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DOE OSTI2018

Annual Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: (CY2017 January 2017–December 2017, Rev. 0)

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98: Frenchman Flat on the Nevada National Security Site was the location of 10 underground nuclear tests. CAU 98 underwent a series of investigations and actions in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order to assess contamination of groundwater by radionuclides from the tests. A Closure Report completed that process in 2016 and called for long-term monitoring, use restrictions (URs), and institutional controls to protect the public and environment from potential exposure to contaminated groundwater. Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are monitored to determine whether the URs remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Monitoring data will be used in the future, once multiple years of data are available, to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. Six wells were sampled for water-quality monitoring in 2017. Contaminants of concern were detected only in the two source/plume wells already known to contain contamination as a result of a radionuclide migration experiment. The 86,000-picocuries-per-liter (pCi/L) tritium concentration in one of the wells is about 12 percent higher than measured in 2016 but is over an order of magnitude less than the peak value measured in the well in 1980. The concentration in the other source/plume well is lower than measured in 2016. The water-level monitoring network includes 16 wells. Depth to water measured in 2017 is generally consistent with recent measurements for most wells. Water-level declines differing from long-term trends were observed in four wells. Three of these (WW-4, WW-4A, and WW-5B) are water-supply wells that experienced increases in pumping during the year. No definitive cause for the sharp decline in the fourth well (ER-5-3-2) in 2016 is known as yet. Institutional control monitoring confirmed the URs are recorded in U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Air Force land management systems, and that no activities within Frenchman Flat basin are occurring that could potentially affect the contaminant boundaries. Survey of groundwater resources in basins surrounding Frenchman Flat similarly identify no current or pending development that would indicate the need to increase monitoring activities or would otherwise cause concern for the closure decision. The URs continue to prevent exposure of the public, workers, and the environment to contaminants of concern by preventing use of potentially contaminated groundwater.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2016

Special Form Testing of Sealed Source Encapsulation for High-Alpha-Activity Actinide Materials

In the United States all transportation of radioactive material is regulated by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). Beginning in 2008 a new type of sealed-source encapsulation package was developed and tested by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). These packages contain high-alpha-activity actinides and are regulated and transported in accordance with the requirements for DOT Class 7 hazardous material. The DOT provides specific regulations pertaining to special form encapsulation designs. The special form designation indicates that the encapsulated radioactive contents have a very low probability of dispersion even when subjected to significant structural events. The special form designs have been shown to simplify the delivery, transport, acceptance, and receipt processes. It is intended for these sealed-source encapsulations to be shipped to various facilities making it very advantageous for them to be certified as special form. To this end, DOT Certificates of Competent Authority (CoCAs) have been sought for the design suitable for containing high-alpha-activity actinide materials. This design consists of the high-alpha-activity material encapsulated within a triangular zirconia canister, referred to as a ZipCan, tile that is then enclosed by a spherical shell. The spherical shell design, with ZipCan tile inside, was tested for compliance with the special form regulations found in 49 CFR 173.469. The spherical enclosure was subjected to 9-m impact, 1 m percussion, and 10-minute thermal tests at the Packaging Evaluation Facility located at the National Transportation Research Center in Knoxville, TN USA and operated by ORNL. Before and after each test, the test units were subjected to a helium leak check and a bubble test. The ZipCan tiles and core were also subjected to the tests required for ISO 2919:2012(E), including a Class IV impact test and heat test and subsequently subjected to helium leakage rate tests [49 CFR 173.469(a)(4)(i)]. The impact-tile test unit contained a nonradioactive surrogate; however, the thermal test unit contained a radioactive source. This paper describes the regulatory special form tests and presents detailed impact and leak test results that demonstrate that the sealed source encapsulation designs satisfy the regulatory tests.

