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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Future of Integrated Performance Modeling in the Crew Health and Performance – Probabilistic Risk Assessment Project

The NASA engineering community utilizes event-driven and fault-tree probabilistic techniques to classify risks in the space environment by taking advantage of the inherent knowledge of complex spaceflight system design and testing to quantify failure risk. In harmonizing the risk of human space flight, answering the question of ‘How do we balance health, performance and resource risks with other engineering risks on long duration space missions?’ remains a deeply challenging and largely qualitative practice. The Human Research Program’s Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT) was a significant step forward in efforts to robustly quantify the risk to crew health for exploration missions. However, there remains a significant gap in the ability to comprehensively assess and characterize risk across the disparate functionalities and capabilities which comprise the Crew Health and Performance (CHP) system. The Crew Health and Performance – Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CHP-PRA) project seeks to characterize CHP risks by expanding beyond the foundation established by its PRA predecessors like IMM and MEDPRAT, that simulate medical risk metrics like loss of crew life and evacuations. One of the new risk measures in the CHP-PRA system is embodied in our Performance Risk Model (PRisM). PRisM provides a novel way of assessing crew performance on mission tasks, using a generalized framework which relates back to NASA-STD-3001. This approach allows PRisM to capture and integrate data from a variety of different domains into a single, unified, reproducible representation of astronaut performance. In this presentation, we discuss the motivation for the CHP-PRA work and give a high level overview of the goals of the project, outline the forward work for PRisM, and discuss collaboration opportunities for the community who might explore if their domain knowledge and data could be represented, integrated, and quantified with these tools, whose outcomes are metrics useful for supporting operational mission planning and decision making.

Lauren McIntyre↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Incorporation of Human Risk Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) With Mishap Investigations to Un-Silo Knowledge

NASA’s Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has been a central driver in efforts to understand, mitigate, and communicate the 29 human systems risks monitored by the board. As a result of the collaboration between research, operations, and technical authorities, large bodies of knowledge have been collected and digested to represent the current understanding of the risks. As a part of these bodies of knowledge, directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) have been developed to communicate the current understanding of the causal relationship of the hazards, contributing factors, countermeasures, other risks, and outcomes that contribute to the overall risk. This risk knowledge is applied in a theoretical sense for potential incidents during exploration even while informed by surveillance data. However, there have been mishaps and close calls during past space exploration that intersect with one or more of the Human System Risks DAGs and knowledge bases. The purpose of this exercise was to un-silo this risk knowledge and connect it to the close call of EVA 23 through the development of a DAG representing the intersection of the HSRB Risks and the events of the close call. The development of the DAG occurred through an iterative process, with each iteration expanding and/or refining the nodes and connections described by the source materials. In addition to the risk documentation developed by the HSRB, lessons learned and other mishap investigation documents were utilized to understand the events that led to water entering the helmet of a crewmember on the EVA. New nodes specific to the events of EVA 23 were interconnected with existing HSRB DAG nodes and edges. Nodes within the DAG were defined within a “DAG-tionary” with any updates to a definition that may have previously existed from the HSRB DAGs, and edges were recorded in a matrix. Both the DAG-tionary and matrix describe where nodes and edges are present across the Risk and Mishap DAG. This DAG will then be reviewed by experts outside of HSRB and HRP to confirm that interpretations of the non-health related events (such as the engineering nodes) are represented accurately. DISCUSSION This process highlighted a method by which the knowledge generated among the contributing members of the HSRB Risks can be effectively adapted and utilized through the tools employed by the Risk Custodian teams. By leveraging these tools, new context and insights to the information at hand can be brought forward to address current spaceflight challenges. Moreover, un-siloing this knowledge through future DAGs and other efforts can drive interprofessional collaboration and foster communication. This will enable teams to work together more effectively, leveraging their diverse expertise to tackle the complex challenges of space exploration and human research. Ultimately, this collaboration will bring NASA closer to achieve agency goals and contribute to the overall shared mission and vision.

Samuel Jacobs↗

DOE OSTI2024

The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.

