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Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program Groundwater And Surface Water Sampling And Analysis Plan For Calendar Year 2010

This plan provides a description of the groundwater and surface water quality monitoring activities planned for calendar year (CY) 2010 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) that will be managed by the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP). Groundwater and surface water monitoring performed by the GWPP during CY 2010 will be in accordance with requirements of DOE Order 540.1A and the following goals: (1) to protect the worker, the public, and the environment; (2) to maintain surveillance of existing and potential groundwater contamination sources; (3) to provide for the early detection of groundwater contamination and determine the quality of groundwater and surface water where contaminants are most likely to migrate beyond the Oak Ridge Reservation property line; (4) to identify and characterize long-term trends in groundwater quality at Y-12; and (5) to provide data to support decisions concerning the management and protection of groundwater resources. Groundwater and surface water monitoring during CY 2010 will be performed primarily in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12: the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime), the Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime), and the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime). The Bear Creek and East Fork regimes are located in Bear Creek Valley, and the Chestnut Ridge Regime is located south of Y-12 (Figure A.1). Additional surface water monitoring will be performed north of Pine Ridge, along the boundary of the Oak Ridge Reservation. Modifications to the CY 2010 monitoring program may be necessary during implementation. Changes in programmatic requirements may alter the analytes specified for selected monitoring wells or may add or remove wells from the planned monitoring network. All modifications to the monitoring program will be approved by the Y-12 GWPP manager and documented as addenda to this sampling and analysis plan. The following sections of this report provide details regarding the CY 2010 groundwater and surface water monitoring activities. Section 2 describes the monitoring locations in each regime and the processes used to select the sampling locations. A description of the field measurements and laboratory analytes is provided in Section 3. Sample collection methods and procedures are described in Section 4, and Section 5 lists the documents cited for more detailed operational and technical information. The narrative sections of the report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and tables (excluding data summary tables presented in the narrative sections) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Groundwater Monitoring Schedules (when issued throughout CY 2010) will be inserted in Appendix C, and addenda to this plan (if issued) will be inserted in Appendix D. Laboratory requirements (bottle lists, holding times, etc.) are provided in Appendix E, and an approved Waste Management Plan is provided in Appendix F.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Annual Report for 2008 - 2009 Detection Monitoring at the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

This annual Environmental Monitoring Report (EMR) presents results of environmental monitoring performed during fiscal year (FY) 2009 (October 1, 2008 - September 30, 2009) at the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF). The EMWMF is an operating state-of-the-art hazardous waste landfill located in Bear Creek Valley (BCV) west of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) on the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee (Appendix A, Fig. A.1). Opened in 2002 and operated by a DOE prime contractor, Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC), the EMWMF was built specifically to accommodate disposal of acceptable solid wastes generated from Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) remedial actions for former waste sites and buildings that have been impacted by past DOE operations on the ORR and at DOE sites off the ORR within the state of Tennessee. Environmental monitoring at the EMWMF is performed to detect and monitor the impact of facility operations on groundwater, surface water, stormwater, and air quality and to determine compliance with applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARs) specified in governing CERCLA decision documents. Annually, the EMR presents an evaluation of the groundwater, surface water, stormwater, and air monitoring data with respect to the applicable EMWMF performance standards. The purpose of the evaluation is to: (1) identify monitoring results that indicate evidence of a contaminant release from the EMWMF to groundwater, surface water, stormwater, or air, and (2) recommend appropriate changes to the associated sampling and analysis requirements, including sampling locations, methods, and frequencies; field measurements; or laboratory analytes that may be warranted in response to the monitoring data. Sect. 2 of this annual EMR provides background information relevant to environmental monitoring at the landfill, including short descriptions of the facility, the hydrogeologic setting, CERCLA decision document requirements for environmental monitoring, and a summary of the EMWMF monitoring history to date. Sect. 3 identifies the respective groundwater, surface water, stormwater, and air monitoring locations at the EMWMF and outlines the associated sampling frequencies, field measurements, and laboratory analytes. Sect. 4 presents a concise technical evaluation of the groundwater, surface water, stormwater, and air monitoring data. Sect. 5 summarizes key monitoring results and data evaluation conclusions along with any recommended changes to groundwater, surface water, stormwater, or air monitoring at the EMWMF. Sect. 6 lists the documents and other technical reports referenced in the preceding narrative sections. Maps and other illustrations referenced in the narrative sections of this annual EMR are in Appendix A. Referenced summary tables of FY 2009 environmental monitoring data are in Appendix B (Groundwater), Appendix C (Surface Water), Appendix D (Stormwater), and Appendix E (Ambient Air).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Single institutional experience with initial ultrasound followed by computed tomography or magnetic resonance imaging for acute appendicitis in adults