Martinez, Oscar A↗

DOE OSTI2021

Calendar Year 2020 Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev. 1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in calendar year (CY) 2020 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM), at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates [FDs]), and verification of use restrictions (URs), institutional controls, and water usage. Groundwater samples were collected; water levels were measured; and well site surveillance was conducted in support of the Underground Test Area Closure Report (CR) for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (DOE/EMNV, 2020). Rainier Mesa (RM) was the site of 61 underground nuclear tests, and Shoshone Mountain (SM) was the site of 6 underground nuclear tests. As a result of these activities, which took place from 1957 to 1992, radionuclides (RNs) were released in the subsurface in the vicinity of the detonations. These 67 underground nuclear tests are associated with 66 specific corrective action site (CAS) numbers, as listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). Two tests, HURON LANDING and DIAMOND ACE (conducted simultaneously), are included within one CAS. The CR (DOE/EMNV, 2020) establishes the regulatory boundaries and regulatory boundary objectives, monitoring program, UR boundaries and URs, and other institutional controls agreed to by EM Nevada Program and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for closure of CAU 99. Regulatory boundaries for the RM/SM CAU were established to protect receptors of groundwater from RN contamination within the three downgradient groundwater basins that receive recharge from RM. The SM regulatory boundary was established to verify that RN contamination does not reach the lower carbonate aquifer below SM. The UR boundaries were established based on contaminant simulation forecasts from the flow and transport simulations with consideration of site-specific topographical controls. The URs associated with the UR boundaries were identified to protect onsite workers and the public from inadvertent exposure to contaminated groundwater as forecasted to occur assuming current conditions. The UR is intended to restrict activities that might expose workers to contaminated groundwater within the UR area. In addition to the URs, other institutional controls are established to monitor and limit access to groundwater. These include federal ownership and management in perpetuity, controlled access of the NNSS and surrounding areas, and reporting water use on the NNSS and surrounding hydrographic basins.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2022

REGULATORY TESTING AND 3D SCANNING METHODOLOGY OF THE DPP-1 TYPE SHIPPING CONTAINER FOR NCT AND HAC TESTS

The safe transportation of radioactive material using appropriately designed and certified transportation packages is important to protect the public and environment. In the United States of America all transportation of radioactive material is regulated by the Department of Transportation (DOT) along with input by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). All packages that contain radioactive material requires that it be transported and regulated by the requirements set by the DOT Class 7 hazardous material transportation. Federal regulations place strict administrative controls on the transport of radioactive materials. The two main goals for transporting radioactive materials are 1. Safety should be the primarily focused on the package because it is the first line of defense. 2. Package integrity should be directly related to the degree of the hazard of the radioactive material contents. The two-part goal ensures that the right package is used. Type B packages are designed to transport radioactive materials with the highest level of radioactivity. Examples of material transported in Type B packagings include spent nuclear fuel, high-level radioactive waste, and high concentrations of other radioactive materials. The purpose of this test protocol is to determine the effects of drop and thermal testing on package performance in a Type B shipping package (DPP-1). Required physical tests for the DPP-1 package include free drop, crush, puncture, penetration, compression, vibration, water spray, water immersion, and thermal. The preparation, regulatory testing, and post-test evaluation of a Type B shipping package tested to the 10 CFR 71.71 and 10 CFR 71.73 requirements will be presented. Six packages were tested and the responses when subjected to the HAC sequence of free drop, puncture, and thermal tests according to 10 CFR 71.73(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3) and (c)(4) were measured. The Free Drop, Crush and Puncture tests were performed at the NTRC in Knoxville, TN, and the Thermal tests were performed Southwest Research Institute in San Antonio, TX. The test units were subjected to a pre-operational leak testing before the NCT and HAC tests and a post-operational leak test and a helium leak test once regulatory testing was complete. Finally, all test units were scanned with a handheld blue light scanner to capture a 3D CAD geometry of the test units in the deformed shape. The handheld scanner provided the most effective and reliable way to acquire accurate 3D measurements of the test unit. The scanned geometry was sectioned in areas with deformation and the cross-section profile was measured to determine accurate and repeatable results of the deformed shape of the test units.

