Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “cyber vulnerabilities”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 235 records · Page 13
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Time Synchronization Techniques in the Modern Smart Grid: A Comprehensive Survey

In modern smart grids, accurate and synchronized time signals are essential for effective monitoring, protection, and control. Various time synchronization methods exist, each tailored to specific application needs. Widely adopted solutions, such as GPS, however, are vulnerable to challenges such as signal loss and cyber-attacks, underscoring the need for reliable backup or supplementary solutions. This paper examines the timing requirements across different power grid applications and provides a comprehensive review of available time synchronization mechanisms. Through a comparative analysis of timing methods based on accuracy, flexibility, reliability, and security, this study offers insights to guide the selection of optimal solutions for seamless grid integration.

comparison↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Real-Time Testbed for Smart Inverter Cyber Security Studies

Distributed energy resources (DER) have become a popular solution to modern-day issues surrounding the efficiency and reliability of power generation, as well as climate change concerns. Energy centers are shifting towards incorporating smart inverters with embedded functionalities such as high voltage ride through (HVRT), low voltage ride through (LVRT), active and reactive power compensation. However, the integration of smart inverters leave DER systems highly vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. The distributed network protocol 3 (DNP3) is a common method of communication between grid-tied hardware. Despite its popularity, the level of security leaves all hardware connected to the grid at risk of severe cyber-attacks. Thus, it is important to study any potential cybersecurity threats towards grid-tied smart inverters to mitigate cybersecurity vulnerabilities and refine existing cyber-security protections. This report describes the proposed testbed design to study cybersecurity threats to smart inverters. The testbed utilizes a real-time simulation case in RSCAD that includes a grid-tied wind turbine (WT) topology featuring two back-to-back two-level voltage source converters (BTB,2L-VSCs) and a permanent magnet synchronous machine (PMSM). The simulated case runs within the NovaCor real time digital simulator (RTDS). This report focuses on the design and implementation of a single module of the GTNETx2 card as a distributed network protocol and the configuration of an IEEE 1518 DNP database file that includes input and output variables mapped to different connection points in the grid that transmit and receive discrete, analog, and binary signals on command. This allows realistic emulation of the communication between the smart inverter and the grid for cybersecurity studies.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Encrypted model predictive control design for security to cyberattacks

Abstract In recent years, cyber‐security of networked control systems has become crucial, as these systems are vulnerable to targeted cyberattacks that compromise the stability, integrity, and safety of these systems. In this work, secure and private communication links are established between sensor–controller and controller–actuator elements using semi‐homomorphic encryption to ensure cyber‐security in model predictive control (MPC) of nonlinear systems. Specifically, Paillier cryptosystem is implemented for encryption‐decryption operations in the communication links. Cryptosystems, in general, work on a subset of integers. As a direct consequence of this nature of encryption algorithms, quantization errors arise in the closed‐loop MPC of nonlinear systems. Thus, the closed‐loop encrypted MPC is designed with a certain degree of robustness to the quantization errors. Furthermore, the trade‐off between the accuracy of the encrypted MPC and the computational cost is discussed. Finally, two chemical process examples are employed to demonstrate the implementation of the proposed encrypted MPC design.

Suryavanshi, Atharva↗
DOE OSTI2023

Software Bill of Materials in the Nuclear Industry

Nuclear power plants (NPP) have thousands of digital assets throughout their facility. Typically, NPPs have asset and configuration management programs that capture the make, model, and version of a component. This information, however, usually only includes first- or second-tier components and does not capture the complete enumeration of software components and their dependencies within operational technology (OT) equipment. As seen with recent cyberattacks, this level of detail is insufficient for identifying if and where an exploitable vulnerability exists within a facility. A software bill of materials (SBOM) provides this detailed enumeration. Further, integrating SBOMs with vulnerability data sources and vulnerability attestation reports can provide improved awareness leading to better cyber risk management and incident response. Preferably, SBOMs are provided by the supplier; however, when an NPP already owns a device, it is less likely they will have a supplier provided-SBOM. Fortunately, SBOMs can be generated on installed digital assets. This paper provides an introduction to the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy paper titled “Towards Software Bill of Materials in the Nuclear Industry,” which describes the SBOM ecosystem and provides a suggested approach to methodically and seamlessly integrate an SBOM program in an NPP.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Flexible and Generic Functional Mock-up Unit Based Threat Injection Framework for Grid-interactive Efficient Buildings: A Case Study in Modelica

