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At least 235 records · Page 13

Women in Nuclear Security: The United Arab Emirates Story

Historically in the United Arab Emirates, security personnel stationed at nuclear sites were typically men with military or policing backgrounds. Although these groups bring important, transferrable skills and experience to the nuclear security mission, some Emirati stakeholders recognize the increased benefit of a greater diversity of voices and backgrounds within the nuclear security team hierarchy. By recruiting from a wider range of disciplines and encouraging gender diversity, the security team could develop broader insight into security challenges, and a greater variety of perspectives could bring forth more innovative solutions. When aligning a diverse, multinational workforce with a common mission, all members of a security organization must fundamentally change their individual approaches to the work; the entire staff must be on the same page. This can be particularly challenging for some people who find it difficult to transition from a framework of beliefs because of past experiences based on prescriptive, exclusionary, hierarchical thought. Also, national cultural values are learned early, held deeply, and change slowly over the course of generations, and inherent biases rooted in these values can create barriers to the collective progress of a team. Creating a more open, diverse, and transparent culture for the team by accepting a unique, egalitarian, professional nuclear security culture that all members adhere to can be a challenging task for some. In this article, I share my experiences related to professional roadblocks, personal challenges, and lessons learned, particularly those regarding the empowerment of women in science and engineering, while developing and establishing the United Arab Emirates nuclear security program. I also discuss the support (and underrepresentation) of women, including those currently in critical leadership positions, and their careers in nuclear security.

Barakah Nuclear Power Plant↗

Embracing the Cloud for Better Cyber Security

The future of cyber security is inextricably tied to the future of computing. Organizational needs and economic factors will drive computing outcomes. Cyber security researchers and practitioners must recognize the path of computing evolution and position themselves to influence the process to incorporate security as an inherent property. The best way to predict future computing trends is to look at recent developments and their motivations. Organizations are moving towards outsourcing their data storage, computation, and even user desktop environments. This trend toward cloud computing has a direct impact on cyber security: rather than securing user machines, preventing malware access, and managing removable media, a cloud-based security scheme must focus on enabling secure communication with remote systems. This change in approach will have profound implications for cyber security research efforts. In this work, we highlight existing and emerging technologies and the limitations of cloud computing systems. We then discuss the cyber security efforts that would support these applications. Finally, we discuss the implications of these computing architecture changes, in particular with respect to malware and social engineering.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Assessment on security system of radioactive sources used in hospitals of Thailand

Unsecured radioactive sources have caused deaths and serious injuries in many parts of the world. In Thailand, there are 17 hospitals that use teletherapy with cobalt-60 radioactive sources. They need to be secured in order to prevent unauthorized removal, sabotage and terrorists from using such materials in a radiological weapon. The security system of radioactive sources in Thailand is regulated by the Office of Atoms for Peace in compliance with Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), U.S. DOE, which has started to be implemented since 2010. This study aims to perform an assessment on the security system of radioactive sources used in hospitals in Thailand and the results can be used as a recommended baseline data for development or improvement of hospitals on the security system of a radioactive source at a national regulatory level and policy level. Results from questionnaires reveal that in 11 out of 17 hospitals (64.70%), there were a few differences in conditions of hospitals using radioactive sources with installation of the security system and those without installation of the security system. Also, personals working with radioactive sources did not clearly understand the nuclear security law. Thus, government organizations should be encouraged to arrange trainings on nuclear security to increase the level of understanding. In the future, it is recommended that the responsible government organization issues a minimum requirement of nuclear security for every medical facility using radioactive sources.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Cyber security analysis testbed : combining real, emulation, and simulation.

Cyber security analysis tools are necessary to evaluate the security, reliability, and resilience of networked information systems against cyber attack. It is common practice in modern cyber security analysis to separately utilize real systems of computers, routers, switches, firewalls, computer emulations (e.g., virtual machines) and simulation models to analyze the interplay between cyber threats and safeguards. In contrast, Sandia National Laboratories has developed novel methods to combine these evaluation platforms into a hybrid testbed that combines real, emulated, and simulated components. The combination of real, emulated, and simulated components enables the analysis of security features and components of a networked information system. When performing cyber security analysis on a system of interest, it is critical to realistically represent the subject security components in high fidelity. In some experiments, the security component may be the actual hardware and software with all the surrounding components represented in simulation or with surrogate devices. Sandia National Laboratories has developed a cyber testbed that combines modeling and simulation capabilities with virtual machines and real devices to represent, in varying fidelity, secure networked information system architectures and devices. Using this capability, secure networked information system architectures can be represented in our testbed on a single, unified computing platform. This provides an 'experiment-in-a-box' capability. The result is rapidly-produced, large-scale, relatively low-cost, multi-fidelity representations of networked information systems. These representations enable analysts to quickly investigate cyber threats and test protection approaches and configurations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) through a Common Global Approach