Kovacic, Donald N↗

DOE OSTI2020

Risk to ecological resources following remediation can be due mainly to increased resource value of successful restoration: A case study from the Department of Energy's Hanford Site

Several nations are faced with the need to remediate large contaminated sites following World War II, the Cold War, and abandoned industrial sites, and to return them to productive land uses. In the United States, the Department of Energy (DOE) has the largest cleanup challenge, and its Hanford Site in the state of Washington has the most extensive and most expensive cleanup task. Ideally, the risk to ecological resources on remediation sites is evaluated before, during, and after remediation, and the risk from, or damage to, ecological resources from contaminants should be lower following remediation. In this paper, we report the risk to ecological resources before, during, and as a consequence of remediation on contaminated units requiring cleanup, and then examine the causes for changes in risk by evaluating 56 cleanup evaluation units (EUs) at the Hanford Site. In this case, remediation includes a restoration phase. In general, the risk to ecological and eco-cultural resources is currently not discernible or low at most contaminated units, increases during remediation, and decreases thereafter. Remediation often causes physical disruption to ecosystems as it reduces the risk from exposure to contaminants. Most new remediation projects at the Hanford Site include ecological restoration. Ecological restoration results in the potential for the presence of higher quality resources after remediation than currently exists on these contaminated lands and facilities. Although counter-intuitive, our evaluation of the risk to ecological resources following remediation indicated that a significant percentage of units (61%) will be at increased risk in the post-remediation period. This increased risk is due to DOE's successful remediation and restoration that results in a higher percent of native vegetation and higher ecological value on the sites in the post-remediation period than before. These newly-created resources can then be at risk from post-remediation activities. Risks to these new higher quality resources include the potential for spread of invasive species and of noxious grasses used in previous cleanup actions, disruption of ecosystems (including those with state or federally listed species and unique ecosystems), compaction of soil, use of pesticides to control invasive species, and the eventual need for continued monitoring activities. Thus, by greatly improving the existing habitat and health of eco-receptors, and maintaining habitat corridors between high quality habitats, the ecological resources in the post-remediated units are at risk unless care is taken to protect them. Many of the negative effects of both remediation and future monitoring (or other future land uses) can be avoided by planning and management early in the remediation process. We suggest DOE and other agencies convene a panel of managers, remediation scientists, regulators, environmental and ecological scientists, Native Americans, economists, and the public to develop a generic list of performance metrics for the restoration phase of remediation, including evaluation of success, which could be applied across the DOE complex.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS2016

Risk-Hedged Approach for Re-Routing Air Traffic Under Weather Uncertainty

This presentation corresponds to: our paper explores a new risk-hedged approach for re-routing air traffic around forecast convective weather. In this work, flying through a more likely weather instantiation is considered to pose a higher level of risk. Current operational practice strategically plans re-routes to avoid only the most likely (highest risk) weather instantiation, and then tactically makes any necessary adjustments as the weather evolves. The risk-hedged approach strategically plans re-routes by minimizing the risk-adjusted path length, incorporating multiple possible weather instantiations with associated likelihoods (risks). The resulting model is transparent and is readily analyzed for realism and treated with well-understood shortest-path algorithms. Risk-hedged re-routes are computed for some example weather instantiations. The main result is that in some scenarios, relative to an operational-practice proxy solution, the risk-hedged solution provides the benefits of lower risk as well as shorter path length. In other scenarios, the benefits of the risk-hedged solution are ambiguous, because the solution is characterized by a tradeoff between risk and path length. The risk-hedged solution can be executed in those scenarios where it provides a clear benefit over current operational practice.

air traffic routing↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of a Safety Hazards Risk Assessment Tool for Uncrewed Aircraft System Traffic Management during Preflight Planning