Martinez, Oscar↗

DOE OSTI2017

Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada for Calendar Year 2016 (January 2016–December 2016), Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98: Frenchman Flat on the Nevada National Security Site was the location of 10 underground nuclear tests. CAU 98 underwent a series of investigations and actions in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order to assess contamination of groundwater by radionuclides from the tests. A Closure Report completed that process in 2016 and called for long-term monitoring, use restrictions (URs), and institutional controls to protect the public and environment from potential exposure to contaminated groundwater. Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are evaluated to determine whether the UR boundaries remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Additionally, monitoring data are used to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries (CBs) calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. In summary, the monitoring results from 2016 indicate the regulatory controls on the closure of CAU 98 remain effective in protection of human health and the environment. Recommendations resulting from this first year of monitoring activities include formally incorporating wells UE-5 PW-1, UE-5 PW-2, and UE-5 PW-3 into the groundwater-level monitoring network given their strategic location in the basin; and early development of a basis for trigger levels for the groundwater-level monitoring given the observed trends. Additionally, it is recommended to improve the Real Estate/Operations Permit process for capturing information important for evaluating the impact of activities on groundwater resources, and to shift the reporting requirement for this annual report from the second quarter of the federal fiscal year (end of March) to the second quarter of the calendar year (end of June).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2017

Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada for Calendar Year 2016 (January 2016–December 2016), Revision 1

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98: Frenchman Flat on the Nevada National Security Site was the location of 10 underground nuclear tests. CAU 98 underwent a series of investigations and actions in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order to assess contamination of groundwater by radionuclides from the tests. A Closure Report completed that process in 2016 and called for long-term monitoring, use restrictions (URs), and institutional controls to protect the public and environment from potential exposure to contaminated groundwater. Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are monitored to determine whether the UR boundaries remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Monitoring data will be used in the future, once multiple years of data are available, to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. Six wells were sampled for water-quality monitoring in 2016. Contaminants of concern were detected only in the two source/plume wells already known to contain contamination as a result of a radionuclide migration experiment. The tritium concentration in both wells is slowly decreasing. The water-level monitoring network includes 16 wells. Depth to water measured in 2016 in all wells is consistent with recent measurements. Institutional control monitoring confirmed the URs are recorded in U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Air Force land management systems, and that no activities within Frenchman Flat basin are occurring that could potentially affect the contaminant boundaries. Survey of groundwater resources in basins surrounding Frenchman Flat similarly identify no current or pending development that would indicate the need to increase monitoring activities or would otherwise cause concern for the closure decision. The URs continue to prevent exposure of the public, workers, and the environment to contaminants of concern by preventing use of potentially contaminated groundwater.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2024

Field-Scale Testing of a High-Efficiency Membrane Reactor (MR)—Adsorptive Reactor (AR) Process for H2 Generation and Pre-Combustion CO2 Capture

The study objective was to field-validate the technical feasibility of a membrane- and adsorption-enhanced water gas shift reaction process employing a carbon molecular sieve membrane (CMSM)-based membrane reactor (MR) followed by an adsorptive reactor (AR) for pre-combustion CO2 capture. The project was carried out in two different phases. In Phase I, the field-scale experimental MR-AR system was designed and constructed, the membranes, and adsorbents were prepared, and the unit was tested with simulated syngas to validate functionality. In Phase II, the unit was installed at the test site, field-tested using real syngas, and a technoeconomic analysis (TEA) of the technology was completed. All project milestones were met. Specifically, (i) high-performance CMSMs were prepared meeting the target H2 permeance (>1 m3/(m2.hbar) and H2/CO selectivity of >80 at temperatures of up to 300 °C and pressures of up to 25 bar with a <10% performance decline over the testing period; (ii) pelletized adsorbents were prepared for use in relevant conditions (250 °C < T < 450 °C, pressures up to 25 bar) with a working capacity of >2.5 wt.% and an attrition rate of <0.2; (iii) TEA showed that the MR-AR technology met the CO2 capture goals of 95% CO2 purity at a cost of electricity (COE) 30% less than baseline approaches.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2018

Testing Results from the Low Activity Waste Pretreatment System (LAWPS) Full-Scale Ion Exchange Column Test and Engineering Scale Integrated System Test - 18634

