Loss of forced cooling flow in the Plum Brook Reactor.
Forced cooling water flow temporary loss accident at Plum Brook Reactor, discussing inspection and corrective action
Barkley, H. B., Jr.↗
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Apollo experience report: Command and service module environmental control system
A comprehensive review is presented of the design philosophy of the Apollo environmental control system together with the development history of the total system and of selected components within the system. In particular, discussions are presented relative to the development history and to the problems associated with the equipment cooling coldplates, the evaporator and its electronic control system, and the space radiator system used for rejection of the spacecraft thermal loads. Apollo flight experience and operational difficulties associated with the spacecraft water system and the waste management system are discussed in detail to provide definition of the problem and the corrective action taken when applicable.
Samonski, F. H., Jr.↗
Apollo experience reports: Window contamination
The problem of window contamination in the Apollo command module is reviewed. All five command module windows were contaminated while in earth orbit on the first three manned Apollo flights. The contamination sources were identified and eliminated. Preflight testing of lunar module windows showed that no serious contamination should occur, and this conclusion was verified in subsequent manned flights. The command module window designs and materials are described, the window contamination sources are identified, and the inflight and chemical analyses of the contamination are outlined. The corrective actions that were taken are reviewed. For the lunar module, the window design and materials and the preflight and fight evaluations are described. Window design recommendations are made.
Leger, L. J.↗
Apollo experience report: Lunar module environmental control subsystem
A functional description of the environmental control subsystem is presented. Development, tests, checkout, and flight experiences of the subsystem are discussed; and the design fabrication, and operational difficulties associated with the various components and subassemblies are recorded. Detailed information is related concerning design changes made to, and problems encountered with, the various elements of the subsystem, such as the thermal control water sublimator, the carbon dioxide sensing and control units, and the water section. The problems associated with water sterilization, water/glycol formulation, and materials compatibility are discussed. The corrective actions taken are described with the expection that this information may be of value for future subsystems. Although the main experiences described are problem oriented, the subsystem has generally performed satisfactorily in flight.
Gillen, R. J.↗
Final Environmental Impact Statement for Langley
The Langley Research Center is described, together with the nature of its activities, from which it can be seen that the Center is basically not a major pollution source. Geographical, geological, and climatic charateristics of the site are also described. inasmuch as they influence both the choice of disposal methods and the environmental effects of the pollutants. The known or probable pollution sources at the Center are described. Where the intensities of these sources might exceed the recommended guide-lines, the corrective actions that have been taken or are being taken are described. The entire inventory of pollution sources and control methods is summarized in an appendix.
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Final environmental impact statement for Ames Research Center
The NASA-Ames Research Center is described. together with the nature of its activities, from which it can be seen that the center is basically not a major pollution source. Geographical, and climatic characteristics of the site are described. inasmuch as they influence both the choice of disposal methods and the environmental effects of the pollutants. The known or probable pollution sources at the center are described. Where the intensities of these sources might exceed the recommended guidelines, the corrective actions that have been taken are described.
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An On Board Processor (OBP) for OAO C
A stored program computer and its application on OAO is considered. The parallel computer has a memory capacity of 16,384 words of 18 bits each, one central processor unit, two 4096 word memory units, and one input/output unit. The I/O has no direct data connection with the CPU so that all data flow between these two units must pass through memory by way of the memory data bus. The primary functions of the onboard computer are auxiliary command storage, spacecraft monitoring and malfunction reporting, data compression and status summary, and possible performance of emergency corrective action.
Hartenstein, R. G.↗
Apollo 15 mission main parachute failure
The failure of one of the three main parachutes of the Apollo 15 spacecraft was investigated by studying malfunctions in the forward heat shield, broken riser, and firing the fuel expelled from the command module reaction control system. It is concluded that the most probable cause was the burning of raw fuel being expelled during the latter portion of depletion firing. Recommended corrective actions are included.
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Application of an onboard processor to the OAO C spacecraft
The design of a stored program computer for spacecraft use and its application on the fourth Orbiting Astronomical Observatory (OAO) is reported. The computer is a medium scale, parallel machine with a memory capacity of 16384 words of 18 bits each. It possesses a comprehensive instruction repertoire and operates on 45 W of power (including the dc-to-dc converter). The machine operates at a 500-kHz rate and executes an add instruction in 10 microseconds. Its primary functions on OAO C will be auxiliary command storage, spacecraft monitoring and malfunction reporting, data compression and status summary, and possible performance of emergency corrective action for certain anomalous situations.