Tremendous growth in the uncrewed and remotely piloted vehicle market is expected in low-altitude, uncontrolled airspace, resulting in potential decreases in safety without systems that support monitoring, assessing, and mitigating risk. At NASA, the System-Wide Safety (SWS) project has been developing a suite of data-driven tools to predict hazards so that the potential risks that these hazards pose can be mitigated. Services to predict various hazards have been developed, including battery capacity, proximity to static obstacles, population risks, global positioning system signal strength, radio frequency spectrum interference risk, and vertiport congestion. These services can monitor hazards along a flight path and if any risks posed by these hazards exceed a threshold, the uncrewed aircraft system (UAS) fleet manager can be alerted to mitigate the risk by modifying the flight path, changing the scheduled departure or arrival times, and/or diverting the vehicle to an alternate vertiport. These services were originally developed to monitor and assess risks during flight, but they have been adapted to assess hazard risks prior to departure so that a fleet manager can evaluate the potential risks for a fleet of UAS along their planned flight paths. These services have been integrated into a prototype tool called the Supplemental Data Service Provider-Consolidated Dashboard (SDSP-CD), developed at NASA Ames Research Center. The tool consists of a dashboard which provides a comprehensive overview for a number of risks and a map display that shows the details of the hazards along each flight’s path. Based on the findings from three previous studies, the SDSP-CD has been updated with new design elements and functions. In this paper, we describe lessons learned from the previous studies, changes made to the interface, and the feedback received during a follow-up usability study. Overall, participants reported that there is a substantial benefit of having a fleet manager use a consolidated dashboard to assess hazards for the vehicles in their fleet and to provide situational awareness to potential risks so that they can be mitigated prior to flight. Once the SDSP-CD matures, it will need to be integrated into flight and mission planning tools. Some initial thoughts on how this integration should be accomplished are shared in this paper. Finally, the functional differences between preflight vs. in-flight risk assessment and the differences in fleet manager vs. UAS pilot roles that may require different information and user interactions are discussed.

preflight↗

DOE OSTI2021

Simple Acceptance Decisions and Acceptance Risk

Acceptance risk may be estimated using cumulative probability distribution functions applied to populations of measurands and test measurement values. “Simple acceptance” is a decision rule that sets the acceptance range of a test result equal to the tolerance range specification. While acceptance risk is comprised of both consumer risk and producer risk, this paper compares the effects of simple acceptance decision rules and guardbanding decision rules on consumer risk. Consumer risk is also known as the probability of false acceptance. The terms describe the risk of accepting test results as passing when the actual values exceed specification limits. False acceptance is only possible when the true value of a measurand is out of tolerance and the test result indicates that the measurand is within tolerance. Metrologists generally have some information about the test uncertainty regarding a specific acceptance test result. Along with a general lack of knowledge regarding the measurand population parameters, the complicated interplay between risk, dispersion, and central values generally prevents calibration laboratories from fully characterizing acceptance probabilities. Organizations that model the measurand populations can reduce consumer risk by avoiding certification of items whose measurand populations are not well centered. The models in this paper present a recurring trend: guardbanding reduces nonnegligible risks of false acceptance when compared to simple acceptance. However, guardbanding is not the most effective means of acceptance risk mitigation. Systematic characterization of measurand populations can provide the information a calibration laboratory needs to reliably control acceptance risk.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS1993

Integrated risk management

The purpose of this report is to first present a basis or foundation for the building of an integrated risk management plan and them to present the plan. The integration referred to is across both the temporal and the hierarchical dimensions. Complexity, consequence, and credibility seem to be driving the need for the consideration of risk. Reduction of personal bias and reproducibility of the decision making process seem to be driving the consideration of a formal risk plan. While risk can be used as either a selection tool or a control tool, this paper concentrates on the selection usage. Risk relies on stated purpose. The tightness of the definition of purpose and success is directly reflected in the definition and control of risk. Much of a risk management plan could be designed by the answers to the questions of why, what, who, when, and where. However, any plan must provide the following information about a threat or risk: likelihood, consequence, predictability, reliability, and reproducibility. While the environment at NASA is seen as warm, but not hot, for the introduction of a risk program, some encouragement is seen if the following problems are addressed: no champion, no commitment of resource, confused definitions, lack of direction and focus, a hard sell, NASA culture, many choices of assessment methods, and cost. The plan is designed to follow the normal method of doing work and is structured to follow either the work break down structure or a functional structure very well. The parts of the plan include: defining purpose and success, initial threat assessment, initial risk assessment, reconciling threats and parameters, putting part of the information down and factoring the information back into the decision process as it comes back up, and developing inferences. Two major suggestions are presented. One is to build an office of risk management to be used as a resource by managers in doing the risk process. Another is to form a pilot program to try out the details in the plan and modify the method where needed.

