SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “security verification”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 235 records · Page 13

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2016

Final Report for FY15 Spent Fuel Project Task 12: Data Authentication

The data authentication task is concerned with the ability of a user to trust the output from an unattended measurement of spent nuclear fuel intended for disposal. Five high-level requirements that are driven from a data authentication perspective need to be considered for instrument development: The instrument must be secured. All data emerging from the instrument must be signed. Instrument inputs may also need to be signed and authenticated. The instrument environment needs to be controlled. A vulnerability assessment will be necessary for the full system before deployment. Additional requirements may be necessary, especially if operational scenarios include arrangements for joint use. None of the prototype instruments currently under development yet satisfies any of these requirements. From a data authentication perspective, the selection of a preferred instrument from among the candidates under development should consider the relative ability to secure the instrument, its relative needs for ancillary instrumentation, and ability of the instrument to self-interrogate its state of health. Further work is recommended to develop advanced technologies, methods and approaches for tamper indication. Beyond the development of any particular instrument for the nondestructive assay of spent fuel, efforts should be devoted to developing the system for spent fuel verification prior to long term disposal, including likely operational scenarios for routine use of the verification system.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Nuclear Forensics

Nuclear forensics is a key part of the nuclear security strategy for the United States and the international community. The NACS Division is central to the leadership role that LLNL has had in nuclear forensics over the past 25 years. Our current nuclear forensic program includes conducting R&D on provenance and attribution signatures, collaborating with international partners, training the next generation of nuclear forensic experts, developing test materials for verification and validation exercises, and providing expert advice to national and international policy makers. Key to our success in these areas has been the strong and continuing involvement in nuclear forensic casework obtained through law enforcement and intelligence channels as well as our outstanding analytical capabilities. NACS must continue to conduct forward-thinking R&D in nuclear forensics that supports operational programs and addresses intelligence gaps. To maintain leadership in nuclear forensics, we must attract, develop, and retain the best talent. The NNSA has a central leadership role in developing educational initiatives for nuclear forensics. In concert with the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute, the NACS Division will continue to participate in all nuclear forensic educational initiatives (undergraduate, graduate, postdoctoral) and incorporate LLNL’s D&I vision into its student and postdoc recruitment efforts. We will continue to build formal relationships with key academic partners and institutions with active and emerging nuclear forensic research interests. We will also strengthen relationships with NNSA DNN and SSAA funded university consortia (e.g. NSSC, ACE, CNEC, CVT, ETI, MTV), helping them conduct research of interest and relevance to nuclear forensics, while at the same time evaluating and recruiting promising talent from these programs.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

DOE OSTI2021

Evaluating Probability of Containment Effectiveness at a GCS Sites using integrated assessment modeling approach with Bayesian decision Networks

Improved scientific and engineering understanding of the behavior of geologic CO2 storage together with established regulatory framework and incentive structures raise the prospects for accelerated, large-scale deployment of this greenhouse gas emissions reduction approach. Incentive structures call for the establishment of appropriate verification and accounting approaches to support claims of the integrity of a geologic storage complex and to justify taking credit for long-term storage. In this study, we present a framework for assessing the probability of containment effectiveness over the lifetime of a geologic carbon storage site (e.g., after 70 years of injection and post-injection site performance) using forward stochastic model realizations based on site characterization data and using a monitoring-informed Bayesian network based on hypothetical detectability from surface seismic surveys over the site injection and post-injection phases. The National Risk Assessment Partnership’s open-source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM) was utilized to develop an ensemble of 10,000 a priori stochastic forecasts of CO2 containment. Those simulations were used to train the Bayesian network model to estimate the prior probabilities of the CO2 leakage mass into overlying, monitorable aquifers considering the uncertainties in the reservoir properties, permeability of potentially leaky wells and the overlying aquifers. The conditional probabilities in the Bayesian network were either learned from the NRAP-Open-IAM simulations or derived from the predefined detection thresholds for the monitoring method. Observations obtained from monitoring, over time during the site operation phases were then used to generate updated posterior probabilities of containment (and any loss from containment) in the Bayesian network by propagating the prior probabilities through the conditional probabilities. We demonstrate how to construct and use the Bayesian network for verifying the long-term storage complex effectiveness informed by monitoring based on the NRAP-Open-IAM simulations previously developed for the FutureGen 2.0 site. This approach may have relevance for stake holders to demonstrate secure geologic storage, provide a defensible, probabilistic approach to claim credit for geologic storage, and to estimate the likelihood that any fraction of the claimed credit may need to be refunded to the creditor based on available monitoring information.

