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At least 235 records · Page 13

Integrating static PRA information with risk informed safety margin characterization (RISMC) simulation methods

The overall objective of the project was to develop a computationally feasible and user-friendly mechanized process to integrate traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and dynamic PRA (DPRA) results. Starting with the systematic identification of items in an existing PRA that need dynamic augmentation, the project used a generic 4-loop pressurized reactor (PWR) and 3-loop PWR as example plants. Station blackout (SBO) and large break loss of coolant accident SBLOCA) were selected as the example initiating events. Using the traditional event-tree (ET)/fault-tree (FT) methodology augmented by dynamic evet tree approach, the potential consequences of the initiating events were simulated with RELAP-3D and MELCOR/RASCAL codes to cover Level 1 through Level 3 of PRA. RAVEN and ADAPT software were used to generate Level 1 simulations with RELAP-3D and Level 2/3 simulations with MELCOR (Level 2)/RASCAL (Level 3), respectively. Example branching conditions (BCs) for SBO included AC power recovery time, valve repair failure time, reactor coolant pump leak time/break size and emergency power supply duration to a total of 9. Example BCs for LOCA included off-site power recovery time, diesel generator power recovery time, auxiliary feed water system operation time, safety relief valve failure to open upon demand, reactor coolant pump seal break time and size to a total of 21. Each RELAP-3D simulation (9,587 scenarios) was labelled OK or Core Damage based on the maximum allowed peak clad temperature (2,100oF). Each MELCOR simulation (4610 scenarios) was labeled as Bin over 10rem or Bin 0-10rem based on the dose at the site boundary. The scenarios were clustered based on the criteria above using the mean shift methodology. Classical PRA (CPRA) and DPRA results were compared to identify the ET sequences that need DPRA augmentation. Several approaches were proposed for the incorporation of these sequences into CPRA using clustering with the mean shift methodology, restructuring the CPRA ETs by adding new BCs/sequences, and using the concept of a limit surface. Procedures for decision making regarding the possible consequences of an initiating event (e.g. core damage or not, site evacuation or not) were developed using a convolutional neural network (CNN), a recurrent neural network (RNN) and a transformer neural network (TNN). The project has led to two PhD degrees, three archival journal papers and five refereed conference proceedings.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Aviation Safety Risk Modeling: Lessons Learned From Multiple Knowledge Elicitation Sessions

Aviation safety risk modeling has elements of both art and science. In a complex domain, such as the National Airspace System (NAS), it is essential that knowledge elicitation (KE) sessions with domain experts be performed to facilitate the making of plausible inferences about the possible impacts of future technologies and procedures. This study discusses lessons learned throughout the multiple KE sessions held with domain experts to construct probabilistic safety risk models for a Loss of Control Accident Framework (LOCAF), FLightdeck Automation Problems (FLAP), and Runway Incursion (RI) mishap scenarios. The intent of these safety risk models is to support a portfolio analysis of NASA's Aviation Safety Program (AvSP). These models use the flexible, probabilistic approach of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) and influence diagrams to model the complex interactions of aviation system risk factors. Each KE session had a different set of experts with diverse expertise, such as pilot, air traffic controller, certification, and/or human factors knowledge that was elicited to construct a composite, systems-level risk model. There were numerous "lessons learned" from these KE sessions that deal with behavioral aggregation, conditional probability modeling, object-oriented construction, interpretation of the safety risk results, and model verification/validation that are presented in this paper.

Luxhoj, J. T.↗

Prophylactic Cranial Irradiation Reduces Brain Metastases and Improves Overall Survival in High-Risk Metastatic Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer Patients: A Randomized phase 2 Study (PRoT-BM trial)

To date, studies regarding the use of prophylactic cranial irradiation (PCI) versus standard of care (SoC) for patients with non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) have not shown a significant effect in terms of overall survival (OS). Additionally, the effect of PCI among high-risk patients has been scarcely studied. The objective of this randomized phase 2 study was to evaluate the role of PCI in a population of patients at high risk for development of brain metastases (BM).