Hunsucker, J. L.↗

NASA NTRS1999

Renal Stone Risk During Space Flight

Space flight produces a number of metabolic and physiological changes in the crewmembers exposed to microgravity. Following launch, body fluid volumes, electrolyte levels, and bone and muscle undergo changes as the human body adapts to the weightless environment. Changes in the urinary chemical composition may lead to the potentially serious consequences of renal stone formation. Previous data collected immediately after space flight indicate changes in the urine chemistry favoring an increased risk of calcium oxalate and uric acid stone formation (n = 323). During short term Shuttle space flights, the changes observed include increased urinary calcium and decreased urine volume, pH and citrate resulting in a greater risk for calcium oxalate and brushite stone formation (n = 6). Results from long duration Shuttle/Mir missions (n = 9) followed a similar trend and demonstrated decreased fluid intake and urine volume and increased urinary calcium resulting in a urinary environment saturated with the calcium stone-forming salts. The increased risk occurs rapidly upon exposure to microgravity, continues throughout the space flight and following landing. Dietary factors, especially fluid intake, or pharmacologic intervention can significantly influence the urinary chemical composition. Increasing fluid intake to produce a daily urine output of 2 liters/day may allow the excess salts in the urine to remain in solution, crystals formation will not occur and a renal stone will not develop. Results from long duration crewmembers (n = 2) who had urine volumes greater than 2.5 L/day minimized their risk of renal stone formation. Also, comparisons of stone-forming risk in short duration crewmembers clearly identified greater risk in those who produced less than 2 liters of urine/day. However, hydration and increased urine output does not correct the underlying calcium excretion due to bone loss and only treats the symptoms and not the cause of the increased urinary salts. Dietary modification and promising pharmacologic treatments may also be used to reduce the potential risk for renal stone formation. Potassium citrate is being used clinically to increase the urinary inhibitor levels to minimize the development of crystals and the growth of renal stones. Bisphosphonates are a class of drugs recently shown to help in patients with osteoporosis by inhibiting the loss of bones in elderly patients. This drug could potentially prevent the bone loss observed in astronauts and thereby minimize the increase in urinary calcium and reduce the risk for renal stone development. Results of NASA's renal stone risk assessment program clearly indicate that exposure to microgravity changes the urinary chemical environment such that there is an increased risk for supersaturation of stone-forming salts, including calcium oxalaie and brushite. These studies have indicated specific avenues for development of countermeasures for the increased renal stone risk observed during and following space flight. Increased hydration and implementation of pharmacologic countermeasures should largely mitigate the in-flight risk of renal stones.

Whitson, Peggy A.↗

NASA NTRS2001

Quantitative risk assessment system (QRAS)

A quantitative risk assessment system (QRAS) builds a risk model of a system for which risk of failure is being assessed, then analyzes the risk of the system corresponding to the risk model. The QRAS performs sensitivity analysis of the risk model by altering fundamental components and quantifications built into the risk model, then re-analyzes the risk of the system using the modifications. More particularly, the risk model is built by building a hierarchy, creating a mission timeline, quantifying failure modes, and building/editing event sequence diagrams. Multiplicities, dependencies, and redundancies of the system are included in the risk model. For analysis runs, a fixed baseline is first constructed and stored. This baseline contains the lowest level scenarios, preserved in event tree structure. The analysis runs, at any level of the hierarchy and below, access this baseline for risk quantitative computation as well as ranking of particular risks. A standalone Tool Box capability exists, allowing the user to store application programs within QRAS.

Weinstock, Robert M↗

NASA NTRS2010

Risk Evaluation in the Pre-Phase A Conceptual Design of Spacecraft

Typically, the most important decisions in the design of a spacecraft are made in the earliest stages of its conceptual design the Pre-Phase A stages. It is in these stages that the greatest number of design alternatives is considered, and the greatest number of alternatives is rejected. The focus of Pre-Phase A conceptual development is on the evaluation and comparison of whole concepts and the larger-scale systems comprising those concepts. This comparison typically uses general Figures of Merit (FOMs) to quantify the comparative benefits of designs and alternative design features. Along with mass, performance, and cost, risk should be one of the major FOMs in evaluating design decisions during the conceptual design phases. However, risk is often given inadequate consideration in conceptual design practice. The reasons frequently given for this lack of attention to risk include: inadequate mission definition, lack of rigorous design requirements in early concept phases, lack of fidelity in risk assessment methods, and under-evaluation of risk as a viable FOM for design evaluation. In this paper, the role of risk evaluation in early conceptual design is discussed. The various requirements of a viable risk evaluation tool at the Pre-Phase A level are considered in light of the needs of a typical spacecraft design study. A technique for risk identification and evaluation is presented. The application of the risk identification and evaluation approach to the conceptual design process is discussed. Finally, a computational tool for risk profiling is presented and applied to assess the risk for an existing Pre-Phase A proposal. The resulting profile is compared to the risks identified for the proposal by other means.

