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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2015

Formal Foundations for Hierarchical Safety Cases

Safety cases are increasingly being required in many safety-critical domains to assure, using structured argumentation and evidence, that a system is acceptably safe. However, comprehensive system-wide safety arguments present appreciable challenges to develop, understand, evaluate, and manage, partly due to the volume of information that they aggregate, such as the results of hazard analysis, requirements analysis, testing, formal verification, and other engineering activities. Previously, we have proposed hierarchical safety cases, hicases, to aid the comprehension of safety case argument structures. In this paper, we build on a formal notion of safety case to formalise the use of hierarchy as a structuring technique, and show that hicases satisfy several desirable properties. Our aim is to provide a formal, theoretical foundation for safety cases. In particular, we believe that tools for high assurance systems should be granted similar assurance to the systems to which they are applied. To this end, we formally specify and prove the correctness of key operations for constructing and managing hicases, which gives the specification for implementing hicases in AdvoCATE, our toolset for safety case automation. We motivate and explain the theory with the help of a simple running example, extracted from a real safety case and developed using AdvoCATE.

Hierarchy↗
NASA NTRS2015

SLS-SPEC-159 Cross-Program Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE) Revision D

This document is derived from the former National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Constellation Program (CxP) document CxP 70023, titled "The Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE), Revision C." The original document has been modified to represent updated Design Reference Missions (DRMs) for the NASA Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Programs. The DSNE completes environment-related specifications for architecture, system-level, and lower-tier documents by specifying the ranges of environmental conditions that must be accounted for by NASA ESD Programs. To assure clarity and consistency, and to prevent requirements documents from becoming cluttered with extensive amounts of technical material, natural environment specifications have been compiled into this document. The intent is to keep a unified specification for natural environments that each Program calls out for appropriate application. This document defines the natural environments parameter limits (maximum and minimum values, energy spectra, or precise model inputs, assumptions, model options, etc.), for all ESD Programs. These environments are developed by the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Natural Environments Branch (MSFC organization code: EV44). Many of the parameter limits are based on experience with previous programs, such as the Space Shuttle Program. The parameter limits contain no margin and are meant to be evaluated individually to ensure they are reasonable (i.e., do not apply unrealistic extreme-on-extreme conditions). The natural environments specifications in this document should be accounted for by robust design of the flight vehicle and support systems. However, it is understood that in some cases the Programs will find it more effective to account for portions of the environment ranges by operational mitigation or acceptance of risk in accordance with an appropriate program risk management plan and/or hazard analysis process. The DSNE is not intended as a definition of operational models or operational constraints, nor is it adequate, alone, for ground facilities which may have additional requirements (for example, building codes and local environmental constraints). "Natural environments," as the term is used here, refers to the environments that are not the result of intended human activity or intervention. It consists of a variety of external environmental factors (most of natural origin and a few of human origin) which impose restrictions or otherwise impact the development or operation of flight vehicles and destination surface systems. These natural environments include the following types of environments: Terrestrial environments at launch, abort, and normal landing sites (winds, temperatures, pressures, surface roughness, sea conditions, etc.); Space environments (ionizing radiation, orbital debris, meteoroids, thermosphere density, plasma, solar, Earth, and lunar-emitted thermal radiation, etc.); Destination environments (Lunar surface and orbital, Mars atmosphere and surface, near Earth asteroids, etc.). Many of the environmental specifications in this document are based on models, data, and environment descriptions contained in the CxP 70044, Constellation Program Natural Environment Definition for Design (NEDD). The NEDD provides additional detailed environment data and model descriptions to support analytical studies for ESD Programs. For background information on specific environments and their effects on spacecraft design and operations, the environment models, and the data used to generate the specifications contained in the DSNE, the reader is referred to the NEDD paragraphs listed in each section of the DSNE. Also, most of the environmental specifications in this document are tied specifically to the ESD DRMs in ESD-10012, Revision B, Exploration Systems Development Concept of Operations (ConOps). Coordination between these environment specifications and the DRMs must be maintained. This document should be compatible with the current ESD DRMs, but updates to the mission definitions and variations in interpretation may require adjustments to the environment specifications.

