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Radiation Scanning Methods for Ship-to-Rail Intermodal Cargo Containers

The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) runs the Rail Test Center (RTC) at the Port of Tacoma (POT). The RTC affords DNDO with the opportunity to test radiological and nuclear threat detection systems associated with the unique on-dock rail environment while in an operational seaport. DNDO selected the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to manage the RTC. The RTC is conducting various evaluation studies to assess scanning opportunities in terms of their affects on the num-ber of container moves required and the affect that the scanning opportunity has on the time it takes to move a container through the on-dock transfer process from ship to rail. The velocity and the number of container moves are directly associated with incremental costs to the terminal operators; increases in either of these parameters help in-form the potential for incremental costs that would result from the implementation of the opportunity.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Homeland Security and Defense Applications

Homeland Security and Defense Applications personnel are the best in the world at detecting and locating dirty bombs, loose nukes, and other radiological sources. The site trains the Nation's emergency responders, who would be among the first to confront a radiological or nuclear emergency. Homeland Security and Defense Applications highly training personnel, characterize the threat environment, produce specialized radiological nuclear detection equipment, train personnel on the equipment and its uses, test and evaluate the equipment, and develop different kinds of high-tech equipment to defeat terrorists. In New York City for example, NNSS scientists assisted in characterizing the radiological nuclear environment after 9/11, and produced specialized radiological nuclear equipment to assist local officials in their Homeland Security efforts.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Testing the Delayed Gamma Capability in MCNP6

The mission of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is to quickly and reliably detect unauthorized attempts to import or transport special nuclear material for use against the United States. Developing detection equipment to meet this objective requires accurate simulation of both the detectable signature and detection mechanism. A delayed particle capability was initially added to MCNPX 2.6.A in 2005 to sample the radioactive fission product parents and emit decay particles resulting from the decay chain. To meet the objectives of detection scenario modeling, the capability was designed to sample a particular time for emitting particular multiplicity of a particular energy. Because the sampling process of selecting both time and energy is interdependent, to linearize the time and emission sampling, atom densities are computed at several discrete time steps, and the time-integrated production is computed by multiplying the atom density by the decay constant and time step size to produce a cumulative distribution function for sampling the emission time, energy, and multiplicity. The delayed particle capability was initially given a time-bin structure to help reasonably reproduce, from a qualitative sense, a fission benchmark by Beddingfield, which examined the delayed gamma emission. This original benchmark was only qualitative and did not contain the magnitudes of the actual measured data but did contain relative graphical representation of the spectra. A better benchmark with measured data was later provided by Hunt, Mozin, Reedy, Selpel, and Tobin at the Idaho Accelerator Center; however, because of the complexity of the benchmark setup, sizable systematic errors were expected in the modeling, and initial results compared to MCNPX 2.7.0 showed errors outside of statistical fluctuation. Presented in this paper is a more simplified approach to benchmarking, utilizing closed form analytic solutions to the granddaughter equations for particular sets of decay systems. We examine five different decay chains (two-stage decay to stable) and show the predictability of the MCNP6 delayed gamma feature. Results do show that while the default delayed gamma calculations available in the MCNP6 1.0 release can give accurate results for some isotopes (e.g., 137 Ba), the percent differences between the closed form analytic solutions and the MCNP6 calculations were often >40% ( 28 Mg, 28 Al, 42 K, 47 Ca, 47 Sc, 60 Co). With the MCNP6 1.1 Beta release, the tenth entry on the DBCN card allows improved calculation within <5% as compared to the closed form analytic solutions for immediate parent emissions and transient equilibrium systems. While the tenth entry on the DBCN card for MCNP6 1.1 gives much better results for transient equilibrium systems and parent emissions in general, it does little to improve daughter emissions of secular equilibrium systems. Finally, hypotheses were presented as to why daughter emissions of secular equilibrium systems might be mispredicted in some cases and not in others.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Detection of Special Nuclear Material in Cargo using Continuous Neutron Interrogation and Tension Metastable Fluid Detectors