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection's (ORP) primary mission is to retrieve and treat Hanford's tank waste and close the Tank Farms to protect the Columbia River. Mixed radioactive waste is stored in 177 underground tanks at the Hanford Site as reported in DOE/ORP 2003- 02, Environmental Impact Statement for Retrieval, Treatment, and Disposal of Tank Waste and Closure of the Single Shell Tanks at the Hanford Site, Richland WA, Inventory and Source Term Data Package. The 177 underground tanks are estimated to contain about 56 million gallons of waste. The Low Activity Waste Pretreatment System (LAWPS) Project provides for the early production of immobilized low activity waste (ILAW) by feeding LAW directly from Tank Farms to the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant's (WTP's) LAW Facility, bypassing the Pretreatment Facility. Prior to the transfer of feed to the WTP LAW Vitrification Facility, tank supernatant waste will be pretreated in the LAWPS to meet the WTP LAW waste acceptance criteria. The LAWPS will also facilitate the return of secondary liquid wastes from the WTP LAW Vitrification Facility to the Tank Farms. In November of 2015 DOE's Tank Operations Contractor, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), awarded a contract to the AECOM team to design, fabricate and operate two test platforms to generate performance data at two different scales and demonstrate technology maturation. The first platform models the ion exchange (IX) columns at full scale, and the second platform models the integrated flowsheet (cross flow filter (CFF) and IX) at 1/9. scale. Overarching technical objectives of performing the full-scale ion exchange test and the engineering-scale integrated test are to: 1. Test interactions between unit process operations; 2. Test removal of non-radioactive cesium from process stream; 3. Test removal of undissolved solids from process stream; 4. Confirm operational flow rate range and stability; 5. Confirm volumetric throughput of waste stream over flow operating range; 6. Confirm range of process temperatures over planned operating range; 7. Establish system hydraulics and process criteria; 8. Coordinate key control and monitoring components; 9. Establish treated product chemistry meets requirements (cesium, solids, and pH); and 10. Test the hazard control strategy for a no flow condition through the IX column. Data collected during testing will be used by WRPS to validate the preliminary design, inform the final design of the permanent plant equipment, and demonstrate that the critical technology elements have advanced to a technology readiness level of 6 (prototypical system validation in a relevant environment). Testing on both platforms started in fall of 2016 generating NQA-1 data. This paper covers test results from the first five phases of testing on the 1/9. scale integrated test platform. A further three phases of testing are currently being executed, these including a 5.6 M sodium simulant containing foulant, a high viscosity simulant and finally a run performed with a lower Cs concentration (all earlier tests were spiked to 4 x Cs to reduce volume and cost). Results from these tests were not available at the time of writing available. Results are also presented from the full scale IX testing. Eight test were performed covering column loading, elution and regeneration; column loading, elution and regeneration with upflow displacement; IX column loading and gas migration; resin removal; solids accumulation; and IX column emergency recirculation and vent. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

Postclosure Inspection and Monitoring Report for Surface Corrective Action Unit 417 at the Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Site

This report presents results of the biennial postclosure site inspection conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) at the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site (Figure 1) surface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 417. The report has been prepared in accordance with the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan contained in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 417: Central Nevada Test Area Surface, Nevada (NNSA/NV 2001), hereafter called the CAU 417 Closure Report. The site closure process was completed in 2001 in accordance with the amended Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO 1996, as amended) (FFACO) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. Responsibility for environmental site restoration was transferred from the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office to LM on October 1, 2006. This report summarizes investigation activities associated with CAU 417 that LM conducted from September 2018 through August 2020. A postclosure inspection was conducted in 2020 to document the physical condition of the CAU 417 soil covers, monuments, signs, fencing, and use-restricted areas.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear Weapons and the Atmospheric Test Era

The era of atmospheric testing defies a simple description. Beginning with the goal of proving fission, the United States’ test program grew in complexity as scientists explored thermonuclear reactions, met the military demand for a variety of weapons for an increasing number of delivery platforms, and reacted to the ever-growing public fear of fallout. And, of course, political considerations were always present, first in the prosecution of World War II and later in the Cold War. To understand the atmospheric test program, then, is to understand how science, politics, and the public shaped our society in ways that are still difficult to fully understand.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2017

