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Because of aging reactor fleets, complicated regulatory applications for new reactors, unresolved uranium disposition pathways, and the nonproliferation and minimization efforts spearheaded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), non-fission-based production of 99 Mo is becoming an attractive alternative.
High-performance room-temperature radiation detectors (high energy resolution for spectrometers, high spatial resolution for imaging devices, and low defect-density for high flux applications) are needed for photon energies (>20 keV) that are not well suited for silicon detectors. Applications for such radiation detectors include nonproliferation, synchrotron, medical, astrophysics, and homeland security. Material- and device- characterization to understand and solve the limiting factors of radiation detection materials and devices is a core element of a radiation detector development R&D program. This presentation will give an overview on the two main synchrotron-based characterization techniques that have been employed by the authors in the last ~20 years: (1) White Beam X-ray Diffraction Topography and (2) Micron-scale detector mapping. A perfect (one domain) crystal (radiation detection material) is a requirement to achieve a highperformance radiation detector. White Beam X-ray Diffraction Topography (WBXDT) allows the rapid screening of the crystallinity of the detector material. With WBXDT we can quickly screen CZT and other crystals to make sure they have only one domain, and to see the presence of extended defects and strain fields.
Detailed knowledge of fission-product (FP) decay properties is needed for a variety of applications of nuclear science such as nuclear-energy production, nuclear-nonproliferation efforts, nuclear-forensics assessments, and stockpile stewardship, as well as for establishing a comprehensive understanding of the fission process, r-process nucleo-synthesis, and fundamental neutrino science. Although nearly a thousand radioactive isotopes are produced in fission, in many cases key pieces of nuclear data on only a handful of isotopes are needed to make a significant impact.
Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico. Activities at the site support research and development programs with a wide variety of national security missions, resulting in technologies for nonproliferation, homeland security, energy and infrastructure, and defense systems and assessments. The U.S. Department of Energy and its management and operating contractor are committed to safeguarding the environment, assessing sustainability practices, and ensuring the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data presented in this annual site environmental report. This report summarizes the environmental protection and monitoring programs in place at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico, during calendar year 2023. Environmental topics include cultural resource management, chemical management, air quality, ecology, environmental restoration, oil storage, site sustainability, terrestrial surveillance, waste management, water quality, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act. This report is prepared in accordance with and as required by DOE O 231.1B, Admin Change 1, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting, and has been approved for public distribution.
In September 2023, the US Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control sponsored a workshop on M400 high-resolution cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) detector safeguards applications under its Safeguards Technology Development Program. The workshop brought together internationally recognized subject matter experts (SMEs) in the field of gamma spectrometry and uranium/plutonium isotopic analysis and experts from H3D Inc. (H3D), the vendor for M400.
For enhancing the effectiveness of nonproliferation efforts in neutron detection, most portable instruments rely on 6 Li scintillators, 10 B-based detectors, or gas-filled 3 He proportional counters. Additionally, gamma-ray detectors based on scintillators and semiconductors are often employed for search applications to find radioactive material in the field. These systems typically include dedicated detectors along with separate high voltage supplies and processing electronics for the gamma-ray and neutron detectors. Ideally, a portable radiation detection system should be lightweight, compact, and cost-effective. In the field, scintillators can serve a dual purpose: (1) detecting gamma-rays and (2) detecting neutrons. Gamma-ray detection with scintillators is based on the interaction of gamma-rays within the scintillating material, whereas neutron detection depends indirectly on neutron capture events. These capture events generate conversion electrons and gamma-rays, which can interact with the scintillator. For enhancing neutron capture, the scintillator can be surrounded by neutron absorber materials with a high neutron cross section. The resulting secondary electrons and gamma-rays from neutron interactions, depending on the absorber material used, can then be analyzed to detect the presence of neutron sources. Similarly, semiconductor-based detectors can be employed along with neutron absorbers as liners for neutron detection. 158 Gd has a significantly larger neutron cross section than 3 He, commonly used in gas-filled proportional counters, as shown in Figure 1. For thermal (0.025 eV) neutrons, the absorption cross section of 158 Gd is 10,000 times greater than that of 3 He (refer to Figure 1). This feature makes naturally occurring gadolinium, which consists of 24.8% 158 Gd, a promising neutron absorber material for use in combination with gamma-ray detectors–yielding a hybrid detector–for neutron detection.
• Thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) is a “gold standard’ technique for actinide isotope amount ratio and assay measurements. • Ubiquitously used in: • Nuclear Nonproliferation • Nuclear Safeguards • Nuclear Forensics • Basic Science • Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) installed a new Thermo Scientific TRITON Plus TIMS in early 2024.
