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At least 235 records · Page 13

Printed Proliferation: The Implications of Additive Manufacturing and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

The growth of additive manufacturing as a disruptive technology poses nuclear proliferation concerns worthy of serious consideration. Additive manufacturing began in the early 1980s with technological advances in polymer manipulation, computer capabilities, and computer-aided design (CAD) modeling. It was originally limited to rapid prototyping; however, it eventually developed into a complete means of production that has slowly penetrated the consumer market. Today, additive manufacturing machines can produce complex and unique items in a vast array of materials including plastics, metals, and ceramics. These capabilities have democratized the manufacturing industry, allowing almost anyone to produce items as simple as cup holders or as complex as jet fuel nozzles. Additive manufacturing, or three-dimensional (3D) printing as it is commonly called, relies on CAD files created or shared by individuals with additive manufacturing machines to produce a 3D object from a digital model. This sharing of files means that a 3D object can be scanned or rendered as a CAD model in one country, and then downloaded and printed in another country, allowing items to be shared globally without physically crossing borders. The sharing of CAD files online has been a challenging task for the export controls regime to manage over the years, and additive manufacturing could make these transfers more common. In this sense, additive manufacturing is a disruptive technology not only within the manufacturing industry but also within the nuclear nonproliferation world. This paper provides an overview of additive manufacturing concerns of proliferation.

3D↗

Climate impact of a regional nuclear weapons exchange: Initial consideration of the Indian and East Asian Summer Monsoon

In Reisner et al. [2017] we reconsider the potential impact of a nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India on global climate, improving upon the result of Mills et al. [2014] with the inclusion of more realistic vertical distribution of black carbon. The change in global precipitation was found to be modest, as shown here in Figure 1. In this note, we examine the impacts on rainfall in somewhat more detail, examining changes in several of the great regional monsoons.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nuclear Weapons Theater Experience_V1

The theater experience is driven by the big message of nuclear deterrence through successful stockpile stewardship. This job enables other national and global security work with roots going back to the capabilities developed during the Manhattan Project and honed through the history of this successor scientific laboratory. The story that unfolds uses a narrative (traditional film-type approach), although the theater setup would offer immersion and decision-making (audience participation). The idea is to demonstrate how and why the Laboratory continues its mission in maintaining the nation’s stockpile while concurrently enabling the ever-evolving multi-disciplinary science and technology innovations developed for that purpose to take other scientists along vibrant paths.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Detecting terrorist nuclear weapons at sea: The 10th door problem

While screening commercial cargo containers for the possible presence of WMD is important and necessary smugglers have successfully exploited the many other vehicles transporting cargo into the US including medium and small vessels at sea. These vessels provide a venue that is currently not screened and widely used. Physics limits that make screening of large vessels prohibitive impractical do not prohibit effective screening of the smaller vessels. While passive radiation detection is probably ineffective at sea active interrogation may provide a successful approach. The physics limits of active interrogation of ships at sea from standoff platforms are discussed. Autonomous platforms that could carry interrogation systems at sea, both airborne and submersible, are summarized and their utilization discussed. An R&D program to investigate the limits of this approach to screening ships at sea is indicated and limitations estimated.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Quality assurance and reliability sub-committee W88-0/Mk5 weapon assessment NSA lab test results (u)

The purpose of this report is to gather appropriate level of relevant stockpile surveillance data to assess trends in the NEP quality, reliability, performance, and safety over the life of the system. The objectives are to gather relevant stockpile data to assess NEP quality and trends and to develop metrics to assess the suitability of the surveillance sampling regime to meet assessment process requirements.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Weapons Experiments Division Explosives Operations Overview

Presentation covers WX Division programmatic operations with a focus on JOWOG-9 interests. A brief look at DARHT is followed by a high level overview of explosives research activities currently being conducted within in the experimental groups of WX-Division. Presentation covers more emphasis of activities and facilities at TA-9 as these efforts have been more traditionally aligned with ongoing collaborative explosive exchanges covered under JOWOG-9.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Nondestructive and destructive assay for forensics characterization of weapons-grade plutonium produced in LEU irradiated in a thermal neutron spectrum

A post-irradiation examination (PIE) of an enriched uranium sample was performed to advance a nuclear forensics methodology, based on intra-elemental nuclide ratios. The PIE was carried out on a few milligrams of low enriched uranium dioxide (LEUO 2 ) sample, irradiated to a burnup of 1 GWd/MTU. The PIE of the LEUO 2 sample provided the concentration of selected plutonium and fission product nuclides ( 239 Pu, 240 Pu, 241 Pu, 91 Y, 95 Zr, 95 Nb, 103 Ru, 133 Cs, 134 Cs, 135 Cs, 137 Cs, 136 Ba, 138 Ba, 140 Ba, 140 La, 141 Ce, 144 Ce, 149 Sm, 150 Sm, 152 Sm, 153 Eu, and 154 Eu). The PIE supported validation of the MCNP (Monte Carlo N-Particle neutronics simulation code) predicted concentration of these nuclides in the irradiated LEUO 2 sample. This study showed that most of the MCNP predicted nuclide concentrations were within 15% and several within 10% compared to the PIE results. Furthermore, gamma and mass spectrometry of nuclides in irradiated LEUO 2 enabled the determination of uranium burnup and time since irradiation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Reply to Comment by Robock et al. on “Climate Impact of a Regional Nuclear Weapon Exchange: An Improved Assessment Based on Detailed Source Calculations”

Robock et al. contend that the reasons for Reisner et al. simulations not producing enough black carbon (BC) in the upper atmosphere are as follows: (1) low fuel loads, (2) high surface winds, (3) omission of latent heat release by cloud formation, and (4) short simulation. We resolve (1) with additional simulations over a range of fuel loads, clarify (2) by noting that our surface winds of 2.4 m/s are below the firestorm threshold, agree that addressing (3) requires more research, and (4) short simulations are appropriate since this is when most of the BC emissions that can reach the upper atmosphere occur. While we agree with their assessment that a firestorm was not produced, we demonstrate here why a firestorm is unlikely in dense population centers found in India and Pakistan where concrete structures dominate. Our conversion of all fuel to BC is an upper bound and was the basis of the assertion on maximum global impacts. Furthermore, our study is the first to treat BC generation and lofting with physics–based models underscoring the need to initialize BC in global simulations properly. Reisner et al. and the responses identify critical gaps that must be filled to make any meaningful assessment of the probability of global nuclear winter.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