This paper presents results using a novel technique for detecting special nuclear materials (SNMs) based on interrogation with a continuous beam of 2.45 MeV neutrons coupled with high intrinsic efficiency tensioned metastable fluid detectors (TMFDs) operated in threshold rejection mode. While passive interrogation may be utilized for detecting SNMs such as {sup 239}Pu from their strong spontaneous fission neutron signatures, this is not so for highly-enriched uranium (HEU), the timely detection of which has been identified as a grand challenge by the U.S. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). Active (neutron and/or photon based) interrogation represents the only viable means for detecting HEU either shielded or unshielded within cargo containers. Active interrogation by neutrons or photons leads to unequivocal induced fission based signatures in terms of neutron energy and multiplicity. The main challenge under such circumstances pertains to being able to discern the relatively weak emission signatures from the intense interrogation pulses of neutrons and/or photons. Purdue University together with Sagamore Adams Laboratories, LLC (SAL) has been developing the TMFD sensor system that promises to provide high neutron detection efficiency for fast and thermal neutrons while remaining gamma-beta blind. As described in these references, the TMFD sensor system works on the principle of transient cavitation detection events (CDEs) caused by ionizing particles such as neutrons, alphas and fission fragments in fluids that have been placed in various states of tensioned (sub-zero) pressure states of fluid metastability. Such CDEs result in recordable signatures - both electronically as for conventional detectors, but also in the form of audio-visual signals. One key advantage that the TMFD holds over conventional neutron detectors is that it has proven gamma-beta 'blindness' and indeed, confirmed to possess GARRn = 1.0 to γ photons (tested in up to 10{sup 11} γ/s field from a 3 Ci {sup 137}Cs source). Such an enablement allows for detection without saturation from background, interrogating and fission created γ photons. Another key attribute is up to 60 % intrinsic fission spectrum neutron detection efficiency which, furthermore, is amenable to tailoring for threshold based rejection. That is, to be able to detect neutrons at or above a desired energy with good efficiency, while remaining relatively blind to neutrons below the chosen threshold. This research is the subject of our ongoing DNDO project at Purdue University, the results of which form the basis of this paper. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Testing the Delayed Gamma Capability in MCNP6 - Paper 86

The mission of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is to quickly and reliably detect unauthorized attempts to import or transport special nuclear material (SNM) for use against the United States. Developing detection equipment to meet this objective requires accurate simulation of both the detectable signature and detection mechanism. MCNP6 is capable of transporting the various types of radiation encountered in these scenarios; however, the accuracy of MCNP6 must be quantified such that we can be confident in the results of the simulations. Delayed gamma transport is one important component of these detection scenarios. Delayed gamma transport is defined as the combination of gamma emission from radioactive and subsequent transport through matter. MCNP always possessed the ability to emit delayed neutrons from fission; however, these delayed neutron spectra and intensity were functional fits and not directly sampled from the created fission products. Furthermore, there existed no method to emit the decay photons from radioactive fission products (or any radioactive nucleus) A delayed particle capability was initially added to MCNPX 2.6.A in 2005 to sample the radioactive fission product parents and emit decay particles resulting from the decay chain. At the point of capture, a residual nucleus is created and decayed using the CINDER90 depletion code. MCNP only sends CINDER90 a residual radioactive nucleus and not a flux (i.e. capture rate). As a result, the Bateman equations for the solution are coupled first order differential equations with constant coefficients. Theoretically, these equations could be solved analytically; however, CINDER90 employs a numerical Markov linear chain scheme to solve these equations. This paper addresses a more simplified approach to benchmarking in order to best assess: (1) whether or not deficiencies exist in the current methodology for certain types of decay chains; and (2) paths forward for improving the delayed particle emission capability. We utilize closed form analytic solutions to the granddaughter equations for particular sets of isotope systems to compare the accuracy of the delayed gamma capability in MCNP6. (authors)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Network Algorithms for Detection of Radiation Sources