Stewart, W. N.↗
Apollo 14 mission circuit breaker anomaly
Continuity through the circuit breaker in the mechanically closed condition was prevented by a foreign substance on the contact surface onboard Apollo 14. It was concluded that this was the only failure of this type in over 3400 units that were flown, and since no circuit breaker is a single-point failure for crew safety or mission success, no corrective action was taken.
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Disaster warning satellite study
The Disaster Warning Satellite System is described. It will provide NOAA with an independent, mass communication system for the purpose of warning the public of impending disaster and issuing bulletins for corrective action to protect lives and property. The system consists of three major segments. The first segment is the network of state or regional offices that communicate with the central ground station; the second segment is the satellite that relays information from ground stations to home receivers; the third segment is composed of the home receivers that receive information from the satellite and provide an audio output to the public. The ground stations required in this system are linked together by two, separate, voice bandwidth communication channels on the Disaster Warning Satellites so that a communications link would be available in the event of disruption of land line service.
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Apollo experience report: Lunar module communications system
The development of the lunar module communications system is traced from the initial concept to the operational system used on manned lunar missions. The problems encountered during the development, the corrective actions taken, and recommendations for similar equipment in future programs are included. The system was designed to provide communications between the lunar module and the manned space flight network, between the lunar module and the command and service module, and between the lunar module and the extravehicular crewmen. The system provided the equipment necessary for voice, telemetry, and television communications; ranging information; and various communications links.
Dietz, R. H.↗
Apollo experience report: Ascent propulsion system
The development of the Apollo lunar module ascent propulsion subsystem is documented. The ascent propulsion subsystem was designed, built, and tested to provide propulsive power for launching the ascent stage of the lunar module from the surface of the moon into lunar orbit for rendezvous with the orbiting command and service module. Because total redundancy was prohibitive in this subsystem, special emphasis had to be placed on reliability in design with adequate demonstration short of an extensive flight-demonstration program. The significant technical problems encountered during all phases of the program are identified and the corrective actions are discussed. Based on this experience, several recommendations are made for any future program with similar subsystem requirements.
Humphries, C. E.↗
Apollo experience report: Lunar module structural subsystem
In the Apollo Program, the lunar-orbit rendezvous mode was used for the lunar-landing mission. To accomplish the lunar landing, a lunar module spacecraft was built. A description of the design requirements for the structural subsystem and of the structural configuration and the method of design verification are given. A discussion is presented of several problems encountered and the corrective actions taken during the designing, manufacturing, and testing of the lunar module.
Weiss, S. P.↗
Apollo experience report: Power generation system
A comprehensive review of the design philosophy and experience of the Apollo electrical power generation system is presented. The review of the system covers a period of 8 years, from conception through the Apollo 12 lunar-landing mission. The program progressed from the definition phase to hardware design, system development and qualification, and, ultimately, to the flight phase. Several problems were encountered; however, a technology evolved that enabled resolution of the problems and resulted in a fully manrated power generation system. These problems are defined and examined, and the corrective action taken is discussed. Several recommendations are made to preclude similar occurrences and to provide a more reliable fuel-cell power system.
Bell, D., III↗
Apollo experience report: The problem of stress-corrosion cracking
Stress-corrosion cracking has been the most common cause of structural-material failures in the Apollo Program. The frequency of stress-corrosion cracking has been high and the magnitude of the problem, in terms of hardware lost and time and money expended, has been significant. In this report, the significant Apollo Program experiences with stress-corrosion cracking are discussed. The causes of stress-corrosion cracking and the corrective actions are discussed, in terminology familiar to design engineers and management personnel, to show how stress-corrosion cracking can be prevented.
Johnson, R. E.↗
Apollo experience report: The cryogenic storage system
A review of the design, development, and flight history of the Apollo cryogenic storage system and of selected components within the system is presented. Discussions are presented on the development history of the pressure vessels, heaters, insulation, and selected components. Flight experience and operational difficulties are reported in detail to provide definition of the problems and applicable corrective actions.
Chandler, W. A.↗
Apollo 11 mission: Glycol temperature control valve
An analysis was made of the cause or causes of malfunctions in the glycol temperature control valve during the Apollo 11 mission. The valve was designed to control inlet temperatures at 45 (+ or - 3) F. Test results show malfunctions were caused by a bearing failure on the worm gear shaft in the actuator. It was concluded that no corrective action was needed because an existing procedure allows manual setting of the value at a position which will meet system requirements.
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