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Occluded Object Reconstruction for First Responders with Augmented Reality Glasses Using Conditional Generative Adversarial Networks

Firefighters suffer a variety of life-threatening risks, including line-of-duty deaths, injuries, and exposures to hazardous substances. Support for reducing these risks is important. We built a partially occluded object reconstruction method on augmented reality glasses for first responders. We used a deep learning based on conditional generative adversarial networks to train associations between the various images of flammable and hazardous objects and their partially occluded counterparts. Our system then reconstructed an image of a new flammable object. Finally, the reconstructed image was superimposed on the input image to provide "transparency". The system imitates human learning about the laws of physics through experience by learning the shape of flammable objects and the flame characteristics.

Chow, Edward↗

Program Risk Planning with Risk as a Resource

The current focus of NASA on cost effective ways of achieving mission objectives has created a demand for a change in the risk management process of a program. At present, there is no guidelines as to when risk taking is justified due to high cost for a marginal improvement in risk. As a remedial step, Dr. Greenfield of NASA, developed a concept of risk management with risk as a resource. In the report, the following topics are addressed: (1) the risk management approach; (2) planning risk and program life cycle; (3) key components of a typical program; (4) the risk trading methodology; (5) review and decision process; (6) merits of the proposed risk planning approach; and (7) recommendations.

Ray, Paul S.↗

NASA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Ground Systems, Software and Operations Infrastructure Cloud Implementation

The growing number of large-scale constellations and the improvements made in the tracking and detection of resident space objects have contributed to the increase of satellite conjunction events. As a result of the increase of objects in Earth orbit, the timeline for risk analysis computations for satellite collision avoidance is more urgent when conjunctions occur. It is imperative NASA maintains a space environment safety functionality for the agency that allows CARA remote access to the ground system while maintaining redundancy. CARA’s On-premises (On-prem) ground system would no longer be able to meet these access and redundancy requirements, hence the investigation and eventual implementation of a Cloud-based ground station infrastructure as a viable solution. This paper will provide an overview of the principal parts of the Conjunction Assessment (CA) risk analysis process used at CARA, summarize the key drivers towards the Cloud solution, and share key lessons learned that are significant for any operational entity considering a cloud solution for real-time satellite operations to ensure a sustainable space traffic environment for all.

Sustainability↗

An Overview of the Orbital Debris and Meteoroid Environments, Their Effects on Spacecraft, and What Can We Do About It?

Because of the high speeds needed for orbital space flight, hypervelocity impacts with objects in space are a constant risk to spacecraft. This includes natural debris - meteoroids - and the debris remnants of our own activities in space. A number of space surveillance assets are used to measure and track spacecraft, used upper stages, and breakup debris. However, much of the debris and meteoroids encountered by spacecraft in Earth orbit is not easily measured or tracked. For every man-made object that we can track, there are hundreds of small debris that are too small to be tracked but still large enough to damage spacecraft. In addition, even if we knew today's environment with perfect knowledge, the debris environment is dynamic and would change tomorrow. This means that much of the risk from both meteoroids and anthropogenic debris is statistical in nature. NASA uses and maintains a number of instruments to statistically monitor the meteoroid and orbital debris environments, and uses this information to compute statistical models for use by spacecraft designers and operators. Because orbital debris is a result of human activities, NASA has led the US government in formulating national and international strategies that space users can employ to limit the growth of debris in the future. This talk will summarize the history and current state of meteoroid and space debris measurements and modeling, how the environment influences spacecraft design and operations, how we are designing the experiments of tomorrow to improve our knowledge, and how we are working internationally to preserve the space environment for the future.

Matney, Mark↗

Treatment of uncertainties for security-related design aspects of advanced reactors when using a risk-informed licensing approach

Sabotage of nuclear plants and theft of special nuclear material are different from many other issues potentially affecting public health and safety, and some of those differences drive the content of the present report. A high-level indication of these differences is provided in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety Goal Policy. Promulgated in the mid-1980’s, when it had become reasonably clear that risk analysis had improved to the point where it was possible to understand the risks associated with plant operation, the Safety Goal Policy articulates qualitative safety goals and quantitative health objectives that are meant to guide regulatory and risk management activities, with the following key exceptions noted in the original policy statement: The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently included in the safety goals. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission’s intention that everything that is needed will be done to keep these types of risks at their present very low level; and it is the Commission’s expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions, it is the Commission’s intent that the risks from all the various initiating mechanisms be considered to the best of the capability of current evaluation techniques. The present report discusses extensions of classical risk management to address some of the special issues that arise in the context of security. Although the present emphasis is on physical security, some attention will be paid to cyber security. A particular focus of the report is on quantitative framework to manage and address uncertainties. This framework is demonstrated via a couple of hypothetical examples.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Integrated Issues and Risk Management: A Theoretical Framework Overview