In support of national defense, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO) Intelligent Radiation Sensor Systems (IRSS) program supported the development of networks of radiation counters for detecting, localizing and identifying low-level, hazardous radiation sources. Industry teams developed the first generation of such networks with tens of counters, and demonstrated several of their capabilities in indoor and outdoor characterization tests. Subsequently, these test measurements have been used in algorithm replays using various sub-networks of counters. Test measurements combined with algorithm outputs are used to extract Key Measurements and Benchmark (KMB) datasets. We present two selective analyses of these datasets: (a) a notional border monitoring scenario that highlights the benefits of a network of counters compared to individual detectors, and (b) new insights into the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) detection method, which lead to its adaptations for improved detection. Using KMB datasets from an outdoor test, we construct a notional border monitoring scenario, wherein twelve 2”*2” NaI detectors are deployed on the periphery of 21*21meter square region. A Cs-137 (175 uCi) source is moved across this region, starting several meters from outside and finally moving away. The measurements from individual counters and the network were processed using replays of a particle filter algorithm developed under IRSS program. The algorithm outputs from KMB datasets clearly illustrate the benefits of combining measurements from all networked counters: the source was detected before it entered the region, during its trajectory inside, and until it moved several meters away. When individual counters are used for detection, the source was detected for much shorter durations, and sometimes was missed in the interior region. The application of SPRT for detecting radiation sources requires choosing the detection threshold, which in turn requires a source strength estimate, typically specified as a multiplier of the background radiation level. A judicious selection of this source multiplier is essential to achieve optimal detection probability at a specified false alarm rate. Typically, this threshold is chosen from the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) by varying the source multiplier estimate. ROC is expected to have a monotonically increasing profile between the detection probability and false alarm rate. We derived ROCs for multiple indoor tests using KMB datasets, which revealed an unexpected loop shape: as the multiplier increases, detection probability and false alarm rate both increase until a limit, and then both contract. Consequently, two detection probabilities correspond to the same false alarm rate, and the higher is achieved at a lower multiplier, which is the desired operating point. Using the Chebyshev’s inequality we analytically confirm this shape. Then, we present two improved network-SPRT methods by (a) using the threshold off-set as a weighting factor for the binary decisions from individual detectors in a weighted majority voting fusion rule, and (b) applying a composite SPRT derived using measurements from all counters.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

A source-attractor approach to network detection of radiation sources

Radiation source detection using a network of detectors is an active field of research for homeland security and defense applications. We propose Source-attractor Radiation Detection (SRD) method to aggregate measurements from a network of detectors for radiation source detection. SRD method models a potential radiation source as a magnet -like attractor that pulls in pre-computed virtual points from the detector locations. A detection decision is made if a sufficient level of attraction, quantified by the increase in the clustering of the shifted virtual points, is observed. Compared with traditional methods, SRD has the following advantages: i) it does not require an accurate estimate of the source location from limited and noise-corrupted sensor readings, unlike the localizationbased methods, and ii) its virtual point shifting and clustering calculation involve simple arithmetic operations based on the number of detectors, avoiding the high computational complexity of grid-based likelihood estimation methods. We evaluate its detection performance using canonical datasets from Domestic Nuclear Detection Office s (DNDO) Intelligence Radiation Sensors Systems (IRSS) tests. SRD achieves both lower false alarm rate and false negative rate compared to three existing algorithms for network source detection.

Wu, Qishi↗

Radiochemistry Education and Research Program at the Pennsylvania State University

A new Radiochemistry Education and Research Program was started at the Pennsylvania University, Radiation Science and Engineering Center. The program was initially supported by the Department of Energy, Radiochemistry Education Award Program (REAP). Using REAP funding as leverage we obtained support from the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Department of Homeland Security, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, various internal funding from PSU and other entities. The PSU radiochemistry program primarily addresses radiochemistry education and secondarily nuclear and radiochemistry research. The education program consists of bolstering our existing radiochemistry and related courses; Nuclear and Radiochemistry, Radiation Detection and Measurement, Radiological Safety and developing new courses, e.g., Laboratory Experiments in Applied Nuclear and Radiochemistry, and Nuclear Methods in Science. A new laboratory has been created with state of the art equipment for the Laboratory Experiments in Applied Nuclear and Radiochemistry course. We also plan to revitalize the nuclear and radiochemistry research programs. We established a state-of-the-art Neutron Activation Analysis Laboratory and a gamma ray spectroscopy laboratory that has 10 stations including state-of-the-art nuclear spectroscopy hardware and software. In addition, we embarked on an expansion plan that included building a new neutron beam hall and neutron beam ports with a cold neutron source. One of the reasons to have a cold neutron source is for the development of a prompt gamma activation analysis facility. A detailed description of PSU radiochemistry education and research program will be given and the future plans will be discussed.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Network Detection of Radiation Sources Using Localization-Based Approaches