Grid-interactive efficient buildings (GEBs) have been considered as an important asset to support the power grid reliability by utilizing the demand flexibility offered by GEBs. GEBs are enabled by advances in sensors and controls, and the communication between building equipment, whole buildings, and the grid. The integration of different building technologies and network-based communication system makes GEBs vulnerable to passive threats such as equipment failure and active threats such as cyber-attacks. Modeling and simulation is an effective way to evaluate the impact of threats on the system performance. This paper proposes a generic and flexible threat injection framework for commonly-used building energy simulators such as EnergyPlus and Modelica to support threat modeling and evaluation. This framework leverages functional mock-up unit (FMU) to develop a general modeling interface for threat injection and simulation. A numerical case study using Modelica as a building energy simulator is conducted to demonstrate the capability of the framework for supporting single/multiple-order threat modeling and simulation of a GEB. Four threats and their combinations are injected on a Modelica-based threat-free building energy and control system, including operating supply fan at its full speed, remotely cycling the chiller on and off, blocking the chiller from receiving the chilled water supply temperature setpoints, and hijacking the global zone air temperature setpoint. Simulation results show that the cyber-attack that leads to short-term signal blocking has small effects on the system operation due to the "self-healing" feature of the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) interactive control system. The threat that takes control of resetting the global zone air temperature setpoints has the most adverse impact on the system energy use, peak power demand, thermal comfort and the provision of demand flexibility. The combination of four threats have aggregative effects on the system but the effects are less than the additive effects of the individual threat.

Fu, Yanyang↗
NASA NTRS2014

Cyber Threat Assessment of Uplink and Commanding System for Mission Operation

Most of today's Mission Operations Systems (MOS) rely on Ground Data System (GDS) segment to mitigate cyber security risks. Unfortunately, IT security design is done separately from the design of GDS' mission operational capabilities. This incoherent practice leaves many security vulnerabilities in the system without any notice. This paper describes a new way to system engineering MOS, to include cyber threat risk assessments throughout the MOS development cycle, without this, it is impossible to design a dependable and reliable MOS to meet today's rapid changing cyber threat environment.

ground data↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cybersecurity for Digital Energy Infrastructure : Trends, Threats, and Cyber-Informed Engineering

This presentation discusses the rise in digital energy infrastructure and associated threats. It covers an in-depth risk assessment of digital energy equipment and provides real world examples of threats, vulnerabilities, and known incidents. Research conducted by INL assessing and addressing these risks follows, concluding with a dive into Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and it's application to digital energy infrastructure, using battery energy storage systems (BESS) as an example.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber Threat Landscape for Distribution Systems

INL cyber analysts will present an overview of the current threat landscape for distribution systems. We will begin with examples of known attacks that have occurred recently to motivate the threat analysis and mitigation discussed in the remainder of the presentation. Examples may include the attacks affecting wind plants in Europe in Spring 2022, ransomware attacks on city utilities and commercial distribution systems, and advanced persistent threats (APTs) including the attacks on Ukrainian electric system in 2015 and 2016, as well as more recent evidence of other APT activity. We will present the end-to-end attack paths and discuss the various attacker skills, financing, motivations, and access that contributed to these attacks. In the second part of this presentation, we will discuss mitigating the cyber threats for distribution systems. We will discuss recent publicly disclosed vulnerabilities and explain their relevant context for distribution system security. Likely attacks to affect distribution systems, such as denial-of-service (DoS), ransomware, edge-device compromise, and advanced persistent threats (APTs) will be described. In addition to an overview of these kinds of attacks, we will provide examples of the various ways in which these attacks can start and what systems they can affect. Simple, cost-effective counter-measures to these attacks will be discussed and we will emphasize how these mitigations can reduce threats when properly applied and maintained.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Synchrophasor spoofing detection and remediation for wide-area damping control