Roberts, Barry C.↗
NASA NTRS2016

You Can't Reach for the Stars if You are Tripping Over the Ground! (Preventing Slips, Trips, and Falls)

Although there are very few mishaps related to ground, vehicle or payload processing at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), employees have experienced a significant number of injuries due to slips, trips, and falls outside of performing flight processing operations. Slips, trips, and falls are major causes of occupational injuries at KSC, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and in general industry. To help KSC employees avoid these injuries, and allow them to be fully productive, KSC launched an initiative in 2013 to reduce slips, trips, and falls. This initiative is based on a four-part model focusing on DATA analysis, HAZARD awareness, PREVENTIVE methods, and BALANCE.

Falls↗
NASA NTRS2017

Preparing for Veg-04 and Veg-05: Improving Pick-And-Eat Food Capabilities for the International Space Station

The capability to grow nutritious, palatable food for crew consumption during spaceflight has the potential to provide health-promoting, bioavailable nutrients, enhance the dietary experience, and reduce launch mass as we move toward longer-duration missions. Studies of edible produce during spaceflight have been limited, leaving a significant knowledge gap in the methods required to grow safe, acceptable, nutritious crops for consumption in space. Researchers from Kennedy Space Center, Johnson Space Center, Purdue University and ORBITEC have teamed up to explore the potential for plant growth and food production on the International Space Station (ISS) and future exploration missions. Ground testing of Chinese cabbage and dwarf tomato crops under different LED lighting and fertilizer conditions is being conducted to allow for a preliminary down selection of the two best lighting recipes and the best fertilizer treatment. Two trials of Chinese cabbage and one trial on dwarf tomato have been completed in on-going ground tests. Horticultural data on crop growth and productivity and chemical data on specific nutrients have been collected and are being analyzed to allow preliminary down selection. Taste test evaluations are planned on the preliminary down selection treatments to allow a final down selection for flight testing. Microbial assessment for hazard analysis critical control points (HACCP) evaluation is also underway to enable implementation of food consumption. Following down selection flight preparation will commence for testing these crops in the Veggie vegetable-production system on the ISS. A crew questionnaire has been developed to better understand the impact of crop growth in Veggie on crew behavioral health. A single Veggie plant growth chamber is currently installed on ISS, and preparations are underway to launch a second Veggie, allowing side-by-side testing under different lighting conditions. Veg-04 will be the first mission that will use this dual-Veggie capability, where the selected cultivar of Tokyo bekana Chinese cabbage will be grown under two different red-to-blue light ratios. ORBITEC has developed custom lighting software allowing independent selection of red and blue light levels. The VEG-05 experiment will test similar light treatments using Red Robin dwarf tomato. These tests offer an opportunity to develop a pick-and-eat fresh vegetable component to the ISS food system as a first step to regular supplemental food production. Our work will help define light colors, levels, and horticultural best practices to achieve high yields of safe, nutritious leafy greens and tomatoes to supplement a space diet of prepackaged food. With this work we will continue the synergistic research to help close gaps in the human research roadmap, and enable humans to venture to Mars and beyond. This research was co-funded by the Human Research Program and Space Biology (MTL1075) in the ILSRA 2015 NRA call.

International Space Station↗
NASA NTRS2016

Exit Presentation

Skills Acquired: Tensile Testing: Prepare materials and setting up the tensile tests; Collect and interpret (messy) data. Outgassing Testing: Understand TML (Total Mass Loss) and CVCM (Collected Volatile Condensable Material); Collaboration with other NASA centers. Z2 (NASA's Prototype Space Suit Development) Support: Hands on building mockups of components; Analyze data; Work with others, understanding what both parties need in order to make a run successful. LCVG (Liquid Cooling and Ventilation Garment) Flush and Purge Console: Both formal design and design review process; How to determine which components to use - flow calculations, pressure ratings, size, etc.; Hazard Analysis; How to make design tradeoffs.

