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More Than Meets the Eye: Clandestine Funding, Cutting-Edge Technology and China's Cyber Research & Development Program

Over the course of the last decade the central government of the People’s Republic of China has utilized a national grant system to invest in the research and development of new dual use cyber capabilities. In order to understand the defense implications of these investments, this research will examine how China is investing resources to develop new cyber capabilities for national security applications. Through the collection of publicly available sources in Mandarin and English, this research will analyze how the Chinese leadership views information technology research and development (R&D), as well as the role cyber R&D plays in China’s various strategic development plans. This work also explores the organizational structure of China’s cyber R&D base. The paper will conclude with a projection of how China might field new cyber capabilities for intelligence platforms, advanced weapons systems, and systems designed to support asymmetric warfare operations.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Proactive Defense for Evolving Cyber Threats

There is great interest to develop proactive methods of cyber defense, in which future attack strategies are anticipated and these insights are incorporated into defense designs; however, little has been done to place this ambitious objective on a sound scientific foundation. Indeed, even fundamental issues associated with how the “arms race” between attackers and defenders actually leads to predictability in attacker activity, or how to effectively and scalably detect this predictability in the relational/temporal data streams generated by attacker/defender adaptation, haven’t been resolved. This LDRD project addressed many of these challenges and the results are briefly summarized here. We have characterized the predictability of attacker/defender coevolution and have leveraged our findings to create a framework for designing proactive defenses for large (organizational) networks. More specifically, this project applied rigorous predictability-based analytics to two central and complementary aspects of the network defense problem – attack strategies of the adversaries and vulnerabilities of the defenders’ systems – and used the results to develop a scientifically-grounded, practically-implementable methodology for designing proactive cyber defense systems. Briefly, predictive analysis of attack strategies involved first conducting predictability assessments to characterize attacker adaptation patterns in given domains, and then used these patterns to “train” adaptive defense systems capable of providing robust performance against both current and (near) future threats. The problem of identifying and prioritizing defender system vulnerabilities was addressed using statistical and machine learning to analyze a broad range of data (e.g., cyber, social media) on recently detected system vulnerabilities to “learn” classifiers that predict how likely it is that, and how soon, new vulnerabilities will be exploited. A variety of cyber threat case studies were developed and investigated throughout the project, one selected from the cyber security research community and one that is more comprehensive and of higher priority to SNL and to external national security partners. A sample of research results and application of this methodology are included in this report (as a series of peer-reviewed publications). For ease of reference the title and SAND number are included below.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A HPC “Cyber Wind Facility” Incorporating Fully-Coupled CFD/CSD for Turbine-Platform-Wake Interactions with the Atmosphere and Ocean

The central aims of the DOE-supported “Cyber Wind Facility” project center on the recognition that wind turbines over land and ocean generate power from atmospheric winds that are inherently turbulent and strongly varying, both spatially over the rotor disk and in temporally as the rotating blades pass through atmospheric eddies embedded within the mean wind. The daytime unstable atmospheric boundary layer (ABL) is particularly variable in space time as solar heating generates buoyancy-driven motions that interact with strong mean shear in the ABL “surface layer,” the lowest 200 - 300 m where wind turbines reside in farms. With the “Cyber Wind Facility” (CWF) program we initiate a research and technology direction in which “cyber data” are generated from “computational experiments” within a “facility” akin to a wind tunnel, but with true space-time atmospheric turbulence that drive utility-scale wind turbines at full-scale Reynolds numbers. With DOE support we generated the key “modules” within a computational framework to create a first generation Cyber Wind Facility (CWF) for single wind turbines in the daytime ABL---both over land where the ABL globally unstable and over water with closer-to-neutral atmospheric conditions but with time response strongly affected by wave-induced forcing of the wind turbine platform (here a buoy configuration). The CWF program has significantly improved the accuracy of actuator line models, evaluated with the Cyber Wind Facility in full blade-boundary-layer-resolved mode. The application of the CWF made in this program showed the existence of important ramp-like response events that likely contribute to bearing fatigue failure on the main shaft and that the advanced ALM method developed here captures the primary nonsteady response characteristics. Long-time analysis uncovered distinctive key dynamics that explain primary mechanisms that underlie potentially deleterious load transients. We also showed that blade bend-twist coupling plays a central role in the elastic responses of the blades to atmospheric turbulence, impacting turbine power.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Research Directions for Cyber Experimentation: Workshop Discussion Analysis.