Fabisinski, Leo L., III↗

NASA NTRS2007

Assessment of Cumulative Trauma Disorder (CTD) Risk for 3 Different Tasks Constructing and Repairing Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI) Blankets, Preparing the Dough for a Pizza, and Operating the Becton-Dickinson FACSAria Flow Cytometer

The Cumulative Trauma Disorder (CTD) risks for three different tasks using McCauley-Bell and Badiru's (1993) formula based on task, personal, and organizational factors were examined. For the Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI) blanket task, the results showed that the task, personal, and organizational risks were at about the same level. The personal risk factors for this task were evaluated using a hypothetical female employee age 52. For the pizza dough task, it was shown that the organizational risk was particularly high, with task related factors also at quite dangerous levels. On the other hand, there was a very low level of personal risk factors, based on a female age 17. The flow cytometer task was assessed with three different participants, a11 of whom had quite disparate levels of personal risk, which slightly affected the overall CTD risk. This reveals how individual difference variables certainly need to be considered. The task and organizational risks for this task were rated at about the same moderate level. The overall CTD risk averaged across the three participants was .335, indicating some risk. Compruing across the tasks revealed that the pizza dough task created the greatest overall CTD risk by far (.568), with the MLI (.325) and flow cytometer task (.335) having some risk associated with them. Future research should look into different tasks for more of a comparison

Gentzler, Marc↗

NASA NTRS2011

DCS: A Case Study of Identification of Knowledge and Disposition Gaps Using Principles of Continuous Risk Management

The Human Research Program (HRP) is formulated around the program architecture of Evidence-Risk-Gap-Task-Deliverable. Review of accumulated evidence forms the basis for identification of high priority risks to human health and performance in space exploration. Gaps in knowledge or disposition are identified for each risk, and a portfolio of research tasks is developed to fill them. Deliverables from the tasks inform the evidence base with the ultimate goal of defining the level of risk and reducing it to an acceptable level. A comprehensive framework for gap identification, focus, and metrics has been developed based on principles of continuous risk management and clinical care. Research towards knowledge gaps improves understanding of the likelihood, consequence or timeframe of the risk. Disposition gaps include development of standards or requirements for risk acceptance, development of countermeasures or technology to mitigate the risk, and yearly technology assessment related to watching developments related to the risk. Standard concepts from clinical care: prevention, diagnosis, treatment, monitoring, rehabilitation, and surveillance, can be used to focus gaps dealing with risk mitigation. The research plan for the new HRP Risk of Decompression Sickness (DCS) used the framework to identify one disposition gap related to establishment of a DCS standard for acceptable risk, two knowledge gaps related to DCS phenomenon and mission attributes, and three mitigation gaps focused on prediction, prevention, and new technology watch. These gaps were organized in this manner primarily based on target for closure and ease of organizing interim metrics so that gap status could be quantified. Additional considerations for the knowledge gaps were that one was highly design reference mission specific and the other gap was focused on DCS phenomenon.

Norcross, Jason↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Historical Overview of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Nearly 300 spacewalks have been conducted over the last 25 years to help build and maintain the International Space Station (ISS). During the nearly 2,000 hours of extra-vehicular activity (EVA), crew members wear extra-vehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuits” to mitigate hazards of the space environment including impacts from meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles. NASA includes detailed EMU MMOD risk analyses as part of the ISS EVA review and approval process. This paper provides a general historical overview of the ISS EVA MMOD risks and the associated risk assessment process. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team produces the ISS EVA MMOD risk analyses using the Bumper3 MMOD risk analysis code in conjunction with detailed information about the EVA including crew-member EVA work sites, crew translation paths, suit orientation, and duration. Detailed physical models of the EMU spacesuits and the ISS are included and tailored for each EVA analysis. Two types of MMOD risk are included: (1) Penetration, and (2) Catastrophic. Penetration risk is for any size leak in the EMU suit. Catastrophic risk is a subset of Penetration Risk and only includes penetrations that cause a 4mm diameter hole (or larger) in the inner “bladder” layer of the EMU suit. This size hole will exceed the ability of the EMU suit to compensate. The MMOD risk analyses also utilize the latest orbital debris environment and meteoroid environment models including additional transient factors to account for recent satellite break-ups and annual meteor storms. These additional factors and the associated increase in EVA MMOD risk are considered when scheduling an EVA to reduce EMU MMOD risk.