Radiation source detection is a critical problem in homeland security-related applications. Deploying a network of detectors is expected to provide improved detection due to the combined, albeit dispersed, capture area of multiple detectors. Recently, localization-based detection algorithms provided performance gains beyond the simple “aggregated” area as a result of localization being enabled by the networked detectors. We introduce the following three localization-based detection approaches: 1) source-attractor radiation detection (SRD); 2) triangulation-based radiation source detection (TriRSD); and 3) the ratio of square distance-based radiation source detection (ROSD-RSD). We use canonical datasets from Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's intelligence radiation sensors systems tests to assess the performance of these methods. Extensive results demonstrate that SRD outperforms TriRSD and ROSD-RSD, and other existing detection algorithms based on the sequential probability ratio test and maximum likelihood estimation in terms of both false alarm and detection rates.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

BOBCAT Personal Radiation Detector Field Test and Evaluation Campaign

Following the success of the Anole test of portable detection system, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office organized a test and evaluation campaign for personal radiation detectors (PRDs), also known as “Pagers.” This test, “Bobcat,” was conducted from July 17 to August 8, 2006, at the Nevada Test Site. The Bobcat test was designed to evaluate the performance of PRDs under various operational scenarios, such as pedestrian surveying, mobile surveying, cargo container screening, and pedestrian chokepoint monitoring. Under these testing scenarios, many operational characteristics of the PRDs, such as gamma and neutron sensitivities, positive detection and false alarm rates, response delay times, minimum detectable activities, and source localization errors, were analyzed. This paper will present the design, execution, and methodologies used to test this equipment for the DHS.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Development of a phoswich detector system for radioxenon monitoring

Abstract Measurement of radioactive xenon in the atmosphere is one of several techniques to detect nuclear weapons testing. For high sensitivity, some existing systems use beta/gamma coincidence detection to suppress background, which is very effective, but increases complexity due to separate beta and gamma detectors that require careful calibration and gain matching. In this paper, we will describe the development and evaluation of a simpler detector system, named PhosWatch, consisting of a CsI(Tl)/ BC-404 phoswich well detector, digital readout electronics, and pulse shape analysis algorithms implemented in a digital signal processor on the electronics, and compare its performance to existing multi-detector systems.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Potential applications of microbial genomics in nuclear non-proliferation

As nuclear technology evolves in response to increased demand for diversification and decarbonization of the energy sector, new and innovative approaches are needed to effectively identify and deter the proliferation of nuclear arms, while ensuring safe development of global nuclear energy resources. Preventing the use of nuclear material and technology for unsanctioned development of nuclear weapons has been a long-standing challenge for the International Atomic Energy Agency and signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Environmental swipe sampling has proven to be an effective technique for characterizing clandestine proliferation activities within and around known locations of nuclear facilities and sites. However, limited tools and techniques exist for detecting nuclear proliferation in unknown locations beyond the boundaries of declared nuclear fuel cycle facilities, representing a critical gap in non-proliferation safeguards. Microbiomes, defined as “characteristic communities of microorganisms” found in specific habitats with distinct physical and chemical properties, can provide valuable information about the conditions and activities occurring in the surrounding environment. Microorganisms are known to inhabit radionuclide-contaminated sites, spent nuclear fuel storage pools, and cooling systems of water-cooled nuclear reactors, where they can cause radionuclide migration and corrosion of critical structures. Microbial transformation of radionuclides is a well-established process that has been documented in numerous field and laboratory studies. These studies helped to identify key bacterial taxa and microbially-mediated processes that directly and indirectly control the transformation, mobility, and fate of radionuclides in the environment. Expanding on this work, other studies have used microbial genomics integrated with machine learning models to successfully monitor and predict the occurrence of heavy metals, radionuclides, and other process wastes in the environment, indicating the potential role of nuclear activities in shaping microbial community structure and function. Results of this previous body of work suggest fundamental geochemical-microbial interactions occurring at nuclear fuel cycle facilities could give rise to microbiomes that are characteristic of nuclear activities. These microbiomes could provide valuable information for monitoring nuclear fuel cycle facilities, planning environmental sampling campaigns, and developing biosensor technology for the detection of undisclosed fuel cycle activities and proliferation concerns.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Lifecycle Management of Nuclear Security Radiation Detection Systems: Testing and Evaluation

The lifecycle of radiation detection systems functioning within a State’s Nuclear Security Detection Architecture encompasses all activities associated with acquisition, deployment, and eventual disposal. Throughout a system’s lifecycle, testing and evaluation activities are needed to ensure requirements are continually met, as underscored by recent experiences.This paper provides:1.A discussion of reasons why testing should be part of the radiation detection equipment lifecycle before, during, and after acquisition.2.A general process for determining applicable evaluation methods.3.A discussion of issues related to integrating testing and evaluation into procurement and operational processes and mitigation strategies.