The contractor requirements document for DOE O 226.1B, Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight Policy, requires DOE/NNSA contractors to establish an assurance system that includes, among other things, “Rigorous, risk-informed, and credible self-assessment and feedback and improvement activities. Assessment programs must be risk-informed, formally described and documented, and appropriately cover potentially high consequence activities” and “Contains an issues management process that is capable of categorizing the significance of findings based on risk and priority and other appropriate factors….” However, the term “risk-informed” is not defined in this or any other DOE order, and no formal guidance on how to integrate the two concepts currently exists. The Risk Management Guide for Defense Programs released by NA-18, Office of Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I), states it is “a framework and general guidance to program office personnel on the effective management of program risks and issues”, however it then defines issues as “events with 100% likelihood of affecting program objectives” and states “unless specified otherwise, the term “risk” will also serve to represent issues for the remainder of this plan,” severally limiting its ability to provide adequate guidance on this topic. Outside of DOE scope, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) imposes similar requirements. ASME NQA-1-2015 Requirement 16 states “Conditions adverse to quality shall be identified promptly and corrected as soon as practicable. In the case of a significant condition adverse to quality, the cause of the condition shall be determined, and corrective action taken to preclude recurrence. The identification, cause, and corrective action for significant conditions adverse to quality shall be documented and reported to appropriate levels of management. Completion of corrective actions shall be verified”. The purpose of this document is to provide a best-in-class framework for an integrated risk and issues management process. This process would provide a robust feedback loop between risk management and issues management to: Enhance risk identification and characterization, use risk handling principles to improve corrective action planning, and ensure regulatory compliance.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Improvements to NASA's Debris Assessment Software

NASA's Debris Assessment Software (DAS) has been substantially revised and expanded. DAS is designed to assist NASA programs in performing orbital debris assessments, as described in NASA s Guidelines and Assessment Procedures for Limiting Orbital Debris. The extensive upgrade of DAS was undertaken to reflect changes in the debris mitigation guidelines, to incorporate recommendations from DAS users, and to take advantage of recent software capabilities for greater user utility. DAS 2.0 includes an updated environment model and enhanced orbital propagators and reentry-survivability models. The ORDEM96 debris environment model has been replaced by ORDEM2000 in DAS 2.0, which is also designed to accept anticipated revisions to the environment definition. Numerous upgrades have also been applied to the assessment of human casualty potential due to reentering debris. Routines derived from the Object Reentry Survival Analysis Tool, Version 6 (ORSAT 6), determine which objects are assessed to survive reentry, and the resulting risk of human casualty is calculated directly based upon the orbital inclination and a future world population database. When evaluating reentry risks, the user may enter up to 200 unique hardware components for each launched object, in up to four nested levels. This last feature allows the software to more accurately model components that are exposed below the initial breakup altitude. The new DAS 2.0 provides an updated set of tools for users to assess their mission s compliance with the NASA Safety Standard and does so with a clear and easy-to-understand interface. The new native Microsoft Windows graphical user interface (GUI) is a vast improvement over the previous DOS-based interface. In the new version, functions are more-clearly laid out, and the GUI includes the standard Windows-style Help functions. The underlying routines within the DAS code are also improved.

Opiela, J.↗

Cassini tour cost reductions

The original design of the Cassini tour violated the cost constraint for the mission operations and data analysis by more than 30 percent. This challenge was addressed by performing tradeoffs in order to establish a modified risk and performance posture for the operations organization. This new posture accepted more data acquisition risk with minimal impact to the mission objectives, and brought the operation costs to within the program's constraints. The methodology employed within the Cassini program in order to address the tour cost, risk and performance parameters is presented.