Small Modular Reactors (SMR) with power levels significantly less than the currently standard 1000 to 1600-MWe reactors have been proposed as a potential game changer for future nuclear power. SMRs may offer a simpler, more standardized, and safer modular design by using factory built and easily transportable components. Additionally, SMRs may be more easily built and operated in isolated locations, and may require smaller initial capital investment and shorter construction times. Because many SMRs designs are still conceptual and consequently not yet fixed, designers have a unique opportunity to incorporate updated design basis threats, emergency preparedness requirements, and then fully integrate safety, physical security, and safeguards/material control and accounting (MC&A) designs. Integrating safety, physical security, and safeguards is often referred to as integrating the 3Ss, and early consideration of safeguards and security in the design is often referred to as safeguards and security by design (SSBD). This paper describes U.S./Russian collaborative efforts toward developing an internationally accepted common approach for implementing SSBD/3Ss for SMRs based upon domestic requirements, and international guidance and requirements. These collaborative efforts originated with the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security working group established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the 2009 Presidential Summit. Initial efforts have focused on review of U.S. and Russian domestic requirements for Security and MC&A, IAEA guidance for security and MC&A, and IAEA requirements for international safeguards. Additionally, example SMR design features that can enhance proliferation resistance and physical security have been collected from past work and reported here. The development of a U.S./Russian common approach for SSBD/3Ss should aid the designer of SMRs located anywhere in the world. More specifically, the application of this approach may lead to more proliferation resistant and physically secure design features for SMRs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Physical Security Timeline Analysis in Support of Advanced Reactor Demonstration and Deployment

This report presents the regulatory requirements and directions on the physical security of advanced nuclear reactors in USA. Presently, a rule is being proposed that allows for a performance-based analysis. In determining the physical security requirements for an advanced reactor, new tools may be desired to conduct a performance-based analysis. These tools should incorporate dynamic analysis methods to provide as much realism as possible. In comparison, the security requirements for existing light water reactors (LWRs) are much more prescriptive and the analysis conducted to establish the required physical security strategies were more easily performed with static analysis. In order to achieve the cost goals that advanced reactors require for adoption; the nuclear security force required should not be excessive. Dynamic physical security analysis methods and tools have been developed by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program. This report details how the dynamic risk analysis tools developed in the LWRS program using the dynamic risk modelling tool, EMRALD, may be adapted for use in analyzing the physical security designs for advanced reactors accounting for variable performance-based requirements. This report provides an example analysis of a hypothetical SFR using publicly available information and generic assumptions to demonstrate the methods and potential presentation and analysis of the results. No actual plant information is used in this example analysis. Future work in this area will create additional models that can be adapted for any advanced reactor concept and use various security features to create a physical security system that provides adequate protection from radiological theft and sabotage.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

How to Handle the Conflict between Safety and Security - 18564

The purpose of safety and security for nuclear activities are the same. They are both necessary measures to protect people and the environment from radioactive material. There are many measures that enhance both the safety and the security but there are also measures serving one area that are in direct conflict with the other. How information is handled is maybe the best example to demonstrate this conflict between interests. In the security field, information is handled on a need-to-know basis, preventing valuable details to fall into hands of antagonists, terrorists etc. The safety culture, on the contrary, is based on knowledge and transparency and it encourages the sharing of information and experience to improve the safety. There is little guidance on how to manage the conflicts between safety and security for a transport system moving nuclear fuel and radioactive waste and especially when there are conflicts between different legislation areas, for example the Act on Nuclear Activities and Safety of Life at Sea. The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co, SKB, transports all Swedish spent fuel and operational waste from the Nuclear Power Plants to the central storage facilities in Sweden. To manage the transport system, SKB owns a fleet of packages, road vehicles and an INF 3 ship. For the shipments of nuclear material, the security focus has increased rapidly over the years after the 9/11 attack, followed by regulatory requirements on enhanced security. SKB is currently running a project to further strengthen the transport security, an activity that requires a careful balance between safety and security. This paper describes the methods used and the challenges experienced trying to manage the conflicts between safety and security for the Swedish nuclear transport system. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Secure environment establishment for FPGA-based safety-critical systems: quality management system context - 159