Harris, Tyrone↗

Data fusion for a vision-aided radiological detection system: Calibration algorithm performance

In order to improve the ability to detect, locate, track and identify nuclear/radiological threats, the University of Florida nuclear detection community has teamed up with the 3D vision community to collaborate on a low cost data fusion system. The key is to develop an algorithm to fuse the data from multiple radiological and 3D vision sensors as one system. The system under development at the University of Florida is being assessed with various types of radiological detectors and widely available visual sensors. A series of experiments were devised utilizing two EJ-309 liquid organic scintillation detectors (one primary and one secondary), a Microsoft Kinect for Windows v2 sensor and a Velodyne HDL-32E High Definition LiDAR Sensor which is a highly sensitive vision sensor primarily used to generate data for self-driving cars. Each experiment consisted of 27 static measurements of a source arranged in a cube with three different distances in each dimension. The source used was Cf-252. The calibration algorithm developed is utilized to calibrate the relative 3D-location of the two different types of sensors without need to measure it by hand; thus, preventing operator manipulation and human errors. The algorithm can also account for the facility dependent deviation from ideal data fusion correlation. Use of the vision sensor to determine the location of a sensor would also limit the possible locations and it does not allow for room dependence (facility dependent deviation) to generate a detector pseudo-location to be used for data analysis later. Using manually measured source location data, our algorithm-predicted the offset detector location within an average of 20 cm calibration-difference to its actual location. Calibration-difference is the Euclidean distance from the algorithm predicted detector location to the measured detector location. The Kinect vision sensor data produced an average calibration-difference of 35 cm and the HDL-32E produced an average calibration-difference of 22 cm. Using NaI and He-3 detectors in place of the EJ-309, the calibration-difference was 52 cm for NaI and 75 cm for He-3. In conclusion, the algorithm is not detector dependent; however, from these results it was determined that detector dependent adjustments are required.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Laboratory and Field Testing of Commercially Available Detectors for the Identification of Chemicals of Interest in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle for the Detection of Undeclared Activities

Traditionally, IAEA inspectors have focused on the detection of nuclear indicators as part of infield inspection activities. The ability to rapidly detect and identify chemical as well as nuclear signatures can increase the ability of IAEA inspectors to detect undeclared activities at a site. Identification of chemical indicators have been limited to use in the analysis of environmental samples. Although IAEA analytical laboratories are highly effective, environmental sample processing does not allow for immediate or real-time results to an IAEA inspector at a facility. During a complementary access inspection, under the Additional Protocol, the use of fieldable technologies that can quickly provide accurate information on chemicals that may be indicative of undeclared activities can increase the ability of IAEA to effectively and efficiently complete their mission. The Complementary Access Working Group (CAWG) is a multi-laboratory team with members from Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratory. The team identified chemicals at each stage of the nuclear fuel cycle that may provide IAEA inspectors with indications that proliferation activities may be occurring. The group eliminated all indicators related to equipment, technology and training, developing a list of by-products/effluents, non-nuclear materials, nuclear materials, and other observables. These proliferation indicators were prioritized based on detectability from a conduct of operations (CONOPS) perspective of a CA inspection (for example, whether an inspector actually can access the S&O or whether it is in process with no physical access), and the IAEA’s interest in the detection technology in conjunction with radiation detectors. The list was consolidated to general categories (nuclear materials from a chemical detection technique, inorganic chemicals, organic chemicals, halogens, and miscellaneous materials). The team then identified commercial off the shelf (COTS) chemical detectors that may detect the chemicals of interest. Three chemical detectors were selected and tested both in laboratory settings and in field operations settings at Idaho National Laboratory. The instruments selected are: Thermo Scientific TruDefender FT (FTIR), Thermo Scientific FirstDefender RM (Raman), and Bruker Tracer III SD (XRF). Functional specifications, operability, and chemical detectability, selectivity, and limits of detection were determined. Results from the laboratory and field tests will be presented. This work is supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, National Nuclear Security Administration.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Ground-state electric quadrupole moment of {sup 31}Al