For applications related to nuclear security, safeguards, and nonproliferation, it is often critical to know the molecular compositions of lanthanide- and actinide-containing samples. Spectroscopy is a widely used tool that looks at the interaction between light and matter: Different species absorb or emit light at unique wavelengths which act as signatures. However, there is a limited number of tools that can achieve high-sensitivity, accurate measurements of lanthanide and actinide molecular compositions. Candidate methods include mass spectrometry, which usually destroys at least part of the sample and requires complicated stoichiometry to guess the original sample’s molecular compositions; optical spectroscopies, which have great atomic but limited molecular sensitivities or other drawbacks which make sensing molecules difficult like limited light sources or strong absorption in the atmosphere; and nuclear spectroscopies (gamma, neutron) which also have limited sources and long (>minute) collection times. As such, the purpose of our research is to develop a new tool to better distinguish between subtle differences in molecules containing lanthanides and actinides. Soft x-ray spectroscopy is sensitive to molecular form and is minimally intrusive/nondestructive to the sample. However, soft x-ray light with sufficient brightness for spectroscopy is typically limited to user-facilities like synchrotrons or free electron lasers, where beamtimes are competitive, and work with radiological materials may be difficult or entirely prohibited. To overcome this issue, our Team has developed a custom tabletop laser-driven, soft x-ray light source which employs high harmonic generation (HHG). Soft x-ray spectroscopy can distinguish between subtly different molecules, in the spectral range which we need to study these heavy elements. A tabletop system provides an effective and affordable tool to find both the elemental and chemical specificity of lanthanide and samples. Creating a light source in the soft x-ray spectrum is difficult because these wavelengths in the range 5-20 nm (20-350 eV photon energies) only penetrate several 100s of nm in most solid materials and only reflect well in shallow, grazing incident angles. The results are applicable to nuclear forensics, because molecular fingerprinting of lanthanide and actinide samples can be used to back out the origin and processing method of nuclear materials (Skrodzki, et al.).
Production of metastable Technetium-99 (Tc-99m), a radioactive tracer that emits gamma rays, is vital to the medical imaging community. Tc-99m is extracted from the decay of Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) which has a half-life of about 2-3 days. The work presented in this report is part of the NNSA’s mission to produce Mo-99 commercially, within the US, without the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in support of nonproliferation and global security. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is working with NorthStar Medical Radioisotopes (NMR) on their efforts to produce Mo-99 through the irradiation of Mo-100 targets using an electron beam. The NMR target comprises a stack of approximately 60-70 Mo-100 disks with diameter 24 mm and thickness 0.74 mm held in stainless steel laminations, each separated using 0.25 mm thick stainless-steel spacers. The symmetric target stack is housed in an Inconel vessel with two Inconel windows on either side. Two electron accelerators are used to produce 40 MeV, 3.16 µA electron beams each that penetrate the Inconel windows and irradiate the Mo-100 disks. Approximately 90% of the total 250 kW beam power is deposited in the NMR target during the irradiation process, with a smaller percentage adding up to 2.2 kW of heat deposited on the Inconel window. During irradiation, pressurized helium gas flows through thin gaps between the disks cooling the beam window, target disks, disk laminations and spacers. Both NMR and LANL have found during cold testing of the target system (no heat deposition) that the Mo 100 disks undergo significant mass loss and disk breakage due to vibrations induced by the flowing helium gas. The mass loss is not only undesirable due to monetary loss from reduced final quantities of Mo-99, but also due to the hazards associated with radioactive material trapped in the cooling lines and particle filters. The effect of flow rate and target geometry on the flow induced vibrations need to be quantified, and recommendations provided to minimize this mass loss. LANL has previously also tested NMR’s Inconel beam window by heating the window, while flowing pressurized helium, using the average heat deposited on the window. However, the NMR beam is pulsed with a duty cycle of 12.5%, which introduces oscillation in temperature around the nominal 600 °C steady state value with each pulse. Available fatigue curves for Inconel are few, established for room temperature, and they are based on mechanical strain cycles not thermally induced strain as in the NMR target. The effect of pulsed beam heating on the Inconel window therefore needs to be quantified. This report details the experiments conducted to assess the factors that lead to mass loss in the NMR target disks as well as to understand the effect of a pulsed beam on NMR’s Inconel window. This work describes LANL’s experimental characterization of the flow induced vibrations and disk mass loss in a reduced scale set-up containing 5 to 10 Mo-100 disks. We use high speed imaging, displacement measurements and microphone measurements combined with signal processing to estimate the vibration frequency of each disk. The effect of disk thickness, target fit and duration of testing on the mass loss is described. We find that in the current configuration of NMR targets, the vibrations and mass loss on the first disk are minimized, while those in the adjacent disks are highest. The microphone and high-speed image data show that increased flow rates and increased duration of testing increases vibration frequency and mass loss. The mass loss is due to both disk rotation and back and forth motion. There are visible wear marks on the disks with the highest mass loss. We also note that the current NMR window gap reduces flow induced vibrations compared to the previous smaller gaps. Improved target holders significantly reduce disk mass loss to almost negligible quantities. This work finds that the larger window to first disk gap and improved target holder geometry should allow NMR to successfully conduct irradiations with minimal mass loss. The window tests were conducted to understand the effect of a pulsed beam on both the window longevity and to estimate the window temperature and displacement during pulsing. The experiments presented here were performed at significantly low power, due to the limitations of the induction heating system. The window temperature rose to approximately 73 °C with a significantly reduced power of 45 W without beam pulsing. With a 5 Hz pulse rate, 12.5% duty cycle, the window temperature remained constant at 26 °C. These experiments will be repeated with improved coil geometry and reported in upcoming journal papers.
Thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) is a “gold standard’ technique for actinide isotope amount ratio and assay measurements. • Ubiquitously used in: • Nuclear Nonproliferation • Nuclear Safeguards • Nuclear Forensics • Basic Science • Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) installed a new Thermo Scientific TRITON Plus TIMS in early 2024.
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is entrusted with ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile while advancing programs aimed at reducing global nuclear proliferation. These critical mission objectives are achieved through the expertise of a highly skilled team of professionals. The operations at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) play a vital role in developing and enhancing knowledge and expertise in advanced nuclear technologies. NCERC supports a wide range of mission areas, including nuclear criticality safety, nuclear emergency response, and nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards, and arms control. It also provides support to the Department of Homeland Security, advances stockpile stewardship science, and delivers scientific expertise to other government agencies, such as NASA and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. NCERC conducts experiments utilizing diverse nuclear materials, from small neutron-emitting sources for testing radiation detection equipment to larger quantities of uranium and plutonium for criticality experiments. A cornerstone of NCERC's mission portfolio includes the operation of four critical mass assembly machines—Planet, Comet, Flattop, and Godiva-IV—which are instrumental in advancing nuclear science and ensuring the nation’s nuclear security objectives.
Applications such nonproliferation, post-detonation forensics, spent-fuel assay, reactor burnup and design, as well as astrophysics, rely on the accurate description of the neutron interaction with unstable fission products. Current neutron-induced cross-section descriptions for these nuclei are either non-existent or based on simplified assumptions, leading to unquantified impacts on predicted cross-sections. The goal of the Realistic Reaction Evaluations for Fission Products Off Stability (RREFPOS) project is to develop a reproducible methodology leading to a more predictive and realistic new set of evaluated nuclear data, improving the reliability of applications involving fission products off stability. The current report documents the activities related to the RREFPOS project in its first year, corresponding to the Fiscal Year of 2025 (FY25).
This report assesses the feasibility and strategic implications of deploying nuclear power reactors, including large-scale plants, advanced small modular reactors (SMRs), and microreactors, in African countries. Case studies focus on South Africa, Egypt, Kenya, Ghana, and Nigeria, examining nuclear energy’s role in Africa’s rapidly evolving energy landscape, marked by fast-growing demand, significant electricity access gaps, increasing renewable penetration, and strong policy commitments to industrialization and energy security. Several U.S. reactor technologies and designs are considered based on their development status and readiness for deployment. The analysis finds that nuclear power can provide reliable, clean baseload and flexible generation, as well as high-temperature process heat for desalination, hydrogen production, and industrial applications. However, suitability is highly country-specific, depending on grid size and stability, transmission capacity, cooling water availability, regulatory readiness, and fuel supply chains. Near-term deployment opportunities are strongest for light-water reactors (such as NuScale, BWRX-300, AP300, and SMR-300) that use low-enriched uranium and build on proven technology. More advanced concepts, including gas-cooled, sodium-cooled, molten-salt cooled reactors, and microreactors, will likely be relevant for African deployment in the 2030s or later, contingent on demonstration projects, high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel availability, and mature international licensing frameworks. Economic analysis shows that SMRs are capital-intensive, with projected overnight costs for 300 MWe units in 2025 ranging from approximately 1.4 to 2.6 billion USD per module. The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) is highly sensitive to the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Given typically higher financing costs and utility balance-sheet weaknesses in many African countries, bankable project structures will require sovereign guarantees, robust offtake arrangements, and layered financing from export credit agencies, development finance institutions, and vendor nations. Comparisons with recent large nuclear projects in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt underscore the central role of state-backed loans, long tenors, and concessional terms. Country case studies illustrate a spectrum of readiness and opportunity. South Africa operates two 920 MWe pressurized light water reactors (totaling 1,840 MWe) at Koeberg and has the most mature regulatory and industrial base, positioning it as a prime candidate for both large reactors and SMRs to replace coal, support desalination, and anchor industrial hubs. Egypt is constructing four VVER-1200 units at El Dabaa with strong state leadership and could later complement this fleet with SMRs for coastal and industrial applications. Kenya and Ghana are advancing through IAEA Milestones with growing institutional capacity and clear interest in SMRs that match their smaller grids and industrialization plans. Nigeria has the largest demand potential but faces acute constraints in grid reliability, project bankability, and regulatory capacity; targeted deployments of large reactors and SMRs near coastal or industrial sites could have high impact if accompanied by major grid upgrades and institutional reforms. The report identifies cross-cutting challenges such as financing, political continuity, public acceptance, nonproliferation and security, waste and back-end management, regulatory capacity, grid adequacy, and long deployment timelines for first-of-a-kind designs, and ANL/NSE-26/3 ii proposes broad directions for resolution. These include stronger multifaceted financing for nuclear, long-term national energy strategies that transcend electoral cycles, proactive stakeholder engagement, strengthened regional and national regulators, and systematic workforce development through centers of excellence and expanded training. The United States should develop partnerships with African countries and offer end-to-end nuclear package similar to those used effectively by competitors: coordinated project development, state-backed financing, long-term fuel services, and durable in-country support through regional offices and sustained workforce/regulatory training. With timely planning, sustained political commitment, and appropriate financing and institutional support, nuclear energy, both large reactors and advanced SMRs, can become a meaningful, though not dominant, pillar of Africa’s future power mix, enhancing energy security, enabling industrial growth, and supporting climate goals.