The paper discusses importance of secure development and operational environment establishment process, its particular stages, including security-oriented analysis and assessment of safety-critical instrumentation and control (I and C) systems. Two particular aspects are covered - security assessment and security assurance related to processes established by Quality Management System (QMS). One of the underlying ideas for the security assessment approach is in performance of gap analysis. Such analysis considers influence of all different factors within I and C system development process, and further application of Intrusion Modes and Effect Criticality Analysis (IMECA) technique. It makes the approach applicable to various safety-critical systems, considering underlying technologies (for example, Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA). Nowadays FPGA technology is often used in wide spectrum of hardware devices - from personal devices to complex I and C systems for Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). The problem of cyber security assessment and assurance for FPGA technology in general and its application in safety-critical I and C systems in particular is not completely solved due to several reasons that cover regulations, QMS processes, implementation of development and verification activities, etc. The paper overviews existing regulations, which cover various aspects of NPP I and C systems development and operation, FPGA technology implementation, and secure development and operational environment establishment and assurance. The paper also emphasizes that complex approach should be used to identify and mitigate all specific vulnerabilities thorough the whole life cycle on the basis on Intrusion Modes, Effect and Criticality Analysis technique. The paper also proposes approach to the development of safety-critical I and C systems in the scope of cyber security assurance process at developer site. Secure development environment is described as a key factor during the development process and the paper also discusses establishment and maintenance of such environment as a part of company's Nuclear Quality Assurance's QMS. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Methodology on cyber security evaluation in nuclear facilities considering I and C architecture - 224

Cyber security has become a major issue in nuclear facilities recently due to obsolescence of existing analog system and increasing the use of digital system for instrumentation and control (I and C) system. There are several cases which are similar to cyber-attacks in nuclear facilities such as Davis-Besse NPP, Browns Ferry NPP, Hatch NPP, Natanz Nuclear Facility, and Monju NPP. Since the cyber-attack called 'Stuxnet' occurred to a Natanz Nuclear Facility at 2010, the regulatory agencies have developed regulatory guidance for cyber security of nuclear facilities. In this paper, we will propose a methodology on cyber security evaluation in nuclear facilities considering I and C architecture. We will introduce the cyber security evaluation model for I and C system with Bayesian Belief Network (BBN). The cyber security evaluation model for nuclear facilities consists of I and C architecture, cyber threat such as malicious activity of attacker, and mitigation measure against malicious activity. In order to make benchmark model with I and C architecture, cyber threat, and mitigation measure, the likelihood and consequence concepts are used as prior information to the model. Bayesian update can be used to evaluate the cyber security for nuclear facility by calculating posterior information and comparing between prior information and posterior information with the model. Moreover, we will propose the methodology on application of the cyber security to existing PSA by using the cyber security evaluation model with BBN. It presents quantitative information for cyber security against cyber-attack and it is helpful to communicate between licensee and regulator on nuclear facilities. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Computer security approach for Rolls-Royce spinline{sup R} safety platform - 227

The number of digital assets at commercial nuclear power plants is significant and will likely continue to increase with time. As a consequence, these plants have become potential targets for cyber-attacks. Around the world, nuclear safety authorities and national Computer and Information Security Agencies are implementing stricter regulations and inspections for critical systems in nuclear plants. There is a particular focus on instrumentation and control systems as they implement key nuclear safety functions. Rolls-Royce follows a strict computer and information security program based on general and nuclear specific norms, Rolls-Royce group processes, and proven technologies. The Spinline digital safety platform has been designed specifically for nuclear applications and features a secure development and operational environment that provides barriers against unauthorized modifications and implements design requirements promoting integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance. The Rolls-Royce secure development environment provides layers of protection utilizing physical and environmental security, human resource security, and information technology systems access control. The Spinline platform strengthens security functions by providing protection against unauthorized, unintended, and unsafe modifications to the system. The Spinline platform has design features promote integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance in the event of inadvertent operator actions or undesirable behavior of connected equipment. The Spinline technology and these computer security processes are based in a wide spectrum of international standards that were accepted as providing a secure development and operating environment by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2014. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Suggestion of a Framework to Evaluate the Extent of Cyber Security Enhancements in NPP