Melone, Kate↗
NASA NTRS2017

SLS-SPEC-159 Cross-Program Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE) Revision E

The DSNE completes environment-related specifications for architecture, system-level, and lower-tier documents by specifying the ranges of environmental conditions that must be accounted for by NASA ESD Programs. To assure clarity and consistency, and to prevent requirements documents from becoming cluttered with extensive amounts of technical material, natural environment specifications have been compiled into this document. The intent is to keep a unified specification for natural environments that each Program calls out for appropriate application. This document defines the natural environments parameter limits (maximum and minimum values, energy spectra, or precise model inputs, assumptions, model options, etc.), for all ESD Programs. These environments are developed by the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Natural Environments Branch (MSFC organization code: EV44). Many of the parameter limits are based on experience with previous programs, such as the Space Shuttle Program. The parameter limits contain no margin and are meant to be evaluated individually to ensure they are reasonable (i.e., do not apply unrealistic extreme-on-extreme conditions). The natural environments specifications in this document should be accounted for by robust design of the flight vehicle and support systems. However, it is understood that in some cases the Programs will find it more effective to account for portions of the environment ranges by operational mitigation or acceptance of risk in accordance with an appropriate program risk management plan and/or hazard analysis process. The DSNE is not intended as a definition of operational models or operational constraints, nor is it adequate, alone, for ground facilities which may have additional requirements (for example, building codes and local environmental constraints). "Natural environments," as the term is used here, refers to the environments that are not the result of intended human activity or intervention. It consists of a variety of external environmental factors (most of natural origin and a few of human origin) which impose restrictions or otherwise impact the development or operation of flight vehicles and destination surface systems.

Roberts, Barry C.↗
NASA NTRS2019

VEG-04: the Effects of Light Quality on Mizuna Mustard Growth, Nutritional Composition, and Organoleptic Acceptability for a Space Diet

Space crop production will be important in future long duration exploration missions to supplement the packaged diet with fresh bioactive nutrients. Plant care and the addition of fresh veggies to the diet may also have a role in astronaut well-being. Pick-and-eat salad crops are the best candidates for this near-term supplementation since they require minimal processing or preparation to add to meals. While light quality can strongly influence plant responses on Earth, the impacts of light quality on plant growth and composition in spaceflight remain unclear. The VEG-04 experiment uses two Veggie plant growth chambers on the International Space Station to simultaneously test different red: blue light ratios on the growth of Mizuna mustard, a leafy green salad crop. In addition to plant health and yield, the composition of key nutrients is assessed. Astronauts conduct on-board organoleptic evaluation of the fresh produce. Microbial food safety of returned produce is examined, and a Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) plan has been developed for this crop. VEG-04 consists of two experiments, one lasting 28 days with a single harvest, and the second lasting 56 days, with three cut-and-come-again harvests. These different scenarios provide an opportunity to test two production concepts, examine different fertilizers, monitor microbial changes over time for this crop, and assess potential impacts of interacting with plants on crew behavioral health and performance in spaceflight operations. In ground testing, plant growth was not significantly different across the different light treatments, however nutrient composition did differ significantly. Flight test results will be compared with ground data. This research was co-funded by NASA's Human Research Program and Space Biology in the ILSRA 2015 NRA call.

Massa, Gioia D.↗
NASA NTRS2021

Cincinnati & Covington Urban Development II: Assessing Flooding and Landslide Susceptibility Along the Ohio-Kentucky Border