Purpose: The objectives of this study was to assess the performance of ultrasound (US) for suspected appendicitis in adult patients and to evaluated the additive value of short-interval (within 1 week) computed tomography (CT) or Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) after performing an initial US. Methods: In this IRB-approved, HIPAA-compliant, retrospective study, electronic medical records (EMRs) were queried for “US appendicitis” performed over a 2-year interval. EMR was reviewed for CT or MRI performed within 1 week of this exam, and if any new or additional information was available at subsequent exam. White count, patient disposition, and pathology, if surgery was performed, were also recorded. Results: 682 patients underwent US for appendicitis over a 2-year duration, age range from 18 to 92 years (average: 30.1 years, M:F = 141:541). Findings showed 126/682 patients with normal appendix, 75/682 uncomplicated appendicitis, and 4/682 with complicated appendicitis. When performed, no additional findings were seen in these groups on short-interval CT or MRI. 2/682 patients had equivocal findings on US but eventually had normal appendix identified on CT. Four hundred and seventy-three patients had non-visualized appendix, of which only 14/473 (3.1%) eventually had appendicitis. Conclusions: Ultrasound is an effective initial modality for evaluating appendicitis even in adult patients. Once a normal appendix, uncomplicated or complicated appendicitis is identified on US, no further imaging is necessary. Very few patients with non-visualization of the appendix eventually have appendicitis. Hence, these patients can be managed with active clinical follow-up rather than immediate CT or MRI. Symptoms and clinical scoring systems can be used for triage of these patients.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, For Calendar Year 2011

This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2011 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following CAUs: (1) CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR); (2) CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR); (3) CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR); (4) CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR); and (5) CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR) Inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved Closure Reports. The post-closure inspection plan for each CAU is included in Appendix B. The inspection checklists are included in Appendix C, field notes are included in Appendix D, and photographs taken during inspections are included in Appendix E. The annual post-closure inspections were conducted May 3 and 4, 2011. Maintenance was performed at CAU 424, CAU 453, and CAU 487. At CAU 424, two surface grade monuments at Landfill Cell A3-3 could not be located during the inspection. The two monuments were located and marked with lava rock on July 13, 2011. At CAU 453, there was evidence of animal burrowing. Animal burrows were backfilled on July 13, 2011. At CAU 487, one use restriction warning sign was missing, and wording was faded on the remaining signs. A large animal burrow was also present. The signs were replaced, and the animal burrow was backfilled on July 12, 2011. As a best management practice, the use restriction warning signs at CAU 407 were replaced with standard Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order signs on July 13, 2011. Vegetation monitoring was performed at the CAU 400 Five Points Landfill and CAU 407 in June 2011, and the vegetation monitoring report is included in Appendix F.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, for Calendar Year 2013

This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2013 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following CAUs: • CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR) • CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR) • CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR) • CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR) • CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR) Inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved Closure Reports and subsequent correspondence with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. The post-closure inspection plans and subsequent correspondence modifying the requirements for each CAU are included in Appendix B. The inspection checklists are included in Appendix C. Field notes are included in Appendix D. Photographs taken during inspections are included in Appendix E. The annual post-closure inspections were conducted on May 14, 2013. Maintenance was performed at CAU 400, CAU 424, and CAU 453. At CAU 400, animal burrows were backfilled. At CAU 424, erosion repairs were completed at Landfill Cell A3-3, subsidence was repaired at Landfill Cell A3-4, and additional lava rock was placed in high-traffic areas to mark the locations of the surface grade monuments at Landfill Cell A3-3 and Landfill Cell A3-8. At CAU 453, two areas of subsidence were repaired and animal burrows were backfilled. Vegetation monitoring was performed at the CAU 400 Five Points Landfill and CAU 407 in June 2013. The vegetation monitoring report is included in Appendix F.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Sampling and Analysis Plan for U.S. Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management Sites