Bayesian network, Risk assessment, Monitoring, car↗

DOE OSTI2025

Puck and Puck/SAW Loop Seals (Final Report)

Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), also known as seals, play a crucial role in various sectors including international nuclear safeguards, arms control, domestic security, and commercial products, by ensuring that monitored or high-value items are not accessed undetected. These devices do not block access but alert to unauthorized tampering. With adversaries' capabilities evolving, there's a pressing need for seals to advance in terms of effectiveness (e.g., better tamper indication and unique identification), and new technology can improve the efficiency of installation and verification. Passive loop seals, widely used in international nuclear safeguards to ensure that continuity of knowledge is maintained on declared items, face stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements that surpass those met by commercial products. The metal cup seal (Figure 1, left), a staple IAEA seal, is robust but requires significant resources for post-use verification – specifically, the seal’s unique identity can only be verified at IAEA headquarters after removal from facilities. Further, the seal has been in use for decades and seal types should periodically be replaced to counter adversarial efforts for defeating seals. In 2020, the IAEA outlined about 40 requirements for a new passive loop seal, aiming for in-situ verification, minimal external tool use, unique identification (UID), and clear tamper indication. In response, research and development efforts focused on creating a new passive loop seal that meets these criteria and in 2022 the IAEA announced the completion of the Field Verifiable Passive Loop Seal (FVPS) (Figure 1, right). Concurrently to the IAEA’s efforts, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) designed, developed, and tested two seal versions – Puck and Puck/SAW, with Puck based on the IAEA’s requirements and including a novel visually-obvious tamper response, and Puck/SAW adding additional beneficial capabilities like the ability to receive a unique identifier from a standoff distance and monitoring the wire integrity. Puck/SAW was specifically designed and developed to address sealing applications in dry spent fuel storage facilities, where the number of sealed spent fuel containers results in heavy verification burden and inspector safety issues related to radiation exposure. These efforts are described in this Executive Summary.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NASA NTRS2012

NASA Tech Briefs, June 2012

Topics covered include: iGlobe Interactive Visualization and Analysis of Spatial Data; Broad-Bandwidth FPGA-Based Digital Polyphase Spectrometer; Small Aircraft Data Distribution System; Earth Science Datacasting v2.0; Algorithm for Compressing Time-Series Data; Onboard Science and Applications Algorithm for Hyperspectral Data Reduction; Sampling Technique for Robust Odorant Detection Based on MIT RealNose Data; Security Data Warehouse Application; Integrated Laser Characterization, Data Acquisition, and Command and Control Test System; Radiation-Hard SpaceWire/Gigabit Ethernet-Compatible Transponder; Hardware Implementation of Lossless Adaptive Compression of Data From a Hyperspectral Imager; High-Voltage, Low-Power BNC Feedthrough Terminator; SpaceCube Mini; Dichroic Filter for Separating W-Band and Ka-Band; Active Mirror Predictive and Requirement Verification Software (AMP-ReVS); Navigation/Prop Software Suite; Personal Computer Transport Analysis Program; Pressure Ratio to Thermal Environments; Probabilistic Fatigue Damage Program (FATIG); ASCENT Program; JPL Genesis and Rapid Intensification Processes (GRIP) Portal; Data::Downloader; Fault Tolerance Middleware for a Multi-Core System; DspaceOgreTerrain 3D Terrain Visualization Tool; Trick Simulation Environment 07; Geometric Reasoning for Automated Planning; Water Detection Based on Color Variation; Single-Layer, All-Metal Patch Antenna Element with Wide Bandwidth; Scanning Laser Infrared Molecular Spectrometer (SLIMS); Next-Generation Microshutter Arrays for Large-Format Imaging and Spectroscopy; Detection of Carbon Monoxide Using Polymer-Composite Films with a Porphyrin-Functionalized Polypyrrole; Enhanced-Adhesion Multiwalled Carbon Nanotubes on Titanium Substrates for Stray Light Control; Three-Dimensional Porous Particles Composed of Curved, Two-Dimensional, Nano-Sized Layers for Li-Ion Batteries 23 Ultra-Lightweight; and Ultra-Lightweight Nanocomposite Foams and Sandwich Structures for Space Structure Applications.