The ground-state electric quadrupole moment of {sup 31}Al(I{sup {pi}}=5/2{sup +},T{sub 1/2}=644(25) ms) has been measured by means of {beta}-ray-detected nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy using a spin-polarized {sup 31}Al beam produced in the projectile fragmentation reaction. The obtained Q moment, |Q{sub exp}({sup 31}Al)|=112(32) e mb, is in agreement with conventional shell model calculations within the sd valence space. Previous results on the magnetic moment also support the validity of the sd model in this isotope, and thus it is concluded that {sup 31}Al is located outside of the island of inversion.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Device for detection and identification of carbon- and nitrogen-containing materials

A device for detection and identification of carbon- and nitrogen-containing materials is described. In particular, the device performs the detection and identification of carbon- and nitrogen-containing materials by photo-nuclear detection. The device may comprise a race-track microtron, a breaking target, and a water-filled Cherenkov radiation counter.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Investigation of Non-Nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform Sites - 20447

The Plowshare Program was initiated by the Atomic Energy Commission, a predecessor agency to the US Department of Energy (DOE), to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear devices. 'Vela Uniform,' part of the broader Project Vela, was designed to use nuclear and other explosions to increase the capability of the United States to detect nuclear tests through seismicity. There were underground nuclear tests conducted off the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) as part of the Plowshare Program (e.g., the Gnome-Coach, New Mexico, Site) and the Vela Uniform Program (e.g., Project Shoal, Nevada, Site) at which the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) has been conducting long-term surveillance and maintenance since fiscal year (FY) 2006. There are many additional locations, particularly for the Plowshare Program, that were considered for nuclear tests or used for non-nuclear tests off the NNSS. Some were only named on paper, but at 30 sites, field work such as drilling test wells and conducting tests using conventional explosives was done. A Plowshare nuclear explosion had been proposed at Project Chariot but was canceled in 1962. In 1992, the discovery of soils contaminated with radionuclides from tracer experiments led to a cleanup by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) of the Project Chariot, Alaska, Site, which was completed in 1994. Following the cleanup of the Project Chariot site, EM was concerned that there might be environmental liabilities at other Plowshare or Vela Uniform sites where field investigations were done, even if the nuclear test was never conducted. The EM Program at the Nevada Site Office began examining records and visiting selected locations that were evaluated for Plowshare and Vela Uniform non-nuclear tests. In total, 161 Plowshare and 14 Vela Uniform sites or proposed projects were identified. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) created summaries of the work carried out at these sites and developed a collection of unclassified documents for them. Preliminary investigations had been conducted at these sites by both LM and EM since the early 2000's. In 2016, in preparation for accepting responsibility for the sites, LM started a program to determine if there were any environmental or safety liabilities associated with them. In 2019, LM formally accepted responsibility for these sites off the NNSS where non-nuclear explosive tests were conducted or where underground nuclear tests were proposed as part of the Plowshare and Vela Uniform programs but were never conducted. LM responsibilities will include maintaining institutional knowledge of the sites, responding to public inquiries, and addressing any concerns at each site. To minimize risk associated with site management, LM has archived all historical records compiled by DRI and has performed limited investigations at sites identified by the prior studies as having a higher potential liability. Preserving records related to site operations reduces the risk of doing unnecessary site investigations in the future caused by the loss of institutional knowledge. During the investigations, some maintenance needs were identified and will be addressed by the end of FY 2021. At the end of FY 2021, investigations, maintenance, and archiving activities will be complete. Remnants of test activities found at sites include craters, mud pits, debris, and open boreholes. Open boreholes are being plugged and abandoned in accordance with state regulatory standards. Other issues are being addressed in accordance with land owner requests and preferences as well as state regulations. Archiving activities include the development of project summaries identifying key operational details and current condition to allow site managers to be easily briefed. The LM experience at non-nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform sites applies to other programs where there is the potential for liability associated with the non-nuclear aspects of nuclear programs. This may include support activities or early phases of planned nuclear projects. Preserving institutional knowledge enables land managers to adequately address any concerns associated with operations and lowers risk. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