Digital I and C systems have been developed and installed in nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, due to installation of digital I and C systems, cyber security concerns have been emerged. One of the major problems is that nuclear industry is in very early stage in dealing with cyber security issues. It is because that cyber security has received less attention compared to other safety problems. In addition, late adoption of digital I and C systems has resulted in lower level of cyber security advancements in nuclear industry than ones in other industries. With this regards, recently, international standard organizations, regulatory institutes, and research institutes have performed a number of studies addressing these cyber security issues in nuclear industries. In order to provide useful information about cyber security issues including cyber security enhancements, this paper suggests a framework to evaluate how much cyber security is improved when a specific cyber security enhancement is applied in NPPs. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

IT Security Support for Spaceport Command and Control System

During the fall 2013 semester, I worked at the Kennedy Space Center as an IT Security Intern in support of the Spaceport Command and Control System under the guidance of the IT Security Lead Engineer. Some of my responsibilities included assisting with security plan documentation collection, system hardware and software inventory, and malicious code and malware scanning. Throughout the semester, I had the opportunity to work on a wide range of security related projects. However, there are three projects in particular that stand out. The first project I completed was updating a large interactive spreadsheet that details the SANS Institutes Top 20 Critical Security Controls. My task was to add in all of the new commercial of the shelf (COTS) software listed on the SANS website that can be used to meet their Top 20 controls. In total, there are 153 unique security tools listed by SANS that meet one or more of their 20 controls. My second project was the creation of a database that will allow my mentor to keep track of the work done by the contractors that report to him in a more efficient manner by recording events as they occur throughout the quarter. Lastly, I expanded upon a security assessment of the Linux machines being used on center that I began last semester. To do this, I used a vulnerability and configuration tool that scans hosts remotely through the network and presents the user with an abundance of information detailing each machines configuration. The experience I gained from working on each of these projects has been invaluable, and I look forward to returning in the spring semester to continue working with the IT Security team.

computer security↗

Re-designing the PhEDEx Security Model

PhEDEx, the data-placement tool used by the CMS experiment at the LHC, was conceived in a more trusting time. The security model provided a safe environment for site agents and operators, but offerred little more protection than that. Data was not sufficiently protected against loss caused by operator error or software bugs or by deliberate manipulation of the database. Operators were given high levels of access to the database, beyond what was actually needed to accomplish their tasks. This exposed them to the risk of suspicion should an incident occur. Multiple implementations of the security model led to difficulties maintaining code, which can lead to degredation of security over time. In order to meet the simultaneous goals of protecting CMS data, protecting the operators from undue exposure to risk, increasing monitoring capabilities and improving maintainability of the security model, the PhEDEx security model was redesigned and re-implemented. Security was moved from the application layer into the database itself, fine-grained access roles were established, and tools and procedures created to control the evolution of the security model over time. In this paper we describe this work, we describe the deployment of the new security model, and we show how these enhancements improve security on several fronts simultaneously.

Huang, C.-H.↗

Plant security during decommissioning; challenges and lessons learned from German phase out decision

Purpose of this paper is to point out the security challenges that may occur during the decommissioning, based on the issues and lessons learned from the German phase out decision. Though national regulations may be different in other countries the basic problems and issues will be the same. Therefore presented solutions will be applicable in other countries as well. The radioactive material remaining at the NPP during decommissioning has the most influence on how the security measures have to be designed. The radioactive material defines the risk potential of the plant and this determines the needed security level. The following aspects have been challenging in Germany: - Scenarios varying from those, used for plants in operation, due to changed operating conditions - Spent fuel will stay in the spent fuel pool for a quite long period before it can be removed from the plant. Risk potential of the plant stays high and requires a high level of security measures - Security measures according to the existing operating license have to stay in place as they are, unless the first license for decommissioning is given respective the spent fuel is removed from the plant site. This even led to the question if improvements of security measures, planned and announced with focus on a plant remaining in operation for another couple of years, need to be done although they will not be required after removing the spent fuel from the plant. A further important aspect for the security design is the fact that a plant under decommissioning has completely different and strongly varying operating procedures, compared to the stable ones of an operating plant. This leads to different needs concerning workspace, infrastructure on plant site, access to buildings etc. An optimized and highly flexible security concept is needed to ensure an adequate level of security as well as an efficient decommissioning. A deep analysis of the vital plant functions, depending on the different decommissioning stages, is required to determine the vital equipment, its location and its need for protection. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Leverage demand-side policies for energy security

