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Optimal imaging for treaty verification FY2014 annual report

FY2014 technical report of our project funded by DNN R&D that leverages advanced inference methods developed for medical and adaptive imaging to address arms control applications. We seek a method to acquire and analyze imaging data of declared treaty-accountable items without creating an image of those objects or otherwise storing or revealing any classified information. Such a method would avoid the use of classified-information barriers. We present our progress on FY2014 tasks defined in our life-cycle plan. We also describe some future work that is part of the continuation of this project in FY2015 and beyond as part of a venture that joins ours with a related PNNL project.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty seismic monitoring: 2012 USNAS report and recent explosions, earthquakes, and other seismic sources

A comprehensive ban on nuclear explosive testing is briefly characterized as an arms control initiative related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The work of monitoring for nuclear explosions uses several technologies of which the most important is seismology-a physics discipline that draws upon extensive and ever-growing assets to monitor for earthquakes and other ground-motion phenomena as well as for explosions. This paper outlines the basic methods of seismic monitoring within that wider context, and lists web-based and other resources for learning details. It also summarizes the main conclusions, concerning capability to monitor for test-ban treaty compliance, contained in a major study published in March 2012 by the US National Academy of Sciences.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Environment: A Workshop Summary

The Center for Global Security Research and Global Security Principal Directorate at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory convened a workshop in July 2016 to consider “The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Security Environment.” We took a broad view of nonproliferation, encompassing not just the treaty regime but also arms control, threat reduction, counter-­proliferation, and countering nuclear terrorism. We gathered a group of approximately 60 experts from the technical, academic, political, defense and think tank communities and asked them what—and how much—can reasonably be accomplished in each of these areas in the 5 to 10 years ahead. Discussion was on a not-­for-­attribution basis. This document provides a summary of key insights and lessons learned, and is provided to help stimulate broader public discussion of these issues. It is a collection of ideas as informally discussed and debated among a group of experts. The ideas reported here are the personal views of individual experts and should not be attributed to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Review of Prior U.S. Attribute Measurement Systems

Attribute Measurement Systems have been developed and demonstrated several times in the United States over the last decade or so; under the Trilateral Initiative (1996-2002), FMTTD (Fissile Material Transparency Technology Demonstration, 2000), and NG-AMS (Next Generation Attribute Measurement System, 2005-2008). Each Attribute Measurement System has contributed to the growing body of knowledge regarding the use of such systems in warhead dismantlement and other Arms Control scenarios. The Trilateral Initiative, besides developing prototype hardware/software, introduced the topic to the international community. The 'trilateral' parties included the United States, the Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). With the participation of a Russian delegation, the FMTTD demonstrated that measurements behind an information barrier are feasible while meeting host party security requirements. The NG-AMS system explored the consequences of maximizing the use of Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) equipment, which made construction easier, but authentication harder. The 3rd Generation Attribute Measurement System (3G-AMS) will further the scope of previous systems by including additional attributes and more rigor in authentication.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Designing Pu600 for Authentication

Many recent Non-proliferation and Arms Control software projects include an authentication component. Demonstrating assurance that software and hardware performs as expected without hidden 'back-doors' is crucial to a project's success. In this context, 'authentication' is defined as determining that the system performs only its intended purpose and performs that purpose correctly and reliably over many years. Pu600 is a mature software solution for determining the presence of Pu and the ratio of Pu240 to Pu239 by analyzing the gamma ray spectra in the 600 KeV region. The project's goals are to explore hardware and software technologies which can by applied to Pu600 which ease the authentication of a complete, end-to-end solution. We will discuss alternatives and give the current status of our work.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Atoms for peace and the nonproliferation treaty: unintended consequences