Source record↗

DOE OSTI2022

Feasibility of critical infrastructure protection using network functions for programmable and decoupled ICS policy enforcement over WAN

Industrial control systems (ICS) represent a major component of our critical infrastructure. With the increasing need for more control and monitoring of such systems, ICS have seen an increase in connectivity to wide area networks (WAN) exposing aging equipment to rapidly evolving cybersecurity threats. Furthermore, the ICS data requires a reliability measure from the networks for critical functions for infrastructure monitoring and control. Especially when remote plant sites are involved such as pipelines, energy distribution networks, and transportation, WAN transport impairments most often provide a best effort delivery with no strict reliability guarantees. Network functions can provide a vendor agnostic, programmable critical infrastructure protection with a single maintenance, policy determination, and reliability assurance surface. A network function (NF) can be utilized for policy enforcement over the communication between remote entities and the main control office. This paper presents the research on transparent integration with existing ICS without disrupting communications, resulting in minimal downtime while decoupling the fast paced evolution of defensive security measures from the upgrade cycle of expensive long term hardware. We report our measurements on the resource requirements and overhead in the network for successful NF insertion under a wide variety of network impairments (network packet delay, reordering, and loss). Our paired NF implementation provides a policy enforcement platform extensible to cover myriad cybersecurity-related communication goals, including packet signing for verification, encryption for data privacy, packet filtering and data diode operation (i.e. protecting against eavesdropping, packet injection, and denial-of-service). Furthermore, bundling communication specifications into packet flows allows for tunability in applying policies as coarse- or fine-grained as the needs of the operator. We report on network function resource requirements in the form of required queue depth and network utilization overhead to inform the decision making against hardware cost constraints.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2021

DAKOTA (Design Analysis Kit for Optimization and Terascale) v.6.14

Sandia's Dakota software supports science and engineering transformation through advanced exploration of simulations. Specifically, Dakota manages and analyzes ensembles of simulations to provide broader and deeper perspective for analysts and decision makers. This enables them to: (1) enhance understanding of risk, (2) improve products, and (3) assess simulation credibility. In its simplest mode, Dakota can automate typical parameter variation studies through a generic interface to a computational model. Dakota also delivers advanced parametric analysis techniques enabling design exploration, optimization, model calibration, risk analysis, and quantification of margins and uncertainty with such models. It directly supports verification and validation activities. The algorithms implemented in Dakota aim to address challenges in performing these analyses with complex science and engineering models from desktop to high performance computers. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525 SAND2021-10468 O

Adams, BrianM.↗

DOE OSTI2021

DAKOTA (Design Analysis Kit for Optimization and Terascale) v.6.16

Adams, BrianM.↗

DOE OSTI2014

Supporting Technology for Chain of Custody of Nuclear Weapons and Materials throughout the Dismantlement and Disposition Processes

The ratification and ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty have been widely regarded as noteworthy global security achievements for both the Obama Administration and the Putin (formerly Medvedev) regime. But deeper cuts that move beyond the United States and Russia to engage the P-5 and other nuclear weapons possessor states are envisioned under future arms control regimes, and are indeed required for the P-5 in accordance with their Article VI disarmament obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Future verification needs will include monitoring the cessation of production of new fissile material for weapons, monitoring storage of warhead components and fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondary stages, and other materials. A fundamental challenge to implementing a nuclear disarmament regime is the ability to thwart unauthorized material diversion throughout the dismantlement and disposition process through strong chain of custody implementation. Verifying the declared presence, or absence, of nuclear materials and weapons components throughout the dismantlement and disposition lifecycle is a critical aspect of the disarmament process. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under these future arms control regimes will require new solutions. Since any acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes to prevent the release of classified or other proliferation-sensitive information, non-nuclear non-sensitive modalities may provide significant new verification tools which do not require the use of additional information barriers. Alternative verification technologies based upon electromagnetic and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to rapidly confirm the presence of specific components on a yes/no basis without revealing classified information. PNNL researchers have also used ultrasonic measurements to obtain images of material microstructures which may be used as templates or unique identifiers of treaty-limited items. Such alternative technologies are suitable for application in various stages of weapons dismantlement and often include the advantage of an inherent information barrier due to the inability to extract classified weapon design information from the collected data. As a result, these types of technologies complement radiation-based verification methods for arms control. This article presents an overview of several alternative verification technologies that are suitable for supporting a future, broader and more intrusive arms control regime that spans the nuclear weapons disarmament lifecycle. The general capabilities and limitations of each verification modality are discussed and example technologies are presented. Potential applications are defined in the context of the nuclear material and weapons lifecycle. Example applications range from authentication (e.g., tracking and signatures within the chain of custody from downloading through weapons storage, unclassified templates and unique identification) to verification of absence and final material disposition.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2018