Duxbury, J. H.↗

The Updated GEO Population for ORDEM 3.1

The limited availability of data for satellite fragmentations and debris in the geosynchronous orbit (GEO) region creates challenges to building accurate models for the orbital debris environment at such altitudes. Updated methods to properly incorporate and extrapolate measurement data have become a cornerstone of the GEO component in the newest version of the NASA Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM), ORDEM 3.1. For the GEO region, the Space Surveillance Network (SSN) catalog provides coverage down to a limit of approximately 1 m. A more statistically complete representation of the GEO population for smaller objects, which can pose a high risk to operational spacecraft, is thus dependent on dedicated observations by instruments optimized to observe debris smaller than the SSN cataloging threshold. For ORDEM 3.1, optical data from the Michigan Orbital DEbris Survey Telescope (MODEST) provided the input for building the GEO population down to approximately 30 cm (converting absolute magnitude to size). For smaller sizes, the size distribution of debris in the MODEST dataset was extrapolated down to 10 cm, and orbital parameters were estimated based on the orbits of the larger objects. When compared to previous versions of the model, significant improvements were made to the process of building the GEO population in ORDEM 3.1, both in the assessment of fragmentation debris in the data and assignment of orbital elements within the model. A so-called “debris ring filter,” based on a range of angles between an orbit’s angular momentum vector and that of the stable Laplace plane, was applied to the data to reduce biases from non- GEO objects, such as objects in a GEO-transfer orbit. In addition, a new approach was implemented to assign noncircular mean motions and eccentricities to the fragmentation debris observed by MODEST because the short observation window (5 min) in GEO limits orbit resolution to a circular orbit assumption for assigning orbital parameters. For ORDEM 3.1, non-circular orbital elements were assigned using relationships that were identified between mean motion and the angle between the orbit plane and the stable Laplace plane, as well as between mean motion and eccentricity, based on breakup clouds modeled by the NASA Standard Breakup Model. This approach has yielded a high-fidelity GEO model that has been validated with data from more recent MODEST observation campaigns.

Manis, A.↗

PRO-X Fuel Cycle Transportation and Crosscutting Report: Avoidability Task

As the frequency and quantities of nuclear material shipments escalate internationally to meet the increased demand for small modular (SMR) and advanced (AR) reactors, the risks and costs associated with shipping activities also likely to increase with them. The primary objective of this study is to evaluate possibilities for risk reduction via avoidability—or, avoiding or reducing the need for nuclear shipments, where possible, either by reducing the frequency or quantities of materials contained in shipments.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners (Second Edition)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance. NASA's objective is to better understand and effectively manage risk, and thus more effectively ensure mission and programmatic success, and to achieve and maintain high safety standards at NASA. NASA intends to use risk assessment in its programs and projects to support optimal management decision making for the improvement of safety and program performance. In addition to using quantitative/probabilistic risk assessment to improve safety and enhance the safety decision process, NASA has incorporated quantitative risk assessment into its system safety assessment process, which until now has relied primarily on a qualitative representation of risk. Also, NASA has recently adopted the Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process [1-1] as a valuable addition to supplement existing deterministic and experience-based engineering methods and tools. Over the years, NASA has been a leader in most of the technologies it has employed in its programs. One would think that PRA should be no exception. In fact, it would be natural for NASA to be a leader in PRA because, as a technology pioneer, NASA uses risk assessment and management implicitly or explicitly on a daily basis. NASA has probabilistic safety requirements (thresholds and goals) for crew transportation system missions to the International Space Station (ISS) [1-2]. NASA intends to have probabilistic requirements for any new human spaceflight transportation system acquisition. Methods to perform risk and reliability assessment in the early 1960s originated in U.S. aerospace and missile programs. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an example. It would have been a reasonable extrapolation to expect that NASA would also become the world leader in the application of PRA. That was, however, not to happen. Early in the Apollo program, estimates of the probability for a successful roundtrip human mission to the moon yielded disappointingly low (and suspect) values and NASA became discouraged from further performing quantitative risk analyses until some two decades later when the methods were more refined, rigorous, and repeatable. Instead, NASA decided to rely primarily on the Hazard Analysis (HA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methods for system safety assessment.