Numerical Simulation of Measurements during the Reactor Physical Startup at Unit 3 of Rostov NPP

The results of numerical calculations and measurements of some reactor parameters during the physical startup tests at unit 3 of Rostov NPP are presented. The following parameters are considered: the critical boron acid concentration and the currents from ionization chambers (IC) during the scram system efficiency evaluation. The scram system efficiency was determined using the inverse point kinetics equation with the measured and simulated IC currents. The results of steady-state calculations of relative power distribution and efficiency of the scram system and separate groups of control rods of the control and protection system are also presented. The calculations are performed using several codes, including precision ones.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2019

Performance of a Biomass Boiler in a Load Profile Test

In this report, results are presented of the performance evaluation of a modern residential cordwood-fired hydronic heater. This unit was tested under a specific load and operating profile that includes cold start, four load levels, reload, and cycling in response to an emulated thermostat. The protocol can be completed in a single day, which allows for replicate runs in about a week of testing. This can characterize variability with greater confidence than current methods used in certification testing, reduces time to conduct certification tests, and moves toward greater representative operations as the test includes start-up and requires boilers to respond to a variety of heat loads in a manner that better reflects day-to-day operations. Detailed in the report are the results of triplicate testing of one U.S. Environmental Protection Agency-certified cordwood-fired outdoor wood boiler. Cold start emissions were the greatest among all testing periods. In triplicate testing, emission output values for the cold start tests were 9.52, 4.74, and 6.63 lb/MMBtu of output for Test 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The overall emission output values for Test 1, 2, and 3 were 0.44, 0.34, and 0.19 lb/MMBtu of output, respectively. Additionally, the work in this project found significant differences in filter sampling methods with different integrated time periods. The use of real-time particulate matter emission measurement devices was explored. Specifically, sampling with one filter over a long test with various phases (cold starts, reloads, high and low burns) yielded lower particulate mass than sampling phase by phase (one filter for high burns, one filter for low burns, etc.). Perhaps the use of a real-time particulate matter emission measurement device can be used to distinguish different burn phases without having to change filters multiple times throughout a varied load test method

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

DOE OSTI2014

Watts Bar Unit 1 Cycle Zero Power Physics Tests Analysis with VERA-CS

The Consortium for Advanced Simulation of Light Water Reactors (CASL) is developing a collection of methods and software products known as VERA, the Virtual Environment for Reactor Applications, including a core simulation capability called VERA-CS. A key milestone for this endeavor is to validate VERA against measurements from operating nuclear power reactors. The first step in validation against plant data is to determine the ability of VERA to accurately simulate the initial startup physics tests for Watts Bar Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (WBN1) cycle 1. VERA-CS calculations were performed with the Insilico code developed at ORNL using cross section processing from the SCALE system and the transport capabilities within the Denovo transport code using the SPN method. The calculations were performed with ENDF/B-VII.0 cross sections in 252 groups (collapsed to 23 groups for the 3D transport solution). The key results of the comparison of calculations with measurements include initial criticality, control rod worth critical configurations, control rod worth, differential boron worth, and isothermal temperature reactivity coefficient (ITC). The VERA results for these parameters show good agreement with measurements, with the exception of the ITC, which requires additional investigation. Results are also compared to those obtained with Monte Carlo methods and a current industry core simulator.