Sandia National Laboratories hosted a workshop on August 11, 2017 entitled "Research Directions for Cyber Experimentation," which focused on identifying and addressing research gaps within the field of cyber experimentation , particularly emulation testbeds . This report mainly documents the discussion toward the end of the workshop, which included research gaps such as developing a sustainable research infrastructure, exp anding cyber experimentation, and making the field more accessible to subject matter experts who may not have a background in computer science . Other gaps include methodologies for rigorous experimentation, validation, and uncertainty quantification, which , if addressed, also have the potential to bridge the gap between cyber experimentation and cyber engineering. Workshop attendees presented various ways to overcome these research gaps, however the main conclusion for overcoming these gaps is better commun ication through increased workshops, conferences, email lists, and slack chann els, among other opportunities.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Enhancing Power Plant Safety through Coupling Plant Simulators to Cyber Digital Architecture

There are differences in how cyber-attack, sabotage, or discrete component failure mechanisms manifest within power plants and what these events would look like within the control room from an operator's perspective. This research focuses on understanding how a cyber event would affect the operation of the plant, how an operator would perceive the event, and if the operator's actions based on those perceptions will allow him/her to maintain plant safety. This research is funded as part of Sandia's Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program to develop scenarios with cyber induced failure of plant systems coupled with a generic pressurized water reactor plant training simulator. The cyber scenario s w ere developed separately and injected into the simulator operational state to simulate an attack. These scenarios will determine if Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) operators can 1) recognize that the control room indicators were presenting incorrect or erroneous information and 2) take appropriate actions to keep the plant safe. This will also provide the opportunity to assess the operator cognitive workload during such events and identify where improvements might be made. This paper will review results of a pilot study run with NPP operators to investigate performance under various cyber scenarios. The discussion will provide an overview of the approach, scenario selection, metrics captured, resulting insights into operator actions and plant response to multiple scenarios of the NPP system.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

History of Industrial Control System Cyber Incidents

For many years malicious cyber actors have been targeting the industrial control systems (ICS) that manage our critical infrastructures. Most of these events are not reported to the public, and the threats and incidents to ICS are not as well-known as enterprise cyber threats and incidents. This paper is a brief study of publically reported cyber threats to critical infrastructure that sheds light on the growing cyber threats to ICS devices. It is important to note that this list is not all inclusive. The events selected in this study highlight the significant threats and incidents to industrial control systems and demonstrate that significant cyber incidents to ICS devices are growing and becoming more complex.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cyber-Physical Risks for Advanced Reactors

Cybersecurity for industrial control systems is an important consideration that advance reactor designers will need to consider. How cyber risk is managed is the subject of on-going research and debate in the nuclear industry. This report seeks to identify potential cyber risks for advance reactors. Identified risks are divided into absorbed risk and licensee managed risk to clearly show how cyber risks for advance reactors can potentially be transferred. Absorbed risks are risks that originate external to the licensee but may unknowingly propagate into the plant. Insights include (1) the need for unification of safety, physical security, and cybersecurity risk assessment frameworks to ensure optimal coordination of risk, (2) a quantitative risk assessment methodology in conjunction with qualitative assessments may be useful in efficiently and sufficiently managing cyber risks, and (3) cyber risk management techniques should align with a risked informed regulatory framework for advance reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance: Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS), Model Advancements for Resilience Analysis

Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) is a co-simulation platform developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The primary high-level use-case for ACCESS is to study existing or new cyber-physical critical infrastructure systems, with a heavy emphasis on 1) systems that utilize communication networks, and 2) studies that seek to understand cyber-related system impacts. ACCESS is currently used for several energy system resilience projects at LLNL. In the Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance (ERMA) project, ACCESS is used in the Modeling for Metric Calculation task (specifically, subtask 4.3, Communications and Cyber Modeling) to model and simulate the cyber and communication system aspects of Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI) systems, with a focus on computing specific communication system metrics that can impact system resilience and mission performance. Simulated communication system performance will be fed back to other ERMA system components so that mission performance can be evaluated holistically. This report describes several enhancements to the ACCESS platform that were implemented during the execution of the ERMA project in support of reslience analysis. This includes the addition of new models and subsystems, enhancements to existing models, and integration with external systems. The remainder of this report is structured as follows. In Section 2, a brief background description of the ACCESS platform is provided, including an outline of ACCESS components, example usecases, and a set of communication network resilience metrics that can be computed with ACCESS. Section 3 describes the ACCESS model enhancements for ERMA in detail. Finally, Section 4 briefly outlines future integration opportunities between ACCESS and project participant capabilities identified during the progression of the project.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Hydropower Cyber-Physical Configurations