Stamatelatos,Michael↗

Deep Learning–Assisted Multiobjective Optimization of Geological CO 2 Storage Performance under Geomechanical Risks

In geological CO 2 storage, designing the optimal well control strategy for CO 2 injection to maximize CO 2 storage while minimizing the associated geomechanical risks is not trivial. This challenge arises due to pressure buildup, CO 2 plume migration, the highly nonlinear nature of geomechanical responses to rock-fluid interaction, and the high computational cost associated with coupled flow and geomechanics simulations. In this paper, we introduce a novel optimization framework to address these challenges. The optimization problem is formulated as follows: maximize total CO 2 storage while minimizing geomechanical risks by adjusting the injection schedules within bounded constraints. The geomechanical risks are primarily driven by injection-induced pressure build-up, which is characterized by ground displacement and the induced microseismicity. We used the Fourier neural operator (FNO)-based deep learning model to construct surrogate models, replacing the time-consuming coupled flow and geomechanics simulations for evaluating the aforementioned objective functions. The developed surrogate models have been incorporated into a multiobjective optimization framework through a genetic algorithm to reduce the computational burden. The proposed optimization framework reduces the computational cost from approximately 2,400 hours, when using objective function evaluations based on physics-based simulations, to around 20 minutes. A set of Pareto-optimal solutions of the proposed workflow yields nontrivial optimal decisions, reducing the microseismicity potential and the vertical displacement. This Pareto front highlights the optimal trade-offs between CO 2 storage amount, safety, and ground displacement, emphasizing the need for careful optimization and management of injection strategies to achieve a balanced outcome. The novelty of this work is twofold. First, we demonstrate the importance of incorporating the minimization of the geomechanical risks as objective functions into the CO 2 storage optimization workflow to mitigate the potential risk of induced microseismicity and ground displacement. Second, we leverage the FNO-based surrogate models to optimize a real-field CO 2 storage operation.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Object-Oriented Bayesian Networks (OOBN) for Aviation Accident Modeling and Technology Portfolio Impact Assessment

The concern for reducing aviation safety risk is rising as the National Airspace System in the United States transforms to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). The NASA Aviation Safety Program is committed to developing an effective aviation safety technology portfolio to meet the challenges of this transformation and to mitigate relevant safety risks. The paper focuses on the reasoning of selecting Object-Oriented Bayesian Networks (OOBN) as the technique and commercial software for the accident modeling and portfolio assessment. To illustrate the benefits of OOBN in a large and complex aviation accident model, the in-flight Loss-of-Control Accident Framework (LOCAF) constructed as an influence diagram is presented. An OOBN approach not only simplifies construction and maintenance of complex causal networks for the modelers, but also offers a well-organized hierarchical network that is easier for decision makers to exploit the model examining the effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies through technology insertions.

Shih, Ann T.↗

Integrating Land Cover Modeling and Adaptive Management to Conserve Endangered Species and Reduce Catastrophic Fire Risk

Land cover modeling is used to inform land management, but most often via a two-step process where science informs how management alternatives can influence resources and then decision makers can use this to make decisions. A more efficient process is to directly integrate science and decision making, where science allows us to learn to better accomplish management objectives and is developed to address specific decisions. Co-development of management and science is especially productive when decisions are complicated by multiple objectives and impeded by uncertainty. Multiple objectives can be met by specification of tradeoffs, and relevant uncertainty can be addressed through targeted science (i.e., models and monitoring). We describe how to integrate habitat and fuels monitoring with decision making focused on dual objectives of managing for endangered species and minimizing catastrophic fire risk. Under certain conditions, both objectives might be achieved by a similar management policy, but habitat trajectories suggest tradeoffs. Knowledge about system responses to actions can be informed by applying competing management actions to different land units in the same system state and by ideas about fire behavior. Monitoring and management integration is important to optimize state-specific management decisions and increase knowledge about system responses. We believe this approach has broad utility for and cover modeling programs intended to inform decision making.

adaptive management↗

Risk Interfaces to Support Integrated Systems Analysis and Development

Objectives for systems analysis capability: Develop integrated understanding of how a complex human physiological-socio-technical mission system behaves in spaceflight. Why? Support development of integrated solutions that prevent unwanted outcomes (Implementable approaches to minimize mission resources(mass, power, crew time, etc.)); Support development of tools for autonomy (need for exploration) (Assess and maintain resilience -individuals, teams, integrated system). Output of this exercise: -Representation of interfaces based on Human System Risk Board (HSRB) Risk Summary information and simple status based on Human Research Roadmap; Consolidated HSRB information applied to support communication; Point-of-Departure for HRP Element planning; Ability to track and communicate status of collaborations. 4

Mindock, Jennifer↗