CASL↗

DOE OSTI2015

Integrated sampling and data flow for Hanford vitrification - 15337

The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) is a one-of-a-kind nuclear facility being designed, built, and commissioned for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) by Bechtel National, Inc. and its subcontractor URS Corporation. The WTP facilities are under construction to complete the design and construction, as well as planning to support the startup, commissioning, and operation for vitrifying the radioactive waste stored in aging underground tanks at the Hanford Site. The work progress includes development of waste feed acceptance and qualification program, including methodologies for processing feed batches. Qualification data from staged feed samples will support the verification that waste acceptance criteria (WAC) and processability requirements are met. This verification is required to ensure safe operation of WTP processes for vitrifying the waste, while establishing specific campaign and batch sheets to comply with glass form acceptance requirements. Sampling and data integration are critical for process control and monitoring of the feed through unit operations. Data collection begins with process knowledge of staged feed for determining the required WAC analyses and testing for unit operations. The waste feed qualification data form the baseline information for WTP operation. The qualification data will be tracked and compared with sample analyses at different steps in vitrification operation. All aspects of data life cycle will be managed by the WTP Plant Engineering organization. The data management approach is established in this manner to allow maintaining campaign traceability through glass production records, while safely processing the corresponding feed campaigns and complying with permitting requirements. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2016

Hybrid Encapsulated Ionic Liquids for Post-Combustion Carbon Dioxide (CO 2 ) Capture

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2022

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 542: Disposal Holes, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0, with ROTC 1-2

The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure of CAU 542 with no further corrective action. To achieve this, corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from July 19 through August 25, 2006, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 542: Disposal Holes. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process: Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. If COCs are present, determine the nature and extent. Provide sufficient information and data to complete appropriate corrective actions.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2017

Hybrid Encapsulated Ionic Liquids for Post-Combustion Carbon Dioxide (CO 2 ) Capture

Ionic liquids (ILs) and Phase Change Ionic Liquids (PCILs) are excellent materials for selective removal of carbon dioxide from dilute post-combustion streams. However, they are typically characterized as having high viscosities, which impairs their effectiveness due to mass transfer limitations, caused by the high viscosities. In this project, we are examining the benefits of encapsulating ILs and PCILs in thin polymeric shells to produce particles of approximately 100 to 600 µm in diameter that can be used in a fluidized bed absorber. The particles are produced by microencapsulation of the ILs and PCILs in CO 2 -permeable polymer shells. Here we report on the encapsulation of the IL and PCIL materials, thermodynamic testing of the encapsulated materials, mass transfer measurements in both a fluidized bed and a packed bed, determination of the effect of impurities (SO 2 , NO x and water) on the free and encapsulated IL and PCIL, recyclability of the CO 2 uptake, selection and synthesis of kg quantities of the IL and PCIL, identification of scale-up methods for encapsulation and production of a kg quantity of the PCIL, construction and shakedown of the laboratory scale unit to test the encapsulated particles for CO 2 capture ability and efficiency, use of our mass transfer model to predict mass transfer and identify optimal properties of the encapsulated particles, and initial testing of the encapsulated particles in the laboratory scale unit. We also show our attempts at developing shell materials that are resistant to water permeation. Overall, we have shown that the selected IL and PCIL can be successfully encapsulated in polymer shells and the methods scaled up to production levels. The IL/PCIL and encapsulated IL/PCIL react irreversibly with SO 2 and NO x so the CO 2 capture unit would need to be placed after the flue gas desulfurization and NO x reduction units. However, the reaction with CO 2 in the presence of water is completely reversible. Therefore, it is not necessary to exclude water from the capsules. Mass transfer in the fluidized and packed beds confirm that the fluidized bed arrangement is preferred and that the mass transfer can be predicted accurately by the rate based model that we have developed. Absorption and desorption experiments in the laboratory scale unit show good uptake and recyclability.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2019

2018 Postclosure Groundwater Monitoring and Inspection Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443

This report presents the groundwater monitoring data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) from the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). CNTA is the site of an underground nuclear test in 1968 that resulted in residual contamination near the detonation depth of 3200 feet (ft); the contamination requires long-term monitoring. Responsibility for the environmental restoration and long-term monitoring was transferred from DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office, to LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration and site closure process were completed in 2015 in accordance with the amended Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (FFACO 1996, as amended) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. The Closure Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action, Unit 443 (DOE 2018a), also called the Closure Report, originally was completed in January 2016 and revised in October 2018; it describes LM’s plan for long-term postclosure monitoring. This includes monitoring of the radioisotopes of interest and water elevations, inspecting the site and maintaining the institutional controls (ICs), evaluating and reporting data, and documenting the site’s records and data management processes (DOE 2018a).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