In 2009, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program initiated a new nuclear forensics outreach effort under its Confidence Building Measures Program. Little did they know that the timing could not have been better. This article focuses on the early years (2009–2015) of the NNSA’s international nuclear forensics outreach, specifically the efforts and experiences of the women who helped establish this program, building it from a fledgling, bilateral effort into an enduring technical capacity provider engaging with dozens of countries and multilateral organizations. At the onset of the program, nuclear forensics was an emerging priority within the US Government and receiving increased focus from international organizations through high-level diplomatic efforts such as the Nuclear Security Summit and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Additionally, working-level initiatives were gaining traction through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. Over the next 6 years, a small team comprising a uniquely large number of women NNSA federal, contract, and national laboratory staff served as key leaders engaging with the international community to strengthen global technical nuclear forensics capacity and best practices. The program continues today under the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program as Investigation Support. The experiences shared here detail a unique time period when the new technical discipline of nuclear forensics was beginning to mature and gain international traction. The authors have made every effort to remember history correctly and be as inclusive as possible. A wealth of training, guidance, and exercise documentation was developed in the 2009–2015 time frame, much of which still serves as the foundation for today’s even more extensive program and community of dedicated technical and diplomatic practitioners.
Long, proud history of expertise in uranium, lithium, high explosives, assembly/disassembly, and nuclear security and a vital part of today’s nuclear security enterprise Integral role in sustaining U.S. nuclear deterrent and reducing global nuclear threats with unique security and nonproliferation research capabilities NN and GSP Missions Bring Fresh Ideas and Solves Important National Security Problems NN and GSP Missions Keep Our Technology and People Sharp and Ready for New Challenges
As an outcome of the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit of 2016, held in Washington D.C., the Governments of Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed, through INFCIRC/909, their will to further improve the overall security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. With this goal in mind, each expressed their commitment to further exchange national practices with other countries through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). They also committed to actively support the IAEA as the central organization for coordinating activities and developing guidance documents and to support the GICNT and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in developing and implementing its nuclear transport security activities. Both of these organizations address the commitments regarding nuclear transport security as outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit 2016. In an effort to continue the momentum from the Nuclear Security Summit, the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (ISCN/JAEA), hosted the International Transport Security Symposium in November 2019. With over fifty countries invited to attend, the event exchanged and promoted good practices in several topical area sessions related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Topical sessions included Laws and Regulatory Framework, Physical Protection Systems, Response Actions, and Insider/Information Security. The Symposium built support for transport security and encouraged IAEA Member States to actively work regionally and internationally with the IAEA’s transport security programme through the practical implementation and incorporation of IAEA Nuclear Security Series recommendations and guidance into their national frameworks for transport security. From these sessions, to the host detailed a recommended path forward for future engagements in the security of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. The paper will discuss the Symposium’s outcomes and highlight the forward momentum made by both signatories and non-signatories for the strengthening of all the critical elements of a State’s transport security regime, including physical protection systems, insider threats to the nuclear and radioactive material supply chains, planning and capabilities for law enforcement response to malicious transport security events, and employment of technology to address critical vulnerabilities to the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials.
To be presented at the 2021 NEM. The March 15-19, 2021 virtual Nuclear Explosion Monitoring (NEM) Program Review combines reviews of several related programs within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D) of the National Nuclear Security Administration.
Nuclear Nonproliferation; Advanced Manufacturing; Global Security; Nuclear Material Initiatives; Material Innovations