Evolving cyber-attack threats put at risk automatic closed-loop systems to be incorporated in the smart grid. Wide-area control systems are particularly vulnerable to signal spoofing attacks due to sensor remoteness and dependence on satellite communication for time synchronization. A successful cyber-attack on a wide-area controller has the potential to reduce relative stability of the power system or worse, destabilize it. As such, detection algorithms must be deployed as defense against such attacks with the ability to autonomously correct for detected tampering or misoperation. The Spoof Catch and Restore Routine (SCR 2 ), a combination of three real-time spoof detectors, each requiring limited information about the plant, is reported here. Nonlinear simulations of a compromised wide-area control system deployed in the Western Interconnection show the effectiveness of SCR 2 in detecting both delay-type and counterfeit-type spoofing attacks on wide-area sensors.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Improving the Cyber Resiliency and Security Posture of Public Power (Final Report)

The key objective of Improving the Cyber Resiliency and Security Posture of Public Power (Project) was to develop a culture of cyber resiliency and security within the public power community. The relative smaller size and unique structure of community-owned electric utilities can sometimes present challenges in immediate recognition of threats and the escalation of potential incidents. The Project offered targeted education, coordination, capability building, and resources to help the public power community better understand, install, and implement cyber and physical resiliency and security systems. The American Public Power Association (APPA) accelerated efforts to develop resources for and with the public power community to understand and implement resiliency, cybersecurity and cyber-physical solutions, including refining and improving the adoption of advanced control concepts. The Project consisted of four major multi-pronged tasks which included: 1) Advance cyber resiliency and security assessments; 2) Conduct, evaluate, and use the results of onsite vulnerability assessments; 3) Research, evaluate, deploy, and integrate both commercial and pre-commercial security technologies; and 4) Research, evaluate, and implement information sharing mechanisms.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Dragonstone Strategy – State of Cybersecurity in the Oil & Natural Gas Sector

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system touches every corner of the nation and increased communications & control capabilities have not only allowed for greater efficiency of system operation, but have also created a massive target for adversaries to launch cyber-attacks. Like any other heavy industrial process, the ONG system relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. The current state of cyber-preparedness across the ONG industry varies from organization to organization. Among the most common challenges that ONG companies face are remote locations, longlived field assets, and lacking capabilities to find and track malware on their systems. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. Various industry and government organizations are performing research and development activities to address some of these challenges, but in many cases industry stakeholders are not aware of solutions that already exist. It is clear that a need exists for a coherent, comprehensive, multi-layered strategy for assuring the security and resilience of the nation's pipeline infrastructure against cyber threats. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cyber-security within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cyber-security of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: The sheer number of differing regulatory bodies and trade groups offering both standards and best-practice recommendations for ONG cyber-security makes it difficult to create a comprehensive, directed, and coherent strategy that is applicable to all players within the ONG industry. The ONG industry is unaware of potentially useful technologies that have been developed for ensuring cyber-security of other infrastructure systems, such as the electric grid. Leveraging these technologies—and the science and engineering behind them—can provide some low-hanging fruit that can greatly improve cyber-security in the ONG industry without significant investments in terms of time and money. In the months following this report, LLNL will continue to perform outreach to key oil & gas industry stakeholders in a continual effort to identify the most pressing cyber-resilience issues in the industry. This outreach will be supplemented with LLNL’s threat intelligence capabilities to begin painting a clearer picture of the overall threat landscape faced by this sector. This assessment will be threat-informed and while the strategy itself will not be classified we will leverage intelligence analysis and adversary capabilities to identify gaps in current cybersecurity practices for oil & gas pipeline systems. Recommended efforts will be compiled into a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, in which LLNL will highlight priority activities to immediately improve the state of cyber-resilience in the industry.