Optimising National WM Strategies through early consideration of Nuclear Safeguards - 18607

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards stand alongside safety and security as one of the three pillars for prudent management of all nuclear material, including nuclear waste. Although safety considerations, including public and environmental radiation protection, are the traditional drivers of waste management strategies, there is a requirement for nuclear safeguards in shaping and quantifying long-term solutions for special classes of radioactive waste. This is especially important when considering the disposal of nuclear material in a repository that could be released from regulatory oversight for radiation protection after a period of institutional control, as some safeguards oversight would still be required. Failure to consider nuclear safeguards at the early stages of planning may alternatively lead to excessive volumes for disposal or the need to recondition already treated wastes. At the very least, safeguards measures should be considered before countries seek to dispose of legacy nuclear materials, decommissioning wastes and other materials containing uranium, thorium or plutonium in an operating repository. Nuclear safeguards are the set of tools and techniques used by the IAEA to verify that countries comply with their international obligations not to divert nuclear materials to nuclear explosive devices. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear safeguards apply to all uranium, thorium and plutonium held in non-weapons NPT states, with limited exceptions. In nuclear-weapon states, much of their material is likewise subject to IAEA safeguards through conditions in agreements with respective suppliers of the uranium. Under IAEA safeguards, such nuclear material must remain accounted for and accessible for periodic verification-analogous to the safety concepts of reversibility and retrievability. Nevertheless, safeguards requirements can be terminated - provided that the State and the [IAEA] agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable - through dilution or immobilisation in solid form (such as cement, glass or ceramic). This means candidate material can be disposed of as non- nuclear material, with no further safeguards requirements, provided this criterion is met. Unlike radiological wastes where repository design strongly influences pathways for radionuclide migration and overall safety performance, repository design is not a factor in considering the termination of safeguards on nuclear material. This paper looks at similarities and differences in the safety, security and safeguards regulatory requirements for the management of radioactive waste and nuclear material in Australia. In particular, it outlines recent experience gained from participation in Australia's waste acceptance criteria working group for a national low-level waste repository and intermediate-level waste store, as well as from Australia's overall waste management strategy. These items of work have coincided with the IAEA update of its internal policy on termination of safeguards on nuclear material. Australia's experience shows how inclusion of safeguards criteria in the planning process is leading to optimisations in choice of facility concepts, project sequencing and equitable distribution of economic risk. By considering the three pillars-safety, security and safeguards-early on in the planning process, Australia's waste management strategy will provide a benchmark for other states in establishing and updating their own waste acceptance criteria for the disposal of nuclear material. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2022

Countering the future chemical weapons threat

After decades of difficult negotiations, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was adopted in 1993 and entered into force on 29 April 1997, banning the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons (CW). As the CWC celebrates the 25th anniversary of its entry into force, it can document considerable success, much of it attributed to the CWC implementing body—the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). However, facing a volatile international security environment and an everchanging chemical industry, the OPCW must transform to meet its mission and remain an exemplar for multilateralism. As the next CWC review conference approaches in 2023, a next-generation OPCW 2.0 can be effective and credible only if it reinforces international norms against CW, anticipates future challenges posed by advancements in science and technology (S&T), incorporates more qualitative elements into the verification and compliance system, and keeps pace with technological change.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

DOE OSTI2025

Thermonuclear Fusion Verification of Staged Z-Pinch Fusion on a 0.5 MA LTD Pulsed Power Generator (Final Report)