This plan incorporates U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) standard operating procedures (SOPs) into environmental monitoring activities and will be implemented at all sites managed by LM. This document provides detailed procedures for the field sampling teams so that samples are collected in a consistent and technically defensible manner. Site-specific plans (e.g., long-term surveillance and maintenance plans, environmental monitoring plans) document background information and establish the basis for sampling and monitoring activities. Information will be included in site-specific tabbed sections to this plan, which identify sample locations, sample frequencies, types of samples, field measurements, and associated analytes for each site. Additionally, within each tabbed section, program directives will be included, when developed, to establish additional site-specific requirements to modify or clarify requirements in this plan as they apply to the corresponding site. A flowchart detailing project tasks required to accomplish routine sampling is displayed in Figure 1. LM environmental procedures are contained in the Environmental Procedures Catalog (LMS/PRO/S04325), which incorporates American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), DOE, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidance. Specific procedures used for groundwater and surface water monitoring are included in Appendix A. If other environmental media are monitored, SOPs used for air, soil/sediment, and biota monitoring can be found in the site-specific tabbed sections in Appendix D or in site-specific documents. The procedures in the Environmental Procedures Catalog are intended as general guidance and require additional detail from planning documents in order to be complete; the following sections fulfill that function and specify additional procedural requirements to form SOPs. Routine revision of this Sampling and Analysis Plan will be conducted annually at the beginning of each fiscal year when attachments in Appendix D, including program directives and sampling location/analytical tables, will be reviewed by project personnel and updated. The sampling location/analytical tables in Appendix D, however, may have interim updates according to project direction that are not reflected in this plan. Deviations from location/analytical tables in Appendix D prior to sampling will be documented in project correspondence (e.g., startup letters). If significant changes to other aspects of this plan are required before the annual update, then the plan will be revised as needed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Groundwater Monitoring Report, U.S. Department of Energy Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

This report contains the groundwater and surface water monitoring data obtained during calendar year (CY) 2019 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) on the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The monitoring data were obtained from wells, springs, and surface water sampling locations in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12. The Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime) encompasses a section of Bear Creek Valley (BCV) between the west end of Y-12 and the west end of the Bear Creek Watershed (directions are in reference to the Y-12 grid system, shown as Plant North. The Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime) encompasses the Y-12 industrial facilities and support structures in BCV. The Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime) encompasses a section of Chestnut Ridge directly south of Y-12. Background information in Section 2 of this report outlines the hydrogeologic framework for groundwater and surface water quality monitoring at Y-12 and includes an overview of the groundwater contamination in each hydrogeologic regime. Section 3 provides details regarding the groundwater and surface water sampling and analysis activities implemented under the Y-12 GWPP, including sampling locations and frequency, sample collection and handling, field measurements and laboratory analytes, quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) sampling, data management, and data quality assessment (DQA). However, the equivalent QA/QC or DQA information for the groundwater and surface water data associated with the monitoring programs implemented by UCOR are not included in this report and instead are deferred to referenced programmatic plans and reports issued by OREM and UCOR. Section 4 of this report presents a summary evaluation of the CY 2019 monitoring data with regard to the respective objectives of surveillance monitoring and exit pathway/perimeter monitoring. The evaluation is based primarily on the analytical results for the following principal groundwater contaminants at Y-12: nitrate, uranium, gross alpha activity, gross beta activity, and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). Section 5 summarizes the most significant findings with respect to the principal contaminants along with recommendations for any proposed changes to the ongoing groundwater and surface water quality monitoring performed under the Y-12 GWPP. Technical reports and plans cited in the narrative sections of the report are listed in Section 6. Narrative sections of this report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and data tables (excluding data summary tables incorporated in the narrative sections) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Appendix C contains construction details for each well sampled during CY 2019 by either the Y-12 GWPP or UCOR, along with schematic diagrams for wells equipped with Westbay™ multiport sampling equipment or Barcad® pump systems. Appendix D supports the background summary discussion in Section 2 and provides more detailed information about the hydrogeologic framework for groundwater and surface water monitoring at Y-12, including the primary sources of groundwater contamination in each hydrogeologic regime. Results for all field measurements and laboratory analyses obtained by the Y-12 GWPP and UCOR are presented in Appendix E, which also includes the sample numbers for the QA/QC samples associated with groundwater and surface water monitoring performed by the Y-12 GWPP.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Recommendations for an Applicant to Calculate Activity Data for Greenhouse Gases Estimates

