA and its Network of Analytical Laboratories for treaty verification. However, the IAEA has recently identified the maturation of plutonium and mixed uranium-plutonium particle analysis techniques as a top priority. We propose to address this area directly by developing the new methods necessary to analyze samples containing plutonium and mixed uranium-plutonium particles. The end products of this study will be: (A) more accurate and ultra-precise isotopic characterization of plutonium -bearing particles from environmental swipe samples, and (B) development and validation of laser ablation particle analysis techniques as robust and accurate analysis methodologies for future safeguards missions.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