In April 2009, President Obama revived nonproliferation and arms control efforts with a speech calling for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. His speech correctly acknowledged the threat of nuclear terrorism and the vulnerabilities of the related unsecure nuclear materials. Unfortunately, the president did not mention and has not mentioned in any speech the threat posed by at-risk radiological materials. Nonproliferation efforts have a well documented history of focus on special nuclear materials (fissionable weapons usable materials or SNM), and other key materials (chemical and biological) and technologies for a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such intense focus on WMD related materials/technologies is essential for international safety and security and merit continued attention and funding. However, the perception that radioactive sealed sources (sources) are of less concern than WMD is unfortunate. These perceptions are based solely on the potentially enormous and tragic consequences associated with their deliberate or accidental misuse and proliferation concerns. However, there is a documented history of overemphasis on the nuclear threat at the expense of ignoring the far more likely and also devastating chemical and biological threats. The radiological threat should not be minimized or excluded from policy discussions and decisions on these far ranging scopes of threat to the international community. Sources have a long history of use; and a wider distribution worldwide than fissile materials. Pair this with their broad ranges in isotopes/activities along with scant national and international attention and mechanisms for their safe and secure management and it is not difficult to envision a deadly threat. Arguments that minimize or divert attention away from sources may have the effect of distracting necessary policy attention on preventing/mitigating a radiological dispersal event. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 should be a clear reminder of the inherent danger of diminishing or dismissing lower-level threats in exchange for enhanced focus on high priority special nuclear materials with the basis for this emphasis being solely on the magnitude of the consequences of a single event. Mitigating all possible or likely terrorist attacks is impossible; however, weaponized sources, in the form of a radiological dispersal device, have been a declared target material of Al-Qaida. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative promoted the spread of the paradoxical beneficial yet destructive properties of the atom. Typically, the focus of nonproliferation efforts focuses on the fissile materials associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction, with less emphasis on radioactive materials that could be used for a Weapon of Mass Disruption. Most nonproliferation policy discussion involves securing or preventing the diversion of weapons grade fissile materials (uranium (U) with concentration of over 90% of the isotope {sup 235}U (HEU) and plutonium with more than 90% of the isotope {sup 239}Pu), with scant attention given to the threat posed by a prolific quantity of sources spread worldwide. Further acerbating the problem of inattention, it appears that the momentum of the continued evolution in the beneficial applications of sources will only increase in the near future. Several expert studies have demonstrated on the potentially devastating economic, psychological and public health impacts of terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or radiation emitting device (ROD/RED) in a metropolis. The development of such a weapon, from the acquisition of the radioactive material to the technical knowledge needed to fashion it into an ROD, is many orders of magnitude easier than diverting enough fissile material for and fabrication/acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Unlike nuclear weapons, worldwide, there are many well documented accounts of accidental and purposeful diversions of radioactive materials from regulatory control. As of the end of 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database had logged 1562 incidents, of which only 18 include weapons grade nuclear materials. As much as 66% of the radioactive material involved in these incidents was not recovered. Since 2004, there has been a 75% increase in incidents of unrecoverable material, much of which is labeled dangerous with potential for deterministic health affects if misused. This makes clear that a black market of illicit trade in sources exists. The incidents reported to the IAEA's database rely only on voluntary state reporting; therefore, the number of lost or stolen sources is expected to be much higher.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Laser Based Ultrasound for Verification of Circuit Card Assemblies

This IR is a follow-up conference Paper to the IR approved abstract; PNNL-SA-194096. --- Verification that equipment is authentic and not changed; even at the circuit card assembly (CCA) level will likely be an important component of future arms control treaties. This effort was an initial evaluation of the potential for laser-based ultrasound (LBU) as an inspection tool for Unique Identification (UID) of Circuit Card Assembly (CCA) boards and CCA components. The LBU system used a laser pulse for ultrasound generation and an Optical Microphone for ultrasound detection to image subsurface structures without physical contact and in a dry state. This paper described the selected CCA surrogate, CCA components that were examined, the LBU system, LBU images of the CCA components, and the initial development of UID algorithms. Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves indicated good performance for two algorithms as a potential means for UID of CCA boards and CCA components.