In 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) directed the NRC staff to address climate change issues and consider the impacts of the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) in its environmental reviews for major licensing actions (NRC 2009b). To implement this direction from the Commission, the staff issued guidance in 2011 and updated guidance in 2014 in Attachment 1 to Interim Staff Guidance COL/ESP-ISG-026 (NRC 2011; NRC 2014). This guidance provides a simpler method than the method described in RG 4.2 Rev. 3, that an applicant can use to meet the plant parameter envelope (PPE) value from the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Licensing of New Nuclear Reactors (NR GEIS). NRC staff estimated the 97-year lifecycle GHG emissions from a reference 1000 megawatt electrical (MWe) light-water reactor (LWR) for various activities associated with construction, operation (including uranium fuel cycle), and decommissioning of nuclear power plants and presented the results in Appendix H of the NR GEIS. Appendix H of the NR GEIS includes estimates of direct emissions from construction equipment and emergency diesel engines in a nuclear facility and indirect emissions from workforce vehicular traffic, fuel transportation and the uranium fuel cycle. The NR GEIS Section 3.3 extended the estimates in Appendix H for the installation of two 1000 MWe nuclear reactors on the same site. Scaling factors were used to extrapolate the GHG emissions of a reference 1000 MWe reactor to a two-unit nuclear reactor plant (each reactor unit generating 1000 MWe). GHG emission estimates for building, operation, decommissioning and safe storage (SAFSTOR) for a two-unit nuclear reactor plant would be based on the plant’s physical size, and therefore estimates for these source categories were assumed to be twice the value of the reference 1000 MWe reactor. However, GHG emissions from the fuel cycle (including fuel transportation) were scaled upward by a factor of 3, based on plant efficiencies greater than the 80 percent assumption in Appendix H. Table 1 below shows the PPE emissions for two 1000 MWe nuclear reactors as provided in NR GEIS. The total GHG emissions for two 1000 MWe reactors were calculated as 2,534,000 metric tons (MT) of CO 2 equivalent (CO 2 (e)) based on a 97 year GHG life cycle period. The GHG emissions lifetime of 97 years for a reference nuclear reactor includes a 7-year building phase, 40 years of operation, 10 years of active decommissioning, and 40 years of SAFSTOR operations (NRC 2024). Construction equipment and vehicular traffic from workers commute would contribute to the GHG emissions during a 7-year building phase. Uranium fuel cycle, vehicular traffic, fuel and waste transportation, and testing of standby diesel generators would contribute to GHG emissions during the 40-year operations phase. While NRC’s regulations allow up to 60 years of reactor facility decommissioning, Appendix H estimated that most of the GHGs would occur over an estimated 10-year period during which to the licensee would engage in significant demolition and earth-moving activities, as discussed in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0586 (NRC 2002). Vehicular traffic by the workforce during a 40-year SAFSTOR period would additionally contribute GHG emissions. The carbon footprint for a 40-year SAFSTOR period was separately analyzed from the decommissioning activities as provided in Table YYYY-2 of the staff issued guidance in 2011 (NRC 2011).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

100-KE REACTOR CORE REMOVAL PROJECT ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS WORKSHOP REPORT

On December 15-16, 2009, a 100-KE Reactor Core Removal Project Alternative Analysis Workshop was conducted at the Washington State University Consolidated Information Center, Room 214. Colburn Kennedy, Project Director, CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) requested the workshop and Richard Harrington provided facilitation. The purpose of the session was to select the preferred Bio Shield Alternative, for integration with the Thermal Shield and Core Removal and develop the path forward to proceed with project delivery. Prior to this workshop, the S.A. Robotics (SAR) Obstruction Removal Alternatives Analysis (565-DLV-062) report was issued, for use prior to and throughout the session, to all the team members. The multidisciplinary team consisted ofrepresentatives from 100-KE Project Management, Engineering, Radcon, Nuclear Safety, Fire Protection, Crane/Rigging, SAR Project Engineering, the Department of Energy Richland Field Office, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington State Department of Ecology, Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board, and Deactivation and Decommission subject matter experts from corporate CH2M HILL and Lucas. Appendix D contains the workshop agenda, guidelines and expectations, opening remarks, and attendance roster going into followed throughout the workshop. The team was successful in selecting the preferred alternative and developing an eight-point path forward action plan to proceed with conceptual design. Conventional Demolition was selected as the preferred alternative over two other alternatives: Diamond Wire with Options, and Harmonic Delamination with Conventional Demolition. The teams preferred alternative aligned with the SAR Obstruction Removal Alternative Analysis report conclusion. However, the team identified several Path Forward actions, in Appendix A, which upon completion will solidify and potentially enhance the Conventional Demolition alternative with multiple options and approaches to achieve project delivery. In brief, the Path Forward was developed to reconsider potential open air demolition areas; characterize to determine if any zircaloy exists, evaluate existing concrete data to determine additional characterization needs, size the new building to accommodate human machine interface and tooling, consider bucket thumb and use ofshape-charges in design, and finally to utilize complex-wide and industry explosive demolition lessons learned in the design approach. Appendix B documents these results from the team's use ofValue Engineering process tools entitled Weighted Analysis Alternative Matrix, Matrix Conclusions, Evaluation Criteria, and Alternative Advantages and Disadvantages. These results were further supported with the team's validation of parking-lot information sheets: memories (potential ideas to consider), issues/concerns, and assumptions, contained in Appendix C. Appendix C also includes the recorded workshop flipchart notes taken from the SAR Alternatives and Project Overview presentations. The SAR workshop presentations, including a 3-D graphic illustration demonstration video have been retained in the CHPRC project file, and were not included in this report due to size limitations. The workshop concluded with a round robin close-out where each member was engaged for any last minute items and meeting utility. In summary, the team felt the session was value added and looked forward to proceeding with the recommended actions and conceptual design.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Best-Estimate-Plus-Uncertainty-Informed Deterministic Safety Evaluation