Dana M. Lear↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Nearly 300 spacewalks have been conducted over the last 25 years to support the construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS). During the nearly 2,000 hours of extra-vehicular activity (EVA), crew wore extra-vehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuits” to help mitigate hazards of the space environment including impacts from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts detailed EMU MMOD risk analyses as part of the ISS EVA review and approval process. This paper provides a general historical overview of the ISS EVA MMOD risks and the associated risk assessment process. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team produces the ISS EVA MMOD risk analyses using the Bumper MMOD risk analysis code in conjunction with detailed information about the EVA including crew member EVA work sites, crew translation paths, suit orientation, and durations. Detailed physical models of the EMU spacesuit and the ISS are included and tailored for each EVA analysis. Two types of MMOD risk are included: (1) Penetration, and (2) Catastrophic. Penetration risk is for any size leak in the EMU suit. Catastrophic risk is a subset of Penetration Risk and only includes penetrations that cause a 4mm diameter hole (or larger) in the pressure-maintaining “bladder” layer of the EMU suit. This size hole will exceed the ability of the EMU suit to compensate. The MMOD risk analyses also utilize the latest orbital debris environment and meteoroid environment models including additional transient factors to account for recent satellite break-ups and annual meteor storms. These additional factors and the associated increase in EVA MMOD risk are considered when scheduling EVAs to reduce EMU MMOD risk.

Dana M. Lear↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Dana M. Lear↗

DOE OSTI2023

Comparison and multi-model inference of excess risks models for radiation-related solid cancer

In assessments of detrimental health risks from exposures to ionising radiation, many forms of risk to dose–response models are available in the literature. The usual practice is to base risk assessment on one specific model and ignore model uncertainty. The analysis illustrated here considers model uncertainty for the outcome all solid cancer incidence, when modelled as a function of colon organ dose, using the most recent publicly available data from the Life Span Study on atomic bomb survivors of Japan. Seven recent publications reporting all solid cancer risk models currently deemed plausible by the scientific community have been included in a model averaging procedure so that the main conclusions do not depend on just one type of model. The models have been estimated with different baselines and presented for males and females at various attained ages and ages at exposure, to obtain specially computed model-averaged Excess Relative Risks (ERR) and Excess Absolute Risks (EAR). Monte Carlo simulated estimation of uncertainty on excess risks was accounted for by applying realisations including correlations in the risk model parameters. Three models were found to weight the model-averaged risks most strongly depending on the baseline and information criteria used for the weighting. Fitting all excess risk models with the same baseline, one model dominates for both information criteria considered in this study. Based on the analysis presented here, it is generally recommended to take model uncertainty into account in future risk analyses.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

DOE OSTI2022

Dynamic risk assessment for geologic CO 2 sequestration

At a geologic CO 2 sequestration (GCS) site, geologic uncertainty usually leads to large uncertainty in the predictions of properties that influence metrics for leakage risk assessment, such as CO 2 saturations and pressures in potentially leaky wellbores, CO 2 /brine leakage rates, and leakage consequences such as changes in drinking water quality in groundwater aquifers. The large uncertainty in these risk-related system properties and risk metrics can lead to over-conservative risk management decisions to ensure safe operations of GCS sites. The objective of this work is to develop a novel approach based on dynamic risk assessment to effectively reduce the uncertainty in the predicted risk-related system properties and risk metrics. We demonstrate our framework for dynamic risk assessment on two case studies: a 3D synthetic example and a synthetic field example based on the Rock Springs Uplift (RSU) storage site in Wyoming, USA. Results show that the U.S. National Risk Assessment Partnership’s Open Source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP-Open-IAM) coupled with a conformance evaluation can be used to effectively quantify and reduce the uncertainty in the predictions of risk-related system properties and risk metrics in GCS.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