The U.S. Department of Energy’s Water Power Technologies Office funded Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory to develop a typology to characterize the variety and pervasiveness of cyber-physical configurations across the nation’s hydropower fleet. Outreach to owners and operators returned configurations for 275 hydropower plants or approximately 12% of the fleet. Components (OT and IT), systems, and connections among systems differed among plants according to function, age, position in the river cascade, and many other factors. Seven cyber-physical configuration types labeled A through I, included from 2 to dozens of plants. They were differentiated by how pervasive data and control connections were among cyber-physical components and how frequently control signals paired with data signals in a feedback loop. The flow of data and control within each type implies what cybersecurity vulnerabilities may exist, and what mitigation actions may be most effective. A self-assessment approach allows plant operators to identify the configuration type similar to their plant and link to the lessons learned and best practices information. The cyber-physical typology reinforces the idea that hydropower facilities vary widely, but it also identifies groups that highlight similarities in how their cyber-physical components interact. This helps address fleetwide cybersecurity needs by identifying a reasonable number of configuration types that share risks, vulnerabilities, and potential mitigations.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Model-Based Diagnostics and Mitigation of Cyber Threats

The report summarizes key tasks performed to develop a toolkit for detecting cyber-attack events in instrumentation and control (I&C) systems of nuclear power plants. The toolkit connects the state-of-the-art GPWR Simulator with the RELAP5 code providing best-estimate nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) analyses, via the application programming interface (API), and allows users to introduce potential cyber-attack scenarios into power plant operational simulation. This summary for the project reflects topical reports submitted during the project as well as a journal paper published in 2022. The focus areas of the summary include: (1) modeling I&C systems for the AP1000 Generation III+ nuclear plant and GPWR simulator, (2) simulation and monitoring of plant response to cyber-attack events, (3) API structure for the toolkit interfacing the GPWR simulator and RELAP5 code, and (4) restructuring of the three-loop NSSS software of GPWR to model the two-loop AP1000 structure. Discussed in some details are (a) the attack tree analysis assessing the susceptibility of the AP1000 I&C system, resulting in reactor trips, in terms of the attack possibility and component sensitivity and (b) realistic estimation of the time to steam generator trip due to cyber-intrusions in the GPWR Simulator. Finally, sample demonstrations of the cyber-security tool kit, in the form of the GPWR-RELAP5 API, are summarized.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance, Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) Model Advancements for Resilience Analysis (Version 3, July 2023)

Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) is a co-simulation platform developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The primary high-level use-case for ACCESS is to study existing or new cyber-physical critical infrastructure systems, with a heavy emphasis on 1) systems that utilize communication networks, and 2) studies that seek to understand cyber-related system impacts. ACCESS is currently used for several energy system resilience projects at LLNL. In the Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance (ERMA) project, ACCESS is used in the Mod eling for Metric Calculation task (specifically, subtask 4.3, Communications and Cyber Modeling) to model and simulate the cyber and communication system aspects of Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI) systems, with a focus on computing specific communication system metrics that can impact system resilience and mission performance. Simulated communication system per formance will be fed back to other ERMA system components so that mission performance can be evaluated holistically. This report describes several enhancements to the ACCESS platform that were implemented during the execution of the ERMA project in support of reslience analysis. This includes the addition of new models and subsystems, enhancements to existing models, and integration with external systems. The remainder of this report is structured as follows. In Section 2, a brief background description of the ACCESS platform is provided, including an outline of ACCESS components, example use cases, and a set of communication network resilience metrics that can be computed with ACCESS. Section 3 describes the ACCESS model enhancements for ERMA in detail. Finally, Section 4 briefly outlines future integration opportunities between ACCESS and project participant capabilities identified during the progression of the project.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment

Hydrogen storage systems may become more widely deployed throughout the country, and so it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity of the facility, and the company that owns the facility. The two main ways bad actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when companies conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks associated with a generic hydrogen storage system by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment

Hydrogen storage systems are becoming more widely deployed throughout the country, and as their presence continues to grow, it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity, and to the company that owns the facility. The two main mechanisms malicious actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when facility managers conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks applicable to a wide variety of hydrogen storage systems by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.