02 PETROLEUM↗
DOE OSTI2021

Identification of Critical Infrastructure via PageRank

Assessing critical infrastructure vulnerabilities is paramount to arranging efficient plans for their protection. Critical infrastructures are cyber-physical systems that can be represented as a network consisting of nodes and edges and highly interdependent in nature. Given the interdependent nature of critical infrastuctures, failure in one node may cause failure in many others resulting in a cascade of failures. In this paper, we propose a node criticality metric that uses Google’s PageRank algorithm to identify nodes that are likely to fail (are vulnerable), nodes whose failure may cascade to many other sites in the network (are important), and nodes that are both vulnerable and important (are critical). We then present a series of experiments to understand how protecting certain critical nodes can help mitigate massive cascading failures. Simulating failures in a real-world network with and without critical node protections demonstrates the importance of identifying critical nodes in an infrastructure network.

Kay, Bill↗
DOE OSTI2021

On Self-Security of Grid-Interactive Smart Inverters

The capability to exchange information with utility operators, aggregators, and nearby smart devices can make a grid-interactive inverter an intelligent cyber-physical device. However, the capability of exchanging information can also put the inverters at the risk of insecure operation. In this paper, possible software manipulations into the inverters are studied to understand their vulnerability to cyberattacks. Moreover, the state-of-the-art system-level and device-level cyber-defense measures are discussed, and advantages and drawbacks of each technique are provided. Studies show that a reference model can be implemented in device-level security to effectively examine incoming setpoints for detecting and preventing malicious or harmful actions. This paper particularly underlines the significance of device-level self-security and its advantages for grid-interactive inverters. Finally, recommendations for future studies are provided.

Gursoy, Mehmetcan↗
DOE OSTI2024

Trends in Cybersecurity Threats to Clean Energy

As deployments of clean energy generation and storage assets continue to grow, the increased attack surface creates a greater risk for cyber threats, but is clean energy truly a target for cyber adversaries? This poster will present research on the trends in cyber incidents that have affected clean energy companies and assets as well as the trends in disclosed and exploited vulnerabilities. From a series of ransomware attacks on European wind manufacturers, to vulnerabilities exploited in solar assets to turn controllers into botnets, to attacks on communication infrastructure that have resulted in extended outages of remote control and monitoring, we explore the techniques used and the impacts to the clean energy sector. Key takeaways include understanding of how OT-focused malware is becoming more flexible and more destructive, how known vulnerabilities are being exploited, the growing number of IT and OT attacks that use built in tools and functionalities. Additionally, we highlight the presumed motivations and targeted sectors for various identified cyber adversaries. Viewers will leave with an understanding of how recent headlines fit into the development of cyberattack trends and what preventions they may need to take to protect against increasingly popular tactics.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Dragonstone Strategy Kickoff Report [Slides]

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system like any other heavy industrial process, relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. Cyber-preparedness varies across the ONG industry from organization to organization. Common challenges include remote locations, long-lived field assets, and insufficient capabilities to find and track malware. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cybersecurity within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cybersecurity of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: regulatory overlap and inefficiencies, and lack of industry awareness of potentially useful technologies for solving known issues. In the months following this report, LLNL will develop a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, coupling threat intelligence, industry knowledge base, and ongoing outreach

02 PETROLEUM↗
DOE OSTI2022

Ransomware Security Threat Modeling for Photovoltaic Systems

Ransomware attacks are one of the most dangerous cyber-attacks which can disrupt the operation of photovoltaic (PV) systems and incur an enormous economic loss. This paper introduces a ransomware security threat modeling method that identifies potential vulnerabilities, threats, and impacts of ransomware attacks targeting a PV system. Here, the security threat modeling consists of three steps: 1) system identification, 2) threat modeling that finds existing vulnerabilities, 3) attack modeling that designs attack profiles to succeed ransomware attacks, and 4) penetration testing that performs authorized cyber-attacks and analyzes impacts of the ransomware attack profiles using a real-time hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) PV system security testbed.

attack modeling↗