Nuclear power plant (NPP) utilities operate contingent on receiving a favorable safety assessment from their national regulatory and safety authority. Among the many facets of NPP safety addressed is verification of integral design-basis performance - a demonstration of a plant's response to a suite of challenging transient and accident scenarios. Thermal-hydraulic system computer codes like RELAP5, TRAC, CATHARE, and ATHLET are used as the simulation engine as part of a broader evaluation model that accounts for a variety of uncertainties. It is common for these evaluation models to apply either a super-bounding/ deterministic or best-estimate plus uncertainty (BEPU) approach. The trend over the past two decades has been away from the classical deterministic methods towards methods explicitly incorporating parametric uncertainty models. These methods center upon the evaluation of parametric and system response uncertainties, where these uncertainties are derived from the convolution of one or more parametric uncertainty models. Acceptance of BEPU methods has provided the nuclear industry benefits regarding operational flexibility and, in some cases, power output. The advantage of BEPU for new NPPs is less obvious. Generally, these new designs include engineered safety features that practically eliminate fuel damage resulting from design-basis events. To substantiate such claims, applying super-bounding assumptions on uncertainties may be a more expedient demonstration of a plant's safety case than those based on BEPU. In addition, the requirements on design inputs for a deterministic evaluation model are substantially less than that for a BEPU evaluation model. As such, applying a deterministic evaluation model is expected to have the advantage of reducing the duration of the licensing review process. For the current operating fleet of light-water reactors (LWRs), the nuclear safety authorities in most countries have followed the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's rules for the preparation of safety analysis. These rules are specified in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, most notably in, Part 10, Section 50.46, entitled 'acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling systems for light-water nuclear power reactors' and its Appendix K. Notably, Appendix K specifies deterministic requirements for analysis of the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), which is generally regarded as the maximum credible accident for LWRs. Projecting 10 CFR 50, Appendix K, to new plants is not obviously applicable as it addresses light water fluid flow and heat transfer phenomena associated with core uncovery. Preventing core uncovery is a requirement for several designs in the class of small modular reactors (SMR). In doing so, the majority of phenomenological uncertainties prescribed in Appendix K are eliminated. Similarly, the impact of other phenomena to effect a change in various safety measures, i.e., figures-of-merit, is expected to be different. The implication is that development of a deterministic evaluation model must be derived with an original technical basis rather than solely rely on Appendix K. While a logical conclusion, the expectation of original bases, regardless of the treatment of uncertainties, is embodied in the U.S. NRC's Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.203, Transient and Accident Analysis. Within the evaluation model development and application process framework of RG 1.203, this paper describes a BEPU-informed deterministic evaluation model for NPPs with large inherent safety margins. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Accuracy, criteria, and clinical significance of visual assessment on diffusion-weighted imaging and apparent diffusion coefficient quantification for diagnosing acute appendicitis