LLNL fielded neutron detectors at UCSD’s CESZAR facility during the experimental campaigns investigating the staged Z-pinch concept. This concept uses high current to compress a cylindrical plasma composed a high atomic number gas, such as argon, surrounding fusion fuel. LLNL analyzed data from the diagnostics and improved the diagnostic setup specific to the experiment. This work helps to advance the mission creating a fusion energy source, which is a benefit to the economy and for energy security.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

DOE OSTI2021

Enabling Computation on Sensitive Data in International Safeguards with Privacy-Preserving Encryption Techniques

Privacy-preserving machine learning is a field of study that explores how to protect and preserve the privacy of sensitive data while allowing the data to be used by machine learning algorithms. This field has had substantial industry investment due to heightened concerns about privacy in the technology industry, with a focus in two broad application areas: financial services and healthcare. Numerous privacy-preserving methods have also been proposed for international safeguards, but they have been difficult to enact because the data they require is con- sidered sensitive or proprietary by the nuclear facility operator. This work examines how current privacy-preserving approaches might be used to enable the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to use that data to contribute to a safeguards conclusion about a state while giving nuclear operators confidence that their sensitive data is adequately protected. This paper begins by exploring several broad categories of privacy-preserving techniques including homomorphic encryption, secure multiparty computation, secure enclaves, and zero-knowledge proofs. Then we discuss some of the security considerations related to using these methods, potential use cases, and a conceptual system design for applying privacy-preserving methods in international safeguards.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2020

Isolating Insecurely: A Call to Arms for the Security and Privacy Community During the Time of COVID-19

The privacy question is one that has only begun to be addressed. While on one hand, many of the staunchest privacy advocates have argued for relaxation of privacy controls in order to develop better tests, “back to work” protocols, and vaccines and other treatments, the same advocates point out that any loss of privacy for the public good should be temporary, transparent, necessary, proportionate, and follow a due process. What should solutions look like for data gathering, sharing, use, and disposal; or for protocols requiring strong individual identity verification and validation?

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2018

Final CRADA Report for Enhanced and Miniaturized Wireless Valve Position Indicator Prototype

Most operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the United States have received approval to extend their operating licenses to 60 years. Now the nuclear industry is preparing to extend operating licenses to 80 years. While NPPs are preparing for extensions (60 years and beyond), the nuclear industry is facing a unique economic sustainability challenge in the current energy market. According to the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), generating costs of U.S. reactors have risen by 28% over the last 12 years, which is impacting the competitiveness of nuclear power in a market being increasingly penetrated by natural gas and renewable energy. This is partly because of the fact that the present nuclear work practice is dependent on a large technical staff which results in high operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, accounting for approximately 66% of the total operating cost. To address these concerns and abide by the NEI’s “Delivering the Nuclear Promise Initiative,” the U.S. utilities are embracing digitalization of their work practice to lower the O&M costs and increase productivity and efficiency while maintaining a safe and reliable operation. To address these above-mentioned concerns, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) researchers (proposal team) have developed a wireless valve position indication (VPI) sensor system that can be retrofitted on three main manual valve types (extendible to other manual valve types) to replace manual valve position verification with digital verification and enable online monitoring of manual valves. The developed technology 1) is evaluated for electromagnetic interference, 2) has a low power consuming and miniaturized electronic board, 3) is mounted on adjustable and reconfigurable sensor mounting unit that can fit on an actual flow-loop (at Idaho State University-ISU) to enable online monitoring of manual valve types without any valve body modification, and 4) ensures robust, secure, and reliable real-time communication of manual valve position.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2021

The Fast Modular Reactor (FMR) Pre-Application Regulatory Engagement Plan

The Fast Modular Reactor (FMR) is a 50 MWe Gascooled Fast Reactor (GFR) being developed by General Atomics Electromagnetic Systems (GA-EMS) under U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP), specifically Advanced Reactor Concepts 2020 (ARC-20). The 3-year conceptual design of the FMR is being conducted with verifications of key metrics in fuel, safety, and operational performance. GAEMS is pursuing design, licensing, and commercialization of the proposed reactor, with demonstration by 2030 and deployment by the mid-2030s. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recommends the pre-application regulatory engagement to provide for early identification of regulatory requirements for advanced reactors and to provide all interested parties with a timely, independent assessment of the safety and security characteristics of advanced reactor designs. As such, GAEMS is developing a pre-application regulatory engagement plan (REP) of the FMR.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2014

SECA Coal-Based Systems - FuelCell Energy, Inc.