Landslides and flooding are reoccurring environmental hazards that lead to health risks and economic burdens in the urban areas of Cincinnati, Ohio and Covington, Kentucky. These communities share underlying natural and artificial conditions that make them vulnerable to these hazards, including excessive precipitation, weak lithology, high impervious surface levels, and steep slopes. Despite the human and economic risks associated with these environmental hazards, the areas of highest vulnerability within the region remain unknown. NASA DEVELOP partnered with Groundwork USA and Groundwork Ohio River Valley (ORV) to assess the region’s susceptibility to landslides and flooding. The team utilized NASA Earth observations, including the Landsat 8 Operational Land Imager (OLI), Landsat 8 Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS), and Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Integrated Multi-satellitE Retrieval for GPM (IMERG), alongside ancillary datasets to map landslide susceptibility and exposure throughout the study area. The team also used ancillary data to map surface runoff and runoff retention using the Natural Capital Project’s Integrated Valuation of Ecosystem Services and Tradeoffs (InVEST) Urban Flood Risk Mitigation Model. The resulting landslide susceptibility and exposure maps highlight the neighborhoods around Avondale and Fairmount as areas of particularly high landslide exposure. Meanwhile, the InVEST outputs demonstrate that Downtown Cincinnati and the Queensgate neighborhood retain the least amount of rainfall. This research provides partners with a more complete hazard analysis of the greater Cincinnati area while also producing refined methodologies to enhance future flood and landslide vulnerability mapping throughout Groundwork USA’s nationwide network of communities.

Paxton LaJoie↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Aggregate Risk Tool for Human Space Flight

This project utilized Data fusion capabilities developed from the 2020-2022 Information Fusion (IFDA) IRAD to enhance functionality of a Human Spaceflight (HSF) Aggregate Risk Product developed by the JSC Flight Safety Office. The tool compiles and presents risk data from multiple Program and Commercial Provider vehicles to provide a holistic assessment of residual risk to Program Managers and Technical Authorities prior to HSF Launches. The aggregation or coupling of risks from multiple sources (Examples: PRA, variances, anomaly data bases, Program Risk Management data bases, technical review board minutes, Hazard Analysis, etc.) when analyzed, identify potential areas of elevated risk in components, systems or mission phases that would otherwise be undetected by nonintegrated program risk management tools and possesses.

Patrick Huckaby↗
NASA NTRS2022

Aggregate Risk Tool for Human Space Flight

This tool utilizes Data fusion capabilities developed from the 2020-2022 Information Fusion (IFDA) IRAD to enhance functionality of a Human Spaceflight (HSF) Aggregate Risk Product developed by the JSC Flight Safety Office. The tool compiles and present risk data from multiple Program and Commercial Provider sources to provide a holistic assessment for Program Managers and Technical Authorities to evaluate residual risk prior to HSF Launches. The aggregation, or coupling of risks from multiple sources (Ex: PRA, variances, anomaly data bases, CRM data, technical review board minutes, Hazard Analysis, etc.) identifies areas of elevated risk in components, systems or mission phases that would otherwise be undetected by non-integrated program risk management tools and possesses. Data is then displayed in an interactive user interface/dashboard that enables users to see potential areas of concern requiring more in-depth analysis.

Patrick M Huckaby↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA) Activities in Support of Artemis I and Plans for Artemis II

The Artemis I mission in 2022 accomplished humanity’s first venture beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) with a human-rated spacecraft in over fifty years. Artemis comprises several key Program elements – Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Orion Crew Module, Service Module, Launch Abort System; the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Exploration Ground System (EGS). Much of our human spaceflight experience with crewed lunar missions is captured in historical program documents, but first-hand knowledge is limited to a few spaceflight veterans. Missions to LEO have offered the opportunity of direct, near-instantaneous communications and assistance, and the ability to return to Earth within a matter of hours in case of emergency. Outward-bound missions do not have these features and will require a more autonomous and reliable spacecraft. The assessment of compliance with applicable safety requirements and adequacy of hazard controls and verifications is the responsibility of the MPCV Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP), along with a Joint [NASA/ESA] Safety and Engineering Review Panel (JSERP) for the review of the European Service Module (ESM). The MSERP has two features that are relatively unique amongst NASA safety panels. First, NASA Engineering was added as a Panel co-chair, which enhanced the Engineering organization’s engagement and level of understanding of hazard analysis methodology and results. The MSERP has representation from each office, including Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) and Health and Medical Technical Authority, supporting the Orion Program in addition to the Engineering and Safety Technical Authority co-chairs. Second, the JSERP has a second set of co-chairs from ESA Engineering and ESA Product Assurance and Safety organizations, which recognizes the international arrangement as one of partnership. This paper will focus on SMA processes, activities, and plans for the Orion element and explore unique challenges associated with Artemis II as we approach the flight of the first crewed Orion vehicle.