Purpose: To assess the accuracy, criteria, and clinical significance of diffusion-weighted imaging (DWI) signal intensity and apparent diffusion coefficient (ADC) quantification for diagnosing acute appendicitis. Methods: Fifty-one patients with right lower abdominal pain [uncomplicated appendicitis (n = 25), complicated appendicitis (n = 10), and non-appendicitis (n = 16)] who underwent MR examination were enrolled in this retrospective study. Two radiologists independently measured appendiceal diameter and wall thickness. They assessed whether a wall defect, an abscess, extraluminal air, or an appendicolith was present on axial T2WI; evaluated intensity on DWI using a 5-point scale; and determined the ADC values of the appendix and peri-appendiceal tissue. Statistical analysis was performed to assess imaging findings for the diagnosis of appendicitis and complicated appendicitis. Cut-off values were determined using receiver operating characteristic analysis. Results: For diagnosing acute appendicitis, the accuracy improved from 78.4% using only T2WI to 86.3% using combined T2WI and DWI for reader 1 and from 82.4 to 86.3% for reader 2. For the appendix, the cut-off ADC values that diagnosed appendicitis were 1.41 × 10{sup −3} and 1.26 × 10{sup −3} mm{sup 2}/s with accuracies of 78.4% and 76.5%, respectively. For the peri-appendiceal tissue, these values of 1.03 × 10{sup −3} and 0.91 × 10{sup −3} mm{sup 2}/s differentiated between uncomplicated and complicated appendicitis with an accuracy of 97.1%. Conclusions: Combined DWI and T2WI provided high accuracy for diagnosing appendicitis. The inflamed appendix had lower ADC value than the normal appendix. The peri-appendiceal tissue presenting low ADC value was a notable finding of complicated appendicitis.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Efficacy of antivirals and mRNA vaccination against an XBF clinical isolate

Recombination events occur frequently in severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), resulting in genetic diversity. Because these events contribute to altered host immune evasion and antiviral susceptibility, it is crucial to evaluate the efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines and antivirals against recombinant variants. As of March 2023, XBB.1.5, a recombinant sublineage of XBB, is currently the dominant form globally (Fig. S1A, Supplementary Appendix). XBB emerged as a result of recombination between two BA.2 descendants, BJ.1 and BM.1.1.1 (a progeny of BA.2.75). We and other groups have shown that XBB.1.5 is resistant to several therapeutic monoclonal antibodies and effectively evades humoral immunity elicited by natural infection or COVID-19 vaccination.1, 2, 3 By March 30, 2023, an additional recombinant variant, XBF, had been sampled 8966 times in 47 countries and territories in GISAID, reaching it highest prevalence in Australia and New Zealand (Fig. S2, Supplementary Appendix). XBF is still increasing in frequency, although the prevalence of XBB.1.5 appears to be increasing at a faster pace in most regions (Fig. S1B, Supplementary Appendix). XBF is a recombinant of BA.5.2.3 (a descendant of BA.5) and CJ.1 (a descendant of BA.2.75) and, like CJ.1, has an additional three substitutions (R346T, F486P, and F490S) in the receptor-binding domain (RBD) of the consensus form of its spike protein compared to baseline BA.2.75 (Fig. S3A, Supplementary Appendix). CJ.1 and its related sublineage CJ.1.1 did not expand as extensively as XBF, being sampled in GISAID only 1589 and 142 times respectively. CJ.1 was found circulating in many countries, but most commonly sampled in South Korea, where it is still increasing and has currently reached about 5% of the sampled population. CJ.1.1 was most frequently sampled in Malaysia and Singapore, but remained rare in both nations, peaking at about 1% of the sample in December of 2022. Despite the importance of these related variants, we have no information about the antiviral efficacy and immunity induced by COVID-19 vaccines against a clinical isolate of XBF.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

SU-E-T-50: Automatic Validation of Megavoltage Beams Modeled for Clinical Use in Radiation Therapy

Purpose: To automatically validate megavoltage beams modeled in XiO™ 4.50 (Elekta, Stockholm, Sweden) and Varian Eclipse™ Treatment Planning Systems (TPS) (Varian Associates, Palo Alto, CA, USA), reducing validation time before beam-on for clinical use. Methods: A software application that can automatically read and analyze DICOM RT Dose and W2CAD files was developed using MatLab integrated development environment.TPS calculated dose distributions, in DICOM RT Dose format, and dose values measured in different Varian Clinac beams, in W2CAD format, were compared. Experimental beam data used were those acquired for beam commissioning, collected on a water phantom with a 2D automatic beam scanning system.Two methods were chosen to evaluate dose distributions fitting: gamma analysis and point tests described in Appendix E of IAEA TECDOC-1583. Depth dose curves and beam profiles were evaluated for both open and wedged beams. Tolerance parameters chosen for gamma analysis are 3% and 3 mm dose and distance, respectively.Absolute dose was measured independently at points proposed in Appendix E of TECDOC-1583 to validate software results. Results: TPS calculated depth dose distributions agree with measured beam data under fixed precision values at all depths analyzed. Measured beam dose profiles match TPS calculated doses with high accuracy in both open and wedged beams. Depth and profile dose distributions fitting analysis show gamma values < 1. Relative errors at points proposed in Appendix E of TECDOC-1583 meet therein recommended tolerances.Independent absolute dose measurements at points proposed in Appendix E of TECDOC-1583 confirm software results. Conclusion: Automatic validation of megavoltage beams modeled for their use in the clinic was accomplished. The software tool developed proved efficient, giving users a convenient and reliable environment to decide whether to accept or not a beam model for clinical use. Validation time before beam-on for clinical use was reduced to a few hours.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Investigations on Repository Near-Field Thermal Modeling - Repository Science/Thermal Load Management & Design Concepts (M41UF033302)