Laser Ultrasound, Equipment Verification, Arms Con↗

Priorities for technology development and policy to reduce the risk from radioactive materials.

The Standing Committee on International Security of Radioactive and Nuclear Materials in the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Division conducted its fourth annual workshop in February 2010 on Reducing the Risk from Radioactive and Nuclear Materials. This workshop examined new technologies in real-time tracking of radioactive materials, new risks and policy issues in transportation security, the best practices and challenges found in addressing illicit radioactive materials trafficking, industry leadership in reducing proliferation risk, and verification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Article VI. Technology gaps, policy gaps, and prioritization for addressing the identified gaps were discussed. Participants included academia, policy makers, radioactive materials users, physical security and safeguards specialists, and vendors of radioactive sources and transportation services. This paper summarizes the results of this workshop with the recommendations and calls to action for the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) membership community.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Single-Volume Neutron Scatter Camera for High-Efficiency Neutron Imaging and Source Characterization. Year 2 of 3 Summary

The neutron scatter camera (NSC), an imaging spectrometer for fission energy neutrons, is an established and proven detector for nuclear security applications such as weak source detection of special nuclear material (SNM), arms control treaty verification, and emergency response. Relative to competing technologies such as coded aperture imaging, time-encoded imaging, neutron time projection chamber, and various thermal neutron imagers, the NSC provides excellent event-by-event directional information for signal/background discrimination, reasonable imaging resolution, and good energy resolution. Its primary drawback is very low detection efficiency due to the requirement for neutron elastic scatters in two detector cells. We will develop a singlevolume double-scatter neutron imager, in which both neutron scatters can occur in the same large active volume. If successful, the efficiency will be dramatically increased over the current NSC cell-based geometry. If the detection efficiency approaches that of e.g. coded aperture imaging, the other inherent advantages of double-scatter imaging would make it the most attractive fast neutron detector for a wide range of security applications.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing transformation of safeguards by the Agency.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Next Generation Trusted Radiation Identification System (NG-TRIS).

The original Trusted Radiation Identification System (TRIS) was developed from 1999-2001, featuring information barrier technology to collect gamma radiation template measurements useful for arms control regime operations. The first TRIS design relied upon a multichannel analyzer (MCA) that was external to the protected volume of the system enclosure, undesirable from a system security perspective. An internal complex programmable logic device (CPLD) contained data which was not subject to software authentication. Physical authentication of the TRIS instrument case was performed by a sensitive but slow eddy-current inspection method. This paper describes progress to date for the Next Generation TRIS (NG-TRIS), which improves the TRIS design. We have incorporated the MCA internal to the trusted system volume, achieved full authentication of CPLD data, and have devised rapid methods to authenticate the system enclosure and weld seals of the NG-TRIS enclosure. For a complete discussion of the TRIS system and components upon which NG-TRIS is based, the reader is directed to the comprehensive user's manual and system reference of Seager, et al.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Comments for A Conference on Verification in the 21st Century

The author offers 5 points for the discussion of Verification and Technology: (1) Experience with the implementation of arms limitation and arms reduction agreements confirms that technology alone has never been relied upon to provide effective verification. (2) The historical practice of verification of arms control treaties between Cold War rivals may constrain the cooperative and innovative use of technology for transparency, veification and confidence building in the future. (3) An area that has been identified by many, including the US State Department and NNSA as being rich for exploration for potential uses of technology for transparency and verification is information and communications technology (ICT). This includes social media, crowd-sourcing, the internet of things, and the concept of societal verification, but there are issues. (4) On the issue of the extent to which verification technologies are keeping pace with the demands of future protocols and agrements I think the more direct question is ''are they effective in supporting the objectives of the treaty or agreement?'' In this regard it is important to acknowledge that there is a verification grand challenge at our doorstep. That is ''how does one verify limitations on nuclear warheads in national stockpiles?'' (5) Finally, while recognizing the daunting political and security challenges of such an approach, multilateral engagement and cooperation at the conceptual and technical levels provides benefits for addressing future verification challenges.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Low-Intrusion Techniques and Sensitive Information Management for Warhead Counting and Verification: FY2011 Annual Report