Paul J. Collier↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Safety-Driven Approach to Exploring and Comparing Air Traffic Management Concepts for Enabling Urban Air Mobility

There is broad recognition that the high tempo and density of Urban Air Mobility (UAM) operations will require identifying new Air Traffic Management (ATM) concepts to safely integrate UAM air traffic into the airspace alongside existing air traffic. However, the simulation models used to compare ATM concepts today are difficult to apply during the early stages of concept development and do not offer enough support in identifying potential new concepts. In addition, they have limited ability to evaluate ATM concepts in terms of safety, security, and other key emergent properties. Instead of using simulation to evaluate ATM concepts, this paper demonstrates how a safety-driven systems engineering approach based on Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) can be used to design properties such as safety into an ATM system from the earliest stages of development. Using a hazard analysis technique called Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), system requirements and the desired ATM behavior are derived. As an example, two possible ATM concepts to implement that behavior are compared to identify their safety-related benefits and tradeoffs. This new approach enables (1) systematic exploration of alternative ATM concepts and (2) identification of the safety-related tradeoffs between concepts as early as possible in the development process.

system safety↗
DOE OSTI2022

Common Cause Failure Evaluation of High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems

Digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) have many advantages over analog systems but also pose different engineering and technical challenges, such as potential threats due to common cause failures (CCFs). This paper proposes a Platform for Risk Assessment of DI&C (PRADIC) developed by Idaho National Laboratory for dealing with potential software CCFs in DI&C systems of NPPs. The methodology development of PRADIC on the quantitative evaluation of software CCFs in high safety-significant safety-related DI&C systems in NPPs is illustrated in this paper. In PRADIC, qualitative hazard analysis and quantitative reliability and consequence analysis are successively implemented to obtain quantitative risk information, compare with respective risk evaluation acceptance criteria, and provide suggestions for risk reduction and design optimization. A comprehensive case study was also performed and documented in this paper. Results show that PRADIC can effectively identify potential digital-based CCFs, estimate their failure probabilities, and evaluate their impacts to system and plant safety.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Common Cause Failure Evaluation of High Safety Significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems using IRADIC Technology

Digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) have many advantages over analog systems but also pose different engineering and technical challenges, such as potential threats due to common cause failures (CCFs). This paper proposes an integrated risk assessment technology for DI&C systems (IRADIC) developed by Idaho National Laboratory for dealing with potential software CCFs in DI&C systems of NPPs. The methodology development of the IRADIC technology on the quantitative evaluation of software CCFs in high safety-significant safety-related DI&C systems in NPPs is illustrated in this paper. In IRADIC, qualitative hazard analysis and quantitative reliability and consequence analysis are successively implemented to obtain quantitative risk information, compare with respective risk evaluation acceptance criteria, and provide suggestions for risk reduction and design optimization. A comprehensive case study was also performed and documented in this paper. Results show that the IRADIC technology can effectively identify potential digital-based CCFs, estimate their failure probabilities, and evaluate their impacts to system and plant safety.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

On the Road to Achieving Safety Excellence at the Idaho Cleanup Project: The Initial Challenges, Solutions, and Positive Results of Striving to be the Best and Safest in the DOE Complex - 20518