The various layers of material from the waste package (such as components of the engineered barrier system and the host rock surface) to a given distance within the rock wall at a given distance can be described as concentric circles with varying thermal properties (see Figure 5.1-1). The selected model approach examines the contributions of the waste package, axial waste package neighbors and lateral neighboring emplacement drifts (see Section 5.2.1 and Appendix H, Section 2). In clay and deep borehole media, the peak temperature is driven by the central waste package whereas, in granite and salt, the contribution to the temperature rise by adjacent (lateral) waste packages in drift or emplacement borehole lines is dominant at the time of the peak temperature. Mathematical models generated using Mathcad software provide insight into the effects of changing waste package spacing for six waste forms, namely UOX, MOX, co-extraction, new extraction, E-Chem ceramic and E-Chem metal in four different geologic media (granite, clay, salt and deep borehole). Each scenario includes thermal conductivity and diffusivity for each layer between the waste package and the host rock, dimensions of representative repository designs (such as waste package spacing, drift or emplacement borehole spacing, waste package dimensions and layer thickness), and decay heat curves generated from knowledge of the contents of a given waste form after 10, 50, 100 and 200 years of surface storage. Key results generated for each scenario include rock temperature at a given time calculated at a given radius from the central waste package (Section 5.2.1 and Appendix H, Section 3), the corresponding temperature at the interface of the waste package and EBS material, and at each EBS layer in between (Section 5.2.2 and Appendix H, Section 4). This information is vital to understand the implications of repository design (waste package capacity, surface storage time, waste package spacing, and emplacement drift or borehole spacing) by comparing the peak temperature to the thermal limits of the concentric layers surrounding the waste package; specifically 100 C for the bentonite buffer in granite and clay repositories, 100 C for rock wall in a clay repository and 200 C at the rock wall for a salt repository. These thermal limits are both preliminary and approximate, and serve as a means to evaluate design options rather than determining compliance for licensing situations. The thermal behavior of a salt repository is more difficult to model because it is not a concentric geometry and because the crushed salt backfill initially has a much higher thermal resistance than intact salt. Three models were investigated, namely a waste package in complete contact with crushed salt, secondly a waste package in contact with intact salt, and thirdly a waste package in contact with 75% intact and 25% crushed salt. The latter model best depicts emplacement of a waste package in the corner of an intact salt alcove and subsequently covered with crushed salt backfill to the angle of repose. The most conservative model (crushed salt) had temperatures much higher than the other models and although bounding, is too conservative to use. The most realistic model (75/25) had only a small temperature difference from the simplest (non-conservative, intact salt) model, and is the one chosen in this report (see Section 5.2.3). A trade-study investigating three key variables (surface storage time, waste package capacity and waste package spacing) is important to understand and design a repository. Waste package heat can be reduced by storing for longer periods prior to emplacement, or by reducing the number of assemblies or canisters within that waste package. Waste package spacing can be altered to optimize the thermal load without exceeding the thermal limits of the host rock or EBS components. By examining each of these variables, repository footprint (and therefore cost) can be optimized. For this report, the layout was fixed for each geologic medium based on prior published designs in the international community, but it will be varied in future work. Section 5.2.4 summarizes the conclusions based on varying two of the three parameters (storage time and waste package capacity), and the results are shown in Appendix H, Sections 5 and 6.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 547: Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 547, Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, and provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that closure objectives for CAU 547 were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 as amended). CAU 547 consists of the following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 2, 3, and 9 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 02-37-02, Gas Sampling Assembly; (2) CAS 03-99-19, Gas Sampling Assembly; AND (3) CAS 09-99-06, Gas Sampling Assembly Closure activities began in August 2011 and were completed in June 2012. Activities were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 547 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2011). The recommended corrective action for the three CASs in CAU 547 was closure in place with administrative controls. The following closure activities were performed: (1) Open holes were filled with concrete; (2) Steel casings were placed over vertical expansion joints and filled with cement; (3) Engineered soil covers were constructed over piping and exposed sections of the gas sampling system components; (4) Fencing, monuments, Jersey barriers, radiological postings, and use restriction (UR) warning signs were installed around the perimeters of the sites; (5) Housekeeping debris was picked up from around the sites and disposed; and (6) Radiological surveys were performed to confirm final radiological postings. UR documentation is included in Appendix D. The post-closure plan was presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 547 and is included as Appendix F of this report. The requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this report. The proposed post-closure requirements consist of visual inspections to determine the condition of postings and radiological surveys to verify contamination has not migrated. NNSA/NSO requests the following: (1) A Notice of Completion from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to NNSA/NSO for closure of CAU 547; and (2) The transfer of CAU 547 from Appendix III to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, of the FFACO.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