Future arms control treaties may push nuclear weapons limits to unprecedented low levels and may entail precise counting of warheads as well as distinguishing between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Such advances will require assessment of form and function to confidently verify the presence or absence of nuclear warheads and/or their components. Imaging with penetrating radiation can provide such an assessment and could thus play a unique role in inspection scenarios. Yet many imaging capabilities have been viewed as too intrusive from the perspective of revealing weapon design details, and the potential for the release of sensitive information poses challenges in verification settings. A widely held perception is that verification through radiography requires images of sufficient quality that an expert (e.g., a trained inspector or an image-matching algorithm) can verify the presence or absence of components of a device. The concept of information barriers (IBs) has been established to prevent access to relevant weapon-design information by inspectors (or algorithms), and has, to date, limited the usefulness of radiographic inspection. The challenge of this project is to demonstrate that radiographic information can be used behind an IB to improve the capabilities of treaty-verification weapons-inspection systems.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Linear models to perform treaty verification tasks for enhanced information security

Linear mathematical models were applied to binary-discrimination tasks relevant to arms control verification measurements in which a host party wishes to convince a monitoring party that an item is or is not treaty accountable. These models process data in list-mode format and can compensate for the presence of variability in the source, such as uncertain object orientation and location. The Hotelling observer applies an optimal set of weights to binned detector data, yielding a test statistic that is thresholded to make a decision. The channelized Hotelling observer applies a channelizing matrix to the vectorized data, resulting in a lower dimensional vector available to the monitor to make decisions. We demonstrate how incorporating additional terms in this channelizing-matrix optimization offers benefits for treaty verification. We present two methods to increase shared information and trust between the host and monitor. The first method penalizes individual channel performance in order to maximize the information available to the monitor while maintaining optimal performance. Second, we present a method that penalizes predefined sensitive information while maintaining the capability to discriminate between binary choices. Data used in this study was generated using Monte Carlo simulations for fission neutrons, accomplished with the GEANT4 toolkit. Custom models for plutonium inspection objects were measured in simulation by a radiation imaging system. Model performance was evaluated and presented using the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Radiotherapy With or Without Erythropoietin for Anemic Patients With Head and Neck Cancer: A Randomized Trial of the Radiation Therapy Oncology Group (RTOG 99-03)

Purpose: To determine whether the addition of recombinant human erythropoietin (Epo) could improve the outcomes of anemic patients receiving definitive radiotherapy for squamous cell carcinoma of the head and neck (SCCHN). Methods and Materials: Eligible patients had SCCHN, with a plan for continuous-course definitive radiotherapy (66-72 Gy) with or without chemotherapy. Patients with Stage III or IV SCCHN were required to undergo concurrent chemoradiotherapy and/or accelerated fractionation radiotherapy. Preradiotherapy hemoglobin was required to be between 9.0 g/dL and 13.5 g/dL (12.5 g/dL for women). Patients randomized to Epo received 40,000 U once weekly, starting 7-10 days before start of radiotherapy. Results: A total of 148 patients were enrolled; 141 were evaluable. Median pretreatment hemoglobin was 12.1 g/dL. Hemoglobin levels at 4 weeks rose by an average of 1.66 g/dL in the Epo arm, compared with an average 0.24 g/dL decrease in the control arm (p = 0.0001). Median follow-up was 2.5 years (3.1 years for surviving patients). There was no statistically significant difference in the primary endpoint of local-regional failure (LRF) rate between the treatment arms. The 3-year LRF rate was 36% for control and 44% for Epo (p = 0.56). There were also no significant differences in local-regional progression-free survival (LRPFS), patterns of failure, overall survival, or toxicity. The 3-year LRPFS rate was 52% for control and 47% for Epo. The overall survival rate was 57% and 56%, respectively. Conclusions: The addition of Epo to definitive radiotherapy for SCCHN did not improve outcomes. The study was not specifically designed to detect a potential negative association between Epo and tumor progression/survival.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Passive high explosive neutron inspection (PHENIX): a new method to confirm the presence or absence of high explosives for nuclear treaty verification