The overall goal of this U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sponsored project is the development of solid oxide fuel cell (SOFC) cell and stack technology suitable for use in highly-efficient, economically-competitive central generation power plant facilities fueled by coal synthesis gas (syngas). This program incorporates the following supporting objectives: • Reduce SOFC-based electrical power generation system cost to $700 or less (2007 dollars) for a greater than 100 MW Integrated Gasification Fuel Cell (IGFC) power plant, exclusive of coal gasification and CO 2 separation subsystem costs. • Achieve an overall IGFC power plant efficiency of at least 50%, from coal (higher heating value or HHV) to AC power (exclusive of CO 2 compression power requirement). • Reduce the release of CO2 to the environment in an IGFC power plant to no more than 10% of the carbon in the syngas. • Increase SOFC stack reliability to achieve a design life of greater than 40,000 hours. At the inception of the project, the efforts were focused on research, design and testing of prototype planar SOFC power generators for stationary applications. FuelCell Energy, Inc. successfully completed the initial stage of the project by meeting the program metrics, culminating in delivery and testing of a 3 kW system at National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL). Subsequently, the project was re-aligned into a three phase effort with the main goal to develop SOFC technology for application in coal-fueled power plants with >90% carbon capture. Phase I of the Coal-based efforts focused on cell and stack size scale-up with concurrent enhancement of performance, life, cost, and manufacturing characteristics. Also in Phase I, design and analysis of the baseline (greater than 100 MW) power plant system—including concept identification, system definition, and cost analysis—was conducted. Phase II efforts focused on development of a ≥25 kW SOFC stack tower incorporating multiple stack building blocks of scaled-up cells, suitable for integration into a large-scale fuel cell power module. Activities in Phase II also included the development of the baseline system, factory cost estimate for the baseline plant’s power block, and conceptual design of a natural gas fueled sub-MW system to be used for testing and verification of the fuel cell stacks in a system environment. The specific objective for Phase III was the validation of the performance and robustness of stacks and scaled stack arrays suitable for use in large-scale power generation systems such as an IGFC with reliable, fail-safe operation being of paramount importance. The work culminated in the verification tests of a 60 kW SOFC stack module in a power plant facility. This final technical report summarizes the progress made during the project period. Significant progress was made in the areas of cell and stack technology development, stack module design, sub-scale module tests, Baseline Power Plant system development and Proof-of- Concept Module unit design. The development of this technology will significantly advance the nation’s energy security and independence interests while simultaneously addressing environmental concerns, including greenhouse gas emissions and water usage.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

DOE OSTI2019

Materials Characterization and Interrogation using Terahertz Radiation

Terahertz (THz) radiation is a powerful tool for characterizing materials and interrogating complex systems. The low-energy, non-ionizing nature of THz photons make it ideal for use as a non-destructive, non-contacting probe. Identification of materials by their unique THz response is possible through various absorption mechanisms, including vibrational (phonon) and rotational spectra. The Drude-like response of materials allows for non-contact electrical conductivity measurements as well. In the additive and advanced manufacturing realm, high sampling rates (kHz) and ability to extract electrical conductivity and composition makes in-situ THz imaging and spectroscopy a prime candidate for monitoring melt-pool dynamics in metal 3D printers. The fiberization of pulsed lasers systems enables the use of THz radiation to monitor oxide layer growth and characterize microstructure in challenging environments, whether ex-situ (e.g. post irradiation hot-cells) or in-situ (e.g. Transient Test Reactor, TREAT), through time of flight measurements and unique vibrational spectra of materials, providing crucial data on previously out of reach processes. While security imaging using THz radiation is already employed in airport body scanners, further miniaturization and ruggedization of THz systems enables materials characterization during field operations, adding a necessary and complementary tool to the arsenal of spectroscopic technologies available to the military and first responders. Cybersecurity is also a major focus for the coming decades; the use of THz interrogation methods to monitor integrated circuit operations provides a non-contacting, undetectable probe for system verification.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