ENDF Cross Sections are not Uniquely Defined

Most evaluated data that is coded into the ENDF format [1] does not uniquely define cross sections, because the evaluator defined total is not equal to the sum of evaluator defined partial cross sections, i.e., the total is not equal to elastic plus capture, etc. So we have always had the question: What is the correct total cross section? This is not a new problem; it has existed since the very beginning of ENDF over forty years ago. It is a problem that is periodically discussed and apparently handled, only to have it pop up again every ten years or so, as we have the next generation of ENDF format users who are not aware of the problem. See the Appendices for a summary of the differences that exist today for the ENDF/B-VII.0 (Appendix C), JEFF- 3.1(Appendix D), JENDL-3.3 (Appendix E), and CENDL-3.1 (Appendix F) data libraries. For use in our application we need consistent, unique data. To accomplish this for decades we [2, 3] have been ignoring the evaluator defined total, and re-defining it as equal to the sum of its evaluator defined parts. This has never been completely satisfactory to us, because we have been doing this without consulting evaluators, or obtaining their approval, so that the data we actually use in our applications may or may not be what the evaluators intended.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, for Calendar Year 2014

This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2014 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following CAUs; CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR); CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR); CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR); CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR); and CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR) Inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved Closure Reports and subsequent correspondence with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. The post-closure inspection plans and subsequent correspondence modifying the requirements for each CAU are included in Appendix B. The inspection checklists are included in Appendix C. Photographs taken during inspections are included in Appendix D. The annual post-closure inspections were conducted on May 28, 2014. Maintenance was required at CAU 407. Animal burrows were backfilled and erosion repairs were performed. Vegetation monitoring was performed at CAU 407 in June 2014. The vegetation monitoring report is included in Appendix E.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Environmental Surveillance at Los Alamos during 2009

Environmental Surveillance at Los Alamos reports are prepared annually by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (the Laboratory) environmental organization, as required by US Department of Energy Order 5400.1, General Environmental Protection Program, and US Department of Energy Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting. These annual reports summarize environmental data that are used to determine compliance with applicable federal, state, and local environmental laws and regulations, executive orders, and departmental policies. Additional data, beyond the minimum required, are also gathered and reported as part of the Laboratory’s efforts to ensure public safety and to monitor environmental quality at and near the Laboratory. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the Laboratory’s major environmental programs and explains the risks and the actions taken to reduce risks at the Laboratory from environmental legacies and waste management operations. Chapter 2 reports the Laboratory’s compliance status for 2009. Chapter 3 provides a summary of the maximum radiological dose the public and biota populations could have potentially received from Laboratory operations and discusses chemical exposures. The environmental surveillance and monitoring data are organized by environmental media (air in Chapter 4; water and sediments in Chapters 5 and 6; soils in Chapter 7; and foodstuffs and biota in Chapter 8) in a format to meet the needs of a general and scientific audience. Chapter 9 provides a summary of the status of environmental restoration work around LANL. The new Chapter 10 describes the Laboratory’s environmental stewardship efforts and provides an overview of the health of the Rio Grande. A glossary and a list of acronyms and abbreviations are in the back of the report. Appendix A explains the standards for environmental contaminants, Appendix B explains the units of measurements used in this report, Appendix C describes the Laboratory’s technical areas and their associated programs, and Appendix D provides web links to more information.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