When Fluor Idaho, LLC (Fluor Idaho) assumed the Idaho Cleanup Project Core contract (ICP Core) in mid-2016, it inherited the successful multi-faceted, employee-owned safety programs of two prior contractors supporting cleanup operations at the Idaho National Laboratory Site. Fluor Idaho incorporated the best of both safety programs along with Fluor Corporate's 106-year legacy of safety initiatives and successes. Fluor Idaho integrated the separate programs and cultures under a One Fluor approach - one project, one mission, One Fluor. Job changes, management changes, and procedures, processes, and system changes presented multiple challenges. Those challenges combined with the severe Winter of 2016/2017 resulted in numerous slips, trips, and falls first aids and reportable injuries. The road to safety excellence started off bumpy and stayed that way for some time. Since then, Fluor Idaho has successfully implemented several key initiatives including employee engagement; management engagement and time in the field; communications improvements; safety culture sustainment; injury/illness prevention; organizational learning; and DOE Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) readiness and preparation. Management became more engaged by making more workplace visits and increasing their supervision of 'life critical work' or complex activities. Additional training became mandatory for first-line supervisors and front-line workers. Most recently, Fluor Idaho increased its injury and illness prevention initiatives extensively. In the last year, things have turned around in a dramatic way. This shift is directly attributable to the significant number of initiatives launched in late 2017 and 2018. These initiatives addressed safety performance in the five key areas of the DOE VPP and promoted sustainability of the company's safety culture. The five key areas are: management leadership, employee involvement, work-site analysis, hazard prevention and control, and safety and health training. Employees and managers alike recommitted to making safety the highest value. The result of this laser-like focus on safety and accident and injury prevention is that injuries and first aids are a fraction of what they were. During FY 2019, employees worked more than 4.2 million hours without a serious injury or lost work-day and 1 million hours without a recordable injury. Fluor Idaho is proud of its safety trend. The company invested significant resources in improving its safety record, and that investment is paying off. Other contractors in the DOE Complex can learn and benefit from this discussion of the challenges Fluor Idaho faced, as well as its innovative safety initiatives that are producing results that are being recognized by our U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) customer. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Visualizing a Vulnerability: Its Connections to Hardware and Software

All Hazards Analysis (AHA) is a framework developed by Idaho National Laboratory that provides capabilities to collect, store, analyze, and visualize critical infrastructure information. A core function of AHA is its ability to simulate faults or outages in networks of infrastructure originating from a plethora of causes, ranging from natural disasters to cyberattacks. AHA utilizes Hardware and Software Bills of Material (HBOM and SBOM, respectively) along with Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEVs) to document the potential attack vectors for each piece of infrastructure. The objective of this contribution to AHA was to create a visualization tool that could capture the small details held in each individual artifact as well as preserve the large-scale connections that link them together to aid threat modeling.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

Hazard and risk analysis framework for nuclear power plant–based integrated energy systems

Employing integrated energy systems (IESs) with nuclear power plants (NPPs) can improve NPP utilization by leveraging dedicated thermal and electric power delivery, but it may also increase operational safety risks. This paper presents a framework to identify and quantify hazards and risks for such IESs. The framework combines accidentology to review past industrial accidents with failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) to identify potential future incidents. Hydrogen explosion and toxic chemical release hazards are of particular concern. Explosion consequences are quantified using the Bauwens-Dorofeev (Bauwens) and trinitrotoluene equivalent mass (TNT-EM) methods, while chemical release consequences are computed using the Gaussian atmospheric dispersion method. Operational disturbances from direct electrical and thermal integration that may affect NPP safety are modeled using probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Hazards and risks are then evaluated for regulatory compliance. The framework is applied to IESs comprising pressurized or boiling water reactors supplying three levels of thermal and electrical power to industrial customers. Case studies include high-temperature steam electrolysis hydrogen plants of varying capacities and a synthetic fuel production plant. Sensitivity analysis examines piping component failures in the PRA model as a precursor to cost estimation for thermal extraction line design. Additionally, Fussel-Vessely (FV) and risk increase importance (RII) measures identify risk-informed design improvements for the thermal extraction system. FMEA highlights hazards such as loss of offsite power, prompt loss of electrical load, loss of thermal output, and immediate steam diversion, in addition to hydrogen explosions and toxic chemical releases. Both Bauwens and TNT-EM methods suggest maintaining several hundred meters of separation between the NPP and hydrogen facility to mitigate explosion risks. PRA results show a maximum initiating event frequency increase of 1.15% and an overall risk increase of 0.28%. Importance measure analysis identifies upstream pipe leak isolation components as critical. Evaluating the results against safety regulations, it is concluded that hazards and risks can be managed to comply with regulations through risk-informed thermal and electrical connection designs, component selection, maintenance programs, and safe separation distances between NPPs and integrated industrial facilities.

08 - HYDROGEN↗