Advanced instruments and methods need to be developed now to create a technical basis to support the negotiation of future nuclear arms control treaties. One new capability that is anticipated is the ability to confirm either the declared presence or declared absence of high explosive (HE) material in the presence of special nuclear material (SNM). Towards this goal, Passive HE Neutron Inspection (PHENIX) has been developed and demonstrated as a method for confirming the presence or absence of HE in the presence of plutonium. The method exploits the inherent presence of neutrons associated with the decay of plutonium as an internal probe source for performing prompt gamma-ray neutron activation analysis (PGNAA), searching for the presence of HE as revealed by the emission of characteristic gamma rays following neutron absorption in hydrogen and nitrogen which are building blocks of present-day, military-grade HE. Tests using stoichiometrically-correct hemishells of mock HE with plutonium show that a system can be expected to positively confirm the presence or absence of these signatures, supporting determination of HE presence or absence with Pu, in a few hours. To protect other potentially sensitive gamma-ray signatures from a treaty accountable item, an analog information barrier has been conceptualized and tested which physically prevents the collection of gamma-ray spectral data outside of user selected energy windows strategically chosen to view only narrow spectral regions corresponding to the hydrogen (2223.2 keV) and nitrogen (9807.2 keV, 10,318.2 keV, and 10,829.2 keV) PGNAA signatures.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Optimizing a detection system for fissile material in nuclear disarmament verification

In arms control treaties, verification plays a crucial role in detecting non-compliance, deterring future violations, and building trust between state parties. Neutron interrogation that induces fission reactions in fissile isotopes and measures the resulting fission neutrons, could be employed for this purpose. This study aims to develop a system which can determine the presence of fissile material while intrinsically protecting information. In this paper, we focus on optimizing the system for discriminating between an enriched uranium block from a depleted uranium (DU) block. The system was built and we report on benchmark measurements with DU and 16% enriched uranium blocks. Furthermore, the Excalibur (Experiment for Calibration with Uranium) neutron source, a neutron spectrometer (redBubble Technology Industries (BTI) N-Probe), and superheated droplet detectors were used for these measurements. MCNP simulations provided insights into detector responses to fissile materials with varying isotopic compositions, confirming that the system functioned as designed.

Active neutron interrogation↗

Monitoring and verification R&D

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report outlined the Administration's approach to promoting the agenda put forward by President Obama in Prague on April 5, 2009. The NPR calls for a national monitoring and verification R&D program to meet future challenges arising from the Administration's nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament agenda. Verification of a follow-on to New START could have to address warheads and possibly components along with delivery capabilities. Deeper cuts and disarmament would need to address all of these elements along with nuclear weapon testing, nuclear material and weapon production facilities, virtual capabilities from old weapon and existing energy programs and undeclared capabilities. We only know how to address some elements of these challenges today, and the requirements may be more rigorous in the context of deeper cuts as well as disarmament. Moreover, there is a critical need for multiple options to sensitive problems and to address other challenges. There will be other verification challenges in a world of deeper cuts and disarmament, some of which we are already facing. At some point, if the reductions process is progressing, uncertainties about past nuclear materials and weapons production will have to be addressed. IAEA safeguards will need to continue to evolve to meet current and future challenges, and to take advantage of new technologies and approaches. Transparency/verification of nuclear and dual-use exports will also have to be addressed, and there will be a need to make nonproliferation measures more watertight and transparent. In this context, and recognizing we will face all of these challenges even if disarmament is not achieved, this paper will explore possible agreements and arrangements; verification challenges; gaps in monitoring and verification technologies and approaches; and the R&D required to address these gaps and other monitoring and verification challenges.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