08 HYDROGEN↗

InterGraph-CPS: A Graph-Theoretic Approach to Characterize Cross-Domain Cyber-Physical Interdependencies and Uncertainties in Electric Grid Systems for Improved Decision-Making in Operation and Response

Critical infrastructure systems such as the electric grid are increasingly cyber-physical; yet, despite the cyber-physical characteristics of critical infrastructure systems, the physical process system and communication/control network system are traditionally analyzed in siloes. As these systems become more cyber-physical, it is crucial that models and methods are available to assess the cyber physical system (CPS) interdependencies, characteristics, and event propagation for improved planning, operation, and response. Thus, we proposed an integrated structural and temporal CPS interdependency analysis framework, InterGraph-CPS, that provides insight into the CPS function during normal operation as well as disturbances. This integrated structural and temporal interdependency framework is uniquely designed for assessing CPSs by account for the challenges of analyzing cyber and physical data streams together due to data availability, data type, and time scale differences. By leveraging both structural (e.g., graph analysis) and temporal (e.g., data analytics) techniques, different CPS behaviors and configurations can be accounted for.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Sovereign Credit Rating Processes Adapted to Critical Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment

United States critical infrastructure entities are increasingly targeted by motivated and capable threat actors and must be prepared to assess and treat a diverse range of cyber risks. Consequently, this necessitates some form of analytical process to evaluate risks and inform cyber security investment decisions. A potential solution for structuring cyber risk evaluation exists within the field of sovereign credit ratings – where agencies employ mature approaches that integrate quantitative and qualitative data to produce a singular value of assessment. Adapting such approaches, we present a novel criterion and methodology for measuring and communicating the likelihood element of cyber risk. The methodology is composed of three sequential phases: a quantitative baseline organized by distinct capability frames, a bounded qualitative adjustment per frame, and a greater-bounded qualitative adjustment spanning the entire process. The process culminates in publication of a cyber capability rating that communicates a critical infrastructure entity’s ability and willingness to mitigate discontinuous function due to cyberattack.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Metaphors for cyber security.

This report is based upon a workshop, called 'CyberFest', held at Sandia National Laboratories on May 27-30, 2008. Participants in the workshop came from organizations both outside and inside Sandia. The premise of the workshop was that thinking about cyber security from a metaphorical perspective could lead to a deeper understanding of current approaches to cyber defense and perhaps to some creative new approaches. A wide range of metaphors was considered, including those relating to: military and other types of conflict, biological, health care, markets, three-dimensional space, and physical asset protection. These in turn led to consideration of a variety of possible approaches for improving cyber security in the future. From the proposed approaches, three were formulated for further discussion. These approaches were labeled 'Heterogeneity' (drawing primarily on the metaphor of biological diversity), 'Motivating Secure Behavior' (taking a market perspective on the adoption of cyber security measures) and 'Cyber Wellness' (exploring analogies with efforts to improve individual and public health).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Mathematical and Statistical Opportunities in Cyber Security

The role of mathematics in a complex system such as the Internet has yet to be deeply explored. In this paper, we summarize some of the important and pressing problems in cyber security from the viewpoint of open science environments. We start by posing the question 'What fundamental problems exist within cyber security research that can be helped by advanced mathematics and statistics'? Our first and most important assumption is that access to real-world data is necessary to understand large and complex systems like the Internet. Our second assumption is that many proposed cyber security solutions could critically damage both the openness and the productivity of scientific research. After examining a range of cyber security problems, we come to the conclusion that the field of cyber security poses a rich set of new and exciting research opportunities for the mathematical and statistical sciences.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Assessment of current cybersecurity practices in the public domain : cyber indications and warnings domain.

This report assesses current public domain cyber security practices with respect to cyber indications and warnings. It describes cybersecurity industry and government activities, including cybersecurity tools, methods, practices, and international and government-wide initiatives known to be impacting current practice. Of particular note are the U.S. Government's Trusted Internet Connection (TIC) and 'Einstein' programs, which are serving to consolidate the Government's internet access points and to provide some capability to monitor and mitigate cyber attacks. Next, this report catalogs activities undertaken by various industry and government entities. In addition, it assesses the benchmarks of HPC capability and other HPC attributes that may lend themselves to assist in the solution of this problem. This report draws few conclusions, as it is intended to assess current practice in preparation for future work, however, no explicit references to HPC usage for the purpose of analyzing cyber infrastructure in near-real-time were found in the current practice. This report and a related SAND2010-4766 National Cyber Defense High Performance Computing and Analysis: Concepts, Planning and Roadmap report are intended to provoke discussion throughout a broad audience about developing a cohesive HPC centric solution to wide-area cybersecurity problems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