Energy security is a top priority for governments, companies, and households because energy systems and the critical functions that they support are threatened by disruptions from wars, pandemics, climate change, and other shocks (1). More often than not, governments rely on policies focused on energy supply to enhance energy security while generally ignoring demand-side possibilities. Further, the indicators traditionally used to measure energy security are also tilted toward the supply side; this fails to capture the full spectrum of vulnerability to energy crises. Energy security assessments need to reflect the wider benefits of security related interventions more accurately. To that end, we develop a systematic approach to measuring the energy security impacts of policy interventions that explicitly considers energy demand (buildings, transport, and industry). Here, we determine that demand-side actions outperform conventional supply-side approaches at making countries more resilient. Energy demand links more directly than supply to the satisfaction of critical social functions and human well-being that are at the core of energy security. Yet, demand-side perspectives tend to be neglected or underrepresented in analysis and policy debates on energy security. Factors that contribute to this supply-side bias include the traditional sectoral organization of industries and policy institutions along fuels (coal, oil, and gas) and energy forms (electric utilities) as well as the decentralized and multivaried activities characteristic of energy demand (from vehicles to household appliances to manufacturing and more), which leads to a multitude of actors and institutional fragmentation. The basic fundamentals of energy systems and markets, where demand and supply are intricately linked, have also not yet risen from vague awareness to a central organizing principle among policy-makers for structuring the energy security discourse.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Cyber Security Primer for DER Vendors Aggregators and Grid Operators

This report provides an introduction to cyber security for distributed energy resources (DER) - such as photovoltaic (PV) inverters and energy storage systems (ESS). This material is motivated by the need to assist DER vendors, aggregators, grid operators, and broader PV industry with cyber security resilience and describe the state-of-the-art for securing DER communications. The report outlines basic principles of cyber security, encryption, communication protocols, DER cyber security recommendations and requirements, and device-, aggregator-, and utility-level security best practices to ensure data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Example cyber security attacks, including eavesdropping, masquerading, man-in-the-middle, replay attacks, and denial-of-service are also described. A survey of communication protocols and cyber security recommendations used by the DER and power system industry are included to elucidate the cyber security standards landscape. Lastly, a roadmap is presented to harden end-to-end communications for DER with research and industry engagement.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Empirical Analysis and Automated Classification of Security Bug Reports

With the ever expanding amount of sensitive data being placed into computer systems, the need for effective cybersecurity is of utmost importance. However, there is a shortage of detailed empirical studies of security vulnerabilities from which cybersecurity metrics and best practices could be determined. This thesis has two main research goals: (1) to explore the distribution and characteristics of security vulnerabilities based on the information provided in bug tracking systems and (2) to develop data analytics approaches for automatic classification of bug reports as security or non-security related. This work is based on using three NASA datasets as case studies. The empirical analysis showed that the majority of software vulnerabilities belong only to a small number of types. Addressing these types of vulnerabilities will consequently lead to cost efficient improvement of software security. Since this analysis requires labeling of each bug report in the bug tracking system, we explored using machine learning to automate the classification of each bug report as a security or non-security related (two-class classification), as well as each security related bug report as specific security type (multiclass classification). In addition to using supervised machine learning algorithms, a novel unsupervised machine learning approach is proposed. An ac- curacy of 92%, recall of 96%, precision of 92%, probability of false alarm of 4%, F-Score of 81% and G-Score of 90% were the best results achieved during two-class classification. Furthermore, an accuracy of 80%, recall of 80%, precision of 94%, and F-score of 85% were the best results achieved during multiclass classification.

Cybersecurity↗

Perspectives on Regulatory Design and Development for Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

The responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with the State but the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognizes that a cornerstone in the development of a nuclear security regime is the development of regulations that address security of nuclear material and other radioactive material in transport. While the IAEA provides recommendations and guidance for security of materials in transport through Nuclear Security Series (NSS) documents, the challenge of integrating those recommendations into a Member State’s national legal framework is significant. Specifically, the development of transport security regulations requires coordination between both legal and technical experts within the country’s competent authority and multiple governmental agencies, as well as input from transport operators and other stakeholders. In addition to these interactions, the regulations must reflect the legal traditions of the Member State to fit within its overall national legal framework. Recognizing the challenge, the IAEA has requested input from international legal and technical experts to develop a methodology for drafting regulations on transport security of nuclear material and other radioactive material. This paper discusses the progress made so far in developing the methodology and provides a perspective on the need for transport security regulations and the challenges associated with their development. Ultimately, the goal of this paper is to introduce the IAEA-proposed methodology and to facilitate the discussion of this methodology with Member States that need support in developing their transport security regulations.

Ladsous, David↗